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Affect is a matter of intensity. This, at any rate, was for some time the con-
ventional wisdom in the field of affect studies. Usually, the compiling of aca-
demic volumes is a much less intensive affair: long- in-the- making, often 
cumbersome, neither the most dynamic nor the most exciting part of aca-
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Affective Societies – key concepts
Jan Slaby and Christian von Scheve
Affect and emotion have come to dominate discourse on social and political 
life at the beginning of the 21st century. In politics, the rise of populism and 
new styles of political contestation are frequently described with reference to 
their emotionalizing and affectively polarizing qualities. Surging religious 
conflicts across the globe are portrayed through an affective lens, highlighting 
the importance of anger, rage, offense, and indignation for prolonged con-
flict. Capitalist economies are increasingly understood as exploiting not only 
people’s cognitive and bodily capacities, but also their feelings and emotions. 
Practices of social media often come with intensified displays of affect, fre-
quently addressed adversely at individuals or groups in an openly hostile or 
even violent manner.
 This current “emotional reflexivity” – the tendency to understand and 
portray the social world in terms of feelings and emotions – is not confined to 
public spheres and political debates, but has been preceded by a “turn to 
affect” within different academic disciplines. This is neither a historical 
coincidence, nor academia’s talent for foretelling the future. Research in the 
social and behavioral sciences as well as in the humanities and cultural studies 
has long suggested that affect and emotion are so intricately and essentially 
human that they form the fundamental basis of being and sociality. As a 
consequence, these disciplines have continuously developed theories that 
account for the role of affect and emotion in social life, both in terms of 
general social and cultural theory and in terms of understanding their 
importance for historically and culturally distinct societies.
 Affective Societies is the theme of an interdisciplinary research initiative that 
acknowledges and systematically extends these insights to study the affective 
and emotional dimensions of contemporary social and societal coexistence. It 
is based on a theoretical and diagnostic approach centered on a social- 
relational and situated understanding of affect and emotion. This perspective 
comes with a methodological orientation focusing on empirically grounded 
approaches. These approaches are capable of illuminating the affective 
dynamics of societal coexistence in their local specificities within different 
domains of life in contemporary societies. The present volume develops a 
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tableau of key concepts that are foundational to this outlook. It offers a frame-
work for the study of affect and emotion across a spectrum of disciplines in 
the social sciences, cultural and media studies, and the humanities. The book 
thus aims at contributing to and further developing in a systematic and innov-
ative fashion work belonging to the broader theoretical movement in the 
humanities and cultural studies variously called “affect studies” or the “turn to 
affect.” It will do so in a way that re- connects these recent strands of theoriz-
ing with long- standing work on emotion and affective phenomena under-
taken in other disciplines, in particular the social sciences, that has mostly 
remained outside the spotlight of these currently much- discussed lines of 
inquiry.
 In this introduction, we will outline the overall perspective of this research 
initiative and explain the rationale of the present volume. We begin by dis-
cussing its title: Affective Societies. We will expound upon Affective Societies as 
both a theoretical designator capable of orienting productive work in social 
and cultural theory and a diagnostic- analytical lens for coming to terms with 
a salient range of recent societal developments. Along the way, we sketch the 
main theoretical trends that inform the approach to affect and emotion essen-
tial to all of the chapters in this volume. These include a dynamic- relational 
and situated understanding of affective phenomena, a perspective on 
embodied yet mobile repertoires of emotion, practices of mediation, and per-
formativity. They encompass the global circulation of symbols, forms, and 
styles within public spheres and realms of political debate that have witnessed 
substantial changes over the past decade. We then introduce our under-
standing of concepts as dynamic templates for analytical articulation. We con-
ceive of concepts as generative schemas linking disciplinary perspectives and 
bridging theory with research. At the same time, concepts are rallying points 
for contestation and debate, epitomizing what is not yet understood, and 
thereby propelling research forward. Furthermore, we explain the logic that 
informs the four thematic parts of the volume and outline the generic format 
of the 29 chapters. We close with an outlook on pressing issues for future 
research.
Affective Societies: theoretical and diagnostic 
perspectives
Human coexistence is profoundly a matter of affect and emotion. This is 
obvious for elementary forms of sociality unfolding in face- to-face interactions 
or close- knit communities. It is no less evident in the formation and makeup of 
larger- scale forms of social organization, with regard to questions of stratification 
and inequality, migration, integration, and social cohesion, institutional change 
and stability, belonging and identification, or conflict and conflict resolution. 
Political communication, for example, is an area of sustained, elaborate, wide- 
ranging, and often expertly performed emotionalization. Likewise, the creation 
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and circulation of cultural ideals of coexistence, forms of belonging, or ways 
of being a person or a citizen are thoroughly affective and often tied to 
specific emotions. Somewhat less obvious – at least by conventional standards 
of social and political theory – is the involvement of affect and emotion in 
the strategies of governance employed by state actors to secure allegiance and 
elicit conformity among its constituents. Here too, a perspective focusing on 
affect and emotion will reveal a range of important insights. For instance, it 
will bring to light strategies directed at the cultivation, regimentation, and 
discursive elaboration of sentiments, affective styles, and emotion repertoires, 
for instance, those pertaining to aspects of belonging and collective identity 
or to modes of compliance with the demands of prevailing political and eco-
nomic powers. Governing subjects necessarily involves governing their hearts. 
Or, at any rate, it involves sustained and far- reaching attempts to do so, 
which are often met with resistance and may have profound unintended con-
sequences, which are usually themselves matters of intensive affect.
 Affect and emotion are also highly prevalent in those social structures and 
social situations in which inequalities and power relations bound to race, class, 
and gender are rampant. While these categories and their intersections have 
been investigated by various disciplines with regard to social, economic, and 
political standing and in view of identities and identity politics, their affective 
constitution has by and large received only scarce attention. Race, class, and 
gender, unlike many other forms of social differentiation, inherently involve 
affective processes of othering that go hand in hand with relational modes of 
address, distinction, and valuation. Memorably analyzed by Frantz Fanon 
(1952/2008) in the case of race, such historically grounded markers of human 
difference are established and sustained for the most part by way of antagonis-
tic affective relations (→ affects of racialization). Such processes of categorical 
marking are inherently affective, that is, they involve potentialities for action 
which can manifest as (subtle or not so subtle) affective dispositions or as out-
right emotions, such as ressentiment, shame, fear, pride, and the like. In view 
of widespread xenophobia and the continued prevalence of structural dis-
crimination and institutional racism, Fanon’s searing analytic of the affective 
and corporeal workings of racialization is certainly ripe for an emphatic 
revival.
 Considering these involvements and intricacies, the long- standing assump-
tion in social theory of a dichotomous opposition between affectivity and 
rationality turns out to be grossly inadequate. While it may still be reasonable 
to describe aspects of the formation of modern societies and nation states and 
their various agencies and institutions as processes of rationalization, the 
assumption that there is a corresponding de- emphasizing of affectivity is pro-
foundly misguided. In research on affective phenomena, the dichotomy of 
emotion and reason has long given way to views that stress their entangle-
ment and mutual co- dependence. Affectivity is indispensable for assessments 
of relevance, for the formation of value and valuation, and for keeping social 
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practices focused on what issues are of concern and what is at stake. Without 
affectivity, nothing resembling real- life evaluation and decision- making 
would be possible at either the individual or the collective level.
 Accordingly, current theorizing on affect and emotion, especially (but not 
only) in fields such as cultural affect theory, philosophy and sociology of 
emotion, as well as cultural anthropology, favors a more elaborate and realis-
tic picture of how contemporary forms of social organization, social collec-
tives, and their many forms of governance and coordination operate, and of 
how they have emerged historically. Likewise, this more recent research 
enables scholars to better understand how the development of these social 
formations and agencies has been crucially involved in the genesis and sub-
sequent modulation, disciplining, and governing of the classical “human 
subject” of Western modernity. By turning toward the affective and emo-
tional dimensions of sociality, social theory catches up with state- of-the- art 
scholarship on emotion and affect. This work neither assumes a dichotomous 
opposition between affectivity and rationality, nor does it consider affect to 
be a private, inner, exclusively “subjective” affair. Instead, it foregrounds the 
situatedness of affect and emotion and emphasizes the dynamic relationality of 
affective processes in their embodied and embedded specificity and with 
regard to their efficaciousness as forceful relations in various local and trans- 
local contexts. Here, affective, cognitive, and volitional elements are inextric-
ably entangled. As such dynamic comportments, affects and emotions are 
indispensable driving forces in the constitution of practices, forms of life, 
institutions, groups, and social collectives. The title Affective Societies and the 
chapters comprising this key concepts volume take up several significant lines 
of work on affect and emotion with the aim of investigating the affective and 
emotional dimensions of social coexistence in contemporary societies.
A social theory perspective
Affective Societies is primarily a theoretical denominator of the systematic 
multi- faceted involvement of affect and emotion among the processes that 
enable, create, sustain – but also threaten or disrupt – human social and soci-
etal life. As an orientating concept, it covers the entire spectrum of social the-
orizing, combining elements of both general social theory and diagnostic theories 
of societies. This useful distinction, however, is more prominent in the German 
academic context and less widely used in the Anglophone world. In Anglo-
phone contexts, the term “social theory” is commonly used to denote both 
general theories of the social (Sozialtheorie) and theories of historically specific 
societal formations or societies, often uniting diagnostic, critical, and norm-
ative dimensions (Gesellschaftstheorie). Yet these distinct types of theory are 
interconnected in that any social theory is developed within the specific social 
and historical context within which the researcher is embedded. In addition, 
any theory of society relies on concepts of social theory and corresponding 
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“middle range” theories (cf. Lindemann, 2009, who draws on Georg 
Simmel’s distinction of these types of theory).
 In terms of social theory, Affective Societies addresses foundational problems 
and questions generally pertaining to the social as recurring in different discip-
linary contexts, such as anthropology, philosophy, sociology, or cultural 
studies. From this perspective, affect is suggested as an essential social theoret-
ical concept, much like other prominent concepts in existing social theory, 
for instance, agency, reciprocity, interaction, communication, or intention. 
Affect is hence not merely an add- on to these more established notions, but a 
foundational dimension of interpersonal relationality itself – it is the central 
dynamic force of social connectedness, ranging from face- to-face encounters 
to various interactive dynamics between individuals and collectives as well as 
inter- and intra- group relations. The latter examples, in particular, already 
permeate the borders of what is known as “middle range” theories in some 
disciplinary contexts (Merton, 1968), which take particular empirical social 
phenomena under scrutiny, such as racism, economic exchange, or social 
mobility. Theories of ritual interaction are a good example of a middle range 
theory, in particular because affect and emotion have traditionally played a 
central role therein. Durkheim (1912/1995) was interested in how solidarity 
can be maintained amongst group members and suggested that rituals and 
collective effervescence (which can be understood as a form of affective 
resonance) tie group members to one another and to the group’s shared 
values. Collins (2004) later extended this theory to include the concept of 
emotional energy as an outcome of ritual interaction. Theories like these are 
usually informed by or are extensions of specific social theories and, as 
becomes evident in the many examples in this volume, can provide novel 
understandings of both micro- and macro- level social phenomena as funda-
mentally rooted in affect and emotion. These include family relations, health-
care, audiences, literature and the arts, communities, political parties, 
organizations, or social institutions such as the law, religion, or mass media.
A diagnostic angle
Aside from this emphasis on social theory and corresponding “middle range” 
theories of and empirical research on concrete social phenomena, Affective 
Societies also bears a diagnostic and critical angle as it is found in many theories 
of societies. These theories circumscribe specific and historically situated 
larger societal formations, in most instances societies in modern (Western) 
nation states. They usually rely on specific assumptions and concepts of social 
theory and, more often than not, integrate and synthesize arrays of “middle 
range” theory and research on phenomena that scholars deem idiomatic and 
important for a specific (type of ) society. Examples would include theories of 
the post- industrial (or knowledge) society (e.g., Bell, 1973), of modern capi-
talist society (e.g., Boltanski & Chiapello, 2007), of the risk society (Beck, 
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1992), or of the information and network society (e.g., Castells, 2010) (see 
Schimank & Volkmann, 2007, for a broader assessment).
 With regard to contemporary societies, there seems to be something novel 
and urgent going on when it comes to manifestations of affect in public dis-
course, as part of political communications, in mediatized social interactions, 
and in more overarching attempts at managing, controlling, and governing 
affect and emotion. In the economy, for example, a neoliberal ideology 
increasingly addresses – and exploits – people’s emotions and seeks to estab-
lish forms of affective governance that aim at maximizing corporate revenue. 
The infamous Facebook experiment in 2012 that manipulated users’ news-
feeds according to their affective implications, pertinent cultural programs 
that emphasize happiness, well- being, and emotional intelligence, and on- 
and offline assessments of users’ emotional states for the purposes of targeted 
and personalized advertising are but some of the developments we have in 
mind. Another example is a series of recent political events and developments 
that have signaled a sea change in public communication and global politics. 
New forms of social media activism bring politically pressing issues onto the 
public agenda and mobilize attention and involvement rapidly and with 
unprecedented reach. Political parties and protest movements emerge and 
rally around salient issues as a result of novel forms of mediatized interaction 
in a decentralized landscape of communications. In general, there is a height-
ened sense of – or one might say even hunger for – spontaneous, informal, 
highly sensuous modes of affective associations, resulting in transient collec-
tives or affective communities (→ affective communities). At the same time, one 
cannot fail to notice the widespread emergence, public appeal, and sustained 
success of right- wing populist parties across Europe and the world, and their 
reliance on highly affective modes of communication. This accompanies a 
substantially altered political climate, evidenced by the increasingly divisive 
nature of political debate and practices in the context of the so- called Euro-
pean “refugee crisis” since 2015. Other landmark events in this regard are the 
successful Brexit campaign of 2016 with its polarizing debates, the shameless 
recourse to fake news, the election and subsequent public displays of “twitter 
president” Donald Trump, or more generally the emergence of and support 
for illiberal and anti- democratic regimes and dictators across Europe and the 
world. Concomitantly, rumors, smear campaigns, and conspiracy theories are 
in high demand – it seems that what “feels true” increasingly wins the day 
over knowledge claims grounded in evidence, including those brought forth 
by acclaimed experts or members of the intellectual establishment. No less 
significant are the rampant forms of trolling, countless instances of hate 
speech, or the strategic circulation of misinformation online (as well as offline) 
that have begun to profoundly affect the social life and political culture of 
many societies around the globe.
 All of these examples, many of which are addressed by ongoing research in 
the Affective Societies Center, suggest that a range of social, cultural, and political 
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phenomena that are characteristic of the present state of social coexistence in 
mobile and networked worlds revolve around affect and emotion. “Affective 
societies” in this respect functions as a sensitizing concept apt to direct 
focused attention to the increasing intensification and reflexivity of affective 
modes of interaction and communication that can be witnessed in the frantic 
and fragmented realms of what was formerly known as the “public sphere.” 
In times of social media and individualized media practices, the orientating 
fiction of a single common realm of public debate governed by agreed- upon 
rational norms of communication and grounded in at least the semblance of a 
moral consensus no longer seems tenable. Instead, its place has been taken by 
a fragmented landscape in which a plethora of local or identity- focused in- 
groups, parties, small- scale communities, or factions rally around symbols, 
styles, or ideals, often in ways that are highly affective (cf. Papacharissi, 2015). 
Within these emerging practices and their mediatized spaces, affective modes 
of address have assumed center stage, often to the detriment of most other 
forms and styles of interaction. It is as of now unclear, however, what specific 
forms of sociality and what modes of political participation will consolidate 
and prove consequential in this thoroughly reformatted and vigorously con-
tested public landscape. Some of the few existing attempts at describing the 
specifically affective and emotional “modern condition” (Dennis H. Wrong) 
may provide valuable orientation and inspiration in developing the diagnostic 
potential of Affective Societies (e.g., Illouz, 2007; Furedi, 1997; Mishra, 2017; 
Lordon, 2013).
 Beyond the relevance of affect and emotion for general social theory, Affec-
tive Societies thus also designates a historical formation of a specific kind: soci-
eties whose modes of operation and means of integration increasingly involve 
systematic efforts to mobilize and strategically deploy affect and emotion in a 
highly intensified and often one- sided manner. This calls for focused atten-
tion to new and intensified ways in which affective modes of communication 
take on an increasing salience both in mediatized public discourse, and for the 
actors and agencies that aspire to take advantage of these developments, for 
instance, by devising focused campaigns for emotionalizing debates or creat-
ing or intensifying a narrow range of collective sentiments (such as fear of or 
hatred against migrants, anger at the government, or distrust of elites).
 As a directive for research, this diagnostic angle of the title Affective Societies 
calls for a refined sensibility for what is truly substantive and specific to con-
temporary societies. While it is important to keep attempts at social and political 
diagnosis grounded in careful scholarship on historical developments, empirically 
grounded “middle range” theories, and reference to existing theories of 
societies, it is likewise key to cultivate a sense for what is (historically) pecu-
liar and unique to present- day social and cultural life. This diagnostic sense 
for what is new should include an educated audacity, a daringness to under-
take imaginative larger- scale assessments of present developments under 
conditions of incomplete knowledge. Strategies of interpretive extrapolation 
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and dramatization could play a role in bringing notable developments into 
clearer focus and rendering salient aspects that might otherwise escape atten-
tion. A central aim of our work is to equip scholars and researchers with con-
ceptual and methodological tools that are up to this task. The affect- and 
emotion- theoretic concepts sketched in this volume are potential building 
blocks for an endeavor of this kind.
Connection and contestation: the role of concepts 
in research
Challenges of a research program
Taken together, the theoretical and the diagnostic understanding of our title 
has provided the rationale of the Collaborative Research Center (CRC) Affec-
tive Societies at Freie Universität Berlin. The premise of this interdisciplinary 
initiative is that a dynamic- relational account of affect and emotion can guide 
a heterogeneous cluster of research perspectives that all study aspects of the 
affective and emotional underpinnings of contemporary societal coexistence. 
In particular, emphasis is placed on the affective dynamics of transnational 
migration, on processes of societal transformation due to increased mobility, 
on changing emotion repertoires in a rapidly transformed global media land-
scape, and on various forms of collectivization and emerging communities, 
for instance, in politics, as part of social movements, in local or social media 
communities, in the arts, or in entertainment. This includes focusing on 
sources of inequality and stratification, intergroup conflict, and processes of 
social exclusion and disintegration within contemporary societies. Disciplines 
contributing to the Center range from social and cultural anthropology, soci-
ology, theater and performance studies, literature, communication, media and 
film studies to art history and philosophy – a unique combination of fields 
that may well be unprecedented within affect and emotion research.
 The initiative as well as this volume are thus highly interdisciplinary in 
nature and bring together theory and research from various areas of the social 
sciences, cultural studies, and the humanities. A major challenge for an 
endeavor of this kind is to devise a conceptual repertoire that is firmly 
anchored in its subject matter while versatile enough to find application across 
such a range of disciplines. We envision that these carefully crafted concepts 
work as bridges between fields as they link distinct theoretical concerns, facil-
itate the transfer of insights, ignite novel questions and methods, and sensitize 
theorists and researchers to the intricacies of different domains of study. In the 
day- to-day work of the Center, a number of focal concepts have instigated 
collaboration, inspiring the search for connections as well as critical debate. 
Projects from different disciplines, with different aims and, at times, widely 
diverging methodological repertoires find common ground by focusing jointly 
on a set of focal concepts. A key advantage of singling out concepts – instead 
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of more encompassing formulations of “theory” – is that they are capable of 
providing a shared understanding in the face of significant differences in 
research perspectives, and even where there may be disagreement and critical 
disputes concerning specific issues pertaining to a given subject matter.
 Because concepts, as we understand them, are primarily means to provide, 
focus and frame access to salient objects and phenomena of social and cultural 
reality, their productive role is best illustrated by way of examples from the 
work of our initiative. We briefly outline two areas of interest. The first con-
cerns social collectives; the second concerns what we call emotion repertoires.
 Several of the Center’s projects tackle the question of how social collectives 
are formed and how they become more integrated and sustained under present- 
day conditions and with regard to affective modes of interaction. Nevertheless, 
the ways in which these undertakings approach their common theme differ 
markedly. They range from ethnographic field work in religious communities 
and participant observation of political movements, new forms of affect- aware 
discourse analysis, and the employment of video and audio recordings in the 
study of audience emotions to the in- depth study of theater performances or the 
minute analysis of film sequences and their recurring audiovisual patterns and 
dynamic forms in the sense of a genre- specific poetics of affect. While vastly 
different in terms of materials, methods, and disciplinary orientation, these sepa-
rate projects coalesce around several guiding concepts. These include a newly 
introduced notion of social collectives that emphasizes dynamics of collectivization 
based on affective relations and shared self- understandings (→ social collectives) 
and a specifically affect- theoretic understanding of communities and forms of 
commonality, in part based on episodes of high- intensity relational affect 
(→ affective communities). These concepts are, moreover, closely linked to an 
understanding of the political that refers to formative relations of power and the 
dynamics between social cohesion and social disintegration while drawing on 
the integrative potentials of aesthetic forms and shared imaginaries (→ political 
affect; → poetics of affect; → Midān moments; → affective citizenship). All these con-
cepts work as dynamic connectors of different scholarly orientations. Their 
partial openness invites productive elaboration in different domains.
 Several of the center’s other research endeavors find common ground in a 
performative understanding of consolidated emotion repertoires (→ emotion 
repertoires). These projects likewise diverge significantly in their aims and ori-
entations, for example, between actor- centric approaches and approaches that 
focus on the collective or institutional level and processes of mediation. The 
latter understand emotion repertoires not primarily as individually embodied, 
enactive and expressive capacities or dispositions, but rather as repositories of 
affective forms and modes of expression implemented in and regulated by 
social domains, subcultures or organizations. Here, emotion repertoires are 
dynamic, mobile, and prone to travel, transform, and hybridize. At first 
glance, this stands in tension with the actor- centric approach that stresses the 
stability and resistance to change of embodied repertoires acquired at early 
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stages of enculturation (→ attachment; → Gefühlsbildung). However, when 
these two contrasting perspectives on the modus operandi and the levels of 
implementation of emotion repertoires are conjoined, a productive angle for 
research ensues. New questions become pressing, such as those pertaining to 
the relationship of individual embodiment and the mediation and circulation 
of repertoires. Specifically, how might emotional expressions be stabilized 
into dynamic yet embodied forms capable of circulation and apt to instigate 
corporeal reenactment by differently socialized individuals at different times 
or places (→ Pathosformel)? “Emotion repertoire” and its conceptual surround-
ings are thus exemplary for the way we envision concepts working in affect 
and emotion research: not as homogeneous constructs with a fixed meaning, 
but as partially open and unfinished formations that inspire efforts to elaborate 
on, embellish, and concretely situate them. As we have seen, the “life” of a 
concept within interdisciplinary scholarship may encompass disputes about a 
certain dimension of its meaning or about a theoretical orientation more 
broadly. In the case at hand, this is evidenced by disagreements about the 
degree and robustness of the bodily “grounding” of emotion repertoires and 
thus the question of the relative stability and intransigence of such repertoires 
versus their malleability, fluidity, and capacity to circulate and hybridize.
 The idea of the present volume on the key concepts of Affective Societies 
has grown out of this productive employment of concepts as devices that 
“travel” between disciplines, research domains, and methodological orienta-
tions. As we have seen, this may crucially include focused clashes between 
their respective outlooks – conflicts and quarrels that drive research forward.
Working concepts: theory and research
It will be helpful to briefly elaborate the understanding of concepts we draw on. 
Concepts are primarily means to enable controlled and focused access to objects 
and phenomena. This qualified realist orientation is the starting point of our 
understanding. To prevent a futile debate about representational accuracy or 
about “realist” versus “instrumentalist” understandings of research, we will not 
argue for it here. Importantly, however, concepts function as connectors 
between fields and as rallying points for the convergence of perspectives, but 
also as matters of contestation and debate. In such cases of dispute, what a 
concept does is help “contain” disagreement by providing a common – if tent-
ative and shifting – frame of reference for diverging perspectives. Accordingly, 
points of conflict – and concomitant open questions or unresolved issues – may 
be identified with precision against a background of shared understanding, even 
across disciplinary boundaries. Often, what happens is that a conflict about 
certain components of a concept will inspire the forming of novel concepts, 
ideally in ways that render the initial problematic more tractable. Thus, when all 
goes well, such conflicts advance understanding by informing and driving con-
ceptual development (cf. Slaby, Mühlhoff, & Wüschner, 2019).
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 Obviously, then, concepts are crucial to interdisciplinary work. They operate 
as hinges between distinct fields, they can bridge theory with methodology, and 
they are specifically prone to “travel” through different subject areas, informing 
and inspiring specific elaborations in these respective fields, while taking up and 
incorporating new elements in turn. With this, our understanding of working 
concepts aligns with Mieke Bal’s (2002) influential approach to “traveling con-
cepts,” put forth specifically as a methodological orientation for the interdisci-
plinary humanities and cultural studies. Besides a rigorous orientation to 
accessing objects of research “on their own terms” (Bal, 2002, p. 8), and under-
scoring the power of concepts to “organize a group of phenomena, define the 
relevant questions to be addressed to them, and determine the meanings that 
can be given to observations regarding the phenomena” (Bal, 2002, p. 31), Bal 
emphasizes the generative nature of traveling concepts. This echoes the philo-
sophical approach to concepts of Deleuze and Guattari (1994) as well as Isabelle 
Stengers’ innovative discussion of concepts in the natural sciences (Stengers & 
Schlanger, 1991). Bal’s own case studies feature concepts that work as dynamic 
templates for the further articulation and refinement of existing notions, but 
especially illustrate the development of new domain- inherent concepts derived 
from a specific conceptual source in response to concrete problems. She dis-
cusses the example of “performativity,” a concept that has left significant 
imprints on an enormously wide swath of fields and disciplines, each time with 
a different emphasis. Less attended to in recent scholarship is the man who 
helped initiate the performativity trend, sociologist Erving Goffman. His bold 
conceptual move was the transposition of an entire cluster of concepts from the 
domain of theater to social life at large, resulting in a creatively formulated 
account of situated social interaction in terms of social roles, performances of 
self, ostentative public displays and stagings, and the intricate arrangement of 
interactional settings (Goffman, 1956, 1967; see Knoblauch, 2009, for discus-
sion). This provided, in effect, a “new and effective organization of the phe-
nomena” of micro- social interactivity (Bal, 2002, p. 31). A comparable 
conceptual move, albeit in a different contexts and sourced from a rather 
different domain, happens in the present volume, when Rainer Mühlhoff trans-
poses the technical concept of resonance from classical mechanics (especially 
from the physics of dynamic oscillators) to the realm of affective relationality. 
Mühlhoff thereby provides a new way to spell out a relational understanding of 
affect in detail. Since physical resonance is a case of dynamic coupling irredu-
cible to the mere addition of separately individuated entities, this engenders an 
understanding of affect as profoundly and irreducibly relational (→ affective reson-
ance). The significant ramifications of this proposal are evident in several of the 
chapters in this volume.
 As these examples show, concepts also inform the theoretical sensibilities 
and perceptual habits of researchers. They help shape viewpoints and angles 
on complex subject matters and research domains (sensitizing concepts, Blumer, 
1954), and they can specifically “sharpen the senses,” in particular when a 
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new conceptual articulation breaks with established habits of sorting and 
judging matters, offering novel modes of cognitive access to reality and thus 
accompanied by newly configured capacities for recognition and judgment 
on the part of researchers (cf. Slaby, Mühlhoff, & Wüschner, 2019). When 
successful, this may help initiate entire research programs, and inspire further 
conceptual development down the road, as the echoes of Goffman’s work in 
later articulations of the performativity paradigm illustrate (e.g., Butler, 1993).
 Traveling concepts may be promising, but using them without reflection 
also has considerable pitfalls. Concepts that are meaningful and instructive to 
theoretical or empirical analysis in one disciplinary context may obfuscate 
careful and precise analysis and rather lead away from producing meaningful 
insights in others. This is especially the case when it is not actual concepts 
that travel, but merely terminology, labels, or metaphors that are halfheartedly 
adopted in another disciplinary context. Concepts such as “swarm” and 
“herding” might serve as examples here. As biological concepts describing 
specific kinds of animal behavior, they have successively made their way into 
the social sciences and are widely used to denote phenomena of mass behav-
ior, for instance, in finance or collective decision- making. By being too quick 
or imprecise in employing concepts which have traveled, however, research-
ers might lose sight of alternative mechanisms or explanations underlying the 
phenomenon of interest or extend the concept in ways that renders it close to 
meaningless (sometimes referred to as “concept stretching,” cf. Sartori, 1970). 
Early in the “turn to affect,” similarly problematic maneuvers were made 
with regard to concepts from neuroscience and developmental psychology, as 
putative scientific findings and their conceptual articulation were adopted 
into cultural theory in an uncritical fashion (Brian Massumi’s invocation of 
the “missing half- second” between neural impulse and conscious decision in 
the experimental work of neuropsychologist Benjamin Libet is exemplary in 
this regard; see Massumi, 1995). Such near- indiscriminate “poaching” of con-
cepts, while sometimes productive as an initial impulse engendering novel 
articulations, often causes confusion on both sides. Used as catchwords, these 
terms misrepresent the complexity and contested nature of the scientific 
domains of their origin, elide the high degree of craft that comes with their 
adequate use, and create mere semblances of understanding in the target 
domain (see Papoulias & Callard, 2010). Accordingly, the practice of concep-
tual articulation requires critical vigilance with regard to such unfounded and 
under- developed transpositions – “semantic detoxification” is needed from 
time to time, to use a term employed by philosopher of science Mark Wilson 
(2006, pp. 516–518) in a related context. Other philosophers currently even 
call for encompassing ameliorative projects designed to battle “representational 
complacency” (Cappelen, 2018). Besides a constructive approach to develop-
ing and refining concepts, the chapters in this book thus also have the task of 
critically increasing precision and, where necessary, dismissing certain con-
ceptual options as inadequate.
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 Importantly, concepts also essentially bridge theory and research in a 
twofold way, in particular when it comes to the acquisition and analysis of 
empirical data. Concept formation can proceed in an inductive fashion, 
wherein concepts are developed from examples and observations of empirical 
reality. In the social sciences, there is an abundant literature on the various 
techniques of data- driven concept formation (e.g., Corbin & Strauss, 2008). 
However, concepts are also widely used in more deductive ways, where a 
description of a concept is already known, which is then used to make sense 
of empirical observations. In the case of the latter, many works have discussed 
the criteria that useful concepts should fulfill, such as resonance, consistency, 
or fecundity, to name but a few (e.g., Gerring, 2012). This is not the place to 
delve into these methodological intricacies in detail. Rather, we are more 
concerned in this volume with assembling concepts that form a common con-
ceptual field, in the sense that the different concepts are meaningfully related to 
one another and thereby facilitate relations to observable phenomena in the 
empirical world. This distantly resembles what Max Weber (1922/1988) sug-
gested with regards to the formation of concepts in social science, namely that 
fruitful efforts are less concerned with establishing “factual relations” between 
empirically observable phenomena (in the sense of “neutral objectivity”), but 
rather between the problems that are of paramount interest to researchers. 
This does not mean, however, that “problems of interest to researchers” do 
not correspond to meaningful configurations of social reality. Well- made 
concepts embody and concretize this very correspondence.
 Having said this, some words on the broader methodological approach of 
the Affective Societies research perspective might be instructive. Given its 
strongly interdisciplinary approach spanning research on affect and emotion 
in the humanities, cultural studies, and the social sciences, there is no unified 
set of methods or analytical techniques that would do justice to the broad 
variety of research questions that are pertinent in the different disciplines. 
However, the overall perspective is characterized by a common methodo-
logical orientation that implies an inductive and interpretative- hermeneutic 
approach to research. Because this approach is specifically geared toward an 
empirically grounded development of concepts and hypotheses, it differs 
notably from deductive approaches aimed at testing theories and hypotheses. 
Most of the concepts presented in this volume can therefore be understood as 
outcomes of this inductive and interpretative research process, whereas others 
have been put to use as explorative or sensitizing concepts. However, more 
often than not, the overall research process proceeds in a circular fashion in 
that concepts that have been derived from examples and observations of 
empirical reality are used as sensitizing concepts in a different context. Based 
on this methodological orientation, researchers in the Affective Societies initi-
ative use and further develop a variety of established methods to study affect 
and emotion in different contexts, including the analysis of qualitative inter-
views, the photo- voice technique, the analysis of images, films, and videos, 
14  Jan Slaby and Christian von Scheve
and phenomenological analyses, as well as ethnographic, literary, and theater 
studies approaches to performativity. All these approaches and tools are pre-
sented and discussed in detail in what is, in effect, the “sister volume” to the 
present book, appearing simultaneously in this Routledge book series: Ana-
lyzing Affective Societies, edited by Antje Kahl (2019).
 As an evolving field of interrelated notions, then, a set of working concepts 
gives shape to a research perspective as it carves out a domain of phenomena and 
opens up routes to access them in a systematic fashion, often giving rise to sur-
prising cross- references. Moreover, concepts, while dynamic and open- textured, 
also function as repositories of the past, as their genealogies embody previous 
stages of understanding and states of research, including paths no longer taken 
but still instructive in hindsight. Our work with and “on” concepts in this 
volume will accordingly include historical perspectives, where earlier stages of 
conceptual articulation with regard to affect and emotion will be illuminated 
and brought into contact with contemporary work.
 Against this background, the present volume will chart a comprehensive 
set of concepts elucidating affect, emotion, and affective relationality from 
different interlocking angles, anchored in the idea that “affect” primarily 
refers to dynamic processes between actors and in collectives, whereas indi-
vidual affective states, emotions, and affective dispositions are derivative. This 
founding idea – affective relationality, in short – is a key principle driving con-
ceptual development. Accordingly, a number of chapters in this volume will 
elaborate varieties and local specificities of such dynamic relations, as well as 
their formative effects. They are also informed by several other principles, 
including, but not limited to the idea of a complex discursive and socio- material 
constructivism with regard to emotions and emotion categories (→ emotion, 
emotion concepts; → emotion repertoires) and an elaborate understanding of medi-
ation that links a basic dimension of affective and emotional embodiment with 
several registers of dynamic forms as well as with advanced techniques and 
practices of mediation (→ affective economy; → Pathosformel; → poetics of affect; 
→ (p)reenactment; → affective publics). Furthermore, in such affective and emo-
tional practices, elements from established praxeological accounts and notions 
of performativity are put to use specifically in the context of affect- based 
practices (→ affective practice; → affective witnessing; → writing affect). Drawing 
from, but not identical to, the idea of affective relationality, the specific capa-
city of affect and emotion to instigate and help enact processes of collectiviza-
tion is emphasized in several chapters. At the same time, chapters focusing on 
these processes also display an awareness of the heterogeneity, precariousness 
and fragility of transient, affect- driven collectives (→ affective communities; → 
audience emotions; → Midān moments; → social collectives). The encompassing 
conceptual tableau that emerges thus concretizes the relationship between 
affectivity and the formation of communities, social and political movements, 
and individual and collective repertoires of emotion and their wide- ranging 
circulation through spaces of contemporary media.
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Format of the chapters
All chapters are similarly formatted, except for differences in style and discip-
linary habits. The texts combine the manner of a glossary entry with a concise 
review article. Working concepts will be defined, historically and systemati-
cally elucidated, and related to ongoing research by way of examples and case 
studies. Entries will be non- authoritative in the sense that “work on the 
concept” is ongoing, so that novel directions and expansions but also debate, 
criticism, and revisions are inspired. Readers will be both informed and 
enabled to proceed with further elaborations of their own. The entries stand 
alone, yet significant interrelations will be highlighted in the form of easily 
discernible (→ cross- references). With these parameters, we hope that the book 
might be read as a unified conceptual exploration of a research field, 
approaching the style of a team- authored monograph. At the same time, 
chapters will be separately usable as glossary- style explications of key notions. 
That is why each chapter begins with a concise elucidation of the concept in 
question.
 The main body of most of the chapters will comprise four subsections 
offering roughly the following perspectives on a given concept: (1) a brief 
historical orientation with gestures to neighboring concepts; (2) a detailed sys-
tematic explication of the concept at issue; (3) illustrations of the concept in 
action, ideally drawn from current research practice; (4) an outlook with an 
orientation toward open questions, further directions, and/or critical contes-
tations. Wherever possible, entries are developed from the perspective of 
concrete, case- based affect and emotion research in all disciplines contributing 
to the CRC Affective Societies. We have encouraged the contributors to relate 
either to their own research or to extant research from their own or neigh-
boring disciplines. Most chapters have been written by current members of 
the CRC Affective Societies. In addition, for some of the chapters, we have 
recruited expert researchers with a track record in innovative work on affect 
and emotion. During the editing process, we have put a premium on ensur-
ing that all entries are stylistically sufficiently similar. At the same time, we 
have encouraged strong authorial voices and intellectual independence, which 
makes for variation in both style and content.
Thematic parts
It should be clear, given our understanding of the nature of concepts and 
their role in research, that our volume is not merely offering explanations of a 
range of technical terms. We do not aspire to a classical “keywords” format, 
nor do we aim at devising a theoretical dictionary or scholarly lexicon. This is 
why we have arranged the concept entries thematically, not alphabetically. 
With this choice of format, we do justice to the insight that concepts, while 
separately intelligible and operative, usually coalesce into interrelated 
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conceptual fields. We decided to sort the concepts into four thematic sec-
tions, roughly indicating a movement from “foundational” to “applied,” from 
“ontological” to “political,” and from “micro- relational” to “collective.”
 We open the volume with a section on basic affect- and emotion- theoretic 
concepts (Part I: “Affect and emotion: charting the landscape”). This section 
is headlined by the entries on → affect and → emotion, and followed by entries 
on several other basic categories of affective phenomena, such as → feeling, 
→ attachment, → atmosphere, and → sentiment. Part II is entitled “Elaborating 
affect,” comprising chapters that demonstrate our general allegiance to, but 
also some critical reservations about, the so- called “turn to affect” and cul-
tural affect studies more broadly. Part III is entitled “Resonances and reper-
toires.” Here, emphasis is placed on processes of mediation, circulation, and 
on the radiating and resonating capacities of bodies that are affectively 
“in touch” with one another and with their surroundings. Finally, Part IV: 
“Collectives and contestations” brings together chapters focusing on the 
collectivizing dynamics of affect and emotion and especially on the political 
dimensions or ramifications of affect and emotion at the present juncture. In 
the following, we outline the central conceptual and theoretical ideas inform-
ing the four parts and briefly highlight some points of convergence as well as 
critical fault lines.
Part I: affect and emotion: charting the landscape
Obviously, there is a wealth of proposals on conceptualizing affective phe-
nomena. As has often been noted, it is hopeless to assume that a single con-
ceptual perspective – let alone something as short and reductive as a 
conventional “definition” – could cover the domain of affectivity exhaus-
tively and find universal acceptance. The best way forward is therefore the 
detailed development of a specific approach that is capable of providing a 
focused outlook on a broad enough segment of affective phenomena, com-
bining a solid footing in theory with a flexible heuristic apt for wide- ranging 
application. Such a conceptual outlook is well advised to begin from a discus-
sion of metaphysical or ontological options, and obviously requires a robust 
awareness of the relevant segments of intellectual history. Following an influ-
ential trajectory of work in cultural affect theory, we begin from a present- 
day appropriation of the dynamic substance monism of early enlightenment 
philosopher Benedict de Spinoza, especially its concomitant metaphysical 
approach to affect (Spinoza, 1667/1985). The first chapter in Part I, entitled 
“affect” (→ affect), accordingly undertakes a focused reconstruction of 
Spinoza’s approach, viewed mostly through the lens of Deleuze’s (1968/1990) 
interpretation and in line with recent feminist readings of Spinoza’s works 
(e.g., Gatens, 2009). While many contemporary approaches to affect merely 
pay lip- service to Spinozism, we aspire to undertake a more thorough 
reconstruction. This perspective centers on an account of affect as efficacious 
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relations between evolving entities in formative settings. It can be read as both 
a basic understanding of power and an encompassing ontogenetic approach, as 
it focuses on processes of formation and transformation, not on finished prod-
ucts. The transition to contemporary approaches in affect studies becomes 
clearer by way of a detailed explanation of some of the basic principles and 
conceptual tendencies in Spinoza’s approach, notably his notion of potentia 
(a kind of micro- power inherent in all entities), and his distinction between the 
terms affectio and affectus. In light of this reconstruction, we believe that several 
contested ideas from recent affect studies literature become more tractable and 
lose their apparent strangeness. For instance, the contention that affect pertains 
to bodies or entities of all kinds, not merely to what commonly counts as “sen-
tient creatures,” is a direct result of Spinoza’s dynamic substance monism and 
his initial definition of affectus. Likewise, the emphasis on incessant processuality 
and transformative dynamics that many proponents of affect studies counten-
ance will seem less excessive on these ontological grounds. Accordingly, the 
chapter is structured such that it leads from discussions of Spinoza’s core tenets 
on affect to several current perspectives in affect studies and to the various con-
ceptual and methodological options prevalent in this field.
 One effect of this comprehensive elucidation of affect is that both the 
contrast with and the similarities to a prevailing understanding of “emotion” 
become accessible. Already, Spinoza’s notion of affectus was much closer to 
vernacular concepts of emotion than many affect theory radicals would like 
to admit. However, we chose to keep a clear separation between the 
concepts of affect and emotion in play. The second chapter in this part 
(→ emotion, emotion concept) offers a broadly constructivist approach to emo-
tions and their socio- culturally specific conceptualization, aligning with 
major strands of interdisciplinary emotion theory in the 20th century. Con-
comitantly, the first part of the volume collects chapters on other key classes 
of affective phenomena, such as feeling, attachment, sentiment, and atmo-
sphere, and it provides a developmental perspective on the “formation of 
feeling” grounded in a particular research perspective from the Affective Soci-
eties project (→ Gefühlsbildung). By charting such a broad spectrum of phe-
nomena and their developmental formation both in childhood and during 
adult life, chapters in the first part broaden the theoretical and terminological 
scope of most current work in affect theory. This enlarges the repertoire of 
methodological and analytical options. To give just one example, the 
concept of sentiment complements the focus on relatively short- term, situ-
ational affective dynamics by emphasizing the sustained, longer- term habitu-
ation and regimentation of affective orientations as part of cultural and 
political programs developed with the aim of ensuring conformity with pre-
valent modes of governance. A perspective on “sentiment,” moreover, offers 
powerful analytical tools for the normative branches of social theory as it 
helps to assess and study in detail the historical formation and transformation 
of normative orders (→ sentiment).
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Part II: elaborating affect
The second part of the volume further elaborates the conceptual register of 
relational affect. In this part, our authors’ allegiance with prevailing currents 
of cultural affect theory (e.g., Gregg & Seigworth, 2010) is most evident, yet 
the chapters give their own constructive and innovative twists to established 
articulations of affect- related phenomena. They focus on the way relational 
affect coalesces into local → affective arrangements, how it enfolds into compar-
atively stable → affective dispositions, how it gets enacted, further shaped, and 
reflexively thematized within → affective practices, and how its circulation 
through discourse and media gives rise to → affective economies. Exemplary 
affective practices such as → writing affect and → affective witnessing are intro-
duced and discussed with regard to their contemporary cultural and political 
relevance. A comprehensive critical perspective on the → affects of racialization 
rounds out this part of the book. This chapter links work on affect in a 
descriptive as well as normative key with anthropological work on the 
ongoing affective ramifications of settler colonialism and current instances of 
environmental racism, and with recent perspectives from critical race theory.
 Considered collectively, the chapters in this part showcase the strengths of 
and fascination with the turn to affect, while consolidating several theoretical 
and diagnostic perspectives and pushing the field forward in multiple direc-
tions. Some of the chapters consciously break with cherished positions of the 
early wave of affect- related work in the 1990s by placing emphasis on the 
close entanglement and mutual dynamic formation of affect and language 
(→ writing affect), or by developing a notion of affective disposition that 
focuses on the relative bodily permanence and differential reenactment of 
recurring patterns of affective relationality (→ affective disposition). Again, 
however, the chapters collected in Part II will not offer a single perspective, 
but encompass contrasting options, also with regard to implications for 
research methodology. For instance, the chapter on affective practice comes 
with a strong mandate to “follow the actors” and pay attention to these 
actors’ own reflexive understanding of the affective dimension of their prac-
tices, including specific terms and concepts employed by actors in situ 
(→ affective practice). By contrast, the chapter entitled “Affective arrangement” 
proposes a somewhat more impersonal approach to the situated settings, 
material contexts and dynamic frameworks in which relational affect unfolds 
locally and trans- locally. Actors do remain in the picture, but only as contrib-
uting elements in larger dynamic formations of heterogeneous components 
that often exceed the scope of what human individuals or collectives con-
sciously grasp and reflect upon (→ affective arrangement). While not entirely 
incompatible, the respective concepts of affective practice and affective 
arrangement emphasize contrasting aspects of the situated manifestation of 
relational affect and thus inspire different analytical perspectives and method-
ologies. Distinct from both these approaches is the concept of affective 
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economy, as it is centered on the role of mediation and media practices in 
forming the manifestation of affect and in establishing a global circulation of 
affective forms, styles, and symbols (→ affective economy). While this chapter 
comes with a provocative – and surely contestable – ontological thesis on the 
general economic character of mediatized affect, it also offers an innovative 
methodology for studying the globally shared symbolic, aesthetic, and imagi-
native undercurrents of contemporary affective societies.
Part III: resonances and repertoires
The third part of the volume focuses specifically on forms, repertoires, and 
registries of affect and emotion and on their dynamic stabilization as parts of 
specific material and nonmaterial contexts. The two preceding parts emphasize 
the fluidity and volatility of affect and elaborate on domains of social and cul-
tural life in which this fluidity becomes tamed. Affect is thereby elaborated 
rather than constrained into specific forms that are very loosely coupled to 
specific and more enduring cultural phenomena. The concepts in Part III take 
this idea one step further by proposing perspectives on and understandings of 
affect as more closely intertwined with cultural forms and formations, both 
material and immaterial. Entries here focus, to varying degrees, on the notions 
of resonances and repertoires to illustrate this intertwining. Both of these 
notions can be understood as poles of a continuum along which affect becomes 
stabilized, channeled, labeled, and governed. Affective resonance, in this sense, 
is introduced as a type of relational dynamics of affecting and being affected, 
characterized as a process of the reciprocal modulation between interactants 
(→ affective resonance). Resonance dynamics are seen as intensive or force- like 
phenomenal qualities with a strong emphasis on face- to-face interaction in 
dyads and small groups rather than in larger and more latent social formations. 
On the other end of the continuum, emotion repertoires refer to the indi-
vidual and collective agentic powers to adapt felt experiences in socially and 
culturally appropriate ways (→ emotion repertoires). Emotion repertoires are spe-
cific forms of more general cultural repertoires that individuals learn and inter-
nalize as skills, resources, knowledge, action, practices, and so forth, to 
meaningfully respond to a given social situation. They enable individuals and 
collectives to enact emotions in ways that are broadly deemed compatible with 
and intelligible to prevailing forms of cultural categorizations, interpretations, 
imaginations, and evaluations. Emotion repertoires thus exhibit a certain dur-
ability and resistance to change, although more in the sense of intransigence 
rather than fixation or stability.
 Both notions aptly illustrate the potential of concepts that travel between 
disciplines and contexts. The concepts in Part III tackle issues that pertain to 
the intertwining of affect and cultural forms and practices. The concept of 
(p)reenactment, for example, draws on more established understandings of 
artistic practices of reenactment as the repetitions of past events within 
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literature, media, art, and theater (→ (p)reenactment). It draws attention specifi-
cally to the affective qualities of reenactment while at the same time empha-
sizing their future- oriented dimension. The concept thus promotes an 
understanding of the affective dynamics that evolve between the poles of 
memory/history and visions of the future. The notion thereby bridges analyt-
ical perspectives on the affects of actual, situated artistic practice and culturally 
condensed meanings of past events. In a similar vein, the concept Pathosformel, 
which goes back to art historian Aby Warburg, serves to describe affect as 
being formalized historically, with reference to primal bodily affects such as 
ecstasy or pain, in objects of art (→ Pathosformel). The concept thus serves to 
reflect the idea that affect can be intimately tied to cultural objects, not in 
purely static and inert ways, but rather as expressions of the changing interfer-
ence between stored (formalized) affect and its various forms of historically 
contingent cultural dissemination.
Part IV: collectives and contestations
Further extending the importance of cultural forms and practices, Part IV 
makes explicit the social and political relevance of relational affect. Under-
standing Affective Societies means coming to terms with how affect is the force 
or intensity that interrelates the various bodies of the social, from actors in 
face- to-face interaction to groups with competing interests and the media 
through which many of these relations are made possible and public. The 
chapters in Part IV explicate how affect and emotion contribute to the forma-
tion, preservation, or disruption of various social formations, such as com-
munities, institutions, or nation states. They also shed light onto how affect 
and emotion are themselves subjected to and channeled by these formations, as 
in the case of the affects of citizenship or feelings of communal belonging. The 
perspectives outlined in these chapters are thus multi- paradigmatic in that they 
emphasize different facets and conceptions of the social, from physical co- 
presence and ritual gatherings to networks and institutions and their normative 
and political dimensions. Previous scholarship in the social sciences, following 
the tradition of Ferdinand Tönnies’ (1887/2005) distinction between Gemein-
schaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society), has usually relegated affect and 
emotion to the domains of families and close- knit communities. This part 
clearly shows that societies and their central institutions are similarly made up 
of an affective fabric that is essential to various forms of governance, civic 
engagement, solidarity, and cooperation. The tight interlocking of affective 
phenomena and social formations reflects the view that both are co- 
constitutive: affect and emotion are integral to any form of sociality, and rela-
tional affect is social at its very core. For example, “social collectives” is not 
just an umbrella term for various social formations, but instead refers to a mul-
tiplicity of actors who are situationally affected by and affect one another while 
self- categorizing as part of this multiplicity (→ social collectives).
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 From this standpoint, the chapters in this part develop both social theoret-
ical concepts pinpointing the contested and collective nature of the social and 
concepts and theories of mid- range phenomena that are essential to larger 
societal formations. For example, the social theoretical concept of belonging 
accounts for actors’ affective and pre- reflexive attachments to places, lan-
guages, or material objects, thus sidestepping the notion of cultural identity, 
which would usually include the idea of a categorical identification with par-
ticular values or social collectives (→ belonging). It also emphasizes the sense of 
being accepted as part of a community, while also avoiding the notion of col-
lective identity, which is often understood as emphasizing sameness. Belong-
ing hence reflects one’s sensing of relational affect as a form of attachment to 
social and cultural formations. In a related account, the concept of orders of 
feeling foregrounds those discursive orders that leave marks on individual and 
collective appraisals of feelings, thus shaping socially, culturally, and politically 
proscribed feeling and display rules (→ orders of feeling). Orders of feeling are 
germane to societies, places, social groups, and communities and impinge on 
subjective experiences vis- à-vis institutionalized social and political hier-
archies. Regarding mid- range social phenomena, the concept of affective 
communities draws attention to processes producing a temporal solidarization 
between affecting and affected social bodies (→ affective communities). Instead 
of understanding social formations as outcomes of pre- established rules, 
norms, and structures, the concept of affective communities stresses the 
importance of sensual infrastructures of social encounters and of modes of 
affective exchange that make up the fabric of the formation and transforma-
tion of the social. Affective publics is a concept further developed in this part 
that renders affect central to the understanding of publics as relational, pro-
cessual, and performative arenas (→ affective publics) in which politically con-
tested issues of social coexistence are debated. The concept also does justice 
to the various critiques of normative understandings of a single unitary public, 
accounting for the fragmented and networked character of publics and the 
diversified modes of public communication they entail.
Outlook: the politics of Affective Societies
Since the advent of the turn to affect in the mid- 1990s, much was made of the 
putative political potentials of a notion of pre- categorical dynamic and relational 
affect. Authors wrote about the event- like intensity of affect as a force capable 
of tearing apart gridlocked discursive and practical formations. Affect was thus 
seen as an instigator of cultural and political change, catalyzing processes of 
becoming; a progressive political force unlike any other (e.g., Connolly, 2002; 
Massumi, 2002). While critics were quick – and often correct – to point out the 
one- sided and unwarranted positive assessment of affect in politics that these 
early articulations invoked (e.g., Hemmings, 2005), a thorough and balanced 
discussion of the political ramifications of the relational affect perspective has yet 
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to take place (see Protevi, 2009, for a promising start). In view of recent surges 
of right- wing political parties and movements in many Western countries that 
often rely heavily on affective forms of mobilization, and considering their 
expressed longing for radical disruption and uprising against what is perceived as 
a globalized, multi- cultural status quo, it can seem that the political “promise of 
affect” has changed sides from left to (far) right. This makes a sound and detailed 
understanding of the many dimensions of political affect all the more urgent. 
Here lies a major challenge for contemporary studies of affect and emotion in 
the social sciences, cultural studies, and the humanities – and it is here where a 
research endeavor such as Affective Societies has the potential to make a significant 
and timely contribution.
 Many of the chapters in this volume speak to the political dimensions of 
affect and emotion in what we hope amounts to a careful probing of the eman-
cipatory potentials vis- à-vis the risks and downsides of affect and emotion in 
politics. What these chapters jointly bring about, first and foremost, is a much- 
needed broadening of perspective. Various processes and techniques of govern-
ance that involve affect are discussed, both in their productive and their 
exploitative capacities (→ immersion, immersive power; → sentiment). Multiple 
forms and dimensions of collectivization come in view – as empowering means 
to foster solidarity, but also with regard to inherent tendencies toward closure 
and exclusion (→ social collectives; → affective communities). Moreover, a premium 
is put on new developments in political communication and recent transforma-
tions of the public sphere (→ affective publics), including new subversive practices 
enabled by new media and interactive technologies (→ affective witnessing; 
→ Midān moments). In a different key, the more subtle aesthetic dimensions of 
commonality and collective imaginaries are analyzed with precision thanks to 
refined affect theoretical concepts (→ Pathosformel; → poetics of affect), and like-
wise the circulation and profound temporal logic of affective formations 
(→ affective economy; → (p)reenactment). Backed by these perspectives on specific 
dimensions of the political significance and efficacy of affect and emotion, other 
contributions are in a good position to tackle contemporary regimes of affective 
politics, such as the pervasive policing of cultural modes of belonging and 
national identities (→ affective citizenship; → belonging), or to ask more founda-
tional questions with regard to the theoretical nexus between affect and politics. 
For instance, it will be asked how an elementary striving for freedom that many 
associate with the ultimate “point” of the political (e.g., Arendt, 1961) might be 
construed in a way that is profoundly social – cognizant of the constitutive 
relationality that links all individuals with one another and to their material and 
natural surroundings (→ political affect).
 In light of these various elaborations on the political dimension of Affective 
Societies, we are convinced that the present volume will advance this segment 
of affect theory considerably and steer well clear of earlier one- sided and 
uncritical perspectives. However, we do not over- estimate this achievement. 
In view of the recent surges of xenophobia, right- and left- wing populism 
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and extremism, unabashed outbursts and shameless public displays of group- 
and identity- focused enmity, ressentiment or hatred, it is vital for affect and 
emotion experts to stay on top of these developments. A willingness to 
engage with surprising, unexpected aspects of this trend is needed, including 
a readiness to confront – and rigorously analyze – the ugly downsides of 
political affectivity. The present volume provides the conceptual foundations 
for work of this kind. The tools are here – it is now time to put them to 
good use in future work on the exhilarating affective dynamics of con-
temporary social and political life.
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Part I
Affect and emotion
Charting the landscape

Chapter 2
Affect
Jan Slaby and Rainer Mühlhoff
In this initial chapter of the Affective Societies: Key Concepts volume we outline 
a basic understanding of affect circumscribing a general tendency that we 
deem fruitful as an analytical perspective. This understanding builds on a 
notion of affect as relational dynamics between evolving bodies in a setting, 
thus contrasting with approaches to affect as inner states, feelings, or emo-
tions. “Affect” designates specifically those encounters between bodies that 
involve a change – either enhancement or diminishment – in their respective 
bodily capacities or micro- powers. Thus, affect is inextricable from an 
approach to power, understood as relations of reciprocal efficaciousness 
between bodies – human as well as non- human – in a particular domain. This 
suggests an affect- based perspective on the dynamic formation and subsequent 
transformation of individual entities – their ontogenesis and individuation – 
instead of assuming that entities, whether ordinary objects or human actors, 
are ready- made, stable, and fixed. For human actors, affects are material and 
ideational relations that, in the short term, increase or diminish their agentive 
and existential capacities in relation to their surroundings and all other actors 
and entities present in a situation. In the longer term, affective relations consti-
tute human and non- human actors, insofar as affective relations over time 
both establish and subsequently modulate – make, unmake, remake – indi-
vidual capacities and dispositions. In other words, relational affect is a central 
factor in the process of subject formation. Moreover, relational affect is a 
driving force in the formation and subsequent consolidation of larger aggreg-
ates of bodies, that is, in processes of collectivization.
 Delineating affect in such general terms is productive for devising research 
perspectives in a number of different fields and with different goals and meth-
odological orientations. Methodologically and conceptually, we will approach 
affective phenomena neither as individual mental states, nor as categorically cir-
cumscribed episodes within human practices (→ emotion, emotion concept). Rather, 
they constitute forceful encounters between evolving entities within tangles of 
formative relations (→ affective arrangements). Emphasis is placed on develop-
mental processes, variable power relations, change and transformation, on the 
formative settings that are the backdrop of ontogenesis and subjectification, and 
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on the spontaneous, intensive association of entities into larger aggregates 
(→ affective communities). In addition, this perspective helps to bring into view 
subtle affective dynamics that may otherwise escape the purview of research-
ers. However, all these phenomena – human actors and their characteristics, 
mental states, interactive practices, social collectives, established systems of 
categories and feeling rules – may still be thought of as the transient yet tem-
porarily consolidated results of such affective encounters. This conception of 
affect – mainly developed from materials found in the philosophy of Benedict 
de Spinoza, read through Gilles Deleuze – is generative of further working 
concepts apt to illuminate the nexus between affect, power, and subjectivity. 
The purpose of this chapter and of several subsequent chapters in this volume 
is to flesh out this cluster of ideas and its conceptual background and high-
light some of the implications for the contemporary study of affect.
Foundation: Spinoza’s relational approach to 
affect
Talking affect with Spinoza
That a key strand of contemporary affect studies is rooted in Spinoza’s philo-
sophy makes it interesting but also vexing. Spinoza offers an all- encompassing 
metaphysical system – a dynamic form of substance monism – that opposes 
central lines of Western philosophical thought running from Descartes via 
Kant to many individualistic and mentalistic approaches in the 20th century 
(cf. Andermann, 2016; Balibar, 1997; Gatens & Lloyd, 1999; Saar, 2013; 
Sharp, 2011). This oft- unacknowledged conflict of metaphysical frameworks 
lies behind some of the controversies surrounding the turn to affect in the 
past 30 years, and might explain some of the misunderstandings and confu-
sions that beset its proponents and opponents alike (cf. Massumi, 1995; Leys, 
2011; see Gatens, 2014, for clarification). In this section, we therefore revisit 
Spinoza’s understanding of affect in light of his overall ontological approach, 
so as to bring the basic perspectives and underlying thought of contemporary 
Spinoza- and Deleuze- inspired affect studies into view. Our account is geared 
to present- day concerns, and aims to strike a balance between philosophical 
reconstruction and a systematic perspective on research. In the second half of 
this chapter we relate this understanding of affect to current approaches 
within affect studies.
 In Spinoza’s main work, Ethica (1677/1985), especially when interpreted 
in a Deleuzian key (e.g., Deleuze 1981/1988a, 1968/1990), affect can be 
characterized along the lines of three thematic vectors: (1) a relational onto-
logy; (2) a constitutive interplay of affecting and being affected; (3) a dynamic 
and polycentric understanding of power.
 Before we explicate these three conceptual strands, a note on Spinoza’s – 
and our own – terminology is in order. Spinoza distinguishes between 
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1 The term “affection” in current English is misleading in this context, as it refers to particu-
larly affectional (i.e., loving) relations, not to affective relations of all kinds as Spinoza’s term 
affectio was meant to refer to. Thus, we will stick with the Latin term wherever the pro-
nounced understanding of affectio is in play, while “affect” captures Spinoza’s affectus well 
enough for a start.
2 References to Spinoza’s Ethics follow the common citation scheme using the work’s internal 
segmentation in parts (I–V), propositions (prop.), scholia (schol.), proofs (dem.), definitions 
(def.), and others.
affections (lat. affectio, affectiones) and affects (lat. affectus).1 Each is closely related 
to his metaphysical position of substance monism, as they are basic onto-
logical notions that apply at the level of being itself. According to Spinoza, 
there is only one substance that is truly all- encompassing, constituting a field 
of immanence to which all being and all reflection on being is inevitably tied. 
Neither an external observer’s position, nor an encompassing representation 
of reality is conceivable in Spinoza’s account, only involved articulations from 
positions within substance. This one substance – not coincidentally also called 
“nature” or “god” – is dynamically differentiated into an infinite amount of 
finite modes. These modes – literally, the modifications of substance – are the 
various discernible entities: all that there is. In its most basic sense, “affec-
tion,” in the sense of the Latin affectio, is just another word for “mode”: “By 
mode I understand the affections of a substance, or that which is in another 
through which it is also conceived” (Spinoza, 1677/1985, I def. 5).2 Yet at 
the same time, and given the nature of modes as ongoing dynamic modifica-
tions of substance, affects- as-affectio are also the relations between the various 
modes, the effects and impacts they mutually exert on one another. In other 
words, then, Spinoza’s affectio refers to the being of entities in a dynamic rela-
tional ontology, and also – or thereby – to the impression made, or trace left, 
on entities by their dynamic encounters with other such modes (cf. Deleuze, 
1981/1988a; Andermann, 2016).
 While affects- as-affectio are all relations between entities (modes) within the 
one substance, Spinoza uses “affect” (lat. affectus) to designate those affections 
that effectively either increase or diminish the powers – agentive capacities or 
potentia – of the entities in question (Spinoza, 1677/1985, III def. 3). As such 
significant impacts, affects- as-affectus might be conceived of as durational 
transitions from one state of being into another. As Deleuze (1981/1988a) 
suggests, from here it is not far- fetched to assume that, in the case of sentient 
creatures, some of these significant transitions register as a felt durée, as feel-
ings, in other words (cf. pp. 39ff., 48f., 62f.). Viewed from this angle, affects- 
as-affectus might be separately individuated and named, thus approaching what 
in current terminology is referred to as emotion: the categorical types desig-
nated as, for example, happiness, sadness, fear, anger, shame, and so on. 
However, a premature focus on the categorical sorting, individual enactment, 
and conscious feeling of such consolidated affects can lead us away from 
acknowledging Spinoza’s principal point, namely that affects- as-affectus are 
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relational phenomena unfolding dynamically and effectively in- between enti-
ties, both human and non- human, and within formative environments. They 
are not – or not initially – individual human comportments, let alone “mental 
states.” For this reason, we postpone the discussion of the relationship 
between affect and emotion to the chapter on emotion (→ emotion, emotion 
concept).
 As a terminological orientation, we use “affect” (affectus/affectio) roughly in 
the way Spinoza employs these terms, while we use the non- Spinozist term 
“affectivity” generically to cover the whole extended family of affective 
phenomena that encompasses, for instance, emotions, feelings, sentiments, 
moods, atmospheres, and so on. In contexts where it is important to preserve 
the Spinozan nuances, we write affect- as-affectio and affect- as-affectus for 
maximal clarity (or just the Latin affectio and affectus in short). Our wager 
throughout is that even short of a theoretically pure adoption of Spinoza’s 
metaphysical outlook, this approach can help inform – either embellish and 
dynamize or productively challenge – other theoretical perspectives on affec-
tive phenomena.
Toward a systematic understanding of affect and affectio
We will now unpack successively some of what is implicit in the general 
determination of Spinoza’s understanding of affectio/affectus. Contemporary 
affect theory and related work would benefit from adopting, or at least 
accounting for, these aspects of Spinoza’s thought.
 (1) Relational ontology. Affect/affectio refers to dynamics of mutual effective 
impingement in relations, that is, between individual entities. This presents us 
with a productive approach to the question of the constitution or formation 
of individual entities, or the process of ontogenesis. To Spinoza, an individual 
(“finite mode”) is nothing more or less than how it manifests in relations of affect-
ing and being affected. Individuation, on this account, is an open process of rela-
tional modulation not guided by an anticipated result or blueprint. It thus 
presents a radically relational and dynamic understanding of individuals and 
their affective encounters. The individual on this approach is a transiently sta-
bilized node in an encompassing relational dynamic and thus constitutively 
entangled with other individuals and a shared formative milieu. Gilbert 
Simondon’s (1989/2005) concept of transindividuality is apt for capturing this 
dynamic- relational understanding of individuals. It emphasizes both the 
separate and unique character of individuals once constituted, and the essen-
tial sharedness of the formative relational domain, or pre- individual milieu, in 
which individuation takes place (Balibar, 1997; see also Sharp, 2011, 
pp. 34–42).
 Another important takeaway of Spinoza’s ontological approach is the 
theorem commonly referred to as ontological “parallelism,” in opposition to 
Cartesian dualism. Human affects in Spinoza are inseparably both a bodily 
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3 For details on this point see Deleuze (1968/1990, pp. 91–95, 217–224), Kwek (2015) and 
Mühlhoff (2018). In Spinoza’s Ethica (1677/1985), this interpretation refers to the group of 
propositions in part III, prop. 49–59 and part IV, prop. 33.
and a mental dynamic, that is, they are, as affectiones, simultaneously relations 
between bodies and “the ideas of these affections” (Spinoza, 1677/1985, def. 
3). Spinoza (1677/1985) states that “the mind and the body are one and the 
same thing, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now 
under the attribute of extension” (prop. 2 schol.). Extension and thinking are 
just two attributes under which the “order and connection of things” as part 
of the one substance may be explicated, and “hence the order of actions and 
passions of our body is, by nature, at one with the order of actions and pas-
sions of the mind” (Spinoza, 1677/1985, III, prop. 2 schol.). This parallelism 
theorem is an important background axiom to an understanding of affect as 
social micro- dynamics. It gives the reason why the nexus of affective 
dynamics and concurrent subjectivity must be analyzed in social situations and 
networks of relations where affect is a register of reciprocity on a bodily and a 
mental level.
 (2) Affecting and being affected. Another key characteristic of Spinoza’s notion 
of affect/affection is that it is always referring to a correlative interplay of 
affecting and being affected. An affective relation is not a one- sided or unilat-
eral impact of one individual on another. Rather, active and receptive 
involvement are inseparable. This entails that the unfolding of an affective 
dynamic is not reducible to properties of only one of the involved individuals. 
The way one individual is affecting and being affected in a situation co- 
depends on all the other participating individuals, both human and non- 
human alike.3 Rather than asking who is affecting whom in a given situation, 
the question how a relational dynamic of affecting and being affected evolves 
in the immanence of a given situation is rendered salient. This informs a basic 
directive for research, namely, the requirement to situate a putative affective 
dynamic within its specific micro- relational milieu, and thus investigate affect 
as part of complex, polycentric, and spatio- temporally extended affective 
arrangements (→ affective arrangements).
 Understanding affect as an interplay of affecting and being affected does 
not boil down to a concept which assumes a cascade of “one- directional 
affections” (individual A affecting B with subsequent “counter affection” of B 
on A) that sums up to reciprocity merely on an aggregate level. The interplay 
of affecting and being affected should be understood in a strong sense, even 
to the point of transforming the implied understanding of causality. The pro-
totypically modern idea of causality as transitive, with billiard balls as the 
standard model, shifts into thinking of immanent causality between things as 
parts of a higher context of effectuation, of which the physics of coupled 
oscillators would be the textbook model (→ affective resonance). Thus the ele-
mentary structure of our Spinoza- based concept of affect is that of a joined 
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movement- with, of a durational coupling of the individuals’ movements in 
reciprocal modulations and resonances, so that it is impossible to say A is 
affecting B without B affecting A. In a Deleuzian terminology, this is to say 
that affecting and being affected is always forming an open process, a process 
of becoming (cf. Deleuze and Guattari, 1980/1987, ch. 10). Of course, this 
perspective does not preclude the singling out of affective and agentive con-
tributions of individuals, nor is it blind to acts of singular and one- sided viol-
ence. To the contrary, it allows to explicate how the violence of a perpetrator 
is often enabled by structural constellations of relative inequalities in affective 
capacities and by overall situational dynamics as their manifestation.
 (3) Power. The concept of affect in Spinoza is intimately connected with – 
even identical to – an understanding of power. Spinoza attributes to each 
individual a potentia, which is a kind of “micro power.” This potentia is not 
something that individuals possess besides their other characteristics. Potentia 
might best be translated as the individual’s capacity to enter into relations of 
affecting and being affected – or affective capacity in short (cf. Spinoza, 
1677/1985, III, post. 1 and 2; Deleuze, 1981/1988a, pp. 49–50). In Spinoza’s 
ontology this amounts to saying that an affective capacity is the individual 
entity’s ability of being in general: “Posse existere potentia est” (“to be able to 
exist is to have power,” Spinoza, 1677/1985, I, prop. 11 dem.). At the same 
time, an individual’s affective capacity is also a receptive capacity as affect is 
always both active and receptive. Potentia is thus the individual’s specific sus-
ceptibility to affections by others as much as it is its power to affect others 
through one’s acts or one’s sheer presence. In combination this makes for the 
fundamental heteronomy in the constitution of the individual in Spinoza, 
whose being is both an expression of its own potentia and modulated by all 
the other individuals (and their potentia) around.
 In this dynamic notion of individuation, a spatial (or “extensive”) and a 
temporal dimension can be distinguished. The “extensive” dimension figures 
prominently in the Deleuzian reading of Spinoza and in some contributions 
to affect studies. It stresses that an individual is nothing but a composition of 
smaller individuals in specific “relations of motion and rest” (see Spinoza, 
1677/1985, II, axioms and lemmata after prop. 13; Deleuze, 1981/1988a, 
pp. 91–92, 123). When a mode “encounters another mode, it can happen 
that this other mode is ‘good’ for it,” so that both enter into composition; 
“or on the contrary decomposes it and is ‘bad’ for it.” In these cases, the 
mode’s “power of acting or force of existing increases or diminishes, since the 
power of the other mode is added to it, or on the contrary is withdrawn from 
it, immobilizing and restraining it” (Deleuze, 1981/1988a, pp. 49–50). What 
an individual is at a given point in time is variable, shifting according to the 
prevalent level of individuation for the explication of a social configuration. 
Such a configuration may sometimes be comprised of humans, of parts of 
humans, of couples, teams, families, corporations, or states and so on. This is 
particularly fruitful for the analysis of structural power phenomena as it 
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4 By the same token, what is in common sense referred to as an individual’s “power” is to be 
explained as a manifestation of their potentia as it is rendered effective in a socially, politically, 
economically stabilized structural constellation of many individuals. That is, an individual’s 
power to act, or even to command or to repress, is not a property of that individual alone, 
but the joint product of larger, relational constellations. Some refer to this crystallized form of 
power as potestas in distinction to potentia (see Negri, 1991; Hardt & Negri, 2000), while the 
clear origin of that distinction in Spinoza is under dispute (see Saar, 2013).
enables understanding the fundamental heteronomy of the individual on 
different scales of relatedness but without rendering the individual passive or 
depriving it of an own power.4
 Along the temporal dimension of individuation, an individual’s potentia is 
always also a product of their history of relations of affecting and being 
affected. The temporal structure of individuation is what makes for a transsit-
uative coherence of one and the same individual passing through a series of 
situations and contexts of relatedness over time, counterbalancing to some 
extent the transience and variability of entities on the process ontological 
account. How an individual can affect and be affected is a result of a kind of 
bodily and environmental repository for specific patterns of affectivity in past 
relations. This repository works by means of the sedimentation of past 
patterns of affect into the potentia, which are thus present as potentials in 
current relations, co- shaping an individual’s affects, actions, and embodiment 
(→ affective disposition). This suggests an account of how past patterns of inter-
action are not identically repeated, but act as tendencies in present affective 
relations – not entirely unlike what gets expressed by notions such as 
“habitus” and “performativity” in practice theory (cf. Bourdieu, 1990; 
Wetherell, 2012) (→ affective practice). Along these lines, the genesis of an indi-
vidual’s potentia can be extended to an analysis of social structures, such as 
gendered or racialized modes of interaction inscribed and perpetuated as pat-
terns of affective relatedness, also consolidated within institutions and often 
blocked from view by being assumed as inevitable givens in the routines of 
day- to-day practice (cf. Mühlhoff, 2018) (→ affects of racialization).
Contemporary affect: ideas and directions
In this second part of our chapter, we extract central ideas for understanding 
affect in contemporary affect research, drawing especially on lines of work 
belonging to what has been termed “cultural affect theory” or the “turn to 
affect.” While we find it unhelpful to play up the putative contrast between 
affect and emotion, it is clear that a Spinozan perspective on affect engenders 
a different analytical gaze, different methodologies, and different research 
questions than work centered on a predominantly anthropocentric, categori-
cal conception of emotion (→ emotion, emotion concept). With this concept of 
affect, a dynamic- materialist ontology challenges the reflexive individualism 
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5 A convincing and accurately wide- ranging exposition of the various strands and perspectives 
of the turn to affect is to be found in the Introduction to the seminal Affect Theory Reader (see 
Gregg & Seigworth, 2010, pp. 6–9). A notable recent account and showcase of the non- 
human strands of affect studies, including a take on the innovative method of “affect analysis” 
is Kwek and Seyfert (2018).
long dominant in Western modernity. This classical mode of thought is pre-
mised on the separation of intelligibility and materiality – articulated variously 
as “body” versus “mind,” or “human” versus “non- human” or “reason” 
versus “nature,” or similar such dichotomies. In light of this, it is unfortunate 
that post- 1990s affect studies were initially pitched by some as a radical break 
with discourse- and language- based approaches to cultural articulation. While 
this was understandable as a strategic reaction against a perceived hegemony 
of poststructuralism (see for example Massumi, 1995, 2002; Sedgwick & 
Frank, 1995), Spinoza’s affectio/affectus both cross- cut and dynamize these 
modernist orderings. That is, they fulfill rather than counter a key poststruc-
turalist aspiration (cf. Terada, 2001). In light of this it is feasible, for instance, 
to explore an account of language as affect (→ writing affect), or focus on the 
affectivity driving discursive practices, or understand affect – as Deleuze 
(1985/1989) suggests – as part of the vital core of what was long considered 
its very opposite: thought itself.
 We cannot develop all these ideas here. Instead, we will identify three 
broader strands of affect- oriented work that have been noteworthy in recent 
years. This selection is not meant to be exhaustive.5 What these three orienta-
tions have in common is that they all approach affect as a modality of power 
– force, effectiveness, potential – not (directly) wielded by human actors. As 
such, these lines of work foreground questions pertaining to the often diffuse, 
distributed operations and formative workings of power in various societal 
sectors and domains of practice (→ political affect).
Bodies- in-relation
Spinoza’s understanding of affectio/affectus features the body in its full worldly 
complexity and environmental permeability, as that which stands in constant 
onto- formative relation with the surroundings and registers – in all sorts of 
sensuous, vital, material, and dynamic ways – what goes on around it. At this 
point, there is a significant overlap with (post-)phenomenological approaches 
in affect studies that emphasize the situated embodiment of affect and the 
affective sensitivity of situated bodies. For instance, Sara Ahmed (2007) 
powerfully expounds the ways that racist public discourse, discriminatory 
social practices, and the operations of paramount institutions – for example 
those of law enforcement, administrative bureaucracy, or the education sector 
– invent, enforce, and sustain the “norms of whiteness” (Ahmed, 2007). The 
effects of these discursive and institutional operations always sooner or later 
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6 Authors who prefer to speak of affects rather than affect also tend to distinguish less sharply 
between affects and emotions. This pertains, for instance, to the work of Ahmed and also to 
that of feminist affect theorist Lauren Berlant (2011). An illuminating discussion of different 
strands of affect- versus affects- centered approaches is provided by Donovan Schaefer (2015).
land – often violently – on the bodies of those who find themselves subject to 
these power dynamics, but also – in different registers of affective impinge-
ments – on the bodies of privileged subjects who align seamlessly with the 
norms and routines of institutions created in their own image: “White bodies 
are comfortable as they inhabit spaces that extend their shape” (Ahmed, 2007, 
p. 158). Ahmed’s work is but the most visible among a growing number of 
interrogations of affect’s involvements in racialization and other violent forms 
of othering, discrimination, and structural oppression (see for example Ngai, 
2005; Chen, 2012; Berg & Ramos- Zayas, 2015; Palmer, 2017; Schuller, 
2018) (→ affects of racialization).
 These lines of work in part continue an earlier feminist and queer theor-
etic current in the turn to affect. In the mid- 1990s, acclaimed queer theorist 
Eve Sedgwick had embarked on a quest to turn the study of affects into a key 
dimension of cultural inquiry, drawing on work by the psychologist Silvan 
Tomkins. With hindsight, Sedgwick’s engagement with Tomkins appears less 
as a transfer of psychological theory into the humanities than as a generous 
reading that pushes beyond the usual demarcations and border policing tend-
encies in earlier humanities scholarship. Tomkins’ categorical model of nine 
transculturally universal affect programs did not have much staying power 
within cultural affect studies. With their queer forays into materialist and 
scientific domains, Sedgwick, Elizabeth Grosz, and others instead paved the 
way for productive lines of work in feminist theory – work characterized by a 
return to questions of materiality and embodiment and by a renewed open-
ness toward cross- disciplinary articulations and remixes de- emphasizing the 
strictures of poststructuralism and discourse theory. Inspired by Tomkins’ 
categorical approach, these authors invoked affects – writ small and in the 
plural – more than Affect in a grandiose singular, as an analytical angle for 
studying the plurality and heterogeneity of modes of bodily affection in 
relation to societal arrangements and power structures.6
 We recommend emphasizing convergences in various different approaches 
and lines of work that all focus on the complex interactive relationality of 
bodies – human as well as non- human – that coalesce locally to form 
efficacious affective configurations and affective communities (→ affective 
communities). For instance, there is a long legacy of work on complexly situ-
ated, technologically enhanced, extended, or biomediated bodies – Donna 
Haraway’s Manifesto for Cyborgs (1984; see Haraway, 1991) is an early land-
mark – that should be conjoined with the more classically phenomenological 
approaches to affect or affects as bodies- in-relation. We think of work by 
Marie- Luise Angerer, Lisa Blackman, Rosi Braidotti, Theresa Brennan, Rey 
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7 A noteworthy historical study of these lines of thought, with critical emphasis on the prob-
lematic biopolitical dimension of notions of impressibility, sentimentality and the body–
milieu nexus in the 19th century, is Kyla Schuller’s The Biopolitics of Feeling (2018). The 
appearance of historical scholarship of this type signals a welcome new phase of scholarly 
rigor and critical awareness in discourses surrounding affect.
Chow, Patricia Clough, Richard Grusin, Mark Hansen, and Luciana Parisi, 
among many others. These approaches are tentatively united by under-
standing bodies of all kinds as constitutively relational, and as permeable, 
extendable, and plastic.7 Likewise, these scholars share a sense for bodies’ 
capacity to resonate, to swing with ambient forces and processes, or in general 
of both living and technological bodies’ inherent proneness for energetic 
transmission, auratic radiance, rhythmic attunement, and also, not least, for 
more immediately physical imbrications and entanglements (→ affective reson-
ance). The named authors share the conviction that there is no natural sanctity 
to the unscathed, unenhanced, non- mediated biological body – be it human 
or animal – or rather: such allegedly pristine natural bodies do not exist, and 
likely have never existed. In light of this, a Spinoza- based perspective on 
affect – together with other lines of work of different origins – encourages 
studies of the specific imbrications of bodies and designed spaces, technolo-
gies, media, and other artifactual arrangements of contemporary societies.
Affective arrangements: individual and milieu
This brings us to a second segment of affect- centric approaches. A good deal 
of current work on affect focuses on the effective entanglement of individuals 
with the arrangements and apparatuses of specific milieus, settings or domains. 
Lawrence Grossberg (2010), in an interview on the origins and prospects of 
affect studies, raises this very point: “[W]hat are the machinic apparatuses or 
regimes of discourse that are constituting the ways in which we live our lives? 
The possibilities of affect and their articulations to conjunctures and historical 
ontologies?” (p. 314). Grossberg asks this question in part with critical intent, 
alleging that some scholars – Brian Massumi among them – directly “leap 
from a set of ontological concepts to a description of an empirical and affec-
tive context” (Grossberg, 2010, p. 314). Grossberg contends that these 
authors fail to pay enough attention to the various arrangements and set- ups 
that make affect concretely effective at particular sites of social life.
 Over and above the ontological plane, where affect- as-affectio is described 
in an abstract register of intensive force relations, there is in each case a spe-
cific organizational, equipmental, spatial or technological set- up of the 
domains under study. It is these “machinic arrangements” – a certain elabo-
rated format of affect- as-affectus – that kindle, channel, and sustain tangible 
relations of affecting and being affected, and that work as operative registers 
of time- and place- specific affective dynamics, often manifest as an in each 
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8 Not fully fitting this second rubric is work on the aesthetic forms pertaining to modes of 
affecting and being affected. Such → poetics of affect play an important role in many artistic 
genres as well as in contemporary practices and formats of media (→ economy of affect). 
Eugenie Brinkema (2014) has provided an excellent study of such “forms of the affects,” 
intended both as a critical corrective to some strands of work in affect studies and a continu-
ation of earlier approaches especially to cinematic affect.
case unique concatenation of what Foucault called the sayable and the seeable 
(Foucault 1977/1980; cf. Deleuze, 1986/1988b, pp. 47–69).
 This angle on affect calls for approaches that study the relevant processes in 
situ by way of various empirical methods. This could mean, for example, that 
researchers chart the material propping of concrete locations, to focus on the 
orchestrated coordination of individuals present at a given site (for instance in 
the study of crowd behavior or in audience research); that they check out 
frequency patterns, intensity contours, and dynamics of communication in, 
for instance, white- collar workplaces, kindergartens, or school yards; that they 
investigate the differential affective responsiveness of patients or customers in 
medical settings, or study the minutiae of how user practices and user affec-
tivity are modulated or subtly nudged by the design features of social media, 
and much else. Work of this kind is required to make good on a central 
aspect of the ontological “promise of affect”: namely that affect is locally 
manifest as a shape- shifting level of material effectiveness, sedimented into 
historical formations that, in all sorts of ways, contribute to establishing and 
sustaining a time- bound, initially inchoate yet characteristic and repeatable 
structure of feeling (Williams, 1977). What is called for here is the transition 
from ontology in general to historical ontology, a step mediated by concepts on 
the meso- scale of cultural articulation – concepts such as Deleuze’s and Guat-
tari’s agencement machinique or Foucault’s dispositif, which have been produc-
tively adapted to affect studies, for instance as “affectif ” (Seyfert, 2012), as 
“affective apparatus” (Anderson, 2014) or as what we prefer to call an affective 
arrangement (Slaby, Mühlhoff, & Wüschner, 2017) (→ affective arrangement).
 There is much work in affect studies that heeds Grossberg’s directive. For 
example, take Melissa Gregg’s (2011) chartings of white- collar workplaces, team-
work and telecommuting work arrangements; Robert Seyfert’s (2018) case study 
of high- frequency trading; Natasha Dow Schüll’s (2014) forays into machine 
gambling in Las Vegas, or consider Grossberg’s (1992) own pioneering work on 
the “rock formation” and popular music more broadly, Michael Richardson’s 
(2016) work on affective witnessing (→ affective witnessing), or Ahmed’s (2012) 
ethnography of the institutional non- performativity of diversity committees.8
Affect and the “wild beyond”
And yet – there will be many who won’t be satisfied with this swift turn to the 
concrete, the material, the organizational. Is there not quite another “promise of 
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9 We think here especially of Ruth Leys’ (2011) sweeping – and rather reductive – critique of 
the Massumi- inspired turn to affect, and related moves by other acclaimed scholars, such as 
Emily Martin (2013) in anthropology. Gatens (2014), Hemmings (2005), and Wetherell 
(2012) offer more balanced yet also predominantly critical assessments of the more radical 
strands of affect theory.
affect” that springs from the pages of Spinoza, and likewise from the writings of 
Bergson, Whitehead, Deleuze, and others? Isn’t it this other spirit of affect that 
Massumi tries to bring out in his refusal to let affect be captured by hegemonic 
codes, discourses, or apparatuses? Indeed, this is what goes on when Massumi 
tries to evoke, express, and hold on to an affective intensity that transpires before 
world, subject, experience, solidify into enduring formations. Preconscious, non-
 human, rife with vital forces (“the virtual”), intensive, at times wild and ecstatic 
– it is this image of affect that some of the deacons of intellectual high culture 
instinctively oppose, because they see it go against fixtures of humanist inquiry: 
against representation, normativity, the subject, intentionality, critique, discip-
linary standards of scholarship, and much else.9 To conclude our chapter, we cast 
a glance over to this other, this wild side of affect.
 Long before the recent turn to affect, Raymond Williams brought forth his 
seminal notion “structure of feeling” in an attempt to re- invoke the living pres-
ences beneath and prior the forms, wholes, and constructs that make up the 
warp and weft of cultural activity. It was meant as a counterpoint to what he 
called the “habitual past tense” of social analysis: “reduction of the social to 
fixed forms remains the basic error” (Williams, 1977, p. 129). This notion antic-
ipated the more radical strands of contemporary affect theory. Williams calls for 
a theoretical sensibility for the energetic immediacy of affective encounters, to 
the uncurbed forces of relation. This is not far removed from the impersonal 
vitality that Deleuze invokes when he discusses affect throughout his oeuvre. 
This more radical end of the affect spectrum remains mostly unacknowledged 
and unaccounted for within the terms and habits of routine understanding, yet 
it energizes, it crucially in- forms day- to-day existence. To call what transpires in 
these fleeting moments pre- subjective, preconscious, pre- discursive, or non- human does 
not signal a naive break with established scholarly practice. When bouts of 
unanticipated intensity well up within routine activity, they provide an occasion 
for change, potentially inspiring fresh articulations of what seemed self- evident 
before. Affect in this sense is a generative irruption, potentially kindling trans-
itions from established understandings toward new thoughts and new discursive 
and practical moves. What is at issue is a dynamic reservoir of possibility, spheres 
of potential – what is formative but not yet formed.
 Williams – in his day less concerned with the non- human than with the 
infrastructures of social experience as lived – used the somewhat pedestrian 
notion “practical consciousness,” a term too narrow in scope for many of the 
purposes of current affect studies. Yet still, this concept points to the 
important idea of dynamic openness of affect and affect- imbued thought: 
Affect  39
10 “Wild beyond” is a phrase we borrow from Jack Halberstam’s foreword to Stefano Harney’s 
and Fred Moten’s The Undercommons (2013). Halberstam does not use it as an affect- related 
notion but as a broader denomination that signals a break with the structured, organized, 
politically formatted realm of Euro- modernity. The more radical strands of affect studies 
share this orientation at least in spirit.
“a kind of feeling and thinking which is indeed social and material, but each 
in an embryonic phase before it can become fully articulate and defined” 
(Williams, 1977, p. 131). Not incidentally, one of the first examples Williams 
mentions is language. He notes that no generation speaks in quite the same 
way as the preceding generation – that there will be shifts in style, in tonality, 
changes to the complexion of existence as enfolded into phrases and idioms 
and habits of speaking. What Williams hints at is the fluid underground of 
social and cultural practices, formations, experiences – the virtual sphere that 
contains the seeds of change, and that is ever only partially and provisionally 
articulated and conceptualized. It is crucial not to lose sight of this other side 
of affect, its opening out to a plane of immanence that is at once the “wild 
beyond” to determinate formations, habits, states, and comportments and 
their indispensable formative backdrop.10
 It is this sense for the openness and non- containability of the virtual that 
lets one appreciate (not necessarily like) the more unconventional and experi-
mental writing styles within affect studies, for instance by Kathleen Stewart, 
Ann Cvetkovitch, or Erin Manning. And it renders noteworthy the capacious 
post- Spinozism of Greg Seigworth. Likewise, in this vein, the more meta-
physical and more radically posthuman endeavors surrounding a “new mate-
rialism” seem sensible (if not always well- executed), for example work by 
Karen Barad, Jane Bennett, and Rosi Braidotti among others (cf. Coole & 
Frost, 2010), as do non- anthropocentric or “heterological” perspectives on 
non- human agency, animacy, and on affective configurations that exceed the 
scope of eurocentric humanism (e.g., Chen, 2012; Kwek & Seyfert, 2018).
 This third and last segment of affect- oriented thought might also serve as a 
note of caution at the outset of a volume on the key concepts of Affective Soci-
eties. While it is our goal to approach the social and political prevalence of 
affect with conceptual rigor and terminological clarity, it is evident that no 
degree of conceptual elaboration will exhaust the phenomena under study. 
Affect tends to outrun even its most encompassing and nuanced conceptuali-
zations. However – to end with another suggestion from Spinoza and 
Deleuze – well- made concepts themselves might become affective forma-
tions: concise compositions, conveyors of an intellectual intensity, capable of 
illuminating pockets of reality, even if, at times, more by conjuring a phe-
nomenal poignancy that they cannot quite capture semantically. Thereby – if 
it goes well – focal concepts may set thought and action on new paths. We 
hope that some of this will transpire in the affective practice of reading the 
chapters collected in this volume.
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Chapter 3
Emotion, emotion concept
Christian von Scheve and Jan Slaby
The term emotion, stemming from the Latin emovere (to move out or agitate), 
broadly refers to those affective upheavals in experience that are directed at 
events or objects in the world and that often prompt us to act in specific ways 
vis- à-vis these events or objects. Since antiquity, these episodes have been 
branded by labels like shame, anger, fear, joy, embarrassment, or disgust, and 
classed into categories. Historically, Darwin’s (1872) The Expression of the 
Emotions in Man and Animals was one of the most influential scholarly works 
to inform prominent understandings of emotion in many academic discip-
lines. Across disciplines, there is broad consensus that emotions are discrete in 
kind; that is, they are characterized by specific configurations of phenomenal 
experience, bodily changes, expressions, and action tendencies. Emotions are 
also widely thought to be adaptive, insofar as they are purposeful and mean-
ingful for an individual, and reflect an evaluative engagement with the 
environment that helps one prepare for specific actions. Related to this capa-
city, emotions are generally presumed to fulfill communicative purposes, for 
instance through facial or vocal expressions, which is why they are deemed 
essential to social interaction.
 Following Darwin’s work, two major debates have refined contemporary 
understandings of emotion. William James (1884) held that emotions are, first 
and foremost, a specific class of feelings, to be distinguished from related con-
cepts such as moods, sensations, and sentiments. Emotions according to this 
view are the subjective feelings associated with bodily changes and expressive 
behaviors. Hence, as James (1884, p. 190) famously put it, “we feel sorry 
because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble” – and 
not vice versa. An almost diametrically opposed shift in understanding 
emotion is linked to a well- known experiment by Stanley Schachter and 
Jerome Singer (1962), based on which they proposed that only thoughts and 
cognitions, specifically the interpretation and labeling of events (including 
bodily changes), can bring about a specific emotion. More recent scholarship 
has increasingly sought to integrate key insights of these feeling- based and 
cognitive accounts, resulting in innovative perspectives that emphasize the 
embodied and socially constituted nature of emotion, which we outline in 
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detail in our own approach. Importantly, in this approach, emotions should 
be considered part of an integrated conceptual field that encompasses affect, 
emotion, and feeling. Roughly, whereas “affect” stands for pre- categorical 
relational dynamics and “feeling” for the subjective- experiential dimension of 
these affective relations, “emotion” signifies consolidated and categorically 
circumscribed sequences of affective world- relatedness.
Emotions as realizations and conceptualizations 
of affect
Although there still are many different ways of understanding the concept of 
emotion and much disagreement remains as to its theoretical elaboration, a 
minimal consensus can be identified across traditions and paradigms. As a 
starting ground, this consensus has also proven to be exceptionally fruitful for 
an understanding of societies as affective societies. Emotions thus are con-
ceived of as object- or situation- directed affective comportments that are sorted 
into culturally established and linguistically labeled categories or prototypes, 
such as, for instance, fear, anger, happiness, grief, envy, pride, shame, and 
guilt. These emotion categories mirror specific kinds of evaluative world- 
relations, for example a relation to imminent danger in the case of fear, to an 
offense in the case of indignation, or to a severe loss in the case of grief. 
Needless to say, these evaluations need not be unambiguous, but can be 
fuzzy, ambivalent, or even contradictory, often resulting in experiences of 
mixed feelings and emotions (e.g., Heavey et al., 2017). Hence, emotions 
also reflect concerns of various sorts, from more abstract goals and desires, for 
example for social status or recognition, to more basic needs such as freedom 
from harm or bodily integrity. Whatever theoretical differences are prevalent 
among researchers, we hold that a workable understanding of emotion must 
accommodate this category- specific directedness to salient classes of events or 
objects.
 Emotions thus are inherently relational categories. They are cognitive and 
affective processes unfolding along the lines of a categorically circumscribed 
evaluative relation, linking an actor or a group to specific matters of concern. 
Thus, for example, the emotion type fear comprises those affective processes 
and appraisals for which individuals or groups are affected by an imminent 
danger; anger comprises those thoughts and affective dynamics that relate an 
individual or a group to a harmful offense or transgression, while grief com-
prises dynamics that relate an individual or a group to a situation of significant 
loss (cf. Helm, 2001). Hence, emotion categories cannot be said to denote 
processes “inside” individuals or capitalize on some social or material 
“outside.” Rather, they are indicative of situational entanglements and the rela-
tional co- constitution of actors, situations, and evaluative orientations. This 
constitutive embeddedness is also reflected in recent works stressing the enac-
tive nature of emotions (Krueger & Szanto, 2016; Slaby, 2014). The term 
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“enactive” suggests that emotions do not simply result from the passive repre-
sentational processing of environmental information, but are an outcome of 
the dynamic embodied interaction between actors and their respective 
environments (Colombetti, 2013; Thompson, 2010).
 The idea of emotions reflecting specific situational entanglements also 
suggests that emotions are episodic. In contrast to moods or sentiments 
(→ sentiments), emotion categories mirror situational – rather than the dispo-
sitional – affective world- relations. Importantly, situational here means “from 
the first- person-perspective” and is not limited to physical space or an 
ongoing interaction (Goldie, 2002). For example, recurrent depreciation can 
be seen as an unbearable situation and produce lasting shame about the self. 
Similarly, an insult in a face- to-face conversation provokes anger at someone 
else that is soon dampened by an apology.
 Understanding emotions as situational and episodic is also in- line with 
the view that emotions are usually linked to feelings (→ feelings). When we 
say we are angry, sad, or proud of something, others usually have an 
immediate idea of what it feels like to be in a state of anger, sadness, or pride. 
In how far feelings are “at the core” of an emotion or in fact necessary for 
them is a question that reflects the different positions of James on the one 
hand, and Schachter and Singer on the other, and is still much discussed 
(e.g., Prinz, 2005). Instead of arguing that conscious phenomenal experi-
ence is a necessary ingredient of an emotion, we suggest a perspective from 
which emotions are predominantly realizations and conceptualizations of 
affect (→ affect). Aligning our understanding of affect with the domain of 
human bodies and phenomenal experience, we can interpret an actor’s situ-
atedness as a specific “mode of being” and an evaluative bodily orientation 
toward the world. Affect in this view is related to the idea of finding 
oneself in the world amidst the forces that enable or hinder one’s thriving 
and one’s capacity to act. As a complex bodily stance, affective comport-
ment is not necessarily focused on a specific object, but rather reflects an 
agent’s entire world- directedness in the sense of a specific “affective inten-
tionality” (Slaby, 2008). Importantly, as part of an emotion, these bodily 
feelings may be directed toward objects and events in the world (expressing 
Goldie’s (2002) idea of “feeling towards”) and eventually become categor-
ized and labeled as an emotion.
 Contrary to some prominent proposals from the cultural studies branch of 
affect theorizing (e.g., Massumi, 2002), affect and emotion in this perspective 
are not systematically opposed. Instead, the relationship is that of a construc-
tive interplay. Affect is a dynamic building block, potentially transgressing 
normatively prescribed and learned ways of relating to the world, eliding any 
“inside” versus “outside” distinction. Affect may bring about and intensify 
emotion episodes, for instance when grief, disgust, or anger build up to such 
a degree that little remains of the composure and sense- making capacities 
of the experiencing subject. Likewise, we assume that the conceptualization 
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of affect into an emotion category will have consequences for the intensity of 
the experience and for the bodily specificity of the overall episode.
 The proposed perspective on emotion and how it links to affect in some 
ways tallies with approaches in social psychology. In particular, psychological 
constructionism and the “conceptual act theory of emotion” (Barrett, 2014) 
propose that emotions are situated and embodied conceptualizations of 
changes in the world that are relevant to an actor. Embodied conceptualiza-
tions essentially involve construals of affect or “core affect” as physical bodily 
changes with highly specific phenomenal and evaluative qualities and con-
sequences for action. Also in this view, affect itself is considered to be non- 
conceptual and non- linguistic, and instead as primarily bodily and beyond 
volitional control. Psychological constructionism (as well as other psycho-
logical theories) also argues that affect can be measured and quantified on a 
number of experiential dimensions, mostly valence and arousal. Although this 
perspective is in some respects compatible to our proposed concept of 
emotion, it does differ in its understanding of affect. Whereas from the per-
spective of psychological constructionism affect is exclusively a property of 
the individual human body and its psychological functioning, our under-
standing is much broader in scope and decidedly not located at the level of an 
individual human body. Instead, it is conceived of as the relational dynamics 
between evolving bodies of different sorts and is more of a force, power, and 
intensity than a property of a biological body. Nevertheless, the repercussions 
of this sort of affect in the sense of a human body being affected resembles 
psychological constructionism’s account.
 Understanding emotions as realizations and conceptualizations of affect also 
aligns with the widespread view that – as evaluative and object- directed 
engagements with the environment – emotions also prepare actors for actions 
in a given situation (Frijda, 2004; Döring, 2003). Because emotions reflect 
matters of concern, they also prompt actors into engaging with the things that 
are of import to them. This motivational impetus is directed at the relation 
between the self and the object of the emotion. We are often prompted to 
maintain or alter this relationship as we are frequently pushed towards or 
pulled away from an object in question. Importantly, emotions are associated 
with action tendencies rather than with specific actions. They serve to decouple 
the “stimulus” from the “response” (Scherer, 1994) rather than to initiate 
some fixed action programs, allowing for flexible ways to engage with what 
concretely matters.
 Furthermore, emotions not only prompt towards action, but are a form of 
agency in themselves. Situations become emotional situations because emo-
tions co- constitute situations through a range of behaviors, from body 
postures to facial expressions, vocal intonations, and gestures. In contrast to 
research that continues Darwin’s line of reasoning that specific sets of 
behaviors are inextricably linked to specific emotions, we acknowledge the 
extensive evidence pointing toward notable cross- cultural differences in 
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emotionally expressive behaviors and their meanings (Elfenbein, 2017). This 
does not imply that, for example, frowned eyebrows are an entirely meaning-
less communicative signal. But interpreting them as a sign of the emotion 
category of “anger” requires additional situational cues and culture- specific 
knowledge (Röttger-Rössler, 2004). The agency of emotions in conjunction 
with their action tendencies – which include speech acts and the verbal com-
munication and social sharing of emotion – therefore are a powerful currency 
for social interaction, intersubjectivity, and the emergence of collective emo-
tions (cf. Stodulka, 2017; von Scheve & Ismer, 2013).
 This rough conception of emotion bears several important points. First, 
emotions are episodic realizations of affect, sorted into culturally established and 
thus historically variable sets of prototypical categories. These categories encom-
pass elements of conceptual knowledge and understanding beyond affective 
attunements, bodily processes, feelings, or sensations. Relatedly, emotions both 
presuppose and contribute to shaping an intelligible domain of value, including 
socially instituted and culturally codified domains of concern and significance at 
which the emotions are intentionally directed. This renders emotions relational 
phenomena that are co- constitutive of actors and situations. Importantly, 
categories such as anger, pride, shame, or disgust also refer to specific action 
tendencies and exhibit in themselves agentic powers. Emotions are closely 
related to reflective self- relations, providing sources of self- understanding, 
anchoring individual narratives of value and import, and providing default ways 
of making sense of actions, decisions, and commitments.
 The intrinsic connection between emotion categories and valuations, situ-
ational entanglements, feelings, action tendencies, and communicative behaviors 
inextricably relates individual traits and experience to cultural repertoires and 
patterns of social organization. This relatedness is critical to providing actors 
with meaning, intelligibility, and accountability as they constitute social and 
communal life. Our proposed understanding of emotion brings to the fore an 
inherent tension that is deliberately built into the concept. On the one hand, 
emotion categories reflect socially shared (though historically and culturally 
diverse) forms of knowledge and experience, for instance through processes of 
socialization and acculturation (→ Gefühlsbildung). This also entails notions of 
praxis and normative expectations regarding the experience, expression, and 
valuation of emotions (→ orders of feeling) as well as the adequate ways to work 
on or manage them (e.g., what we find disgusting or praiseworthy, how to 
respond to specific dangers, or how to adequately deal with conflict, loss, mis-
chief, and so on) (Scheer, 2012; Thoits, 2004). On the other hand, emotions 
also reflect individual predispositions, affections, biographies, and embodied 
experiences that do not always fit seamlessly into the socially circumscribed pro-
totypicality of emotion categories (→ affective disposition).
 This tension between the individual and the collectively shared aspects of 
emotion is reflected in the concept of emotion repertoires (→ emotion reper-
toires). Repertoires are the building blocks that link the emotional lives of 
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individuals to social structures, forms of social organization, domains of prac-
tice, ideology, and spheres of belonging. Emotion repertoires at the same 
time are collectively shared and individually available. From a socialization 
perspective, they reflect developmental processes of the appropriation of 
emotion concepts and their prototypical situational entanglements and valu-
ations as well as of the norms and rules pertaining to, for example, expressive 
behaviors (e.g., Holmes, 2015). These processes include the learning and 
habituation of emotions as well as their enactment and performance, all of 
which comprise elements of novelty, change, and variability. From a cultural 
and societal perspective, emotions as concept- bound responses to shared con-
cerns are intimately linked to various cultural practices, social institutions, and 
value spheres, as found in the arts, politics, education, religion, or the judi-
ciary (e.g., Bergman Blix & Wettergren, 2015). These realms incorporate and 
promote specific understandings, representations, articulations, valuations, and 
practices of emotion, and hence influence subjects’ actual emotional experi-
ence. This can happen in implicit and barely noticeable ways when emotions 
remain mere residuals, or in deliberate attempts at the strategic management, 
regulation, and manufacture of individual and collective emotions (e.g., 
George, 2017).
 Emotions in this view are subject to constant social change while at the 
same time being significant agents of change themselves. As shared emotion 
repertoires change over time, so too, most likely, will actors’ emotional 
experiences. And as actors’ emotional experiences change, for example 
through rapid social structural changes or the occurrence of “cultural lags” 
(Ogburn, 1922), so too may emotion repertoires. This perspective allows 
for an understanding of emotions beyond the individual human actor. 
Emotion repertoires can be attributed to collectives and also to social 
domains or spheres of belonging, such as groups, organizations, or institu-
tional domains, shifting the emphasis from individual enactments to col-
lective or domain- specific performances of emotional behavior. Likewise, 
this opens up a perspective on how emotions move and undergo trans-
formation independently from the comportment of individual actors. Rep-
ertoires with their symbols, formats, and practices circulate globally in 
mediatized form, enter into other cultures of emotion, and thereby lead to 
hybridization, change, but also potentially to tension and conflict within 
established orders of feeling.
Examples from research
Given their associations with culturally derived categories, situational entan-
glements, affect, and emotion repertoires, emotions are at once constitutive 
of human sociality and contingent upon it. On this account, the concept of 
“emotion” speaks to at least two different understandings of relationality: 
those capitalizing on situated relations between human and non- human 
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bodies, in the sense of a “flat ontology,” and those that emphasize symbolic 
and structural forms of relationality, as in social stratification and social net-
works (Crossley, 2011). Emotions thus address long- standing debates in social 
theory over the “structure/agency divide” and provide novel perspectives to 
overcome that divide by hinting at how individual- level properties of actors 
interact with their social structural and cultural embeddedness. We can think 
of emotions not only from the standpoint of individual experience, but also 
in terms of emotional deviance, alienation, belonging, cohesion, or social 
exclusion. Emotions in this sense might be thought of in “full- duplex” 
fashion, that is, in a way that highlights the mutual contingency of emotion 
with different social formations such as groups, teams, organizations, social 
movements, or nation state societies. Two examples from existing research 
shall serve to illustrate this perspective.
 Transnational migration usually involves relocating from one social and cul-
tural space to another, crossing not only language and nation- state borders, but 
also those borders related to customs, practices, worldviews, and value spheres. 
In addition, social and cultural perspectives on emotion suggest that trans-
national migration also means relocating across the borders of “emotion cul-
tures,” or dominant practices, norms, and values associated with emotion 
categories. Looking at Vietnamese psychiatric- psychotherapeutic patients in the 
German capital of Berlin, von Poser and colleagues (2017) investigate the emo-
tional consequences of transnational migration using a concept of emotion close 
to the one we propose. Their interdisciplinary approach – combining insights 
from social anthropology and transcultural psychiatry – promises an under-
standing of the migratory process from multiple affect- related perspectives. First, 
it allows for an investigation of affective tensions arising from potentially conflict-
ing emotional orientations and affordances. Long- nurtured evaluative world- 
relations and modes of being might cease to provide meaning in novel social 
and cultural circumstances, instead leading to irritation, tension, and dissonance 
(→ affective resonance). This might also include distortions and adjustments to the 
ways affective comportments are sorted into emotion categories when culturally 
specific emotional prototypes become blurred and ambiguous. This points, 
second, to affordances resulting from cultural differences in the very meanings 
of emotion categories and in the emotional repertoires associated with these cat-
egories. For instance, situations that might be construed as “shameful” in one 
cultural context may well elicit shame in another context too, but the social 
expectations regarding situation and emotion might differ dramatically. Third, 
these affective and emotional challenges of transnational migration bear con-
sequences at both an individual and societal level, impacting a range of con-
ditions from individual mental and emotional health to the very social fabric of 
hosting societies and communities, as von Poser and colleagues (von Poser et 
al., 2017) illustrate.
 From a notably different theoretical perspective, a second example high-
lights the situational entanglement of affect and emotions with their more 
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inert repertoires. Collective emotions are often conceived as spontaneous and 
involuntarily processes irrupting in crowds and gatherings without much cog-
nitive involvement. Emotional contagion and facial mimicry are amongst the 
possible mechanisms responsible for this rapid transfer of emotions across 
individuals. Taking a slightly different approach, Knoblauch and Herbrik 
(2014) consider the case of audience emotions (→ audience emotions). In audi-
ence emotions, they suggest, collective emotions often stem from the close 
interplay of pre- existing declarative and tacit forms of knowledge related to 
specific emotion categories and situational affective comportments. Dedicated 
spatial arrangements such as the architectural layout of a large stadium, 
promote certain forms of social interaction, a common focus of attention, 
entrainment, and bodily affection. At the same time, actors engage in ritual 
practices that entail specific choreographies and performances such as chant-
ing, singing, or gesturing. These choreographies are explicitly aimed at the 
generation and expression of discrete emotions, which are labeled, articulated, 
and socially shared. As such, they are part of an emotion repertoire that is 
learned and internalized over time through repeated enactment and situ-
ational exposure. This perspective on emotion allows researchers to disentan-
gle affective upheavals of experience from their situational and material 
components, and from the emotion categories into which they are culturally 
labeled, branded, and enacted. Importantly, this view contributes to our 
understanding of the formation of different social collectives that share the 
same social space. Although patterns of bodily affection within a stadium may 
be shared by most actors present, their linguistic labeling and social sharing 
will be contingent on emotion repertoires that arise from and contribute to 
the formation of distinct social collectives, such as different groups of sup-
porters (see also von Scheve & Ismer, 2013).
Conclusion
The understanding of emotion we propose seeks to address a number of 
shortcomings and oversights in existing social science and cultural studies per-
spectives. On the one hand, there is an obvious danger to “over- 
intellectualize” emotions and to treat them as one would treat language, 
cognition, and conceptual thought. From such a vantage point, emotions are 
merely another form of discourse, compromising most of what one com-
monly associates with emotions, such as their immediacy, agency, affective 
phenomenology, and bodily dynamics. On the other hand, there is a risk of 
overlooking the importance of culture and sociality by reducing emotions to 
their affective and bodily qualities. Emotions are much more than sweating 
palms, racing hearts, or reddening cheeks. They are situation- and culture- 
specific conceptualizations and classifications of these bodily reactions, evalu-
atively directed toward specific objects, including the historically contingent 
norms, values, and social expectations to which they are related. This variety 
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of ingredients or dimensions of an emotion has important methodological 
ramifications for empirical social research. It seems almost self- evident that 
specific research methods, such as in- depth interviews, ethnographic observa-
tions, experiments, or standardized surveys will only be able to address par-
ticular aspects of an emotion at a certain time. For example, discourse analyses 
may help uncover the linguistic labeling or textual representation of different 
emotion categories, but they will fall short of providing insights into emo-
tions’ bodily, affective, and experiential dimensions. Empirical research there-
fore needs to take great care to avoid construing emotions reductively 
according to the particular epistemological limitations that every scientific 
method inevitably yields (cf. Stodulka, 2017).
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Chapter 4
Feeling
Gerhard Thonhauser
In the conceptual field formed by → affect and → emotion, feeling is the 
broadest term most notably evading a clear- cut definition. In everyday lan-
guage, feeling is an umbrella term for all forms of felt experience, including 
but not limited to the capacity and readiness to feel emotions. In traditional 
emotion research, two tendencies can be identified. On the one hand, the 
terms “emotion” and “feeling” are often used interchangeably. On the other 
hand, when a distinction is introduced, feeling is usually defined as the bodily 
felt component of an emotional episode. Within the conceptual field opened 
up by a relational understanding of affect, it is reasonable to understand 
feeling as the bodily experience dimension of affect, in contrast to emotion, 
which points to its culturally shaped conceptualization. Whereas it is possible 
to understand affect and emotion solely with reference to their function and 
as only rudimentarily involving felt experience, feeling necessarily entails an 
experiential dimension including an irreducible form of self- awareness or self- 
involvement – a feeling is always experienced by someone and involves an 
evaluation of one’s own situation. However, the focus on experience should 
not lead us to understand feeling as a “mental state” insulated from social 
interaction and corporeal embeddedness. Rather, the present chapter will 
outline an understanding of feeling as in itself relational, processual, and inter-
actively embodied – instantiating an affective- intentional orientation in the 
world, as manifest in → affective dispositions and → affective practices.
 For developing such a working concept of feeling, a Spinoza- inspired 
notion of affect as relational dynamics between bodies can be combined with 
certain phenomenological approaches offering an understanding of feeling as 
embodied, relational, and situated. Such a view holds that feelings are neither 
just experiences of the body, nor just experiences of the world. Rather, these 
are two dimensions of feeling that are phenomenologically inextricable. The 
idea is that all feelings are bodily, but most of the time, the body is not the 
object of the feeling. Such a notion of feeling builds on a phenomenological 
understanding of embodiment – mostly inspired by Maurice Merleau- Ponty 
– which understands the body as constitutive for our relatedness to the world 
and to others. Rather than closing us off from our material and social 
Feeling  53
environment, the body is the scene of embeddedness and connectedness. 
Although the present chapter mostly relies on phenomenological sources, the 
notion of feeling outlined here is closely related to the other core concepts in 
the conceptual field of affective societies. On the one hand, feeling is tightly 
linked to affect; rather than insulated “mental states,” feelings are interactively 
instantiated within the dynamics of corporeal affection (→ affective resonance). 
On the other hand, feeling is tightly linked to emotion; in contrast to sensa-
tions, feelings are intentional experiences that pertain to an essentially share-
able, culturally modulated, concern- driven engagement with the world. 
Within the conceptual field formed by affect and emotion, the notion of 
feeling has the particular role of uniting bodily affection and intentional 
world- orientation in a way that entails an experiential dimension with self- 
involvement.
A brief history of the term feeling
The task of elucidating “feeling” is not only troubled by the various uses of 
the term in different scientific disciplines and traditions, but maybe even more 
so by the ambiguity of its everyday usage. The Oxford English Dictionary 
(OED) differentiates 30 senses of the noun feeling. The noun is the nominali-
zation of the verb “to feel” for which the OED differentiates 47 senses. This 
all points to a wild diversity of meanings. Some order can be achieved, 
however, when noting that the etymologically primary meaning is related to 
sensation or touch. Feeling first of all means “the capacity to experience the 
sense of touch or other bodily sensations,” or “a physical sensation or percep-
tion (as of touch, heat, cold, pain, motion, etc.) experienced through this 
capacity.” To feel something first and foremost means to touch it or to be 
touched by it. This etymology is further supported when considering that the 
English verb “to feel” is derived from the Germanic verb fühlen. According to 
the Deutsches Wörterbuch by the Brothers Grimm, fühlen can be traced back to 
the Old High German falan, which is related to folma, meaning palm, that is 
the inner surface of the hand (compare the Latin palma and the Greek paláme). 
This suggests that the oldest sense of fühlen is most likely to touch something 
with one’s hands or fingers; a sense preserved in the English verb “to palm.” 
To sum up, the etymology suggests that feeling originally had the sense of 
being in a bodily relation with external objects, touching them and being 
touched by them. It is a rather new development, mostly dominant in con-
temporary analytic philosophy, that the notion of feeling is deprived of any 
epistemic function and reduced to a bodily sensation that lacks connection to 
the world and others.
 The crucial step toward such a notion of feeling can be displayed with refer-
ence to the example of Kant’s practical philosophy. Kant held the view that 
moral judgments are solely based on understanding (Verstand ) or reason 
(Vernunft ). As a consequence, for an individual to fully exercise her autonomy it 
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does not only require her to follow the moral law, it also requires that she does 
so solely based on the formal principle of it being the right thing to do, and not 
based on any feeling or desire. Kant claims that moral autonomy can only be 
achieved by sharply separating oneself from one’s inclinations (Neigungen). In 
this chapter, I cannot discuss the merits of Kant’s practical philosophy. It only 
serves as an example for the workings of the dichotomy of feeling (Gefühl) and 
understanding (Verstand) and its far- reaching consequences for the conceptuali-
zation of feeling. Most importantly, such a dichotomy prompts a generalization 
of all feelings, which tends to encompass the entire domain of felt experiences – 
from love to toothache – along the lines of bodily sensations. Such generaliza-
tion has enabled understandings of feeling as deprived of any productive role 
within a reasonable engagement with the world, which could grow into crudely 
prejudiced but widely spread assumptions like the association of feeling with 
femininity (in contrast to male rationality).
 In contrast to the Kantian framework, Spinoza (like Leibniz or Descartes) 
did not separate feeling from understanding, but rather understood feeling as 
integral part of understanding. Max Scheler (1973) saw shortcomings in both 
traditions and attempted to find a solution which combines elements from 
both. He suggests maintaining the distinction between feeling and under-
standing, while avoiding the reduction of feelings to sensations. Instead, he 
conceives of feeling as a unique kind of experience. According to Scheler, 
feeling discloses a distinct sphere of objects that is concealed for under-
standing, namely the sphere of value. Thus, in contrast to Kant’s formal 
ethics, Scheler’s material value ethics grants feeling a crucial role. Feeling is 
the vehicle for the experience of value; far from being a bodily sensation 
without epistemic significance or moral relevance, Scheler places feeling at 
the core of an evaluative and normative engagement with the world.
 For the formulation of his theory, Scheler (1973, 2008) introduces two 
conceptual differentiations. First, Scheler follows Husserl in pointing out a 
crucial equivocation of the German term Gefühl, which is also present in 
many English accounts of feeling. This equivocation confuses “feeling acts” 
(Gefühlsakte) with “feeling sensations” (Gefühlsempfindungen). The main idea is 
that “feeling acts” belong to the domain of “intentional experiences” (inten-
tionale Erlebnisse), while “feeling sensations” belong to the same class of 
experiences as sensory perceptions like taste, smell, or touch. This distinction 
allows for an understanding of sensations as not themselves intentional states – 
they are not directed at objects or events – but rather as possible contents of 
intentional states. Let me illuminate this with the example of bodily pain: 
Bodily pain does not determine the mode in which it is felt; one can suffer 
from pain, endure it, or enjoy it. This shows that feeling sensations are a pos-
sible content of intentional states and that various types of feeling acts can be 
directed toward the same feeling sensation (i.e., either suffering from, bravely 
enduring or enjoying one and the same feeling sensation of pain). Sensations 
are a residuum that can only be experientially detected and causally explained 
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and thus elude the direct grasp of research. In contrast, “feeling acts” are 
intentional experiences that allow for fulfillment or non- fulfillment as well as 
for intersubjective understanding and sharing, and thus are open to be studied 
from a variety of cross- disciplinary perspectives. Second, Scheler makes use of 
the fact that German has two nominalizations of the verb “to feel.” Whereas 
English only knows the term feeling, German presents a distinction between 
Fühlen and Gefühl. This enables Scheler to differentiate between (intentional ) 
feeling (Fühlen), the apprehension of an object or event in light of a value, and 
feelings (Gefühle), which he defines as responses to such feeling of value. This is 
yet another distinction than the distinction of “feeling acts” (Gefühlsakte) and 
“feeling sensations” (Gefühlsempfindungen), which was explained in the intro-
duction and which Scheler adopted from Husserl (1975). Let me illuminate 
this with the help of another example. Consider the case in which I sense that 
another’s remark is offensive, but remain indifferent rather than responding 
with an appropriate emotion like anger. In such a case, Scheler’s distinction 
allows us to say that I indeed felt the value of the other’s remark, although 
without having the corresponding feeling.
 Distinguishing feeling sensations (Gefühlsempfindungen), intentional feeling 
(Fühlen), and feelings (Gefühle) has a lot of potential for disambiguating the 
notoriously vague field of feeling- terms (cf. Schloßberger, 2016). Feeling sensa-
tion signifies sensory experiences that are localized within the body and have the 
status of pure states without intentionality of their own. Intentional feeling, on the 
other hand, signifies forms of sensing or conceiving that are decisive for an 
evaluative engagement with the world and others (comparable to → emotion, 
emotion concept). Following this distinction, it is reasonable to understand feeling 
as the combination of feeling sensation and intentional feeling in a bodily felt inten-
tional experience. This would suggest that we should see feeling sensation and 
intentional feeling as abstractions (obtained by phenomenological analysis) that we 
normally encounter as elements of feeling. Moreover, it suggests a stratification 
of feeling depending on whether feeling sensation or intentional feeling is predomi-
nant (cf. Vendrell Ferran, 2016). It needs to be noted, however, that Scheler’s 
ethics did not gain much traction beyond his immediate successors within the 
early phenomenological movement. Moreover, his distinction between feeling, 
feeling sensation, and intentional feeling has largely gone unnoticed. The latter is 
likely due to the fact that it cannot be rendered in English without some lin-
guistic acrobatics that make it sound highly artificial.
Feelings within 20th-century emotion research
Most of 20th-century research on emotions – at least within philosophy and 
psychology – was driven by cognitivism about emotions. Most philosophers 
supporting cognitivism about emotions identify emotions with evaluative 
judgments (cf. Kenny, 1963; Solomon, 1993). According to this view, 
emotions are intentional states directed toward objects and events in the 
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ments or appraisals need to be deliberate or that an individual even needs to be consciously 
aware of them.
2 I follow the terminology of Prinz here. Damásio reverses the meaning of the terms feeling 
and emotion.
world. This view goes hand in hand with the degradation of feelings. The 
implicit understanding is that feelings are not world- directed at all, but rather 
experiences of one’s own body. Moreover, some cognitivists claim that feel-
ings are not necessary for emotions, and may or may not accompany them. 
Such a view leads to a deprivation of emotions from any bodily component, 
transforming them into cognitive states, such as an evaluative judgment, 
which might be accompanied by conative states, i.e., a motivation to act.
 Appraisal theories are the leading cognitivist approach in psychology 
(cf. Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). The main idea is that 
for an emotion to occur, a stimulus is appraised according to a range of cog-
nitive criteria.1 In contrast to some judgment theorists, appraisal theorists hold 
that the appraisal is necessarily followed by some bodily process. In particular, 
the distinction between various components of an emotion by some appraisal 
theorists can be seen as an attempt at reconciling the world- directedness of 
emotions with their bodily nature. According to this view, an emotion com-
prises several elements or components, namely cognition, motor expressions, 
action tendencies, neurological processes, and bodily feelings (cf. Scherer, 
2005). This theory, however, continues to align feelings with mere sensa-
tions. While the world- directedness of an emotion is captured in its cognitive 
component (the appraisal), the feeling remains reduced to an accompanying 
bodily sensation.
 Cognitivist approaches crucially depend on the dualism between experi-
ence of the body and experience of the world, accompanied by a dualism 
between affectivity and cognition. In contrast to these views, the working 
concept of feeling suggested here is meant to overcome the distinction 
between bodily affection and cognition by locating the intentionality of an 
emotion in the bodily experience.
 Somatic feedback theories (cf. Damásio, 1994; Prinz, 2004), the other major 
trend in 20th-century emotion research, fare better in this regard, as they claim 
that patterns of bodily changes are crucial for the intentionality of emotions. The 
main idea is that an emotion is a mental state detecting certain bodily changes 
which, in turn, detect changes in the environment.2 Thus, an emotion repres-
ents changes in the environment mediated through bodily changes. However, 
intentionality is here understood in purely functionalist terms according to which 
an apparatus (like a thermostat) can just as well be said to be intentional. Para-
doxical as it may seem, somatic feedback theories also eliminate feelings from 
emotions since they separate intentionality – understood here as the detection of 
environmental changes – from any felt experience.
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Feeling as bodily affection and meaningful  
world- orientation
In this section, I will offer a tentative sketch of a working concept of feeling 
within the conceptual field of relational affect. According to the perspective I am 
proposing, feeling is immediately bound to bodies as affecting and being affected 
(→ affect). At the same time, feeling provides a meaningful orientation within the 
world (→ emotion, emotion concept ). Finally, it implies an irreducible experiential 
dimension which involves a form of self- relation. In short, feeling is the inextric-
ably intertwining of bodily affection, world- directedness, and self- involvement.
 Such an understanding of feeling can build on recent trends in the philo-
sophy of emotions. To begin with, Peter Goldie (2000) has advocated a 
return to a close identification of emotions with feelings. He claims that the 
separation of emotions from feelings was based on the false premise that feel-
ings are mere bodily states without intentionality. Instead, Goldie argues that 
certain feelings are also directed toward objects and events in the world. He 
uses the term “feeling towards” to signify these intentional feelings, distin-
guishing them from “bodily feeling.” Goldie thereby overcomes the dualisms 
predominant in cognitivist and appraisal theories of emotions; emotions are 
not merely cognitive appraisals plus a feeling component. He also overcomes 
the neglect of experience in somatic feedback theories; feeling towards is at 
once bodily felt and directed toward objects and events in the world.
 Matthew Ratcliffe (2008, 2014) has radicalized this approach, mainly by 
dismissing the distinction between feeling towards and bodily feeling. He defends 
the view that all feelings are “both feelings of bodily states and at the same 
time ways of experiencing things outside of the body. World- experience is 
not distinct from how one’s body feels; the two are utterly inextricable” 
(Ratcliffe, 2008, p. 1). The main idea is that although all feelings are bodily 
felt, most feelings are not feelings of the body. In other words, most feelings 
do not have the body as their object; even though all feelings are bodily felt 
in a way that is experientially accessible, most feelings are experiences of 
something other than the body. When experience works, the body drifts into 
the background and becomes the transparent medium of experience. In those 
instances, we encounter our body as a feeling body, not as a felt body; our 
feeling body directs us toward events in the world. Even when we become 
aware of our feeling body, this awareness does not need to imply a trans-
formation of the body into an object and indeed it seldom does.
 Ratcliffe continues to argue that there are certain kinds of feelings – includ-
ing belonging and estrangement, familiarity and unfamiliarity, embeddedness 
and disembeddedness – that are not concrete emotional episodes, but rather 
fundamental ways of finding oneself in the world. He labels these kinds of experi-
ences “existential feelings,” emphasizing that they are at the same time funda-
mental ways of finding oneself and being oriented in the world. Existential 
feelings establish both a sense of reality of the world, and a sense of one’s belonging to 
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the world. Slaby and Stephan adopted Ratcliffe’s suggestion to overcome another 
fateful dualism, namely one that separates world- experience and self- experience. 
Their main claim is that all feelings are at once a disclosure of world and self; 
they are “an evaluative awareness of which goes hand in hand with a registra-
tion of one’s existential situation” (Slaby & Stephan, 2008, p. 506). Rather than 
separating the experience of objects and events in the world from the experi-
ence of the self, we need to understand how my evaluation of an event is 
accompanied by a felt self- evaluation through which I embed myself within a 
meaningful situation. The term feeling is well- suited to cover this intertwining 
of world- orientation and self- relation. What we need is an understanding of 
feeling as at once feeling toward and bodily (self-)feeling. Putting “self ” in brackets is 
meant to indicate that (self-)feeling does not need to transform the body into 
the object of the feeling; rather, (self-)feeling first and foremost takes the form 
of a bodily self- awareness constitutive of all felt experiences: all feeling is neces-
sarily experienced as someone’s feeling. This pertains to a theme that has a long-
 standing history within philosophy, ranging from Selbstgefühl in German 
Idealism, via Heidegger’s (1927/1996) Jemeinigkeit and Sartre’s (1936/1991, 
1944/1966) conscience (de) soi to the Heidelberg School of self- consciousness 
(cf. Henrich, 1967; Frank, 2002).
 Such an understanding of the feeling body is at the core of phenomeno-
logical accounts of embodiment. Thomas Fuchs, for example, draws on 
Maurice Merleau- Ponty’s (1945/2012) notion of intercorporeality to develop 
an account of inter- affectivity. From a certain perspective, Fuchs comes to a 
similar conclusion regarding the relationality and reciprocity of affective life 
as a Spinoza- inspired notion of affect. The claim is that living bodies are con-
nected with each other in such a way that each of them immediately affects 
others, and is immediately affected by them. Accordingly, affective life cannot 
be understood separately from its embeddedness within enabling and sustain-
ing social environments.
The mutual bodily resonance in social encounters, mediated by posture, 
facial, gestural, and vocal expression, engenders our attunement to others 
and functions as a carrier of basic interpersonal atmospheres such as 
warmth, ease, familiarity, and belonging, or in the negative case, cold-
ness, tension, unease, or unfamiliarity.
(Fuchs, 2013, p. 222)
This allows Fuchs to strictly oppose an understanding of affectivity in terms 
of mental states. He states that “affects” (which he uses as an umbrella term 
for all affective experience) “are not inner states that we experience only indi-
vidually or that we have to decode in others, but primarily shared states that 
we experience through mutual intercorporeal affection” (p. 223). However, 
this discussion of Fuchs also makes manifest the limitations of a phenomeno-
logical approach that exclusively conceives of embodiment in terms of the 
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intercorporeal relations of human beings. To begin with, Fuchs’ account of 
inter- affectivity focuses strongly on social relations, while paying less attention 
to socio- material settings (→ affective arrangement). Moreover, his account of 
social relations can be charged with blindness regarding the power and nor-
mativity inscribed into all such relations. Finally, in terms of the basic onto-
logical premises of the theory, a phenomenological account of embodiment 
restricts inter- affectivity to the domain of sentient beings. In contrast, affect is 
claimed to constitute a general ontology pertaining to all entities. While I 
take power, normativity, and socio- material settings as important issues that a 
phenomenological notion of inter- affectivity should but able to account for, 
I consider it plausible to restrict feelings to sentient beings. The hypothesis is 
that all entities are part of the dynamics of affect, but only sentient beings are 
capable of experiencing affective dynamics in the form of felt experiences.
Outlook
According to a traditional understanding of the term, feelings seem to constitute 
a challenge for empirical research. The assumption is that while the emotional 
states of an individual can be inferred from the observation of behavioral and 
physiological indicators, there appears to be no scientific method to measure 
bodily experience (cf. Scherer, 2005). The aim of this chapter was to show that 
this assumption is based on a conflation of feelings with feeling sensations. 
Whereas it is true that feeling sensations are only accessible to the individual 
undergoing them (I cannot experience another’s sensations), feelings are best 
conceived of as essentially shareable affective- intentional experiences within a 
meaningful understanding of self and world. However, this does not speak 
against the corporeality of feelings. Rather, the working concept of feeling out-
lined here suggests that a feeling is at once bodily felt and intentionally directed 
toward objects or events in the world, and that this double role can be conceived 
of in terms of the feeling body. Within the conceptual field of affect and emotion, 
such a notion of feeling emphasizes the experiential dimension involved in 
dynamics of → affective resonance and in the enactment of → emotion repertoires; an 
experiential dimension that implies self- involvement. Feeling is at once evalu-
ative world- orientation and situational self- awareness. Feeling constitutively is 
(self-)feeling, a form of bodily (self-)awareness in all experiencing. Although 
feeling concerns the experiential dimension of individual bodies, it is important 
to note that the body is here understood as the scene of embeddedness into the 
world and of connectedness with others. This suggests that feelings are intersub-
jectively accessible through their relational embodiment and intentionality, and 
are thus open to be studied from a variety of cross- disciplinary perspectives.3
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Chapter 5
Gefühlsbildung (the formation 
of feeling)
Birgitt Röttger-Rössler
The German term “Gefühlsbildung,” translated roughly as “feeling- formation” 
or “the formation of feeling,” takes the threefold semantics of Bildung (as educa-
tion, formation, and emergence) and transfers these to the appearance and stabi-
lization of → emotion repertoires. Hence, Gefühlsbildung has a broad spectrum of 
meanings encompassing not only the explicit ways in which feelings and emo-
tions are purposefully taught and influenced but also the more implicit processes 
by which feelings and emotions take form in everyday social interactions. Both 
dimensions of the formation of feeling depend on the given socio- political 
structures as well as the values and norms of a specific social or cultural group. 
Moreover, the behavioral norms in a society also always include “feeling rules” 
(Hochschild, 1983) that define who is allowed to feel which feelings, at what 
intensity, in the presence of whom (vis- à-vis age, gender, status), and in which 
social situation. Equally important, these norms dictate the form in which these 
feelings must be expressed or even suppressed (→ orders of feeling). Studies in 
social and cultural anthropology confirm the enormous diversity of these social 
and cultural codes of emotion (e.g., Lutz & White, 1986) that are themselves 
subject to continuous historical transformations (Frevert, 2013) as well as global 
influences.
 A major part of the social and cultural formation of human emotionality 
takes place during childhood. Nonetheless, the formation of feeling is a life- 
long process that is not restricted to this life phase alone, since changing soci-
etal demands imposed on individuals as they age as well as changes in society 
itself require continuous emotional readjustments. However, the notion of 
Gefühlsbildung is restricted here to intentional and purposeful forms of 
emotion modulation taking place in, for example, institutional settings such as 
kindergartens, schools, psychotherapeutic intervention centers, or self- 
enhancement programs. In contrast, the socialization of emotions is under-
stood as a more general term encompassing explicit modes of emotional 
education as well as implicit processes of emotional modulation in everyday 
social interactions and behavioral routines. Thus, investigating processes of 
the formation of feeling means focusing primarily on the explicit facets of 
emotional socialization and analyzing related social practices.
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 This chapter first addresses some terminological issues in order to describe 
the concept of the formation of feeling. Then, it examines how feelings are 
socialized and taught in childhood and adolescence from a comparative social-
 anthropological perspective. It goes on to focus on how processes of 
Gefühlsbildung take place in the context of migration – that is, in transnational 
social fields. Finally, it considers how globally circulating “emotional 
pedagogies” interact with local conventions of formation of feeling. The 
outlook addresses the relationship between the explicit and informal forms of 
Gefühlsbildung and discusses the affective dynamics unfolding within the inter-
play of these processes.
Education, socialization, Bildung, and the 
formation of feeling
Although the terms “education,” “socialization,” and “Bildung” overlap to 
some extent, they all emphasize different aspects. Within the social sciences, 
the term “education” has the clearest definition of the three. It is defined as 
the planned, socially preconstructed ways in which adults influence children 
and adolescents with the goal of imparting the norms, values, abilities, and 
skills of their respective society or social group (Löw & Geier, 2014). Educa-
tion is only one aspect of human socialization, defined as the complex pro-
cesses through which individuals interacting with their social and material 
environments acquire the behavioral requirements and knowledge of their 
respective social worlds. The term “socialization” is much broader than the 
term “education”: It also comprises implicit forms of social learning that are 
understood as a life- long process.
 The difficult to translate German term “Bildung” (derived from the Old 
High German term “bildunga” meaning creation, image, and/or gestalt) 
emerged in the Middle Ages within the context of the theological concept of 
imago dei. Here, Bildung is understood as a process by which God forms the 
human being in His own image. With the changing view of humanity in the 
18th century focusing on potentially enlightened beings who act and think in 
rational categories, the term “Bildung” finally became secularized and applied 
individually. Representatives of enlightenment pedagogy assumed a funda-
mental need for every human to be educated and therefore called for uni-
versal access to Bildung. Bildung was increasingly understood as a process of 
individual self- formation encompassing not only knowledge acquisition, 
meaning the Bildung of the rational intellect, but also the “Bildung des Gemüths 
[of the mind]” (von Humboldt, 1982) or the “Bildung des Herzens [of the 
heart]” (Schiller, 1784/1967), considered to be the site of feelings (Frevert & 
Wulf, 2012).
 The different meanings acquired by the term “Bildung” over the course of 
history still reverberate in its modern iteration, as it still stands not only for 
the acquisition of formalized knowledge but also the life- long process of 
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coined the term “social intelligence” as early as 1920, describing it as the ability to under-
stand and manage others.
human development. Within this development, humans broaden their intel-
lectual and pragmatic capabilities, and also extend their personal and social 
competencies to meet the needs of their respective life situations. This latter 
aspect encompasses the ability to creatively enrich, or even critically question 
and transform, social conditions. In this regard, the classical concept of Bildung 
differs from today’s focus on social competencies, prevalent within Western 
perspectives on human development, which emphasize the ability to cope 
with and adapt to demanding lifeworlds. The current understanding of social 
competencies is closely connected to the increasingly significant notion of 
“emotional competence.”
 This concept, introduced by psychologists Peter Salovey and John D. 
Mayer (1989), was popularized by psychologist and science journalist Daniel 
Goleman (1996) under the heading “emotional intelligence.”1 Nowadays, the 
term is applied in a wide range of fields beyond psychology, such as voca-
tional training and adult education; and is even used in commercial human 
resources consulting to describe programs for acquiring self- enhancement 
techniques to control personal emotionality. Emotional competence is 
described as an individual’s ability to cope with their own emotions and those 
of others appropriately within a given situation. This means interpreting emo-
tions in specific encounters in the “correct” way, evaluating them, and then 
responding to them with the appropriate form of behavior (Saarni, 1999). 
Nonetheless, there is no universal specification of what should be considered 
to be an appropriate “emotionally competent” behavior in any particular situ-
ation. Instead, this depends strongly on the respective social and cultural 
norms or “feeling rules” as proposed by Arlie R. Hochschild (1983). Indi-
viduals learn some of these rules implicitly through daily interactions and 
behavioral routines during the course of their socialization. However, many 
of these rules are a product of targeted feeling- formation; that is, of explicit 
processes of modulation.
 These processes of modulation take place within institutional structures 
such as kindergartens, schools, adult education centers, psychological and 
psychiatric practices, and social education counseling centers. They are shaped 
not only by the feeling rules valid in a given institution and the practices 
applied within it but also by the resulting affective arrangements (→ affective 
arrangement ). However, the formation of feeling in the sense of an explicit 
modulation of emotions also takes place outside institutional structures and 
within informal, social processes of communication – for example, when 
people verbalize, evaluate, and classify emotional experiences in private con-
texts or otherwise act these out together. Increasingly, this is a process that is 
now being conveyed through various media channels. These informal, 
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though by no means implicit, conscious modulating processes play a major 
role in both stabilizing and transforming emotion repertoires (→ emotion 
repertoires).
 Hence, Gefühlsbildung includes all the explicit ways in which emotions are 
influenced and formed. It takes place within the framework of institutionally 
structured processes as well as in informal social interactions and practices. 
Using the German term “Gefühl,” similar to the English term “feeling,” 
invokes connotations of immediate, sensual feeling and is therefore aimed 
toward the dimension of subjective, bodily experience (→ feeling). This 
should indicate that subjective experience is formed into distinct, culturally 
categorized emotions (→ emotion, emotion concept) by social processes of 
modulation.
The formation of feeling in childhood and 
adolescence
Although social and cultural anthropology reveal a long tradition of studying 
childhood, adolescence, and socialization, they have rarely taken aspects of 
the formation of feeling into account. It is only in the last few decades that 
attention has turned to the specific issue of the socialization of emotions. In 
the context of the “emotional turn,” this has produced several significant 
studies on different cultural practices of emotional childrearing that investi-
gate how the emotional concepts and feeling rules of their lifeworld are con-
veyed to children within the context of everyday scenarios and interactions 
(e.g., Briggs, 1998; LeVine et al., 1994). This raises theoretical questions 
regarding how far culture- specific childrearing practices in general can shape 
the formation of emotions – that is, ontogenetic emotional development – 
without being aimed specifically at shaping children’s emotionality.
 Comparative social- anthropological studies, such as the pioneering work 
of Naomi Quinn (2005), indicate that different cultures vary widely not only 
in their social, economic, and political structures but also in their behavioral 
norms, and values. Therefore, childrearing goals utilize what is only a limited 
set of practices to socialize children in line with their respective societal 
norms. From the perspective of a theory of emotions, it is particularly inter-
esting to note that all the societies examined in these studies utilize affective 
or emotionalizing childrearing practices such as evoking fear, creating uncer-
tainty, teasing, shaming, or praising in order to teach children specific lessons 
(Quinn, 2005, p. 490). It can be assumed that these affective childrearing 
practices impact the formation of emotions significantly.
 This assumption was at the center of an empirical social- anthropological-
psychological research project investigating the effects of emotionalizing 
childrearing practices on the emotional development of children in three 
different cultural groups (from Madagascar, Taiwan, and Indonesia). Results 
showed that cultural differences in the use of affective childrearing strategies 
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intertwined with specific socialization contexts – that is, the social constella-
tions in which children grow up and in which values and behavioral norms 
(including feeling rules) are conveyed to them – have a decisive and highly 
culture- specific impact on the ontogenetic formation of feelings (Röttger-
Rössler et al., 2013, 2015). When discussing their results, the research team 
developed the theoretical concept of “socializing emotions.” They use this 
ambiguous term deliberately to describe the emotions that the deployment of 
emotionalizing childrearing practices intends to elicit. The aim is to convey 
specific lessons in a particularly enduring fashion – that is, to use emotions for 
purposes of socialization. This research showed that the use of “socializing 
emotions” also leads to the formation or socialization of other emotions. 
Therefore, it makes sense to differentiate analytically between socializing and 
socialized emotions. For example, childrearing practices based on fear (of cor-
poral punishment) among the Bara of Madagascar create not only fear among 
the children but also intensive anger and a high level of potential aggression 
toward those performing the sanctions. For the Bara, anger and aggressive 
behavior toward persons in authority is unacceptable. Therefore, it is punished 
rigorously, and children learn to suppress these emotions out of fear of being 
sanctioned. However, aggression and anger directed toward nonrelated peers 
is tolerated. These feelings actually represent a desired form of behavior in this 
segmentary, competitively oriented society, which is perceived as being cate-
gorically different from what is viewed as inappropriate anger toward persons 
in authority. In short, through the socializing emotion of fear, Bara children 
also develop a disposition toward anger that can lead to different, linguistically 
differentiable forms of anger within the course of their further socialization 
(Funk, Röttger-Rössler, & Scheidecker, 2012, pp. 224–226, 233–235; see 
Scheidecker, 2017, for a detailed presentation of these complex processes).2 
This research team’s studies show that the development of emotion repertoires 
is modulated to a similar extent by both the explicit and implicit emotional 
childrearing that takes place within ongoing processes of socialization in daily 
interactions. They also show that the implicit and explicit modes of emotional 
modulation are closely entangled. However, what happens if this entangle-
ment falls apart – for example when conditions of socialization (family- and 
social structure, economic situation) change as a result of societal transforma-
tions or migration, and the conventional modes of feeling- formation within a 
specific social group cease to fit the current lifeworld? This is the question I 
shall examine in the next section.
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The formation of feeling in transnational 
social fields
Social-anthropological, sociological, and (social) psychological migration 
research has frequently examined conflicts between immigrant parents and 
their children (the so- called second generation) along with the challenges of 
“immigrant parenting” (Suárez-Orozco & Suárez-Orozco, 2001). However, 
it has hardly considered the aspect of the formation of feeling. Our study 
within the Collaborative Research Center Affective Societies on the formation 
of feeling and intergenerational relations within the Vietnamese community 
of Berlin focused specifically on this topic.3 Our previous studies had shown 
that a large part of the conflict between the parent generation that had 
migrated from Vietnam and their children growing up in Germany relates to 
feeling rules that are perceived as incompatible. Parents interact with their 
children primarily on the basis of an emotion repertoire socialized in Vietnam. 
The children, in turn, find this hard to accept because it contradicts the 
feeling rules dominant in the social fields (school, peers) in which they grow 
up. Two examples can illustrate this. First, Vietnamese parents place a great 
deal of importance on their children treating them with respect and defer-
ence. Obeying parents immediately and without question is considered a sign 
of respect and unopposed recognition of parental authority. It is often hard 
for the children to accept this because voicing disagreement and one’s own 
opinion are not only encouraged and supported in educational settings but 
are also something they often observe in the parental homes of their German 
friends. Second, these children have to assist their parents in many everyday 
situations by, for example, translating for them when dealing with local gov-
ernment, going to the doctor, filing applications, or filling out forms. In these 
contexts, the family’s fabric of authority becomes destabilized because it is the 
parents who are dependent on their more competent children. This asym-
metry of linguistic competence and knowledge of the German context 
weakens the cultural model of “filial piety” and changes affective relations 
between generations (Röttger-Rössler & Lam, 2018).
 Members of the second generation process their problems with their 
parents’ behavior and modes of emotional expression largely on internet plat-
forms and in the form of YouTube clips under the keyword “asian parents.” 
By employing humorous exaggeration, they use these platforms to debate 
family interactions and tensions. Such digital platforms provide important 
spaces for the informal formation of feeling. They can be used to negotiate, 
express, reflect on, and name affective tensions. Young people use them spe-
cifically to address the divergent feeling rules dominating the different parts of 
their lifeworld. They share their experiences and find ways to express the 
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4 It must be emphasized that feeling rules always have to be analyzed within the historical situ-
ation in which they are embedded. Feeling rules shaping the parental generation’s upbringing 
and socialization in the (postwar) Vietnam of that time have also changed significantly over 
the years. Moreover, these feeling rules were never homogeneous but varied significantly 
according to region and social background. Thus, the modes of emotional childrearing prac-
ticed by immigrated parents represent very specific forms of “immigrant parenting.”
5 Our previous research focused primarily on the families of former GDR contract workers. 
Therefore, results do not generalize to other immigrant groups such as those who came from 
South Vietnam to the BRD as “boat people” in the 1970s or those who are currently migrat-
ing to Germany, primarily from central Vietnam.
feeling of “living in Germany and having Vietnamese parents” (quoted from 
an interview). In this sense, they form affective communities (→ affective com-
munities). In my view, these internet platforms are significant media outlets for 
“emotional meaning making” and therefore the formation of feeling. On this 
basis, the children of these Vietnamese migrants work together in a generation-
 specific way to create a transcultural emotion repertoire that fuses components 
of the feeling rules that shape their daily life in Germany with those that their 
Vietnamese- born parents relate to and try to pass on to them.4 This emotion 
repertoire differs considerably from that of both their peers with German 
parents and their peers who are growing up in Vietnam. In large part, this 
emotion repertoire forms around affective experiences of dissonance that are 
specific to this generation – in other words, especially for children of migrants 
who came to the GDR from North Vietnam in the 1980s as contract workers 
and who have been the focus of our study so far.5
 Parents, on the other hand, discuss the challenges of raising children in 
Germany with other parents – and, like their children, increasingly do this 
online. They are also trying to modify parts of their emotion repertoire in 
response to their experiences of dissonance. However, this is often difficult 
for them because, in contrast to their children who are in the process of 
developing their emotion repertoire, parents need to reform a repertoire that 
was already acquired and consolidated many years ago. In this case, the pat-
terns of emotional response and expressions acquired during socialization in 
Vietnam and habitualized through long- standing behavioral routines prove to 
be particularly enduring and resistant to change. Many Vietnamese parents 
have difficulties with direct verbal and gestural signs of affection toward their 
children. It seems that a limited, restrained form of feeling expression is 
deeply embedded in the parental generation and hard for them to overcome.
 The tensions that often lead to severe conflicts between Vietnamese 
parents and their children are also frequently the subject matter of explicit 
feeling- formation measures promoted by institutions engaging in family, 
youth, and social work. These institutions offer different counseling and 
intervention programs based primarily on those childrearing ideals and feeling 
rules that are currently prevalent in Germany. As a result, they focus on con-
veying these ideals and rules to their clients.
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6 See www.cfchildren.org and www.secondstep.org. Eight million students (from lower and 
middle grades) and two million adults have participated in “Second Step” programs since 
2004 (Wilce & Fenigsen, 2016, p. 82).
Emotion pedagogies on the move
Recent years have seen a significant increase in global programs on the for-
mation of feeling in numerous countries such as China, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Israel, and the United States as well as in Central and South 
America. Various globally applied programs have been developed under the 
generic term “Social Emotional Learning” (SEL). These are designed to train 
adolescents and adults not only to perceive, name, and regulate their own 
feelings but also to communicate with others empathically (see, e.g., eduto-
pia.org, wingsforkids.org, or casel.org). In 2003, UNESCO started a global 
campaign, launched by the globally active NGO Committee for Children, to 
implement “Second Step,” a SEL component oriented toward both adoles-
cents and adults.6
 The social anthropologists James M. Wilce and Janina Fenigsen (2016) 
have coined the term “emotion pedagogies” (EPs) to describe such formation 
of feeling programs. They view EPs as a new phenomenon that can be distin-
guished clearly from traditional ways of influencing and regulating emotions. 
They define EPs as being characterized by the following features: (1) accept-
ing all emotions, (2) focusing on naming emotions, (3) focusing on so- called 
“I messages,” (4) understanding emotions as teachable and learnable skills, 
(5) developing specific curricula, and (6) being oriented toward a neoliberal 
understanding of the self and the person (Wilce & Fenigsen, 2016, p. 83). 
Whereas traditional forms of emotion regulation to be found in all cultures 
focus usually on certain emotions that may either be felt and shown or sup-
pressed depending on the respective feeling rules, EPs firmly insist on allow-
ing all emotions to surface, including those that are deemed “bad” in their 
respective societies. This is rooted in the belief that suppressing emotions 
which society categorizes as unwanted and negative is harmful to mental 
health. A central element in every EP is therefore to uncover, recognize, and 
name all emotions with the help of emotion word lists. Uncovering and 
naming all emotions is considered to be the prerequisite for processing them 
any further. This “taming- by-naming” approach, which presumes a referen-
tial relation between word and emotion, is often connected in many EPs with 
so- called “I messages.” This concept, developed by the US psychologist and 
popular self- help writer Thomas Gordon, is a communicative practice in 
family therapy stipulating that messages sent to others have to be sent in an 
“I” form. According to Wilce and Fenigsen (2016, p. 85), this privatizes 
emotions and makes them the responsibility of the individual. The single 
individual is then responsible for what she or he feels and how she or he feels 
it. Emotions are perceived as competencies that can be learned through 
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7 Pritzker understands these enactments as living translations, as translingual practices through 
which situated performances become translated into the bodily dimension of experience 
(Pritzker, 2016, pp. 166–167).
formalized instructions within the context of set curricula. These new, 
globally oriented EPs therefore emphasize and disseminate neoliberal forms of 
the self- concept in line with the “subjective turn of modern culture” (Taylor, 
1992, p. 26). They are generating diverse modes and technologies of self- 
management and self- formation that have resulted in a market for such for-
mation of feeling programs. This makes the study of EPs of great importance 
for theoretical debates on the nexus of emotion and economics (Illouz, 2007) 
or the emergence of “emotional economic man” (Andrade, 2013).
 Any examination of globally operating EPs leads to the question – at 
least from a social anthropological perspective – of how far such forms of 
“cultural globalization” create new diversities that not only influence local 
forms of Gefühlsbildung, but are themselves also transformed through inter-
actions with these local practices. Sonya E. Pritzker (2014, 2016), for 
example, is studying “inner child emotions pedagogies,” a version of the 
SEL approach currently popular in China. This is geared toward uncover-
ing the emotions situated deep within humans – in the so- called “inner 
child” – and making them accessible to modulation. Pritzker shows how 
these EPs based on Western psychotherapeutic ideologies are fused with 
traditional Chinese practices of self- management and lead to a new form of 
Chinese governmentality that is closely intertwined with the country’s 
socio- economic transformation. Pritzker shows how the strong emphasis 
on verbalizing emotions as the key to one’s own inner experience, so 
dominant in the original Euro- American method, is expanded significantly 
in Chinese practice by the inclusion of dynamic enactments. Because the 
verbalized emotions of one person are scenically enacted and acted out by 
the other participants, the group experiences a direct and shareable inter-
subjective physicality. These emotions become embodied affective phe-
nomena of resonance that blur the line between the internal and the 
external, between self and other. These practices link up with traditional 
Chinese concepts that conceive emotions as affective resonance phenomena 
(Pritzker, 2014, pp. 8, 40) (→ affective resonance). During the pedagogic 
enactments of these Chinese “inner child” workshops, different cultural 
ideologies and models of emotion as well as styles of expression and regula-
tion are fused into a new transcultural emotion repertoire.7 The globally 
operating EPs sketched here raise questions regarding the dissemination and 
implementation of neoliberal concepts of the self, thereby linking up with 
recent debates in the social sciences on affective economies that grasp the 
institutionalized techniques of Gefühlsbildung theoretically as kinds of imma-
terial labor, and as competencies that individuals need to acquire in order 
to meet the demands of a neoliberal labor market.
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Outlook
In the present context, the concept Gefühlsbildung is restricted deliberately to 
processes of exerting an explicit influence on emotions, and of the targeted 
modulation of emotions. It is distinguished from the multilayered, implicit 
processes of the socialization of emotions. Differentiating analytically between 
what are de facto two closely intertwined aspects makes it easier not only to 
grasp their interplay but also to focus specifically on the affective dynamics 
emerging in the context of diverse forms of Gefühlsbildung. I assume that for-
mations of feeling never proceed without friction but always tend to create 
affective tensions that relate closely to their respective socio- cultural struc-
tures and feeling rules.
 The close entanglement of Gefühlsbildung and affective dynamics becomes 
evident in the three examples given above, each addressing a different facet of 
this relationship. The first case study about childrearing strategies among the 
Bara in Madagascar showed that the experiences of affective dissonance pro-
voked in the adolescents as part of the local childrearing practices play a 
crucial role in this process: They motivate latent aggression and channel it 
during the course of socialization so that it may develop into distinctive, 
socially accepted emotions. This example illustrates that affects are of central 
importance for the creation of emotion repertoires. It suggests that the forma-
tion of feeling practices are built upon the triggering of affect; they can be 
effective only if they succeed in doing so.
 The second example concerning parent–child relations in Vietnamese 
Berlin showed that the different feeling rules and corresponding practices 
confronting immigrant parents and their children generate affective disso-
nances that motivate them to deal with disparities in experience, and thereby 
to engage in Gefühlsbildung (in the sense of consciously performed acts). 
Arguing about divergences in experience, reflecting on them, and negotiating 
them both within and between each generation simultaneously leads to the 
formation of what are, at least in part, new emotion repertoires. A central 
research question emerging here concerns the limits imposed on the trans-
formation of emotion repertoires by their embodied nature. The case study 
suggests that the reserved style of emotional expression acquired by the 
parents during their socialization in Vietnam is engrained so deeply in their 
corporeality that it is hardly modifiable.
 The third example, that of globally circulating emotion pedagogies, 
addresses a central question in recent research: Which experiences of affec-
tive dissonance within local worlds lead people to turn to new global 
feeling- formation programs? Conversely, one can ask how far affective 
resistance by the embodied repertoires of participants forces modifications 
to the global programs – as can be seen in the “inner child pedagogies” 
popular in China. Here, again, the deep entanglement between the 
formation of feeling processes and affective dynamics becomes clear. It is 
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experiences of affective dissonance that both motivate people to turn to 
new parameters of Gefühlsbildung in order to transform their emotions, as 
well as cause them to resist.
 A better analytical grasp of the processes of the formation of feeling – 
suggested here both within a single society and in transnational or trans-
cultural contexts – can be gained by distinguishing between explicit forms of 
modulating emotions and their implicit formation during the course of social-
ization, even when these modes are closely intertwined in reality. The 
concept of Gefühlsbildung should be understood as an analytical tool designed 
not only to cast light on these complex entanglements but also to serve as an 
impulse for further theoretical analyses of the many- layered processes leading 
to the formation, stabilization, and transformation of emotion repertoires.
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Chapter 6
Attachment
Gabriel Scheidecker
Attachment refers to an enduring affectional bond of humans to particular 
others, whether individual or collective, as well as to non- human actors such 
as animals, material possessions, places, or spiritual beings. Attachments are 
distinguished by their tendency to persist over time and across contexts and 
their profound emotional and affective significance. The concept of attach-
ment allows attending to the diachronic dimension of emotional and affective 
relationships from the perspective of individual actors. As a fundamental pre-
condition for human existence and the development of all major capacities, 
attachments are formed from birth onwards. Although early attachments may 
persist for decades or even a lifetime, individuals usually also lose attachment 
figures and turn toward new ones over the course of their life. The temporal 
dimension of attachment transcends particular bonds, since experiences in 
preceding attachment relationships function as dispositions for future attach-
ments (→ affective disposition). Such dispositions for attachment are theorized 
as internal, affective- cognitive working models of the self in relation to par-
ticular others. They evolve through past relational experiences and guide 
ongoing interactions in existing attachment relationships as well as engage-
ment in future relationships, which in turn provide new experiences. Thus, 
the concept of attachment accounts for both continuity and transformation 
across the course of life.
 Attachments are central for affective and emotional processes in several 
ways. To begin with, attachments themselves can be considered affectional 
bonds. This becomes apparent, for instance, in the desire for proximity with 
an attachment figure, the comfort (or discomfort) experienced in their pres-
ence, distress upon involuntary separation, or the grief that may be caused by 
losing them. Moreover, dispositions for attachment can be considered central 
to the idiosyncratic ways in which individuals tend to emotionally affect and 
respond to others, and also to the specific patterns of deploying and regulat-
ing emotions in relationships and beyond. Such patterns are most fundament-
ally established through early socialization, as caregivers and other social 
partners may play a powerful role in amplifying, curbing, or modulating a 
child’s affective environment and their various affective responses to it.
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 In cultural studies on affect, the term “attachment” is sometimes used as a 
counterpoint to highly celebrated notions like movement, circulation, or 
transformation (e.g., Ahmed, 2004; Berlant, 2011). However, it has not been 
explicated as a key concept within this field. A more comprehensive concep-
tualization of attachment is offered by classical attachment theory, which was 
founded in the 1960s by Bowlby (1969) and Ainsworth et al. (1978) and has 
since evolved as one of the most influential approaches to child development 
and parenting advice. While drawing considerably on classical attachment 
theory, the current contribution proposes to modify and extend several of its 
major tenets that are too limited and normative in light of ethnographic 
research beyond the educated classes of the Western world (e.g., Keller, 2013; 
Morelli et al., 2017). By doing so, this chapter aims to encourage cultural 
studies and social science research on affect and emotion to both deal with 
and contribute to attachment theory from a critical distance. Overall, the 
concept of attachment, as proposed here, calls for attending to the formation 
and transformation of persisting affectional bonds as fundamental constituents 
of affective societies.
Attachment in affect studies
The term attachment appears frequently in key writings in affect studies. 
However, it is rarely explained explicitly, but rather used en passant. Its uses 
in some of the more prominent texts may serve as one starting point from 
which to unfold attachment as a key concept for the study of affective soci-
eties. In The Cultural Politics of Emotion, Sara Ahmed (2004) introduces the 
concept in a matter- of-fact tone: “Of course, emotions are not only about 
movement, they are also about attachments or about what connects us to this 
or that” (p. 11). In Cruel Optimism, Lauren Berlant (2011) positions a notion 
of attachment at the heart of her own central concept: “Cruel optimism is the 
condition of maintaining an attachment to a significantly problematic object” 
(p. 24). What appears to be common about the usages in these central pas-
sages is the apparent opposition of attachment to movement, circulation, or 
transformation. The fact that these latter notions are often seen in a very 
positive light in affect studies imparts a somewhat problematic position to the 
notion of attachment. As an obstacle to change, attachment seems to slip into 
the role of representing the downside of affect. In Cruel Optimism, for 
instance, attachment is mainly introduced to account for the inability to 
detach from an object of desire, even though this object threatens the well- 
being of the subject. Here it is precisely an attachment that makes optimism 
cruel. Such a thankless role as an obstacle to desirable transformation is also 
ascribed to similarly positioned notions like Ahmed’s term stickiness:
Indeed, the question, “What sticks?”, is one that is posed throughout this 
study. It is a reposing of other, perhaps more familiar, questions: Why is 
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1 One of few exceptions with an explicit reference to classical attachment theory is Anna 
Gibbs’ Disaffected (2002, p. 337).
social transformation so difficult to achieve? Why are relations of power 
so intractable and enduring, even in the face of collective forms of 
resistance?
(Ahmed, 2004, pp. 11–12)
Conversely, it must be desirable to detach, as Ahmed (2004) subsequently 
confirms: “There is hope, of course, as things can get unstuck” (p. 16). Thus, 
the notion of attachment seems to be viewed somewhat negatively by some 
central authors within affect studies, mainly as an impediment to the free cir-
culation of affect and the fluidity of social relations, and more generally as a 
blockade to the transformation of societies (in a desired direction). It is rarely 
explicated as an analytical concept with particular histories and cross- 
disciplinary relationalities.
 It may be worthwhile to establish “attachment” as a key concept for the 
study of affect and emotion in the social sciences and cultural studies for 
several reasons. The concept of attachment may help to cast light on processes 
of emotional and affective stabilization, continuation, or patterning that tend 
to be overshadowed by notions of circulation, transformation, fluidity, crea-
tivity, or excitement. The latter have so far figured more prominently within 
affect theory and seem to enjoy rather broad approval. Attachment is far more 
fundamental to the affective and emotional lives of people than indicated in 
its understanding as a mere impediment to affective and social dynamics. Fur-
thermore, as attachment is a well- established and highly influential concept in 
other disciplines, especially developmental psychology, it can be fruitful to tie 
in with these lines of research and the debates surrounding them. Affect 
theory may thereby benefit from the conceptual and empirical work that has 
already been done in these fields. Conversely, affect theory might be enabled 
to contribute in specific ways to attachment theory, and also to the various 
fields of its application as well as to the wider public understandings of close 
relationships.
Classical attachment theory
Although most works in affect studies using the term “attachment” do not 
explicitly refer to classical attachment theory, an indirect influence via its 
popularization is highly likely.1 This is because attachment theory, introduced 
in the 1960s by child psychiatrist and psychoanalyst John Bowlby, has been 
widely popularized and blended with everyday understandings of social rela-
tionships, at least in the educated classes of the Western world. As the leading 
approach to the formation of interpersonal relationships in developmental 
psychology, attachment theory guides all kinds of practitioners and institutions 
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3 The notion of attunement in developmental psychology has been taken up by many propo-
nents of affect studies and is relatively widely used as a fancy term (for a critical overview see 
Papoulias & Callard, 2010, pp. 42–46).
whose work relates to childrearing. Conversely, parents and their children 
may incorporate its tenets from birth on, for example, through post- natal 
hospital care, when seeking parenting advice, through nursery practices such 
as the period of familiarization, and in interventions of institutions of family 
support or in the arrangement of legal custody (cf. Rosabal- Coto et al., 
2017). Beyond the realm of parenting, attachment theory has become increas-
ingly influential in various schools of psychotherapy and psychiatry. Due to 
this unprecedented influence of attachment theory in a range of disciplines, 
social institutions, and popular understandings of close relationships, it is 
reasonable to build on this approach explicitly but also critically.
 Bowlby and Ainsworth (1965) defined attachment as a profound and endur-
ing emotional bond that connects one individual to another across time and 
space (cf. Cassidy, 2016). Whereas preceding theoretical models, based on psy-
choanalytic and social learning theory, explained children’s ties to their care-
givers as a secondary drive derived from the more primary hunger drive, 
Bowlby ascribed such bonds to a biologically predisposed desire for proximity 
and the corresponding behavioral tendencies already present in newborns. Thus, 
rather than explaining attachment as a side effect of being fed, attachment theory 
considers interpersonal affectional bonds as an essential precondition for infant 
survival, as well as for the development of all major human abilities, such as 
social interaction, cognitive processes, or emotional regulation. The central 
positioning of affectional bonds may be a chief reason for the widespread recep-
tion and application of attachment theory described above.
 While the tendency to become attached is claimed to be biologically 
rooted – all children are believed to form attachments as long as a caregiver is 
available, even if she or he is abusive2 – children will develop varying attach-
ment patterns or qualities depending on their experiences with primary care-
givers. The way caregivers attend and respond to the affective signals of 
children, particularly those related to distress, is considered to be crucial for 
the quality of the attachment they develop. Sensitive responsiveness, that is, 
prompt and appropriate responses to the child’s emotions, is seen as ideal, 
fostering a secure attachment, whereas non- sensitive patterns are thought to 
give rise to several forms of insecure attachments. Caregivers’ sensitivity is 
manifested in emotionally attuned communication between caregiver and 
child, which allows the child to develop confidence that the caregiver will be 
available and responsive if needed and thus form a secure attachment.3
 The social experiences of children in the first years of life in relation to its 
primary caregivers are considered to be particularly crucial for the formation of 
idiosyncratic attachment patterns, which are decisive for the way individuals 
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engage in social relationships and regulate emotions throughout their life 
(cf. Thompson, 2016). Such long- lasting effects of early social experiences are 
ascribed to the emergence of basic internal working models concerning the self 
in relation to others. These models influence all future relationships of the 
person, and are constantly being elaborated and modulated. In line with current 
findings on memory and embodied simulation, such working models are theor-
ized as guiding ongoing attachment behavior, feelings, and affective dynamics 
by letting involved partners re- experience and pre- experience relevant scenarios 
(cf. Bretherton & Munholland, 2008). This may be exemplified by trust, which 
is considered to be a fundamental affective dimension of attachments. Whether, 
to what degree, and in regard to which concerns an individual is able to trust in 
a certain attachment partner, depends on the feelings invoked by recalled and 
projected scenarios of reliability or rejection.
 In addition to relationships, early attachment patterns have been found to 
influence a wide array of domains, such as emotional regulation and under-
standing, personality characteristics, concepts of the self, social cognition, and 
conscience. Moreover, classical attachment theory is increasingly deployed to 
explore affectional bonds between adults and non- human figures. The variety 
of attachment figures being considered ranges from sport teams (de Groot & 
Robinson, 2008), material possessions (Kleine & Baker, 2004) and brands 
(Thomson, MacInnis, & Whan Park, 2005), to pets such as family dogs (Beck 
& Madresh, 2008), places such as landscapes and homes (Scannell & Gifford, 
2010), and gods or other spiritual beings (Granqvist & Kirkpatrick, 2018). In 
general, such research extending the scope of possible attachment figures 
beyond human actors can be endorsed. It must be noted, however, that this 
expansion of attachment theory into a wide array of psychological, social, and 
para- social domains amplifies the reach of some fundamental tenets estab-
lished in early childhood research. Thus, research on early attachment forma-
tion needs to be considered critically.
Reconsidering attachment theory
Recently, classical attachment theory has been criticized from the perspective 
of cultural anthropology and cross- cultural psychology, calling for a reconsid-
eration of attachment theory that takes into account cultural diversity (Quinn 
& Mageo, 2013; Otto & Keller, 2014; Keller & Bard, 2017). Such critiques 
argue that attachment theory, counter to its universalistic claim, largely reflects 
the specific ideals of relationships and parenting dominant in the Western edu-
cated classes. This limitation of current attachment theory is all the more rel-
evant as these theories increasingly inform policies and programs of “parenting 
improvement” in low- to middle- income countries around the world 
(cf. Rosabal- Coto et al., 2017; Morelli et al., 2018). Two aspects of attach-
ment theory – its normative dimension and the assumption of monotropy – 
are particularly problematic from a cross- cultural perspective.
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 The distinction between secure and various forms of insecure attachment 
is clearly normative, since only secure attachment is considered beneficial. It 
is believed to promote the child’s future psychological well- being, cognitive 
abilities, sociability, and many other characteristics deemed desirable. 
Consequently, attachment- informed programs and institutions of parenting 
intervention promote globally sensitive- responsive parenting and associated 
forms of relating and interacting, such as assigning the child with a (quasi) equal 
role in interactions, responding to the child’s emotional expressions instead of 
caring proactively, engaging in turn- taking, face- to-face interaction, smiling, 
explaining, or other forms of verbal communication. Such parenting patterns 
may well reflect the standards of the Western educated classes, to which the 
majority of the researchers as well as research subjects belong (see Henrich, 
Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). However, they clearly depart from parenting 
models and goals in many societies around the world (see Keller, 2013; Morelli 
et al., 2017). Thus, such a normative dimension needs to be critically reflected 
upon when using attachment as a key concept of research.
 The second critical point – monotropy – refers to the psychoanalytically 
derived assumption that a child usually attaches to one principal caregiver 
(e.g., the mother) whom he or she prefers over all other social partners, par-
ticularly in times of need. Although it is theoretically acknowledged that 
anyone who consistently takes care for the child can become the principal 
attachment figure, in empirical research as well as in the applied field, the 
biological mother is mostly considered a priori as the exclusive attachment 
figure. In stark contrast to this view, ethnographic research has demonstrated 
that children in many societies around the world grow up from birth on in an 
extensive network of caring social partners (e.g., Weisner & Gallimore, 1977; 
Keller & Chaudhary, 2017). Such a large interdependent social network goes 
well beyond the nuclear family, which often seems to serve as an implicit ref-
erence point for attachment researchers and practitioners. Thus, the monot-
ropy assumption with its focus on the mother – or the romantic partner in 
adults – as primary attachment figure is problematic from a cross- cultural per-
spective. Instead, this chapter encourages scholars to attend to the whole array 
of possible attachment figures and also to the specific socio- material settings 
in which attachments are embedded.
 Of course, not all relationships that children or adults engage in are con-
sidered to be attachment relationships. Several criteria are commonly used to 
discern them from other kinds of relationships (see Cassidy, 2016, pp. 12–13): 
(1) attachment bonds are persistent over time and across contexts; (2) one 
attachment figure is not easily interchanged with another, e.g., individuals 
may grieve over the loss of one attachment figure even though another is 
available; (3) attachment bonds are highly emotionally significant; (4) indi-
viduals wish to maintain some proximity to the attachment figure; (5) this is 
especially true when he or she seeks security and comfort in times of distress; 
(6) involuntary separation from the attachment figure is experienced as 
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distressing. Yet it has to be noted that these characteristics hardly draw a clear 
line between attachment relationships and other close relationships, as is often 
presumed by attachment researchers. Instead, these characteristics can be 
understood as representing one tendency among human relationships, which 
can manifest differently depending on the cultural and social context.
 Children growing up in nuclear households in an urban environment and 
spending considerable amounts of their daytime just with one parent may 
possibly develop pervasive, hierarchically organized, dyadic attachments with 
two or three individuals that are clearly delineated from the wider social 
context. By contrast, in societies in which the task to care for children is 
widely shared, the cooperating group rather than particular individuals might 
serve as a secure base and become an object of attachment. Children growing 
up in an Efe community of hunter- gatherers (Democratic Republic of 
Congo), for example, are cared for by many adults and older children who 
alternate with one another frequently depending on who is nearby and avail-
able in the moment of need. One- year-old children were cared for on 
average by 14 different individuals within a span of merely two hours 
(Morelli, Henry, & Foerster, 2014). The attachment system is further compli-
cated by considering the possibility that an individual develops different 
modes of attachment with different social partners or groups. This option is 
systematically ignored if only a principle attachment figure, such as the 
mother, is examined. To provide an example of such differentiation of attach-
ments and its consequences for emotion, affect, and the self, the next section 
describes particular ways of relationship formation in a rural community in 
Madagascar.
Example: multiple attachments in Madagascar
This case is based on 15 months of field research on the socialization of 
emotion in a rural community in southern Madagascar (Scheidecker, 2017). 
From birth on, children in this community spend most of the day outdoors in 
a densely populated village and are thus almost constantly surrounded by 
several social partners within arm’s reach. According to systematic observa-
tions of 42 children ranging from three months to three years old, interactions 
are clearly socially differentiated. Mothers, other adults, and preadolescent 
babysitters almost exclusively attend to the bodily needs of children, for 
example through continuous body contact and frequent feeding, aimed at 
keeping the child in a calm state and fostering rapid physical development. 
These interactions with caregivers develop into distinctly hierarchical attach-
ment patterns. While caregivers hardly engage children in interactions like 
face- to-face contact, smiling and laughing, chatting or playing, other children 
are consistently available for such affectively intensifying communications. As 
soon as children can walk, they spend most of the day in the company of 
their peers in search of cheerful and exciting experiences, sometimes 
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interrupted by intense conflicts. Some of the peers, mostly cousins, become 
permanent companions that develop into intimate, enduring, reliable social 
partners, whereas other, unrelated peers turn into passionately resented 
enemies, connected by a chain of mutual retaliation.
 Based on my fieldwork, I argue that these simultaneously evolving, highly 
disparate forms of hierarchical attachments (with caregivers) and egalitarian 
relationships (with peers) are connected to different modes of self, affect, and 
emotion. The self in hierarchical relations within the kin group is character-
ized by the prioritization of interdependence over autonomy; it is understood 
as existing only through the constant influx of “life force” from the ancestors. 
Thus, far from being ascribed to a single act of procreation in the past, the self 
is believed to persist only by way of perpetual recreation through forebears. A 
metaphor commonly used to imagine the self in hierarchical relations is the 
banana tree, whose single sprouts are considered as descendants. They grow 
from and through a common body and die away if separated from it. As long 
as individuals stay close to their parents and ancestors, follow their directions, 
and integrate into the hierarchical structure of their descent group, they are 
believed to be safe. Correspondingly, hierarchical relations are generally asso-
ciated with low- intensity affect and feelings of (physical) security and tran-
quility. Little occasion is given to intense positive or negative emotions 
within these relations. Even if people feel strongly affected, they are expected 
to refrain from displaying it, as it would be considered disrespectful and 
unduly self- expressive. Moreover, hierarchical relations are also shaped by a 
kind of latent moral fear that only intensifies if norms of one’s group are 
transgressed and sustenance through parents and ancestors is threatened. 
Although hierarchical relations are constantly performed and reinforced 
through a wide array of social practices within facilitating socio- material set-
tings, they are also anchored in the form of working models in individual 
actors. Generally speaking, these models, which have been reconstructed else-
where in detail (Scheidecker, 2017), entail felt expectations that parents and 
ancestors will constantly sustain one’s physical well- being, but also apprehen-
sions that they could withdraw it, with life- threatening consequences, in case 
of moral transgressions.
 Egalitarian relationships depart clearly on many levels from hierarchical 
relationships. First, in these relationships, autonomy is prioritized over inter-
dependence. They are not inherited but depend largely on personal prefer-
ences. Yet, egalitarian relationships, at least between related individuals, are 
characterized by a high degree of continuity and availability, as the social 
partners involved usually grow up together, live side by side, and cooperate 
closely throughout life. Thus, these relationships are hardly covered by the 
notion of friendship. By contrast to the hierarchical social sphere, which is 
highly formalized and routinized, the egalitarian social sphere is characterized 
by intense individual emotions and passions, both positive and negative, that 
guide actions and interactions to a large extent.
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 These roughly sketched hierarchical and egalitarian patterns of attachment, 
which are in fact much more nuanced, are highly persistent across age, 
gender, and material environments. Individuals switch between these modes 
mainly as a function of their situational social context, although there may be 
some material environments more conducive to certain modes over others. A 
basic condition for the socialization of such highly distinct modes is the neat 
separation of hierarchical and egalitarian social spheres, with mutually exclu-
sive patterns of interaction, from early childhood onwards. However, these 
conditions started to change drastically with the introduction of schooling at 
the end of my field research. As a consequence, children began to spend 
considerable amounts of time under the surveillance of authority figures 
(teachers), who played a large role in structuring and regulating peer- 
interactions.
Outlook
Given the enormous influence of attachment theory in research on socio- 
emotional processes as well as in a wide range of applied fields and amongst 
the wider public, it is crucial to engage with this theory in an endeavor to 
understand affective societies. The reasons are twofold: First, to be able to 
benefit from the extensive conceptual and empirical work that has been done 
within this paradigm; second, to give critical findings in that domain a chance 
to become relevant beyond academia, for example in the applied fields of 
attachment theory.
 With regards to the first reason, the current, rather flat notions of attach-
ment in affect studies can be enriched by attachment theory in order to 
achieve a more multilayered conceptualization of attachment. In the resulting 
view, attachment is more than just an opponent to circulation or transforma-
tion, rather, it integrates stability and transformation, social relationalities and 
individual dispositions: Particular patterns of socio- emotional interaction lead 
to the formation of corresponding dispositions of attachment, theorized as 
internal working models, which in turn affect and are affected by ongoing 
social relations.
 Furthermore, it allows one to account for idiosyncratic patterns of relating 
and responding affectively and emotionally to others in a given situation, and 
individual ways of engaging in (or detaching from) long- lasting relationships. It 
is clear that these individual patterns are derived from social interactions and are 
always enacted (and possibly transformed) in particular socio- material settings 
that may be conceptualized as affective arrangements (→ affective arrangements). 
Even if the primary research focus is the affective and emotional dynamics of 
particular social settings (and not the relational histories of individuals), the 
concept of attachment may be useful to account for powerful influences con-
nected to the particular characteristics of present actors (→ affective dispositions). 
Taken together, the concept of attachment promotes a view according to which 
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affective relationality is neither reducible to the current affective arrangement, 
nor to the respective dispositions of the actors involved. Rather, it implies that 
affective relationalities are permanently co- constructed in a complex interplay of 
both sides.
 As for the second reason, it seems important to contribute perspectives of 
cultural studies and social sciences to attachment theory, given that it is the 
most influential approach to socio- emotional development – particularly in 
light of its global applications in increasingly heterogeneous contexts, which 
necessitate its pluralization in many ways. The two suggestions in this chapter 
– to account for the full diversity of patterns of attachment as well as for mul-
tiple attachments – are but two aspects of attachment theory that need to be 
explored in an open fashion. One area in which such explorations are par-
ticularly urgent is the field of migration studies. How do the children of 
migrating families deal with affectional bonds to individuals, objects, or places 
left behind, and how do the attachment patterns they have acquired subse-
quently affect processes of building new affectional bonds with people whose 
ways of relating may be different? How do children whose parents have 
migrated negotiate their close relationships to family members and to people 
outside the diaspora (e.g., friends, nurses) if their ways of relating contrast 
significantly? How do parents reconfigure or maintain ways of relating and 
interacting with their children in the new context, in which their practices 
might be heavily challenged? To pursue such questions, it is necessary to both 
draw on and expand the notion of attachment.
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Chapter 7
Atmosphere
Friedlind Riedel
“Atmosphere” refers to a feeling, mood, or Stimmung that fundamentally 
exceeds an individual body and instead pertains primarily to the overall situ-
ation in which bodies are entrenched. The concept of an atmosphere thus 
challenges a notion of feelings as the private mental states of a cognizant 
subject and instead construes feelings as collectively embodied, spatially 
extended, material, and culturally inflected. In this sense “atmosphere” can be 
considered a mereological concept: While “affect” refers to the ways in which 
(emerging) bodies relate to each other (→ affect), “atmosphere” describes the 
ways in which a multiplicity of bodies is part of, and entrenched in, a situ-
ation that encompasses it. In this respect, atmospheres tend to be contagious, 
as they wield authority over the entirety of bodies in a situation. Timothy 
Morton (2007) conceives of the homogenization characteristic of atmospheres 
as “rendering”: a mass of elements is rendered in one all- encompassing 
rhythm or hue. Atmospheres are thus modes in which the world shows up or 
coalesces into an indivisible and intensive situation or in which a group of 
bodies comes to exist as a felt collective. In this regard, atmosphere operates 
as a medium that brings into appearance that which cannot be deduced from 
or reduced to the bodies present in a situation. Nor can an atmosphere be 
referred to as a single, specific source. An atmosphere, then, not only simu-
lates a palpable unity where there might otherwise be difference, but can even 
render potential futures or repressed memories abundantly present, or make 
otherwise absent or ulterior persons or relationships perceptible. Crucially, 
these effects of atmosphere are not mental projections “into the world” but 
have a material presence and pertain to embodied processes of involvement.
 German philosopher Hermann Schmitz (1969/2005), who introduced the 
term atmosphere into phenomenology in the 1960s, considered atmospheres 
as meaningful situations and as spatially extended non- subjective feelings. 
Drawing on Schmitz, yet largely dissenting from his so- called new phenomeno-
logy, the term “atmosphere” has been variously defined across disciplinary 
boundaries in recent scholarship. For instance, atmospheres have been charac-
terized as qualities of a space (Böhme, 2017), as mediums of perception 
(Thibaud, 2003), or as a non- representational social dimension (McCormack, 
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2008; Anderson, 2009). Despite philosophical and disciplinary heterogeneity, 
these various notions of atmosphere all grapple with, and aim at subverting, 
binary distinctions between inner and outer world, medium and content, 
meaning and matter, individual and collective, body and mind, subject and 
object. Atmosphere is invoked as that which mediates between two terms, 
integrates both, or precedes their distinction.
 To study the ways in which atmosphere pertains to affective societies, I 
suggest a move beyond traditional phenomenology of perception or aes-
thetic theory. These approaches consider the subject as a perceiver of atmo-
spheres, and accordingly construe the latter as aesthetic or perceptual 
givens. My interest, by contrast, is focused on what an atmosphere does and 
how it operates. Thus, this chapter foregrounds the mereological structure 
of atmosphere, as well as its capacity to modulate situations and collectives 
into coherent wholes. While the manipulation and creation of atmosphere 
is critical in the arts and architecture, which share a traditional under-
standing of and concern with human perception, I will outline a concept of 
atmosphere by means of examples from domains that do not center on the 
perception of individual subjects. Instead, I propose to conceive of atmo-
sphere in relation to (religious) transformation, (mass) mobilization, and 
processes of (political) homogenization. Furthermore, due to the close 
affinity that music and sound have with atmosphere, I approximate atmo-
sphere through music. In what follows, I trace the genealogy of the term 
atmosphere in German, and point to its grammatical specifics, before elabo-
rating on four of its key characteristics.
A genealogy of atmosphere
The modern Latin term “atmosphaera” that entered English, German, or French 
derives from the Ancient Greek “ατμόσφαιρα,” a sphere of vapor, steam, or 
emanation. It is widely assumed in scholarship on atmosphere that the notion of 
atmosphere as feeling is a metaphorical adaption of a meteor ological term. 
However, closer attention to the term’s genealogy in German in important but 
so far largely neglected historical texts not only challenges this interpretation, 
but also significantly broadens the semantic scope of the term.
 From the early 18th century onward, “atmosphere,” particularly in German 
and French, did not simply denote the aerial vapors of celestial bodies but 
referred to corporeal effluvia, substances that emanated from and enveloped 
humans and all other sentient and non- sentient bodies, and also referred to the 
force field of magnets. These “atmospheres” primarily related to the sense of 
smell and were composed of various transpirations specific to a body, but also 
comprised humors and passions, all of which radiated into its surroundings. In the 
case of human atmospheres, feelings as humors could thus literally be smelled and 
prompted attraction or repulsion. Furthermore, since emanations varied accord-
ing to gender, occupation, diet, and habitat, atmospheres were social indicators, 
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suggestive of the character of a person, their social class, and emotional situation. 
Historian Alain Corbin (1986) thus speaks of these atmospheres as “social 
emanations.” Crucially, the atmospheres or feelings that bodies emanated were not 
mere immaterial aesthetic phenomena of perception but consisted of material 
effluvia and could even transmit contagion such as cholera. It is this non- binary 
concurrence of material substance and feelings already present in the early 
semantics of atmosphere that imbues the term with innovative potential and 
aligns it with affect in a monistic ontology (→ affect).
 With advances in scientific knowledge about the human body, the term 
“atmosphere” became largely obsolete as a medical term by the early 19th 
century. But connotations of “social effluvia” and the idea of materially 
emanating feelings remained an important semantic dimension of atmosphere 
in poetical and philosophical writings until the beginning of the 20th century. 
Thus, when Georg Simmel (1917), whose seminal footnotes on atmosphere 
have so far gone unnoticed in scholarship on the topic, spoke of the “atmo-
sphere” of both people and cities, he was not appropriating a meteorological 
term for the emergent discipline of sociology. Instead, his interest lay with 
the social implications of corporeal effluvia in processes of Vergesellschaftung 
(socialization). Like Simmel, psychiatrist Hubertus Tellenbach, writing much 
later in the 20th century, considered atmospheres in the quasi- medical sense 
of room- filling phenomena emanating from bodies. In his pioneering work 
Geschmack und Atmosphäre (Taste and Atmosphere) published in 1968 he 
extrapolated these personal emanations onto families, social groups, and 
nationalities where they would operate as media “of a prereflective and pre-
verbal elemental contact” (Tellenbach, 1981, p. 229). In Tellenbach’s psycho-
logical Daseins analyse, being social meant emanating and discerning atmosphere. 
With the discovery of pheromones, this decidedly materialist notion of atmo-
sphere as corporeal emanation came to resonate with new scientific evidence. 
Teresa Brennan (2004) thus concludes in her opus magnum that pheromonal 
odors are critical to how atmosphere is felt and affect is transmitted.
 Schmitz, who established “atmosphere” as a central concept of his 
phenomenology of the felt- body (Leibphänomenologie), bypasses the etymo-
logy of the word and considers atmosphere in its semantic confluence with 
the phenomenological notion of Stimmung (Wellbery, 2003). Schmitz was 
not the first to do so; William Stern (1935) who, like Schmitz, pursues a 
philosophical personalism, had already posited atmosphere as Stimmung. Stern 
argued that a feeling of familiarity, for instance, would be of “completely 
‘atmospheric’ nature; it is a total mood [Gesamtstimmung] in which the special 
affective tonings of people, things, and events are indistinguishably embed-
ded [my translation, F. R.]” (Stern, 1935, p. 784). Instead of drawing on 
Heidegger’s fundamental- ontological notion of Stimmung, however, Schmitz 
refers to psychological phenomenology and quotes Theodor Lipps’ (1906) 
“spatial feelings” (Raumgefühl) or Ludwig Binswanger’s (1933) “tuned 
spaces” (gestimmte Räume), famously defining feelings as spatially poured out 
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atmospheres (“ortlos ergossene Atmosphären”; cf. Schmitz, 1969/2005, p. 343). 
He conceives of atmospheres in terms of what he would, in contrast to 
Gernot Böhme’s (2017) spatiological thinking, later identify as a “situation 
ontology.” Atmospheres were thus holistically embedding situations per-
meated by and unfolding in suggestions of movement that modulate the 
dynamics of the felt- body (Schmitz, 1969/2005). Feelings, consequently, 
were not internal states of a subject but encountered in the world as quasi- 
objective external forces that grip the felt- body. In this anti- mentalist and 
anti- materialist stance, to feel, then, literally means to move and to be 
moved. In contrast to a Spinozist ontology however, Schmitz’s personalism 
is committed to a methodological anthropocentrism where a normative 
human person acts as the benchmark for an analysis of atmosphere: In order 
for his phenomenological accounts to gain general validity, the perceiver of 
atmosphere must be of normal human condition (Schmitz, 1969/2005, 
p. 131), of normal sanity (Schmitz, 1969/2005, p. XI) and normal mind 
(Schmitz, 1969/2005, p. 46). In light of this, Schmitz’s felt- body becomes 
highly suspicious and complicit in the very humanist project that theories of 
affect have intended to challenge.
 In the 1990s, Böhme translates Schmitz’s idiosyncratic language into a 
popular aesthetic theory that now focuses on the perception and creation of 
atmosphere. According to Böhme (2017) atmospheres pertain to “the 
common reality of the perceiver and the perceived” (p. 20) and are located 
between subject and object. Böhme (2017) conceives of the term as a meta-
phoric appropriation from meteorology and, unlike Schmitz, considers atmo-
spheres as emanating and radiating “ecstasies” of things, while apparently 
remaining unaware of the term’s historical and lexical associations with bodily 
effluvia. In contrast to the atmospheric emanations of the 18th and 19th centu-
ries, the radiations he speaks of turn out to be virtually immaterial since, as he 
repeatedly insists, they would be nothing without the perceiving subject 
(Böhme, 2017, p. 183). Böhme, whose writings are sometimes dismissed by 
his German peers as philosophically flawed (Wellbery, 2003), has nevertheless 
become a key reference in scholarship on atmosphere and applied research on 
ambiance. Critically expanding on Böhme, Jean- Paul Thibaud (2003), who 
develops a nuanced theory of urban ambiances, states that rather than being 
objects of perception, atmospheres condition perception. Rainer Kazig (2007) 
defines atmospheres as media between humans and environment, while Ben 
Anderson (2009) who, in a much- cited article, coins the phrase “affective 
atmosphere,” conceives of them as “singular affective qualities that emanate 
from but exceed the assembling of bodies” (p. 80). Mikkel Bille, Peter 
Bjerregaard, and Tim Flohr Sørensen (2015) who have critically pointed out 
the tautological character of the phrase “affective atmosphere,” suggest focus-
ing on the shaping and deliberate staging of atmospheres while Kathleen 
Stewart (2011) has identified them as “force fields” and Tonino Griffero 
(2014) has emphasized their “authority.”
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The grammar of atmosphere
In German, the word “Atmosphäre” is often used in conjunction with the verb 
“herrschen” (to rule, to reign, or to govern). Writing about lodging- houses in 
Manchester, Friedrich Engels (1892/1952) rhetorically contends: “What 
physical and moral atmosphere reigns in these holes, I need not state” (p. 42). 
The German collocation that Engels uses here, “an atmosphere reigns” (eine 
Atmosphäre herrscht), grammatically places both climatic and moral atmosphere 
in the subject position and imbues it with the agency to govern a sphere. 
Herein lies a critical structural difference between the semantic capacities of 
the German word “Atmosphäre” and the English word “atmosphere” since the 
latter finds it much harder to leave its grammatical status as an object. More-
over, the verb “to reign” underlines the mereological character of “atmo-
sphere”: just as the sovereign reigns over an area by uniting its inhabitants 
under one law, ideology, or banner, so an “atmosphere” is said to reign over 
a particular place and wield authority over all bodies present in that place (see 
also Griffero, 2014). The authority of atmosphere thus pertains to a location 
or situation as a whole, for instance, an apartment, a concert, a mass uprising, 
or a religious event. These places or events can all be described as being 
“governed” by a particular atmosphere. It thus comes as no surprise that cre-
ating and mobilizing atmospheres can be considered a technology of power.
 But this collocation is not exclusive to the lexeme “Atmosphäre.” Various 
words, from the phenomenal complex of weather and Stimmung to feelings 
such as grief, joy, boredom, or silence, are all collocated in German with the 
verb “herrschen” (to reign) and can consequently be assigned the grammatical 
subject position. This linguistic co- association of these diverse nouns further 
adds to their affinity, in particular between weather, feelings, and moral senti-
ments (→ sentiment). Syntactically speaking then, feelings and atmospheres in 
German are not necessarily descriptors of subjectivated human existence or 
qualities of situations and places, but dominant forces that “govern” situ-
ations, societies, spheres of action.
 Drawing on Morton’s theory of ambient poetics and on the “situation onto-
logy” in terms of which Schmitz frames his notion of atmosphere, I will elab-
orate upon the following four key characteristics of atmospheres: their 
mereological fabric, their modal structure, their intensification at affective 
thresholds, and their affective efficacy through “suggestions of movement.”
From meteorology to mereology
Key to the mereological conception of atmosphere proposed here is the 
seamless coherence of atmospheric phenomena. Morton (2007) argues that 
“ambient poetics is a rendering” (p. 35), a process whereby, for instance, all 
elements of a film are drenched in a technically generated color- scheme. 
Photo filter applications put this aspect of atmosphere to work and ultimately 
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commercialize the longing for atmospheric experiences. They do so by filter-
ing a photo into a finely- tuned coherent color- mode that retrospectively 
charges the image, and thus the memory of the situation in which it was 
taken, with an intensive atmosphere. Such rendering invokes coherence in 
two ways: First, processes of rendering pertain to a situation, a place or an 
artistic creation as a whole, and second, they also constitute its coherence; just as 
Johann G. Herder (1785/1869, p. 49) had posited that climate affected the 
entirety of things in a given region while at the same time rendering its 
inhabitants a cultural collective. In an atmosphere then, the multiplicity of 
bodies is imbued with a seamless hue, just as a sunset tinges the entire 
“world” in shades of red. The widely remarked affective “meaningfulness” of 
atmospheres (Vadén & Torvinen, 2015) is related to this coherence, for an 
atmospheric whole cannot be further differentiated into numerable elements 
or separate meanings.
 Critically, however, such a hue or climate that pervades a situation as 
atmosphere does not necessarily affect or involve each individual body in the 
same way. For this reason, Morton (2007) refers to the absorptive capacities 
of atmosphere as simulation. Atmospheres transform a situation of diverse ele-
ments in such a way that even discordant voices and bodies are fashioned in 
an all- encompassing style. Using the meteorological term “atmosphere” as a 
metaphor for the contagion of religion and religious mass mobilization, 
Friedrich Schleiermacher (1799/1958) argues that once religion has seized a 
critical mass, even those who are not converted by it shine in its light. In a 
crowd of believers, religiosity is simulated as strikingly genuine in the atmo-
sphere. Here, atmosphere does not simply invoke coherence but also simu-
lates it, erases inconsistencies, and melts, unifies, and homogenizes by 
imposing an overarching significance onto elements that might otherwise be 
unrelated. The 19th-century poet Edward Bulwer- Lytton (1842) names this 
the “deception” or “phantasmagoria” of atmosphere. Tim Flohr Sørensen 
(2015) exemplifies this aspect in his study on atmospheres of funeral rites in 
pre- historical passage graves, where he elaborates how the lack of light and 
thus visibility collapses the difference between living and dead bodies among 
whom one’s own presence is no longer confined to a bodily and bounded 
identity but becomes a “seamless infiltration” (p. 7). Not only is death atmos-
pheric in the penetrating darkness, but darkness undermines the (exceptional) 
status of the human subject as living being.
 As smoothing forces that evoke coherence, atmospheres are also highly polit-
ical, since they paint even conflicting voices in an all- encompassing homogen-
eous light. This can be exemplified by the musical “accompaniment” blaring 
from concentration camp loudspeakers, which served not only to drown out 
death cries acoustically, but to assimilate them into the musical mood of 
Wagnerian marches. Or consider the singing or chanting congregation in which 
participant individuals both simulate and consume religious unity (Riedel, 
2015). The monochrome uniforms in which the denizens of a totalitarian 
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regime or a religious community are attired are also such devices of unification. 
Similarly, the deliberate assimilation and mimetic strategies of dressing, moving, 
and shouting that prime a crowd for revolution (Runkel, 2018) or impel a foot-
ball team and their fans to prevail are technologies of mobilizing atmospheres of 
power (Edensor, 2014). Since atmosphere presides over situations in their 
entirety, it not only subverts anthropocentrism, but does away with the idea of 
a center altogether (see also Morton, 2002). Or, to use Schmitz’s terminology, 
atmosphere is spatial, but without a location and surface (“ortlos” and “randlos”). 
Atmosphere, then, does not simply surround a person as a centrifugal expanse, 
as some have argued, but, rather, following Morton, personhood itself may be 
conceived of as environmental or in fact atmospheric.
Modes and modulations
That music and sound but also light, odor, or weather all have a latent tend-
ency to become ubiquitous and thus to invoke coherence and charge a situ-
ation with atmosphere is due to their capacity to operate as modes. A 
landscape at night might be charged with atmosphere because the moonlight, 
or absence thereof, renders the entire world in a monochrome mode of 
shades of black, which may even obliterate the difference between earth and 
sky, void and matter, human and non- human. The atmosphere of the night 
here is not a locatable object in the world but a mode in which the hetero-
geneous objects coalesce in one characteristic color scheme. The same can be 
said for odors that have no defined location in space but rather modulate a 
space in its entirety, as in the historical notion of atmosphere- as-effluvia. 
Likewise, sound does not appear as an object in the world with a defined 
location and surface, but rather, charges an entire place or situation with 
sonorous intensity due to what Schmitz terms its surfacelessness.
 Appropriating the concept of mode from music theory, modes, like atmo-
spheres, are structured mereologically. A mode in the modern sense of scale, 
for instance, determines the pitch relationships in a musical piece. To shift 
only one pitch of the scale may transpose the entire musical piece into 
another mode. Mode thus determines the musical material in which music 
unfolds and thus always affects a musical piece in its entirety. It is for this 
reason that musical modes have a strong affinity to moods and to being 
atmospheric. In its extended sense as fashion, style, manner, or way (Weise), 
musical mode is not to be reduced to pitch relationships. Friedrich Schiller 
writes in 1797 that rhythm serves as a tool (Werkzeug) to provide a dramatic 
production with an “atmosphere,” because everything is subject to the law of 
rhythm. For Schiller, rhythm is a mode that combines “all characters and all 
situations [my translation, F. R.]” (von Goethe & Schiller, 1881, p. 329) of a 
play into one seamless whole.
 In modulating mood, atmosphere governs the relationships of its parts just 
as the scale sets the degrees of its pitches. In turn, the embeddedness of each 
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body within the encompassing whole predominates the more individual affec-
tive vectors in which bodies are related to each other. Even if we approach such 
atmospherically charged situations from the perspective of individual perception, 
those who are repelled by it or remain unaffected by it may nevertheless recog-
nize the way in which a situation coheres in a distributed feeling, or sense its 
grip as a modulating force (for modes of involvement and perception see 
Griffero, 2014). But it is also possible to turn this argument around and follow 
Robert Seyfert’s (2012) notion of the affectif, which he defines as “mode of 
affective interaction” where only bodies sharing a certain frequency spectrum 
are drawn into affective resonance (→ affective resonance). Thus, contrary to 
Schmitz’s normalized and ethnocentric configuration of the felt- body, a focus 
on the modes in which a situation coheres as atmosphere enables us to consider 
atmosphere with respect to the abundant cultural, historical, and physical diver-
sity of embodied end even disembodied existences.
Affective thresholds
Atmosphere, Leo Spitzer (1942) writes, indicates “something characteristic 
which distinguishes one place from another” (p. 22). This diacritic function 
of atmosphere is not accidental, but essential. Social movements and ritual 
situations play on contrast to mobilize atmospheres. Victor Turner (1995), 
who in the 1950s proposes to conceive of ritual (and society) as a process 
“with successive phases of structure and communitas [emphasis added]” (p. 78), 
highlights the atmosphere of communal singing precisely at the point in the 
process of a Ndembu pregnancy ritual where moral rules are explicitly 
inverted and where a highly sexualized language is given voice to in ritual 
songs that would otherwise be fraught with shame. In the ritual mode, shame 
is powerfully defused and replaced by a sexualized atmosphere that animates 
not an individual subject but transforms the entire situation into a “collective 
feeling” (Schmitz, 1969/2005) (→ affective communities). Climatic situations of 
transition from one meteorological state to another, such as the first day of 
spring or the notoriously photographed sunset that marks the dramatic thresh-
old between day and night, are also particularly atmospheric.
 Such affective thresholds are critical to musical modes that only make sense 
and produce meaning in their difference from each other. Put simply, mode is 
inherently differential. Furthermore, musical mode operates most powerfully as 
an atmospheric tool when one mode contrasts with another. The juxtaposition 
of modes is thus a musical technique of invoking atmosphere and affording 
experiences of immersion (→ immersion, immersive power), as, for instance, in the 
traditional court- music of Myanmar where musical pieces performed by the 
Hsaing Waing orchestra are structured in alternating tempos. The musical shift 
into quicker tempos powerfully generates a musical, and indeed corporeal, 
momentum that unleashes dancers from the preceding slow meter and pulls 
them into rapid movements. Music kicks in. The atmospheric tension here 
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derives not just from the substance of each of the rhythms but from their con-
trast. For this reason, the affective power of mode is always specific to histor-
ically situated musical traditions and cultures of listening, and their repertoires 
and modal systems. Similar techniques are employed in baroque suites or in 
classical symphonic works that are composed of a succession of distinctive 
movements that contrast in various musical parameters, such as a shift in key, 
meter and rhythm, volume, timbre, tempo, or orchestration.
Caught up in movement
The question that studies on atmosphere have usually started with is how an 
atmosphere is felt, perceived, or experienced. Attending to the material texture 
of light, temperature, sound, and architecture inside pre- historic passage- graves, 
Sørensen (2015) argues that bodily movements of entering and – in the case of 
the living – exiting the tomb, are not simply caused by architecture but are 
themselves generative of the spatial form and of a shifting sense of presence and 
self in “evolving kinesfields” (p. 7) and further alter sensorial perception. Move-
ment is thus integral to how atmospheres might have unfolded in situations of 
interment. Circumventing the clause of subjectivity characteristic of Böhme’s 
notion of atmosphere, a focus on movement in which bodies are continuous 
with architecture, sound, or climate, Sørensen suggests, enables a study of atmo-
sphere that decenters the human being.
 Schmitz, equally, elevates “movement” as a key term for his phenomeno-
logy of perception to evade what he sees as the problematic reduction of per-
ception to the senses. Rather than being seen, heard, or smelled, atmospheres 
are perceived in and through movement. “Being moved” is not a metaphor 
for feelings but a corporeal dynamic manifest in the felt- body. Even seem-
ingly static phenomena are related to the felt- body through what he terms 
“suggestions of movement” (Bewegungssuggestionen). Albeit immobile, archi-
tecture and landscape may nevertheless suggest movements through lines of 
flight, height, narrowness, darkness, or expansiveness. Climatic states, too, 
take effect as felt atmospheres by engulfing the felt- body in suggestions of 
movement, thus invoking feelings as atmospheres. Like architecture and 
weather, music assembles an entire array of suggested movements by means 
of harmonic tension, timbral shifts, rhythmic drive, melodic contour, or 
volume. In situations of worship and ritual music making, musical “sugges-
tions of movement” may function affectively in the manner of atmospheres as 
they may lead to spiritual transformations and religious becomings (Riedel, 
2015; see also Eisenlohr, 2018; Abels, 2018). Thus, in a worship service of a 
Pietist congregation, when the last verse of a protestant hymn is transposed 
into a higher key, a harmonic shift charged with movement suggestions takes 
place. The singing and seated congregation embodies this shift by standing up 
to sing the last verse, enraptured in a musical atmosphere saturated with reli-
gious feelings (Riedel, 2015).
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Conclusion
The ways in which atmospheres unfold and take effect are not limited to the 
four modalities outlined here. The diversity of culturally and historically spe-
cific situations in which atmospheres operate have yielded other key features 
such as vagueness, spatial extension, processual formation, or meaningfulness. 
The value of atmosphere as a heuristic concept, as I have sought to suggest 
here, however, is its mereological fabric that significantly exceeds the realm 
of (aesthetic) perception.
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Chapter 8
Sentiment
Jonas Bens and Olaf Zenker
The way the word “sentiment” is used in everyday English provides a starting 
point for characterizing it as an analytical term. Sentiment can mean a view 
or opinion that is held or expressed as in “I agree with your sentiment.” But 
it can also denote a feeling or emotion as in “an intense sentiment of horror.” 
Furthermore, sentiment can be used as a mass noun referring to “a general 
feeling or opinion” as in “the rise of racist sentiment” (cf. Stevenson, 2010). 
This vernacular use of sentiment already reflects two major premises of senti-
ment as an analytical term. First, the concept of sentiment connects cognitive 
processes of forming opinions and judgments with affective and emotional 
dynamics. Second, sentiments do not only seem to exist on the individual but 
also on the collective level.
 Sentiment describes an evaluative regime of meaning as embedded in and 
colored by affective and emotional dynamics. The term “regime” signifies that 
sentiments contain regular patterns, orderly procedures, and rules of how sense is 
to be made of the world. This process of meaning- making is not limited to 
rationality and cognition, however, but always includes affect and emotion. In 
other words: affect and emotion are not merely additions to independent rational 
processes of cognition and meaning- making, but inextricably permeate them and 
thereby co- constitute sentiments. Such sentiments can be experienced in 
different modes: as vague gut feelings, weakly shaped intuitions, clearly formed 
opinions, and even firm judgments. Thus, all of these can be described as senti-
ments: an opinion on how to assess the behavior of a person (for instance, the 
morality of a particular action or a whole lifestyle), a judgment on which system 
of rules is preferable over another (for example, when it comes to the appropri-
ateness of criminal justice measures over traditionally practiced rituals of recon-
ciliation), a perception of the truth of theoretical premises (as they may be 
derived from religious doctrine or scientifically produced knowledge), a choice 
over the legitimacy of a political measure (based on democratic deliberation, 
authoritarian rule, or something else entirely).
 Sentiments are experienced by individuals, but they cannot be reduced to 
bodily feelings or inner sensations; they structure meaning- making on a col-
lective level, but are not simply abstract structural formations either. Sentiments 
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1 In this case, sentiments can include “moral emotions” (Haidt, 2003). For an illuminating 
ethnographic approach see Scheidecker (2017). However, moral emotions describe only one 
aspect of the broader understanding of sentiment.
are social- relational phenomena and emerge in processes of individual and col-
lective formation and instantiation. Because sentiments are dialectically repro-
duced, they may change over time, but do so in relation to both individual and 
collective processes of remembering. As such, sentiments coalesce into relatively 
stable regimes and tend to change slowly and gradually. As they endure, senti-
ments can potentially transport structures for meaning- making through time and 
space – and can sometimes travel with great historical depth.
 Sentiments emerge on multiple scales. On the macro- level, they can 
appear as wide- ranging discursive formations, on the meso- level as institu-
tionalized and materialized arrangements and on the micro- level as both con-
ditions for and the product of individual action. On all of these scales, 
sentiments have the potential to structure processes of meaning- making for 
collectives and individuals, govern the formation of subjects, and establish 
frames of references for communication.
 In their relative stability over time, sentiments play a key role in processes 
of creating, maintaining, and transforming normative orders – a term most 
broadly understood as any form of law, politics, cosmovision, or morality. 
Investigating sentiments is therefore central for coming to terms with polit-
ical, legal, religious, and moral orders and the myriad practices that bring 
them about, challenge them, transform them, and aim to stabilize and repro-
duce them. The concept of sentiment provides an important tool to analyze 
the normative dimension of affective societies.
Neighboring concepts
Sentiment can be investigated through the conceptual lenses of both affect and 
emotion, and therefore cuts across the field of Affective Societies (→ affect; → 
emotion, emotion concept). When affective and emotional dynamics relate to the 
establishment of relatively stable evaluative regimes of meaning, which govern, 
structure, and regulate how people make sense of the world and how the world 
inscribes into people’s sense- making, one can apply the term sentiment.
 Sentiments emerge in the relational co- presence of bodies in space, and 
affective arrangements are sites of their production and re- actualization 
(→ affective arrangements). Sentiments inscribe themselves into the emotional 
life of individuals, institutional arrangements, and whole societies and can 
become deeply encoded into cultural frameworks. As such, they play a role in 
the production of and form part of emotion repertoires (→ emotion repertoires). 
Sentiments can be described as affective inasmuch as they are experienced as 
vague, pre- structured, and atmospheric, and as emotional inasmuch as they 
take on a concrete, scripted, and localized form.1 They can be found in the 
everyday and in the extraordinary.
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2 There is also a growing field in computing called “sentiment analysis” that analyses natural 
language use, typically in “big data” settings (e.g., Liu, 2010). It is based on sociolinguistic 
insights on how opinions are expressed in metaphor, grammar (e.g., syntax), word combina-
tions, ideophones, and so forth.
3 Bourdieu’s (1972) concepts of habitus and hexis fruitfully explore the interconnection 
between socio- economic structure and subjective experience and theorize the interface of 
society and body, language and feeling. The potential of Bourdieu’s theory to contribute 
to more recent debates on the relationship of language and affect, however, is yet to be 
explored in detail.
 At a subjective level, sentiments can be experienced as feelings (→ feeling). 
But although sentiments have a strong normative dimension, they go beyond 
what is usually described as “feeling rules” (Hochschild, 1983). Feeling rules 
govern what people feel in a given context. Sentiments govern what people 
feel about the meaning of a given context.
 At a collective level, sentiments can, to a large degree, be described as 
discursive in the Foucauldian sense (Foucault, 1972a).2 The concept of dis-
course, however, is clearly focused and mainly confined to the realm of 
language, while the concept of sentiment decidedly includes non- linguistic, 
affective forms of meaning- making. Sentiments can be understood as an 
element of Foucault’s broader concept of dispositif, which is described as an 
apparatus containing both discursive and non- discursive components 
(Foucault, 1972b, p. 195; cf. Mühlhoff, 2018).3
Conceptual roots
There are two major conceptual roots of sentiment as an analytical term. The 
first can be found in certain strands of practical philosophy, the second in 
social science thinking. We propose to draw from both of these sources to 
outline sentiment as an analytical device.
 At least three philosophical traditions can be mobilized to outline the idea 
of sentiment: (1) Aristotelian ethics, (2) Scottish moral sense theorists, (3) a 
more recent theoretical line of thinking leading from Marx over Nietzsche 
and Freud to Foucault. Recent approaches that use sentiment as an analytical 
lens have drawn on all three of these traditions, albeit with different emphases 
(cf. Throop, 2012).
 A first conceptual root for imagining sentiment can be seen in the Aris-
totelian (2009) tradition of virtue ethics. Virtue ethics sees ethical behavior 
as a question of crafting oneself as a moral subject rather than adhering to 
rules and duties (deontological ethics) or choosing one’s actions by paying 
close attention to their consequences (consequentialist ethics). In Aristote-
lian thought, affect and emotion play an integral role in forming the moral 
subject and hence deserve a central place in thinking about law and politics 
(Huppes- Clysenaer & Coelho, 2018). Contemporary practical philosophers 
such as Martha Nussbaum (2013) draw on the Aristotelian tradition to 
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think about what kinds of sentiment should be produced and maintained 
and what kinds have to be challenged and transformed in order to promote 
virtue.
 A second conceptual root can be found in Scottish moral sense theory 
most prominently associated with the work of David Hume (1751) and 
Adam Smith (1759). These thinkers explicitly outlined sentiment as 
“a word which can stand both for judgment and affection” and systemati-
cally “conflate[s] opinion and feeling” (Mullan, 1988, p. 8). The “moral 
sense,” a feeling of sympathy for and with others, is seen as a normative 
device to orient one’s judgments. While moral philosophers of the 18th 
century thus relied on affect and emotion to assess the morality of actions, 
sentimentality increasingly came to be regarded as false, self- indulgent, and 
artificial from the end of the century onwards, prominently so in the field 
of arts and aesthetics. This was especially the case after Friedrich Schiller 
distinguished between “naive” and “sentimental” poets in his influential 
series of papers Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung (Schiller, 1795/1993). 
Schiller asserted that naive poets, for instance in Greek antiquity, had 
directly described nature in an unalienated way. Most contemporaneous 
sentimental literature, however, was written from the alienated and self- 
reflective stance of modern culture; it aimed for an ideal state, yet ulti-
mately reproduced its own artificiality.
 This conception of being internally divided and alienated from one’s 
own nature developed into a specifically “modern” concern throughout the 
19th century, preparing the ground for a third conceptual root found in the 
work of Karl Marx (1867), Friedrich Nietzsche (1887), Sigmund Freud 
(1930), and Michel Foucault (1984). These scholars represent a line 
of thinking on the internal divisions of the affective and emotional life of 
the subject and the ambivalence of moral sense. Marx emphasizes that the 
subject is not simply able to assess right and wrong independent of 
the socio- economic structure of power it is embedded in. In his concept 
of commodity fetishism, the affective life of the subject is led astray by the 
structural conditions of capitalism and develops a false consciousness about 
the value of commodities that might nevertheless “feel right” (Marx, 1867, 
ch. 1). This theme of internal division and alienation of the subject is taken 
up by thinkers from the late 19th and early 20th centuries: the subject must 
subject itself in order to come to power (Nietzsche), the subject must have 
desires which can never be fulfilled for it to function (Freud), the subject is 
embedded into structures of power in such a way that it always both resists 
and wields power (Foucault). Conceptualizing the subject as internally 
divided and contradictory – not only because it is embedded in structural 
relations of power – challenges some of the premises of the two older tradi-
tions concerning the concept of sentiment. It questions the divisions 
between sentiments promoting virtue and those promoting vice, as both 
are inextricably entangled in the formation of the subject. Affect and 
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4 An example of this strain of thinking about “moral sentiments that escape the alternative 
between good and evil” (Fassin, 2013, p. 249) is the concept of ressentiment as developed 
from a phenomenological perspective by Max Scheler (1912) in reference to Nietzsche. See 
also Fassin’s illustrative differentiation between the French term “ressentiment” (which is also 
used as a loanword in German) and the English term “resentment.”
emotion can likewise not easily guide a moral sense, because the affective 
and emotional life of the subject is internally contradictory.4
 These traditions point toward the two important components of sentiment 
as an analytical term, which are, as mentioned before, already embedded in its 
vernacular meaning. First, they point to the normative dimension of affective 
and emotional dynamics and to their role in the (re)production of normative 
orders. Affect and emotion are not in opposition to normative judgments, but 
essentially contribute to their formation. Second, in this process of emotional 
and affective meaning- making, the individual and the collective emerge as 
dialectically interrelated and internally divided. This creates constant ambigui-
ties in the process of their co- instantiation.
 The social sciences have also made sentiments a topic of investigation. For 
instance, sentiment is an integral part of Bronislaw Malinowski’s (1927) func-
tionalist theory of culture and society. He defined sentiment as “a system of 
organized emotions” (Malinowski, 1927, p. 139). In his elaborations, which 
are quite in line with contemporary research on affect and emotion, he 
emphasizes that “our emotional life is definitely co- ordinated with the 
environment” and explains that
round each person or object the emotions are organized into a definite 
system – the love or hate or devotion we feel for a parent, a country or a 
life- pursuit […] the ties which bind us to the various members of our 
family, patriotism, ideals of truth, righteousness, devotion to science – all 
these are sentiments.
(Malinowski, 1927, p. 139)
Since Malinowski, anthropology has continued to investigate sentiment to 
describe how people make sense of the world and establish normative orders 
in the context of affective and emotional dynamics (Abu- Lughod, 1986; Lutz, 
1988; Throop, 2010). It has analyzed the larger political dynamics engendered 
by sentiment, such as humanitarianism (Fassin, 2012) or the colonial govern-
ance of the intimate (Stoler, 2002, 2007).
 Social scientific and specifically anthropological investigations focus 
directly on the collective and social- relational dimension of sentiment. Senti-
ments as relatively stable evaluative regimes of meaning and feeling, of beliefs 
and desires, should be investigated as socio- cultural phenomena and must 
conceptually include collective actors and their systemic and structural dimen-
sions. This perspective is less explored in the conceptual roots in practical 
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5 This research contributes to the broader field of law and emotion research (e.g., Bandes, 
2001), particularly to those studies interested in the role of emotions in transitional justice 
proceedings (e.g., Mihai, 2016; Reynaud, 2017; Clarke, 2019).
philosophy mentioned above. Drawing on practical philosophy as well as 
social science thinking, sentiment appears as a multifaceted concept to think 
about meaning- making and the formation of normative orders.
Sentiment at work
The particular topic of our research, the politics of international criminal 
justice in Africa, can illustrate how a focus on sentiment sheds light on the 
affective and emotional dynamics of evaluative meaning- making.5 We high-
light this process below by proposing a terminological shift from the sense of 
justice to the sentiment of justice.
Sentiment and the International Criminal Court in Africa
The research project on which these observations are based includes ethno-
graphic fieldwork at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague 
and in several places in Northern Uganda. At the center of the project is an 
analysis of the affective and emotional dynamics in which the ICC case The 
Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen is embedded. In this criminal proceeding, 
Dominic Ongwen, a former commander of the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA), a Ugandan rebel force engaged in a decade- long civil war with the 
government, is accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The pro-
ceedings are conducted at a time of growing criticism of the ICC’s engage-
ment in Africa (cf. Clarke, 2019). Many, particularly high- ranking African 
politicians, criticize the ICC for prosecuting exclusively Africans and accuse 
the Court of neo- colonial practices. This research project aspires to grasp the 
role of sentiment in this case on multiple scales.
 At the macro- level, sentiments can appear in the form of globalized and 
mediatized discursive formations. In such debates on transitional justice in 
Africa, one example is the appearance of colonialism and the Holocaust in 
global discourses. The critics of the ICC frequently refer to “learning a 
lesson” from the history of European colonialism in Africa and criticize the 
Court’s legal interventions as a neo- colonial practice. The proponents of 
international criminal justice in Africa frequently refer to “learning a lesson” 
from the history of the Holocaust of European Jews and make a plea for 
ending the culture of impunity for mass- scale violence. Such claims in polit-
ical discourses can fruitfully be investigated as sentiments and explored in 
their embeddedness in affective and emotional dynamics. While both the topoi 
of colonialism and the Holocaust are mobilized to justify normative judg-
ments on the legitimacy of the ICC’s activities in Africa, they also connect to 
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affective and emotional dynamics encoded in collective memory. By invo-
king colonialism in the context of asking audiences to form a judgment on 
the legitimacy of the ICC, emotions of pride in African nationalists fighting 
for decolonial liberation and indignation about foreign oppression factor into 
the normative decision- making process. Invoking the Holocaust in the same 
context taps into emotions of horror about the industrial extermination of 
human beings and indignation about such deeds going unpunished. Charac-
terizing such macro- debates as a competition between “anti- colonial senti-
ment” and “anti- impunity sentiment” opens up an analytical space in which 
affect and emotion and the formation of judgments are taken seriously in their 
mutual entanglements.
 At the meso- level, sentiments can appear as materialized regimes of regu-
lating feeling and meaning- making in institutional settings. The ICC as an 
institutional frame is derived from a normative order, namely international 
criminal law, and is engaged in a transitional justice project. In assisting soci-
eties in coming to terms with a violent past and facilitating a transition to a 
peaceful and democratic regime, the ICC can be analyzed as an institution 
producing specific sentiments. From such a perspective, it becomes clear that 
the law is not free of emotions (Bandes, 2001), but instead systematically tries 
to produce specific affective and emotional dynamics. While employees of 
the ICC frequently emphasize in conversations that an international criminal 
proceeding must “take the emotion out” of the process of justice- making, 
they often highlight the deterrent function of the ICC and appreciate that 
potential or actual perpetrators of mass violence are afraid of the Court. The 
ICC’s elaborate infrastructure of victim participation is frequently justified by 
the satisfaction of victim’s emotional desires to “have their day in court.” The 
ICC applies strict rules of behavior for visitors to court hearings: they must sit 
quietly and are not allowed to bring books even for long proceedings. 
Security personnel immediately intervene if visitors engage in conversations 
or display specific emotions that are seen as inappropriate, such as smiling or 
laughing. These and many other examples point to the mobilization of insti-
tutionalized regimes to produce sentiment in the context of transitional 
justice. The past is to be judged in a specific way to construct a peaceful and 
democratic present.
 At the micro- level, sentiments can be observed as materializing in concrete 
events, such as court hearings in The Hague and outreach events in Northern 
Uganda, but also in narrative interviews with participants justifying their 
assessments of the legitimacy of the Dominic Ongwen case. An analysis of the 
rhetoric applied in the courtroom reveals how participants (contrary to the 
ideal of a purely rational legal proceeding) consequently use affective and 
emotional framing for their legal arguments and their statements of fact. Arti-
facts such as images and audio and videotapes are purposefully mobilized in 
order to evoke affective and emotional dynamics within different audiences. 
Outreach events are set up to create specific affective atmospheres in order to 
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create popular support for the ICC’s transitional justice projects. All this is 
directed to influence people’s formations of judgments in the context of the 
case. One can observe that when people justify their subjective judgments on 
the legitimacy of these proceedings, they frequently present narratives, 
whether personal and biographical stories or widely known histories, in 
which emotional and affective dynamics are encoded: stories of killed relat-
ives, feelings of betrayal by the government or LRA rebels, the unbearable 
and precarious life in camps of internally displaced people, but also widely 
used tropes such as the anti- colonial and anti- impunity sentiment also found 
in globalized or regionalized discourses.
 Sentiments that appear on these multiple scales constantly re- instantiate 
each other. The individual actors of the ICC’s transitional justice perform-
ances form their opinions and judgments about the legitimacy of these pro-
ceedings in the context of affective and emotional dynamics that unfold on 
multiple scales. When individual actors utter these judgments, these utter-
ances feed back into the multi- scalar production of sentiment (→ affective 
witnessing).
From the sense of justice to the sentiment of justice
Combining the conceptual roots of practical philosophy and social science 
thinking within the analytical device of sentiment, it appears fruitful to also 
approach questions of justice with the concept of sentiment. So far, however, 
when scholars have addressed justice not only in purely normative terms, but 
by descriptively including people’s subjective experiences, they have typically 
done so in the framework of the sense of justice.
 Legal philosophy has approached this topic in the philosophical traditions 
outlined above, connecting the sense of justice with the work of the Scottish 
moral sense theorists (Dubber, 2006; Solomon, 1995), among others. This 
approach to the sense of justice puts the emotional life of the individual in the 
center of the investigation and tends not to sufficiently highlight its inter-
dependence with society. More recent anthropological investigations take an 
explicit social science position and characterize the sense of justice primarily 
as a social- relational phenomenon (Brunegger & Faulk, 2016). These 
approaches, however, tend to include all kinds of experiences and perceptions 
people can have in relation to the law, and seem to lack a specific focus on 
affect and emotion.
 Against this backdrop, we argue that research on perceptions of justice can 
benefit from expanding our understanding of the sense of justice through a 
more comprehensive lens on the sentiment of justice (Bens & Zenker, 2017). 
Such a perspective allows for a clear focus on affect and emotion without 
losing sight of the relational embeddedness of people’s experiences. Investi-
gating sentiments of justice means taking seriously the processes through 
which people assess the legitimacy of normative orders as they unfold in 
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affective and emotional dynamics. Such an investigation does not conceive 
sentiments of justice only as internal phenomena in people’s minds or as 
external structures conditioning the production of subjectivity, but rather as 
constantly re- produced in the dialectic of the individual and the collective.
Exploring the normative dimension of affective 
societies
Mobilizing the idea of affective societies means systematically taking affect 
and emotion into account when analyzing culture and society. Sentiment is a 
key concept for the analysis of affective societies, because it pays close atten-
tion to affective and emotional dynamics in normative processes of meaning- 
making. Sentiments describes the evaluative regimes of meaning that emerge 
entangled in and colored by affective and emotional dynamics. As such, senti-
ments play a central role in processes of ordering, regulating and structuring 
human interaction through rules.
 The concept of sentiment is especially suited to focus on relations of power 
and inequality in affective societies. Basic categories in the production of 
inequality and alterity – such as class, race, and gender – are invoked, re- 
produced, and legitimized by way of sentiments. Capitalism, racism, or patri-
archy, for instance, are long- standing formations deeply entangled in 
sentiments; the same applies to the movements that counter them – be they 
socialist, anti- racist, or feminist. In this sense, sentiment as an analytical term 
is politically neutral, but can be used to describe the processes at work when 
power relations are established and challenged.
 Human life is inextricably embedded in affective and emotional dynamics 
reconstituting both individuals and collectives; the invention and re- invention 
of normative orders is no exception. In its broadest sense, sentiment thus 
provides an analytical device to help understand how affective societies are 
produced, maintained, challenged, and transformed.
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Part II
Elaborating affect

Chapter 9
Affective arrangement
Jan Slaby
“Affective arrangement” is a philosophical concept that describes the in each 
case unique constellation of a particular affect- intensive site of social life. An 
affective arrangement comprises an array of persons, things, artifacts, spaces, 
discourses, behaviors, expressions or other materials that coalesce into a 
coordinated formation of mutual affecting and being- affected. While its com-
posite materials are heterogeneous, an affective arrangement is characteristi-
cally social. As such, it usually brings multiple human actors into a 
conjunction, so that these actors’ reciprocal affecting and being- affected is the 
central dimension of the arrangement. The concept thus pertains to the 
mutually formative combination of socio- material settings and local – as well 
as non- local (i.e., mediatized) – affective relations. As part of an affective 
arrangement, affective relations are channeled and modulated in recurrent 
ways that can be charted by researchers.
 As a working concept, “affective arrangement” – and the methodological 
perspective it anchors – can help researchers come to terms with ongoing 
affective relationality in various settings, in particular where actors with 
different positions, roles, histories, dispositions, or habits engage and interact. 
Affective arrangements are regularly found, for instance, in corporate offices, 
in public arenas of sports or entertainment, at the sites of religious or ceremo-
nious rituals, at the sites of social and political gatherings of various sorts, but 
also in the private setting of the family home or in the interactive spaces of 
contemporary media. The concept facilitates micro- analyses of such settings 
as it furthers both an understanding of the entities that coalesce locally to 
engender relational affect, and also the overall affective tonality or → atmo-
sphere that prevails in these locales.
 The concept is inspired by Deleuze’s and Guattari’s influential notion of 
agencement (Deleuze & Guattari, 1975/1986, 1980/1987; see also Buchanan, 
2015; Nail, 2017). Another precursor is Foucault’s concept of a “dispositif of 
power” (Foucault, 1977/1980), which stresses materiality, historicity, and vis-
ibility in the study of power relations but does not place particular emphasis 
on affect. Deleuze’s and Guattari’s agencement refers to local concatenations of 
diverse materials that actively run through a characteristic routine. Thus, the 
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concept invokes a notion of distributed agency in the sense of a performative 
sequence jointly enacted by the contributing elements. Affective arrangements 
likewise comprise agency – both human and non- human – in inex tricable 
entanglement with relations of affecting and being affected among its various 
elements.
 An affective arrangement is a fragmentary formation – a tangle of pieces, 
where the pieces in question keep their distinctness and individuality no 
matter how densely they are enmeshed. Yet there is a characteristic mode of 
relatedness that holds the elements together, a specific mode of affecting and 
being affected. In such a dynamic interplay, the elements sustain a local sphere 
of affective intensity and thereby both initiate and give shape to characteristic 
affective relations and agentive routines.
 In view of their dynamic openness and heterogeneity, affective arrangements 
resist attempts to sharply demarcate them. Yet often, there will be a sensible 
difference between inside and outside, marked by thresholds of intensity. Affec-
tive arrangements are performatively open- ended, capable of expanding into their 
surroundings by incorporating new elements. From the point of view of indi-
vidual actors, affective arrangements often exert an active allure, drawing actors 
in by offering occasions for → immersion within a sphere of → affective resonance, 
thereby potentially giving rise to longer lasting → attachment, or even, at times, 
to forms of behavioral addiction (cf. Schüll, 2014).
Arrangement thinking: key dimensions
Affective relations unfold as part of a local formation of elements, involving 
actors, materials, and their environmental contexts and conditions, whose 
characteristics and potentials enter into and shape the affective relations in 
question. Thus, where affect is at issue, there is always more going on than 
merely the affectedness or affective experience of an individual actor or an 
interacting dyad viewed in isolation. The point of the concept “affective 
arrangement” is to bring the contributing elements and dimensions into focus 
in their specificity and with regard to their local mode of composition. 
Ideally, this enables an understanding of a multiplicity of elements in terms of 
how they coalesce locally into a concise formation of affecting and being 
affected (→ Pathosformel ).
 There is much leeway as to the forms affective arrangements may take, 
with regard to the elements that might figure in them and as to the types of 
relatedness holding them together. However, there are recurrent dimensions 
that have proven useful for elucidating concrete cases. Among these are the 
aspect of heterogeneous composition (i.e., a non- unifying adherence of self- 
standing elements), the idea of a polycentric tangle of relations that nevertheless 
gives an impression of a characteristic mode of relatedness, the idea of shifting 
thresholds of intensity that provisionally demarcate the arrangement from its sur-
roundings, and – slightly less centrally – the sense of an often (but not always) 
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pleasurable absorption, captivation or immersion that an affective arrangement 
affords to individuals that are about to get involved with it, with potential for 
longer- lasting → attachment. In terms of dynamics, an affective arrangement is 
usually beset by two counteracting tendencies: one toward its consolidation 
into a relatively permanent pattern, the other, opposing the first, toward 
transformation or even dissolution. Often, phases of relative dominance of 
either tendency can be observed (i.e., relatively stable arrangements vs. relat-
ively more fleeting ones). As temporally stabilized agglomerations of materials 
and expressions, affective arrangements function as repositories of the past, 
which points to their complex, multi- scale historicity (→ affective disposition).
 With the concept “affective arrangement” comes a particular style of thought 
and methodological orientation – arrangement thinking, one might call it – that 
lets theorists and researchers approach affective relations in a specific way. Over 
and above a general orientation toward the situatedness of affect, emphasis is 
placed on local meshworks, apparatuses, and relational configurations, and one 
reckons with surprising combinations of elements in one’s attempt to situate a 
given instance of affect within a particular “intensive milieu” of formative rela-
tions. The theoretical optic engendered by this concept is one that seeks out 
fragmentary complexes, and invokes an ecological perspective critical of indi-
vidualism and mentalism. This style of thought can be glossed as a form of 
materialism, but it is a vital materialism that foregrounds the dynamics, liveliness, 
and intrinsic performativity of matter (Barad, 2007; Bennett, 2010; see Ahmed, 
2008, for critical remarks on this trend).
Background and related concepts
As the invocation of Deleuze and Guattari as well as Foucault indicates, the 
idea of an affective arrangement is inspired by influential conceptual lineages 
in continental thought, with Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud as early instigators. 
What these precursors have in common is a broadly materialist and social- 
realist allegiance pitted against the idealism of bourgeois culture, and at least 
Nietzsche and Marx share a tacit focus on performativity and agency as 
opposed to representation, and a form of subject- thinking that emphasizes 
formative relations to the environment, to ambient culture, or socio- industrial 
complexes. Marx’ fragment on machines and his thoughts on commodity fet-
ishism (Marx, 1973), Nietzsche’s naturalistic yet constructivist and affect- 
oriented construal of the subject (Nietzsche, 1886/2002), and also Freud’s 
concept of the “complex” as an idiosyncratic psychic constellation all prefig-
ure certain aspects of what will later become, in the works of Deleuze and 
Guattari, the agencement.
 The successive stages of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s collaborative work are 
the main attractor for the different phases and facets of arrangement thinking. 
An early seminal articulation is in the Anti- Oedipus, a book that commences 
with the re- coding of the Freudian complex into the “desiring machine” 
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(Deleuze & Guattari, 1972/1983). This move frees the agencement (the French 
translation of Freud’s “complex”) from both its psychic interiority and its 
confinement within a stuffy family setting – the Oedipal triangle. Instead, the 
agencement gets relocated within a plurality of socio- material constellations, 
object relations, and machinic concatenations, fueled by a notion of desire 
centered on the polyvalence and productivity of attachment. Around the 
same time, Deleuze and Guattari identify Kafka as the virtuoso of the agence-
ment machinique and the modern novel as its aesthetic format of choice, while 
they also point to literary writing in general as a practice of crafting energetic 
complexes of affect that might stick and prevail (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1975/1986) (→ writing affect).
 With its productivity, dynamism, and polyvalence, the agencement machin-
ique was supposed to counter the strictures of structuralism while preserving 
its insights into the formative workings of cultural formations, rituals, sign 
systems, or other codified practices (cf. Schmidgen, 1997). In its more 
developed phase in A Thousand Plateaus (1980/1987), Deleuze’s and Guattari’s 
approach takes the guise of an encompassing dynamic- materialist ontology 
reaching from the microscopic to the cosmic scale.
 On a parallel track, mid- 20th century theorizing in Western Marxism 
began to champion a notion of “apparatus” as a device of power- inflected, 
often repressive subject- formation, with Althusser’s ideological state apparatuses 
as a central articulation (Althusser, 1970). In critical distinction to Althusser 
and his deterministic leanings, Foucault settled on the subtler notion of a 
“dispositive” or “dispositif of power” (a term that initially got translated into 
English as “apparatus,” whereby its distinctness was lost). In Foucault’s work, 
the “dispositif ” replaces his earlier notion of a “discursive formation,” empha-
sizing the role of non- discursive materials and arrangements in the production 
and maintenance of power relations. The concept anchors both a perspective 
on power as productive, distributed, and polycentric and an understanding of 
the subject as in part shaped and molded by socio- material configurations, 
where Foucault stresses the heterogeneity of these formations as well as their 
strategic character. Given the productivity of the concept, it is understandable 
that there are attempts to accommodate the dispositif directly to affect theory 
with the term “affectif ” (Seyfert, 2012). While this proposal overlaps to some 
degree with the present account, it is preferable to speak of an affective micro- 
dispositif in the context of affective arrangements (Mühlhoff & Slaby, 2018; 
see also Anderson, 2014).
 More recently, “apparatus” has resurfaced in the work of feminist philo-
sopher of science Karen Barad, who continues an earlier line of non- dualistic 
feminist thought on the material- discursive practices of science initiated, 
among others, by Donna Haraway, whose “apparatus of bodily production” 
also belongs in the conceptual lineage tracked here (see Haraway, 1988, 
p. 595). In Barad’s (2007) relational ontology centered on “entanglements” 
and “intra- action,” with a stress on material agency and post- human 
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1 Limits of space prevent an exploration of the resonances between the conceptual lineage 
charted here and approaches in microsociology. Erving Goffman’s work on interaction rituals 
and their settings, situations, and frames is highly instructive, in part also because Goffman 
often speaks of “arrangements” himself (see, e.g., Goffman, 1983); a key articulation of 
microsociological emotion theory is Collins (2004).
performativity, the apparatus is the main arena of distributed agency. Like the 
agencement before it and the affective arrangement on the present account, 
Barad’s apparatus is not merely an assortment of stuff at a place, but a lively 
unit comprised of different elements that operate together dynamically, a site 
where things unfold in a more or less regular way, without an instance of 
top- down control. Barad’s quantum- physics-derived notion of “entangle-
ment” signals the non- separability of intra- acting parts within such relational 
meshworks and allows a focus on variably drawn and re- drawn boundaries 
among and within phenomena. The term “entanglement” has been employed 
productively in recent years within cultural analysis, for instance in feminist 
approaches to the biosciences (Wilson, 2015) and in media theory (e.g., 
Chow, 2012). Much recent work on networked media and emerging social 
media practices can be considered as informed by arrangement thinking, as 
the focus in media theory has shifted from separate devices to dispersed media 
environments and overlapping practices of mediation, with multiple formats, 
technologies, and temporalities coalescing into multisensorial complexes and 
“intensive milieus” (Angerer, 2017).
 Other recent articulations in the agencement lineage are the varieties of 
assemblage theory in the social sciences. Besides Bruno Latour’s widely received 
actor- network theory that draws variously on a flattened notion of assemblage 
(Latour, 2005), Manuel DeLanda’s (2006) social ontological approach is note-
worthy. In keeping with Deleuze’s and Guattari’s groundwork, DeLanda 
understands “assemblage” – until recently the standard translation of the 
French agencement – as a non- organic totality whose parts are self- subsistent 
and autonomous in relation to the whole. Likewise, his topological per-
spective foregrounds the specificity and historical contingency of an assem-
blage, opposing essentialism and archetypical thinking. DeLanda’s approach 
synthesizes Deleuze’s and Guattari’s metaphysics with complexity theory, 
network science, and innovative strands of organization theory, showcasing 
the potentials and range of application of assemblage- style thought. On the 
flip side, his work has been criticized as too rigid in its bottom- up logic, as 
unclear with regard to key notions (such as “scale”) and as not receptive 
enough to the heterogeneity, non- linearity and “crankiness” of real- life 
assemblages (cf. Buchanan, 2015).1
 In order to enable it to function as a focal concept for the study of affect, 
and especially as a notion capable of bringing out the specificity of situated 
affective relations, it is important to construe “affective arrangement” in a suffi-
ciently open- textured manner. Accordingly, we advise against adherence to 
114  Jan Slaby
one particular school of thought to the exclusion of other approaches, and 
suggest a more free- floating usage.
Examples from research
To heed this directive, this section presents examples from recent work on 
affect in which the concept and the thought style of arrangement thinking have 
found application. The cases are such that a particular domain of study has 
inspired further conceptual development at the ground level of research. Each 
example will emphasize a dimension of affective arrangements, but it is not 
assumed that all of its dimensions will ever appear together in a single case.
 An intuitive example is contemporary work environments such as open- 
floor corporate offices with their communication and interaction routines 
among co- workers in a spatial set- up, wired- up by networked media and 
interactive workflow technologies (cf. Slaby, Mühlhoff, & Wüschner, 2017). 
Crucial in modern office workplaces is both the creation of a working atmo-
sphere – an affective style of moment- to-moment interaction and engage-
ment among the co- workers – and the longer- term habituation and 
cultivation of affective dispositions and agentive routines. The affective 
arrangement is a dynamic formation that modulates individual dispositions 
and harnesses energies and potentialities to the benefit of the overall set- up 
(i.e., that of the company or organization). There is an element of self- 
organization as local interaction patterns and intra- active routines emerge in 
part spontaneously, but also a dimension of design and deliberate affect 
engineering that draws its techniques from the legacies of group dynamics 
research, organizational psychology, ergonomics, or human factors research 
(among much else). Conceptual elaboration in these settings might suggest 
further notions capable of characterizing the dense mutual modulation of 
affectivity, behavior, and habit in close- knit workplace interaction, for 
instance concepts such as “affective resonance” or “immersive power” (cf. 
Mühlhoff & Schütz, 2017; Mühlhoff & Slaby, 2018).
 Significant political events and movements might be approached through the 
lens of the affective arrangement. Recent ethnographic work on the street pro-
tests during the revolutionary uprisings in Egypt in 2011 make use of the 
concept to bring the particular affective atmosphere, texture, and temporality – 
and their various enabling conditions – of the movement into focus. The pro-
tests at issue are those on the Tahrir Square in downtown Cairo on 18 
memorable days of the square’s occupation in 2011 (cf. Ayata & Harders, 2018). 
In interviews, activists speak of a palpable intensity and energy unfolding during 
the protests, and many consider their time on the square as life- changing. 
Approaching the dynamics on the square as a complex of interlocking arrange-
ments – rather than a matter of collective emotions such as anger, fear, or 
enthusiasm – provides a fruitful angle on the heterogeneity of contributing 
factors (material, architectural, practical, discursive, medial, etc.), on the 
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uniqueness of certain transformative moments, but also on the tensions and 
differences among participants and participant factions. Arrangement thinking 
lets researchers look at Tahrir Square as a material- discursive site imbued with 
the traces of previous struggles, movements, epochs, and balances of power that 
weigh into the particular affective texture of the 2011 uprisings. As a conceptual 
guide for qualitative research, the optic of arrangement thinking is capable of 
combining – not merging – individual perspectives, gleaned from narrative 
interviews with activists, with fine- grained descriptions of the affective dynamics 
on the square. A socio- political event on the world- historical scale is thereby 
dissected into a confluence of enabling and contributing factors without impos-
ing a reductive explanation. It is noteworthy that the political event itself can 
become the focus of arrangement thinking, as epitomized in the concept 
“Midān moment,” coined to bring to attention the exceptional temporality of 
an ongoing situation of protest, including its manifest transformative force 
(Ayata & Harders, 2018) (→ Midān moments).
 The ethnographic study of rituals is another domain where the concept 
of an affective arrangement has proven useful. In his work on religious per-
formances at saints’ shrines in Sehwan, Pakistan, the anthropologist Omar 
Kasmani brings to bear an arrangement optic to focus on the multilayered 
temporality of practices of devotion at holy sites, with emphasis on the 
complex soundscapes, on the “sonic mise- en-scène of affect” (Kasmani, 
2017). By foregrounding the local arrangement of sound, the thick sensual-
ity and complex historicity of the audible comes into view as a powerful 
conveyor of affect. Practices of devotion are seen as multiply layered 
soundscapes in which a panoply of tendencies, temporal dimensions, parti-
cipant orientations, tensions, and contestations coalesce at a historically 
charged site into a unique sonic formation:
[T]he ordinary tinkering of tea- sellers, the guttural roar of motor- cycle 
rickshaws, the five calls to prayer, the daily bustle of surrounding markets 
as well as the occasional fights, brawls and conflicts on site are as much 
part of an emergent yet already drifting sonic- scene as are dissonances 
triggered by ritual performances themselves.
(Kasmani, 2017)
Arrangement thinking here entails a sensibility for the time- and site- specific 
complexities and ambivalences that inhere practices of worship at tension- 
riddled sites. This prevents a monothematic approach that would foreground 
a focus on transcendence and view participants mainly in their role as 
devotees with few other stakes in their practice. Countering such readings, 
Kasmani emphasizes the political dimension audible at Pakistani shrines, 
lending an ear to other vital concerns besides religious ones, and discerning 
stirrings of political agency on part of those engaged in the rituals: “in pub-
licly sounding allegiance to Shia figures, events and temporalities, pilgrims 
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long for other histories, they insist on other futures. They voice a historical- 
emotional consciousness that critiques, interrupts, and refuses a for- granted 
continuity of the present” (Kasmani, 2017).
Conclusion: two methodological orientations
Implicit in the preceding exposition of the concept “affective arrangement” 
are two distinct methodological orientations. Taken in its full complexity, 
“affective arrangement” is a philosophical concept that aims at elucidating the 
unique constellation of a particular affect- intensive site of social life. It drives 
toward disclosing the operative essentials of a social site in terms of a unique 
local patterning of relational affect, giving shape to a potentially idiosyncratic 
affective texture or formation inherent in a specific place at a time. The 
methodology associated with this employment of the concept is qualitative, 
interpretive, and constructivist, as a given site or domain will be described 
from a unique and potentially personal angle. Such descriptions are crafted 
with the help of various aesthetic and stylistic means, as deemed appropriate 
to the case at hand. It will be hard – if not impossible – to separate this sort of 
work with the concept from an educated perspective and capacity for judg-
ment of an individual scholar, stemming from an individual learning history 
and experiential trajectory. This is more than the global orientation of 
arrangement thinking, which is a perspective comprising relatively clear- cut 
principles (as described above). What is required, over and above this general 
orientation, is a unique “take” or imprint on part of the individual scholar or 
researcher. Moreover, their trained power of judgment (Urteilskraft) will not 
only be applied as such, but has to effectively coalesce with whatever is cur-
rently under study, forming an affective arrangement in its own right between 
scholarly orientation and domain of inquiry. A central role then inevitably 
accrues to skilled academic writing, as the unique affective Gestalt of a given 
arrangement requires the right words in a nuanced textual arrangement ade-
quate to the scene under study. At issue is an involved, potentially immersive 
style of approaching and then writing about one’s subject matter.
 On the other hand, much in the foregoing has pointed also to aspects of 
potential empirical research methodologies. For instance, social scientists, eth-
nographers, or researchers of media who approach a social domain might use 
“affective arrangement” as an explorative concept that guides their charting of 
the material layout and functional design of social spaces, domains, or media 
platforms, focusing on those elements and their structured interplay that are 
presumably instrumental to the reliable production and/or continued circula-
tion of affect. Here, the concept works as a generative template inspiring hypo-
theses, research questions, and initial domain descriptions. For example, the 
ethnographic study of ritual might map out elements of the material propping 
and staging instrumental to the unfolding of affect during the ritualistic perform-
ances – up to the minute drawing of empirically grounded heat maps and 
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interaction diagrams. In the sociology of organizations, the design of offices and 
workplaces might be approached with an eye to those factors and local set- ups 
which likely play a role in realizing the predominant forms of affective inter-
actions or affective atmospheres in these settings.
 What these predominantly empirical endeavors have in common is that 
they do not have to assume the full qualitative notion of the affective arrange-
ment, but can restrict their scope to selected dimensions, or focus on different 
elements of an arrangement sequentially during the research process. Reck-
oning with an affective arrangement within empirical research can take the 
form of an orientating blueprint which might be coarse- grained and selective, 
with details being filled in as new data emerges. The research process takes 
the form of moving back and forth between arrangement sketches and their 
correction and elaboration in the light of new material.
 The best- case scenario for the interdisciplinary study of affect is that these 
two methodological tracks stay closely aligned. Conceptual elucidations of 
affective arrangements will be more potent when informed by empirical 
research about the constellations in question and about their various compon-
ents and modes of composition. Empirical work, in turn, will be less prone to 
reductionism or simplification when it keeps reckoning with complex and 
oftentimes unique constellations that may exceed what can, at present, be 
established by empirical methods – and sometimes also that which “makes 
sense” in conventional ways. With “affective arrangement” we have a rich 
conceptual template that has a foot each within the qualitative and the quant-
itative, without being split- up artificially. This is a key characteristic of what, 
in the present volume, is glossed as work on the concept as a methodology for 
the study of affect and emotion: the crafting of concepts that provide dual 
service, that is, they work as heuristics suited for wide- ranging application, 
but also as generative templates for articulation and explication within 
ongoing research and academic writing.
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Chapter 10
Affective disposition
Rainer Mühlhoff
An affective disposition is an individual’s repository of affective traces of past 
relations, events, and encounters, acting in the present as potentials to affect 
and be affected. In philosophy, the term disposition, or dispositional property, 
denotes the capacity of a thing to act or be acted upon in a specific way. A 
disposition is a latent property that manifests only in specific encounters. This 
chapter introduces the concept of affective dispositions in an affect theoretical 
framework that understands affecting and being affected as a relational and 
constitutive register of being, such as in Spinozan ontology (→ affect). The 
concept “affective disposition” is coined specifically to describe couplings of 
active and receptive inclinations of a body as part of its striving for self- 
preservation (conatus) and is thus very close, but not identical, to what is called 
potentia in Spinozism.
 With the phenomenal scope of social theory in mind, an individual’s affec-
tive disposition is a product of their biographical past. It is shaped, for 
instance, by infant–caregiver inter- affectivity, by significant personal relations, 
bodily abilities, traumatic experiences, and sedimented patterns of relational 
affect. As a repository of such traces, an affective disposition is inseparably a 
bodily and a mental entity (see Spinoza’s parallelism theorem, → affect). It 
manifests in forms of embodiment and in the relational dynamics of being a 
social body among social bodies. By way of an affective disposition, influ-
ences of the past are virtually present in an individual’s future relations. This 
means that affective traces from the past co- shape future affective dynamics, 
not in a deterministic way, but through differential actualization in interplay 
with the affective dispositions of all other bodies in a particular context. The 
way an individual’s affective disposition manifests in a particular relation thus 
always depends on outside factors that both partially augment and inhibit the 
individual’s capacity to affect and be affected. It is, accordingly, a process of 
reciprocal modulation.
 The English term “disposition” has a double meaning that reflects this 
conceptual entanglement between the diachronic co- presence of the past and 
synchronic modulation in the present. It can mean a prevailing tendency or 
inclination of an individual toward something (“disposition” in the sense of 
120  Rainer Mühlhoff
temperamental, psychological, or personal inclinations), and it can mean a 
power of disposing an individual to something (“disposition” in the sense of 
the environment’s power of disposing the individual to certain affective 
modes of interaction). In analogy to this meaningful duality, an individual’s 
affective disposition can manifest either as a set of tendencies toward affecting 
others and reacting to affect engendered by others in a specific way. Or it can 
manifest as a specific susceptibility to be at the disposition of the present field 
of affective relations due to the way the person’s specific affective disposition 
is captured, harnessed, and thereby modulated in a certain relational context. 
This duality of contributing to the situation and at the same time being 
shaped by it is at the heart of the concept of an affective disposition.
 At a systematic level, the concept of an affective disposition serves as a 
theoretical hinge to connect individuality and social structures in the register 
of inter- affectivity. Affective dispositions explain the emergence of inter- 
affective patterns. These bear the signatures of the persons involved and per-
petuate social structures and large- scale regularities that pertain to a higher 
entity or social whole. Beyond the dichotomy of structural determinism 
versus bodily essences of the individual, the concept of an affective disposi-
tion helps to explain how social and cultural regularities in affective inter-
actions, such as gendered and authoritarian patterns or the subtleties of a 
specific social or cultural vibe, are virtually sedimented in each individual’s 
capacities to affect and be affected as a product of biographical influence.
Example
Consider the case of a high school reunion ten years after graduation. The 
students have gone in different directions; they have developed, matured, and 
transformed. Some still know each other, others are completely alienated 
from the group because they moved far away and have not been seen since 
high school. And yet, over the course of the night, you might find yourself 
and many others falling into the same old patterns regarding, for instance, 
who cracks the jokes, who speaks most, how people laugh together, who 
clings to whom, who seeks whose attention, who is having subtle tensions 
and frictions, who is being bullied, what kind of gendered behavior re- 
emerges, and so forth. It is worthwhile to look at this example particularly 
from a perspective of the constitution of interactive patterns in processes of 
affecting and being affected. What is interesting is that a sudden re- emergence 
of long forgotten but latent inter- affective patterns might occur even if, after 
school, you went to a completely different environment where you estab-
lished completely different ways of relating and forming attachments to 
others.
 Since a high school class is a micro- social whole, this example operates on 
a mid- range scale. Its interactive patterns instantiate larger social structures, 
such as gendered or racialized interactions, and yet, as a group dynamic, are 
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so much more than that. While these interactive patterns are highly 
dependent on the personal characteristics of particular members, this does not 
mean that the way in which individuals perform “themselves” is similar to 
how they perform in other group contexts. Speaking in the vocabulary of 
affective dispositions, an inter- affective “role” that grows out of the group 
dynamics of a school class over years gets sedimented, in the form of a poten-
tial pattern of affecting and being affected, in one’s affective disposition. In 
the same way, affective roles in families, in relationships, in intensive work 
environments and many other micro- social constellations might sediment as 
potentials to affect and be affected in future constellations. While the indi-
vidual is the carrier of their affective disposition, it takes a certain interactive- 
situational context of the affective dispositions of others for the former to 
manifest again. Therefore, in the class reunion, you might find yourself re- 
engaging in long forgotten inter- affective patterns based on both the situ-
ational framing and by your internally sedimented affective capacities.
Related concepts across disciplines
There has been no systematic use of the term “affective disposition” in affect 
studies so far. Hence this chapter aims to introduce the concept as a refined 
understanding of the more general notion of an “affective capacity” that 
highlights the inherent ambiguity of being- disposed-to and being- at-the- 
disposition-of that is connected to one’s affective capacity. There are, however, 
concepts at work (mostly in empirical disciplines) that share some of the 
defining properties of affective dispositions. Three of them shall be briefly 
discussed in this section.
 The term “disposition” has been discussed in analytical philosophy (for a 
historical overview, see Malzkorn, 2001). It must be noted that this debate 
seems to have little in common with the present account of “affective dispo-
sitions.” This is for two reasons. First, the analytic debate is dominated by an 
approach that seeks to formalize dispositional properties of objects through 
conditional statements in a logical calculus. The abstracting “if- then”-
structure that is inherent in this style of thought contradicts the fundamental 
idea of a reciprocal and dynamic unfolding of affective dispositions in open 
and generative processes within situated assemblages (→ affect; → affective 
resonance; see also Mühlhoff, 2015). Second, the point of affective dispositions 
is that they do not rely on a fixed “list” of possible actions or affects a body 
might engage in based on its disposition, but refer to a set of potentials that 
manifest differentially in varying relational contexts. At the heart of the pro-
posed understanding of affective dispositions is Spinoza’s famous line: nobody 
“know[s] what the body can do, or what can be deduced from the considera-
tion of its nature alone” (Spinoza, 1677/1985, III prop. 2 schol.; cf. Deleuze, 
1968/1990). In the analytic debate, “disposition” seems to refer to a static list 
of how a pre- constituted thing can act or react to the impact of other things 
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in various circumstances. “Affective disposition,” in contrast, is to be under-
stood ontologically and dynamically, that is, as an ontogenetic notion: Only 
through constant actualization of its affective disposition is a thing what it is, 
but this actualization depends on a changing relational context and is there-
fore somewhat variable.
Psychology
In personality and social psychology the term “disposition” is used in the 
sense of personality traits. Much of personality research is concerned with the 
methodology of how to empirically measure a person’s personality disposi-
tions by their manifest behavior or reactions, and of how to predict or explain 
behavior using the known dispositions of a person. From this empirical per-
spective, personality dispositions are not immediate observables, but “latent, 
hypothetical characteristics that can only be inferred from external, observable 
cues” (Ajzen, 2005, p. 2). There is also a vivid debate on the underlying 
theoretical models, the most prominent of which is perhaps the “five- factor” 
or “OCEAN model.” Since its widespread adoption in the 1980s, there is an 
emerging consensus among empiricists that there are five key dimensions of 
personality traits (“openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness 
and neuroticism”) that are deemed sufficient as a system of coordinates with 
which to map the diversity of individual characters (see Norman, 1963; 
McCrae & Costa, 1996).
 Some authors in social psychology distinguish between two major kinds of 
personality dispositions, personality traits, and attitudes. An attitude, unlike a 
trait, is an “evaluative disposition” (Ajzen, 2005, p. 20) toward something, such 
as “toward politicians and political parties” or “toward ethnic groups and 
nationalities,” etc. (p. 1). That is, an attitude is a disposition that manifests in 
judgments “respond[ing] favorably or unfavorably to an object, person, insti-
tution, or event” (Ajzen, 2005, p. 3), while personality traits are dispositions 
that manifest as subtle modalities of personally engaging in or with outer 
affairs. For instance, personality traits could manifest as “dominance, sociab-
ility […] emotional stability, ambitiousness,” etc. (Ajzen, 2005, p. 1). The 
empirical concept of personality dispositions is thus based on the assumption 
that there is some kind of inner (psychic or emotional) structure to an indi-
vidual that causes enduring behavioral tendencies. Insofar as these tendencies 
are statistically “probable” reaction patterns, they are similar to the concept of 
an affective disposition in that they are non- deterministic in nature.
 Another related field in psychology is the field of attachment theory, 
particularly in developmental psychology. An attachment is typically 
defined as an enduring “affectional bond” between a human and someone 
or something else that persists over time and across contexts (→ attachment). 
Attachment theories emphasize that early infant attachments inform the 
way individuals engage in future relationships and social relations. If 
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attachment is analyzed specifically with respect to its dynamic affective 
qualities, such as attunement behavior (cf. Stern, 1985/2010), it is immedi-
ately apparent how one’s attachment history can be theorized as a signi-
ficant source for what I call affective dispositions. However, it should be 
noted that the concept of an affective disposition makes a slightly more 
general claim than just a “disposition for future attachments.” An affective 
disposition does not necessarily manifest in an enduring episode in which 
emotional ties develop. Affective dispositions can also unfold in very situ-
ated and short- lived dynamics, in explosions, controversies, repulsions, or 
temporary alliances. They can appear in in black- outs or social behavioral 
patterns like taking space or being shy, speaking up or backing out. They 
can be unleashed in all kinds of affective spaces, including, for instance, 
spaces of politics or media. At a theoretical level, the proposed theorization 
of an affective disposition seeks to escape a cognitivist vocabulary even 
more than attachment theory does. While attachment patterns are some-
times theorized as forming an internal working model of the self (→ attach-
ment), affective dispositions do not generally manifest in such cognitive or 
reflexive instances. Instead, they are theorized as purely relational poten-
tials, that is, as manifesting only in a concrete affective arrangement. These 
locally embedded manifestations repeatedly constitute the body as a situated 
social body. Consequently, there is not one body engaging, based on its 
history, in evolving and transforming forms of attachments. Rather the 
body gets re- constituted anew in each situation by means of differential 
manifestations of its affective dispositions.
Sociology
In sociological theory, the term “disposition” is used in the context of habitus 
theories as an approach to explain participant behavior in relation to a social 
whole (see Bourdieu, 1980/1990; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Roughly, 
so- called “dispositional approaches” may be distinguished from positional 
approaches to the relation of participant and social whole, such as those 
theories focusing on social roles and role expectations (e.g., Parsons, 1951; see 
Mouzelis, 1995). Dispositional theories follow a praxeological approach, 
stressing the role of what they call habitus. The habitus is a system of percep-
tive, reactive, and behavioral schemata or tendencies that is acquired in the 
course of an individual’s socialization in various social “fields” (Bourdieu, 
1980/1990). This concept serves to account for the influence of social strati-
fications and backgrounds such as class, religion, education, profession, 
nationality, ethnicity on an individual’s behavior in a certain social context. 
Social “fields” are organized in hierarchical relations. These relations are 
given by differentials of power and various forms of capital. A habitus is the 
signature of one’s specific social background and history of socialization as an 
aspect of social capital.
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 The proposed theory of affective dispositions and the theory of habitus 
both stress that past influences have a latent impact in present interactions. 
Yet, the crucial difference is that the concepts of “social field” and habitus in 
Bourdieu – where habitus is acquired within a social field – seem to be expli-
citly limited to “objective relations.” These relations are seen from an exter-
nal, almost “scientific” vantage point, thus abstracting from personal 
idiosyncrasies, first- person affective experience and situatedness. According to 
Bourdieu, a “general property of fields is that they are systems of relations 
that are independent of the populations which these relations define” 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 106). As a methodological consequence:
The notion of field reminds us that the true object of social science is not 
the individual […]. It is the field that is primary […]. This does not imply 
that individuals are mere “illusions”, that they do not exist: they exist as 
agents – and not as biological individuals, actors, or subjects – who are 
socially constituted as active and acting in the field under consideration 
by the fact that they possess the necessary properties to be effective, to 
produce effects, in this field.
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 107)
The concept of “disposition” in Bourdieu’s habitus theory therefore relies 
on a rather broad angle from which the world appears to be segregated in 
distinct, impermeable strata. Large- scale structures seem to have an almost 
mechanistic impact on the individuals by means of socialization, making 
the individual an abstract agent in a web of “objective” relations. In con-
trast, the understanding of dispositions presented in this chapter is focused 
more on situated unfolding and on a subjective- experiential register of 
evaluation. It is also better suited to accommodate the fluidity of bound-
aries between “fields.” This can be seen in the example of the high school 
reunion. The way one falls back into old inter- affective, experiential, and 
behavioral patterns in the class reunion can hardly be explained solely in 
terms of class/race/field habitualization, for what makes the patterns re- 
emerge is the arrangement of individuals, the particular mix of personalities 
as carriers of potentials to affect and be affected (of which class, race, and 
gender might be a non- reducible part). In the register of affecting and 
being- affected, dynamic patterns and qualities emerge that do not simply 
reflect only societal stratifications and social roles. A theory of affective dis-
positions widens the scope of social theory beyond the abstract set of 
“objective relations” that subtracts from each social situation its concrete 
“population.” In fact, the particular mix of micro- social relations in the 
reunion might produce similar but not identical inter- affective dynamics as 
ten years ago despite the fact that its participants have, in the meantime, 
been socialized in vastly different social fields, educational paths, economic 
milieus, and social strata.
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 Apart from a habitus, there is also a set of affective traces reactivated in the 
class reunion. These affective traces act as individual matrices in which sensit-
ivity (the power to be affected) and active potential (the power to affect 
others) are entangled. The concept of an affective disposition therefore sys-
tematically directs attention toward the emergence of inter- affective 
dynamics. This does not mean that social structuration (class, race, gender, 
etc.) is blended out of the picture; rather, in a structure of superimposition, 
every affective disposition will always inseparably encode both structural 
aspects and individual particularities.
The authoritarian personality
Another precursor to the notion of affective dispositions comes even closer 
to the understanding proposed in this chapter. It can be found in the studies 
on the Authoritarian Personality by Adorno, Frenkel- Brunswik, Levinson, 
and Sanford (1950), a piece of empirical work that is located somewhere 
between social psychology, psychoanalysis, and sociology. The latter starts 
from the assumption that there is a “psychological” or “emotional disposi-
tion” (pp. xi, 16) of individuals that is distributed to a certain extent in the 
population and on which susceptibility to fascist ideology is based. In a 
broad empirical investigation that also aimed at quantitative evaluation, the 
famous “F scale” was invented as an approach
to bring together in a scale items which, by hypothesis and by clinical 
experience, could be regarded as “giveaways” of trends which lay relat-
ively deep within the personality, and which constituted a disposition to 
express spontaneously (on a suitable occasion), or to be influenced by, 
fascist ideas.
(Adorno et al., 1950, p. 15, italics in original)
While authoritarianism is a much more specific topic than the general idea of 
an affective disposition, the concept of an “emotional” or “psychological dis-
position” that is at work in the Authoritarian Personality is an important pre-
cursor to the concept of affective dispositions. In particular, the authors stress 
that a psychological disposition involves both receptivity toward certain influ-
ences as well as a tendency toward certain active attitudes. For instance, it is 
due to their specific psychological dispositions that some individuals “gravi-
tate toward [political] groups” (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 195) or that some are 
“more receptive to one pattern [of political engagement], others to another” 
(p. 178). Even an individual’s “choice of ideology” in general “appears to be 
[…] in large parts an expression of important emotional dispositions” 
(pp. 206–207). Thus, Adorno et al. do not assume a clear- cut distinction of 
traits and attitudes. Rather, receptive manifestations of an authoritarian dispo-
sition blend into active and attitudinal manifestations.
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 These considerations are a role model for the conception of affective dis-
positions as they highlight both the non- deterministic character of disposi-
tions and a deep layer of social structure. Adorno and his collaborators, in line 
with similar analyses by Erich Fromm and Wilhelm Reich, apply a psychoan-
alytic model in which “[t]hese dispositions can be understood, in part at least, 
as expressions of ego weakness” (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 236). Regardless of 
what “ego weakness” really means and whether this theoretical view is still 
deemed adequate today, what is relevant is that the authoritarian disposition is 
understood as biographically and inter- affectively acquired, and as such is a 
product of micro- social structures. In addition, the manifestation of a psycho-
logical disposition in actual acts is seen as co- dependent on structural con-
ditions in the present. “Psychological dispositions do not actually cause 
Fascism; rather, Fascism defines a psychological area which can be successfully 
exploited by the forces which promote it for entirely non- psychological 
reasons of self- interest” (Adorno, 1951/1982, p. 135). This makes the concept 
of an authoritarian psychological disposition a mediator, or a hinge, between 
social structures, operating in realms like education, infant–caretaker inter- 
affectivity, and political formations on a larger societal scale. The concept of 
an affective disposition will copy this functionality at the general level of 
subject constitution, without limiting its focus to authoritarianism.
Systematic elaboration
In Spinozan ontology, the individual manifests in each situation and relation 
as a carrier of a power, called potentia, which is simultaneously a capacity to 
affect and be affected by others (see Spinoza, 1677/1985; Deleuze, 
1981/1988, 1968/1990) (→ affect). At the same time, a truly relational and 
non- individualistic reading of Spinoza’s ontology implies that the individual 
is itself only constituted in internal and external “relations of motion and rest” 
– or, in short, affective relations. An individual, with all its particularities and 
personal traits, is thus the effect of the power to affect and be affected, of 
which it is itself also the carrier. There is a way to resolve this seeming circu-
larity that remains within the non- individualistic paradigm of a relational 
ontology of affect and yet still allows for the attribution of individual specifi-
cities: Such specificities should not be thought of as rooted in a static bodily 
constitution, but in a dynamic realm of inter- bodily forces and potentials. 
That is, the conception of individual specificities of potentia may be transposed 
from the ontological register of actuality and substantial essences (such as of 
the brain, the body, or the psyche) to an ontological register of dynamic, rela-
tional potentials.
 In this perspective, the traces of a body’s past affective encounters, along 
with their concurrent mental imaginations and psychic traces, constitute a 
virtual part of ones potentia as long as they stay latent and do not manifest in 
the here and now. We may refer to this virtual component of potentia as 
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1 Balibar (1997) prominently made this point with respect to the individual in Spinoza.
2 See Deleuze (1968/1994, pp. 213–214) on the clear and distinct (French “clair et distinct”).
“affective disposition.” The term “virtual” is taken from Deleuze (1966/1991, 
1968/1994; see also Massumi, 2002), who uses it to describe an ontological 
register of pure potentiality, in distinction from the register of currently 
“actual” or manifest forms. Following Simondon (2009), it is important to 
note that this virtuality, and thus also the affective disposition, is a trans- 
individual entity.1 That is, it unfolds in the field of affective forces and 
dynamics of a relational context; it does not pertain to the independent indi-
vidual alone but to an individual- in-a- situation. Its possible actualization, or 
becoming- manifest in an affective dynamic, is co- dependent on all the other 
individuals and their affective dispositions within a situation. In the process of 
actualization of an affective disposition, an individual is therefore both “at the 
mercy” of a wider context as much as they are disposed by their own bio-
graphical past. An affective disposition is both a set of latent personal inclina-
tions and a specific susceptibility to the environment’s power of disposing a 
subject to certain affective dynamics. This ambiguity is also why the process 
of actualization of affective dispositions is always a differential manifestation: 
it cannot identically repeat forms, as it depends on a possibly altered relational 
context.
 Consequently, falling back into old affective patterns, as in the high school 
reunion, is not an act of mere remembering where past affects are represented 
and then stored somewhere (in the brain) only to be retrieved and repro-
duced later. Virtual affective traces act as potentials in the present, that is, as 
the readiness to act anew on one another that will unfold only in relations. If 
they unfold in an interactive dynamic, these potentials would differentially 
repeat old patterns. The concept of a virtuality does not include the actual 
shapes it will bring about in its unfolding, only the tendency toward acting 
on one another in a way that connects to a past. This is why the presence of 
latent affective dispositions often escapes conscious awareness or easy reflec-
tion until there is a relational encounter in which they suddenly unfold. 
Virtual entities generally evade “clear and distinct” mental representations and 
yet might suddenly be unleashed as relational forces of unexpected power.2
 Although each person’s affective disposition is highly particular and idiosyn-
cratic, affective dispositions also tend to perpetuate social structures. In order for 
a certain regularity to appear in an encounter, for example, a gendered pattern 
of inter- affectivity, it is often sufficient for a certain fraction of a group of people 
to have a more or less similar affective disposition as a result of previous influ-
ences. This is because patterns such as gendered or racialized interactions tend 
to be mutually stabilizing modes of interaction, which is how they gain so much 
power. Moreover, such patterns are easily superimposed as general overtones 
onto what feels like a highly particular and specific affective relationship such as 
a friendship, a romantic relationship, etc. Often, these superimposed structures 
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are affectively stabilized by the implicit fact that many other individuals in a 
certain environment share these latent meta- structures in their affective capa-
cities as they were exposed to them in their biographic past. This might be the 
case even if the individuals are not conscious of the impact of meta- structures as 
the dynamic appears to them as highly individualized, such that their hidden 
complicity with power structures evades direct attention.
Outlook and applications
The phenomenon of an authoritarian disposition mentioned before points 
toward an important application of the general concept of an affective dispo-
sition. This is deemed of new importance in light of the current political situ-
ation of emerging right- wing populist mass movements in many Western 
societies (Gordon, 2017), which provides a politically acute and theoretically 
puzzling example. Further research should discuss whether, and which, latent 
affective dispositions might be a factor contributing to populist mobilization. 
To this end one could, for instance, start by clarifying whether the notion of 
an authoritarian character syndrome as found in Adorno et al. (1950) or 
Reich (1933/1970) can be reformulated as a special case of an affective dispo-
sition, thus yielding a theory of an authoritarian affective disposition that is less 
dependent on psychoanalytic theory. The Spinoza- based affect theoretical 
framework facilitates a perspective on ontogeny in which affective relations 
and the genesis of mental ideas and understanding come together in building 
a body’s specific capacity to affect and be affected. This could be applied to 
the psychoanalytic account by Else Frenkel- Brunswik (Adorno et al., 1950, 
pp. 337–389), who suggests that an authoritarian disposition consists of affec-
tive traces of hierarchical affective relations in early infancy, where the mind 
was exposed to these relations not in a mode of understanding but of arbitrar-
iness and subordination: “Was the issue in question explained to the child and 
was he included in the discussion of it, or did it appear to the child as unin-
telligible, arbitrary, and overwhelming?” (p. 371).
 An authoritarian affective disposition could be latent for a long time, only to 
manifest after decades in response to certain political, social, or economic cir-
cumstances. It is therefore a pressing question what role such affective disposi-
tions play in the current emergence of right- wing populist movements, and 
how these dispositions are distributed within a certain population. If populism, 
as Ernesto Laclau puts it, is not primarily a certain “political or ideological 
content” but a “mode of articulation” of that content (Laclau, 2005, p. 34), this 
approach will allow one to investigate whether there are specific affective dispo-
sitions that make subjects more likely to resonate with a populist mode of 
articulation. This would supplement the positional or propositional analysis of 
political engagement with what Massumi describes as a politics of “dispositional 
trigger mechanism[s]”: “Addressing bodies from the dispositional angle of their 
affectivity, instead of addressing subjects from the positional angle of their 
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ideations, shunts government function away from the mediations of adherence 
or belief and toward direct activation” (Massumi, 2005, p. 34). In this way, 
individual predispositions of neo- authoritarian forms of political engagement 
could be unearthed, and yet, the potentially long latency of such dispositions 
can show how relational, social, and political co- factors are responsible for their 
sudden activation.
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Chapter 11
Affective practice
Basil Wiesse
“Affective practice” is a concept based on Margaret Wetherell’s (2012) 
linkage of affect theory with practice theory. It can be understood in two 
ways: First, in a narrow sense, the term may refer to the treatment of specific 
practices as belonging to a subcategory of “affective practices,” for example, 
when the affective dimension of an activity becomes the main focus of atten-
tion and is reflexively attended to. Here, affect is produced in a practice and 
reflected upon as part of that practice. Second, the concept of an affective prac-
tice highlights the affective dimension of practices in general. Importantly, 
the first perspective on the concept informs the second one and is essential for 
developing a more comprehensive understanding of affectivity. Likewise, 
current developments in affect studies convincingly argue that affectivity plays 
an important role in social practice far beyond specifically demarcated affec-
tive episodes. For this reason, it is the second and broader understanding of 
affective practice that will be the focus of this chapter.
 The concept “affective practice” addresses how affectivity is collaboratively 
produced. This production can encompass specific affective phenomena, as well 
as more general bodily processes of affecting and being affected. Crucially, the 
praxeological perspective on affect involves the ways in which participants in a 
practice refer to and interpret a particular phenomenon, and how this interpre-
tation, which is always unfinished and open to revision, is accomplished as part 
of the practice itself. For example, bumping into somebody on the sidewalk 
could be interpreted as accidental as well as provocative, while an outburst of 
laughter may be seen as an authentic expression of amusement or as inappropri-
ate behavior. From a praxeological point of view, these interpretations do not 
necessarily require discursive explication. Rather, they make up an implicit or 
tacit dimension of the performances in question. In light of this, it is worthwhile 
to investigate the practical nature of affective categories, including the range of 
related concepts examined in this volume. For instance, researchers might ask 
how particular emotional episodes are recognizably performed and distinguished 
as general cases of “emotion” (→ emotion, emotion concept). The same goes for 
publicly distinguishing feelings as feelings, performing atmospheres as atmo-
spheres, and collaboratively producing affect as affect.
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 A praxeological approach to affect operates under three basic assump-
tions: (1) Practices are bodily activities. They are thus always already affect-
ing their participants in some way. (2) Practices are inherently public affairs, 
and their affective dimension is no exception. Therefore, participants make 
their own continuous affective engagement recognizable and thus mean-
ingful to others, whether participants or bystanders. (3) Practices unfold in 
a processual manner. To allow for cohesion between their past, present, 
and future activities, participants need to be able to refer to past meanings 
of their practice as well as to anticipate future stages of their practice. In the 
context of meaningful affective performances, participants are continually 
remaking both given and potential meanings over time. Bringing these 
three assumptions together leads to a heuristic stance that takes affect as 
ongoing practical accomplishment. Elaborating on this, the present chapter will 
first outline a general perspective on theories of practice, highlighting their 
intersection with theories of affect. These entanglements will then be dis-
cussed from two perspectives: one that illuminates the affective dimension 
of practices in general, and one that treats affective phenomena as practi-
cally constituted. Abstracting from the latter, the chapter argues that affec-
tivity itself is a dimension that does not “preexist” within practices, but 
rather exists as a practical accomplishment in its own right.
An outline of praxeology
Practice theories are a heterogeneous field of study. Attempts at unifying 
different theoretical approaches have to reconcile different understandings of 
“practice” as well as deal with “family resemblances,” or theories that are not 
sorted into the “practice” category, such as actor- network theory or post-
structuralist approaches to performativity. For the purpose of this chapter, I 
will offer the following working definition: Practice theories, just like any 
other social theory, are interested in the study of social phenomena. In this 
case, “the social” is taken to be fundamentally “made up” of practices rather 
than individuals or structures. Practices are understood as embodied, mean-
ingful, and processual performances, which can most concisely be described 
as “[nexuses] of doings and sayings” (Schatzki, 2012, p. 15). These perform-
ances are public in a twofold sense (cf. Schmidt & Volbers, 2011): First, they 
remain open to involvement, scrutiny, and modification, even from actors 
not currently involved in the practice. Second, they do not “belong” to a 
particular entity, such as an actor executing a preformulated plan, but always 
already involve an assemblage of multiple participants. This assemblage in 
turn is taken to be organized by relying on specialized infrastructural practices 
or as part of a practice’s own enactment. The same goes for the recruitment 
and training of new participants. While this can involve specialized practices 
of education, more often than not, participants are instructed in the skillful 
enactment of a practice as it runs its course, making the instruction into a 
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practice, and therefore its “rules,” virtually inseparable from the enactment of 
the practice itself (cf. Garfinkel, 2002, pp. 105–108).
 Practice theories therefore distance themselves from theories of action that 
presuppose the existence of actors who are supposed to formulate and execute 
plans according to internal motives. Simultaneously, they reject theories of 
structure according to which everyday occurrences are more or less “blind” 
enactments of supposedly underlying and inescapable norms and values. For 
instance, from a praxeological point of view, the practice of reading is not 
taken to be the expression of a “reading intent” nor as representative of the 
structural enforcement of a “reading norm.” Instead, it is to be investigated at 
face value, as continually and recognizably constituting itself as reading to 
participants and bystanders as well as in reading by procedurally generating its 
participants as participants. At a minimum, this would include both the 
“reader- of-the- text” and the “text- that-is- read.”
 This example already indicates how different practices may link together. 
In the case of “reading a book,” the practice of reading is linked to practices 
of writing, paper- making, lumbering, publishing, shipping, and so on. Taking 
the example one step further allows highlighting how practices involve both 
humans and non- humans and how this involvement may potentially invert 
common- sense subject–object distinctions. A non- human text may demand 
submission from a human reader – for example, as the suspension of disbelief 
– and the writer–text relation may involve significant resistances during text 
production, also known as “writer’s block” (→ writing affect). Practice theory 
is decidedly materialist in that regard. Rules, motives, structural constraints, 
and other factors normally seen as behind, outside, or invisible to the current 
situation are only taken into account if and when they can be shown to be 
part of overt performances or resistance within practices. For instance, prac-
tice theory acknowledges grammatical rules only insofar as they are episodi-
cally and explicitly invoked, or when they can be reconstructed from 
observed regularities in practices like reading, writing, and reviewing.
 This does not mean that praxeology is naively situational or overly fixated 
on the present. More often than not, practices involve different participants at 
varying times and sites who may very well be ignorant of one another 
(Schatzki, 2002, p. 80). Further, practices are taken to inscribe themselves into 
their human and non- human participants: the former via absorption into their 
habitus, the latter via acquiring their status as meaningful sites and artifacts. 
This allows for the reenactment and routinization of practices as well as for 
relatively stable trans- situational linkages between different practices. 
However, this may also lead to ever- changing practical environments that 
require continuous re- adjustments, or even to the death of a practice 
altogether.
 Praxeological research therefore needs to follow the numerous threads of 
activities when attempting to sketch a picture of the practices under investi-
gation “in the wild.” This picture includes participants’ own interpretations 
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1 This is also termed “second order observation,” an observation that observes observances. 
This idea becomes highly relevant for the social sciences as soon as one assumes that people 
continuously interpret (observe) their surroundings, and that social scientists therefore ought 
to investigate (observe) these observations. This stands in opposition to the project of propos-
ing alternative interpretations (observations) in parallel, that would then need to be justified 
(observed) as somehow “better” (e.g., “more sciency”) than those of their objects of research, 
that is, people. This latter approach gives rise to further complications since social scientists 
are people themselves.
of their activity. These interpretations can frequently reveal what seem like 
paradoxes, discrepancies, and self- contradictions. In cases where active denial 
of discrepancies is fundamental to the ongoing success of practices and their 
institutions, such as in judicial decision- making (cf. Garfinkel, 1967, 
pp. 104–115), this can lead to precarious situations. However, the aim here is 
neither to dismiss participants’ interpretations as, for example, naive or dull, 
nor to offer alternative explanations for what is really going on. Instead, they 
are taken to be integral to participants’ sense- making and therefore part of the 
investigated activity itself. The core aim of such research is thus to investigate 
how these interpretations are, quite literally, put into practice.1
 Given that practices are taken to be, among other things, embodied and pro-
cessual, theories of practice have in a sense always already and necessarily 
included affectivity in some way or another. But this is not to say that prax-
eology at large has actually paid much explicit attention to the affective side of 
sociality proper. Otherwise, there would be no need to reconstruct the implicit 
affect theories of canonical authors, Pierre Bourdieu in particular (cf. Matthäus, 
2017; Scheer, 2017). Within contemporary practice theory, there are two 
approaches that may shed light on this affectual blank spot: one explores the 
affective dimension of practices, another conceptualizes affect itself praxeologi-
cally. What both approaches have in common is that affect is seen as a public 
affair. Any supposedly subjective experience of affect is here taken to be far less 
interesting, if not epiphenomenal, compared to the public performance of affect. 
The two approaches differ, however, in their conceptualization of affect: as a 
dimension of practices in general, or as a practice in its own right.
The affective dimension of practice
Exploring the affective dimension of practice means highlighting how prac-
tices incorporate affectivity, delineating the role of affect in practices. This 
approach can largely be seen as theoretical. It requires defining affect before-
hand, and locating it within theory- specific conceptions of “practice.” For 
instance, affect can be taken to be part of a teleoaffective structuring of prac-
tices. This idea was developed by Theodore Schatzki (1996, pp. 98–102) and 
outlines one of the ways in which practices may acquire an organizational 
structure and continuity over time and space. Through an overarching, 
albeit open- ended and adjustable telos, practices become projective and 
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2 The idea of a unidimensional bipolar organization of affect is proving to be quite resilient in 
general (for a prominent example within sociology see Collins, 2004) – classical (Freud, 
1922) and contemporary (Feldman Barrett & Russell, 1998) suggestions for more complex 
models notwithstanding. Given the contested status and definition of affective bipolarity, 
making it a theoretical prerequisite (as opposed to an empirical phenomenon of affective dis-
course or discursive practices thematizing affect) seems at the very least questionable.
3 In my opinion, the overt limitations of Schatzki’s teleoaffective structure largely stem from a 
difference in vocabulary. Where Reckwitz speaks of affect, Schatzki (2012) speaks of the 
ordering of bodily doings and sayings via basic practical understanding, such as “moving 
one[’s] hands hither and thither” (p. 16) during sorting activity. By undergirding this process 
with psychological categories of “pleasure/displeasure” and “desire/aversion,” Reckwitz may 
be specifying things from the outset in a somewhat too determinate fashion.
“project- like,” delineating a range of possibilities and outcomes. An example 
would be building a chair when doing carpentry. Affective phenomena serve 
as qualifiers that are symbolically linked to this telos, continually expressing 
and confirming the adequacy or appropriateness of current activity. Accord-
ing to Schatzki (1996, p. 101), the extent to which affect is weighted within a 
practice’s teleoaffective structure varies widely. For instance, “building a 
chair” may be open to such a large variety of affective expression, from the 
joys of accomplishment to various kinds of frustration, that it becomes 
impossible to precisely characterize its affective dimension. The same can 
most likely not be said for “holding a funeral” or “telling a joke.”
 Schatzki’s approach of delegating affect largely to matters of style has been 
pointed out as limited in light of the rich theorizing of affect in recent 
scholarship. Andreas Reckwitz (2016, p. 165), for example, proposes a deeper 
intertwining of affect and practice. He does so by invoking an anthropolo-
gical constant in the form of a one- dimensional bipolar drive structure 
(Triebstruktur). In his words, humans have a “basic capacity for reactions of 
desire and aversion, pleasure and displeasure” (Reckwitz, 2017, p. 121). Con-
sequently, Reckwitz understands affects as “states of physical arousal, of 
pleasure or displeasure, directed at some definite person, object or idea” 
(Reckwitz, 2017, pp. 118f.). These are taken to be fundamentally built in to 
practices, thus making any praxeological research that does not take affectivity 
into account phenomenally inadequate (Reckwitz, 2017, p. 116). From 
Reckwitz’s point of view, this conceptualization helps further our under-
standing of how practices create, recruit, and maintain their participants 
through mechanisms of motivational structure and immediate focusing of 
attention (Reckwitz, 2017, p. 120).
 Still, apart from the debatable idea of a fundamental affective bipolarity,2 there 
is not too great a difference between Schatzki’s and Reckwitz’s perspectives on 
affect. Both authors propose that affect plays an important role in keeping prac-
tices and their participants together.3 Reckwitz (2017) further highlights an 
important methodical strategy for how to observe the affectivity of practice “in 
the wild,” which consists of identifying and studying practices that make their 
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4 Ethnomethodology can be regarded as a subset of praxeology, its distinguishing feature being 
the emphasis on extremely detailed “how- questions” (as in “how does x work exactly”). This 
is already implied by the name itself if read backwards: “Ethno- methodo-logy” as dealing 
with the investigation of the ways by which a collective produces itself (and as itself ). An altern-
ative reading should also be mentioned: The investigation of these methods by a collective 
(ethno- methodology).
own affective component reflexively accessible, and therefore, more easily 
observable. This method can be employed, for example, in studying the archi-
tectural production of atmospheres by professional designers or architects 
(Reckwitz, 2017, p. 124). But it is also here where the line between affect as 
dimension of practices and affect as accomplished in practices begins to blur. If affect 
is, at least in principle, practically accessible, we might assume that the necessary 
condition of affectivity is always already “practical.” This would allow us to treat 
affective phenomena as practical accomplishments in themselves.
Affective phenomena in practice
Interpreting affectivity as decidedly practical in this sense has two implications. 
First, viewed broadly, it embeds affect within the contingencies of history and 
culture. This replaces the debate over any potentially constant properties of 
affect with the possibility of empirical investigation, and of comparing milieu- 
specific treatments of affect. As such, it brings the research close to ideas already 
raised in 1939 by Norbert Elias in his Civilizing Process (2000). This makes affect 
interesting to (post-)structuralist praxeologists who might, for instance, draw on 
a Bourdieuian vocabulary for quasi- structural phenomena (such as “field” and 
“habitus”) that arise from practices over time (for an example, cf. Scheer, 2012). 
However, as Bourdieu (2000) consistently emphasized, these structural abstrac-
tions ought to be taken as secondary compared to the primacy of practices. 
When operating within an emerging field such as the study of affect, it is espe-
cially important that a praxeological stance does not skip the detailed scrutiny of 
affectual activities, as this scrutiny is required to attain a clearer picture of what 
its research matter may originally entail in the first place. Therefore, I will now 
focus on the second implication of treating affect as practical: affect as accomp-
lished within situational social activity.
 This ethnomethodologically4 informed perspective has already proven to 
be fruitful in existing research on emotion. Studies on shame and anger, for 
example, show how distinct emotional episodes are cooperatively performed 
and include elaborate interaction sequences that demand full participation 
from the bodies involved (cf. Katz, 1999) (→ emotion, emotion concept). The 
view of emotions as practical situational accomplishments has been employed 
successfully, even when the emotional episodes in question are exceptionally 
brief and embedded within other activities (Goodwin & Goodwin, 2001). 
Less salient affective phenomena, such as atmospheres, can also be understood 
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5 Later on, she moves from situated affect toward its “broader, ‘argumentative textures’ ” in the 
sense of the societal dimension of affect (Wetherell, 2012, p. 100). This is something 
Wetherell argues is not well represented in ethnomethodological research in particular. I 
would counter that attempts for substantial societal representation might even run against 
ethnomethodological and other praxeological research programs themselves or at least require 
such attempts to be put in the backseat. Assuming the primacy of practice gravitates toward 
an emphasis on tentative continuity of form, or “constitutive order,” over continuity of 
meaning, or “aggregate order” (cf. Rawls, 2009; Korbut, 2014). The latter is taken as pro-
duced in participants’ ongoing meaning- making, while the ways in which this meaning- 
making works is the topic of the former.
as a kind of doing, an ongoing “atmospherization” of sites and situations (→ 
atmosphere). As suggested by Reckwitz, this atmospherization is part of a 
professional repertoire of practice. Importantly, this is also true for laypersons, 
who do not merely “consume” the atmospheric offer of a structure but rather 
create atmospheres of their own during the course of everyday interactions 
(cf. Augoyard, 2007, esp. pp. 135–164). Finally, even in its general sense of 
bodily affecting, affect can be viewed as practical, insofar as it is skillfully 
employed and organized by participants (→ affect). Telecommunications and 
social media practices, for example, cannot rely on “natural” physical copres-
ence and instead handle reciprocal affecting in a different way, foregrounding 
it in the process (cf. Knorr Cetina, 2009; Wiesse, 2018). At this point it can 
be hypothesized that this handling of affect is not limited to selected practices 
but is much more prevalent than it initially appears. Past research has shown 
how supposedly natural and ubiquitously relevant components of social inter-
action require participants’ efforts in order to maintain their “naturalness.” 
Examples include the bodily category of gender (Garfinkel, 1967, 
pp. 116–185, 285–288; see also Butler, 1990) and basic mutual trust in one 
another’s interactional competencies (Garfinkel, 1963; Rawls & David, 2006). 
It is not too much of a stretch, then, to view any basic, natural, or self- evident 
component of social interaction, including the “capacity of bodies to affect 
and be affected” (Cromby & Willis, 2016, p. 481), as similarly practice- based.
The accountability of affect
Margaret Wetherell (2012) has proposed an approach to affect that is thoroughly 
praxeological in that it treats affect in its entirety – not just some aspect or 
dimension of it – as a practical accomplishment. Discussing affectivity in social 
situations, she proposes an economical definition of affect as “embodied 
meaning- making” (Wetherell, 2012, p. 4).5 This opens up an exceptionally wide 
range of potential praxeological research questions, given that “all social practice 
is affective because all human practice is embodied and comes attached with 
some valence” (Wetherell, 2012, p. 96). However, Wetherell leaves the specifics 
as to what exactly should be regarded as affective to practices and their particip-
ants themselves (Wetherell, 2012, p. 98). Here, Wetherell markedly differs from 
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the theory- rich strategies of Schatzki and Reckwitz. With her approach, social 
research on affect reflexively acknowledges that it obeys the logic of practice 
(Lynch, 2001) and thus submits both to its own disciplinary conventions as well 
as to the conventions of the field being researched (cf. Winch, 2008). In sum, 
the theoretical definition of affect then involves an empirical question regarding 
the public definition of affect as affect.
 For researchers, this means asking first and foremost how affect is made 
reflexively accountable by participants in a practice, in other words, how it is 
made “visibly- rational-and- reportable-for- all-practical- purposes” (Garfinkel, 
1967, p. vii). What is of interest here is what participants need to be doing 
that allows a potential “inside observer” to label these activities as affective. 
This means that the criteria for judging the “affectiveness” of activities are 
ideally to be taken from participants directly. Where they stem from an 
outside source (such as researchers), they should either be kept in check by 
the field being studied or turned into research items themselves. Reckwitz’s 
(2017, p. 124) suggestion that researchers may identify practices where affect 
is attended to reflexively makes a first orientation in this endeavor fairly 
straightforward. Fields as diverse as psychotherapy, political rhetoric, and mar-
keting categorize and reflect upon their own activities as affective. They do 
so by drawing on their own definitions of affect or modifying definitions 
from other fields. The critical acknowledgment and continuous empirically 
based revision of one’s existing research vocabulary for “embodied meaning- 
making” then serves to go beyond strict participant classifications in specific 
fields. This, in turn, allows one to uncover the “seen but unnoticed” 
(Garfinkel, 1967, p. 36) practicalities of affectivity in everyday life.
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Chapter 12
Affective economy
Hauke Lehmann, Hans Roth, and 
Kerstin Schankweiler
How do feelings shape our sense of who we – and others – are? What is the 
role of media in the production and modulation of such feelings? How do 
these feelings contribute to the emergence and perpetuation of social and 
political collectives thought of as affective societies? How are affects mobilized 
to transform and reinvent the imaginaries on which societies draw? These are 
the kinds of questions that we seek to address through the concept of affec-
tive economy. We set out to do so by developing an economic perspective 
on processes of affecting and being affected. Whereas the term “economy” 
refers to the totality of production, distribution, and consumption in a society, 
the concept of affective economy focuses more narrowly on the exchange 
and circulation of affects through media. In concentrating on the sphere of 
distribution, this concept builds on an understanding of affect as relational: 
the starting point for our investigation is not an individual, autonomous 
subject, but rather the relational forces and entanglements from which 
subject- positions emerge in the first place. Here, we understand distribution 
to involve a certain level of collectivity. The term “affective economy” has 
recently attracted interest in affect studies, especially following the writings of 
Sara Ahmed. For Ahmed (2004), affective economies are an analytical tool to 
describe the creation of collective identities. In our understanding, however, 
such an analysis has to take into account the role of media in order to describe 
precisely how bodies and ideas become aligned with each other. The follow-
ing remarks aim at addressing this desideratum.
 The central theoretical foundation of our concept of affective economy 
rests on a distinction between abstraction and bodily experience. The former 
relates to the abstract sphere of exchange, that is collective affective references 
(fantasies, scenarios, ideas, imageries, etc.). These are “abstract” insofar as the 
circulation of affects through media involves an act of abstraction from the 
subjective qualities of feeling (→ affect). This is not to say that affects here are 
less concrete or real. What becomes abstracted in this form of comparison and 
exchange is the individual perspective of a feeling subject. The latter relates to 
discrete processes of affecting and being affected with regard to bodily experi-
ence. These can neither be separated from nor reduced to one another in any 
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way. Rather, they operate in a dynamic relation of permanent feedback. 
Affects circulate through multiple media as intensities whose modality is not 
necessarily fixed. They can be differentiated by levels of energy as well as by 
characteristics such as a temporal contour or a sense of space. Circulating 
affects repeatedly become translated and appropriated individually as sensory 
qualities (→ feeling). These qualities vary on a spectrum of consonance and 
dissonance. Appropriation in this context refers to the act of making sense of 
affective experience – of intensity – in the form of a feeling. Only in these 
appropriations do affects find individual expression, which can then refuel the 
processes of affecting and being affected. Feelings, as understood here, are not 
exclusively private, inner states, but are capable of becoming collective 
through their affinity to and interaction with affective dynamics. This poten-
tial collectivity is what accounts for the political dimension of affective eco-
nomies. By sharing ways of affecting and being affected, a collective can come 
to view itself as a community. Even when appearing as rather solidified, such 
a community constantly re- negotiates the terms based on which affective 
qualities are communicated and exchanged against one another (→ affective 
communities).
Affective economies: a political media theory 
of affectivity
Our objective is to conceptualize affective processes of collectivization as a 
question of media and mediation. Herein, we build on certain theories of 
media economy, which use the concept of economy to focus on the consti-
tutive force (strukturbildende Kraft) of acts of communication and networks of 
perception (Winkler, 2004). This perspective is not limited to the level of 
technical devices and processes, but rather supposes that “all contact means 
exchange, and all exchange is governed by the law of reciprocity, is commer-
cial, whether it be exchange of thought with fact, or of cotton with shoes” 
(Dewey, 1969, p. 152). We argue that this reciprocal mediation is best under-
stood through an analysis of its inherent affective dynamics. Following this, 
media organize processes of exchanging and sharing affects; they can also link 
embodied, individual perspectives to collective ideas, fantasies, and discourses. 
In this regard, understanding the function of media is indispensable for devel-
oping insights into the establishment and perpetuation of power relations. 
The inclusion of a media dimension also encompasses a historical perspective. 
Mediated in multiple ways, affects can involve diverse forms that mobilize 
and modulate feelings, and as such, can refer to their historical context 
without being fully determined by it (→ Pathosformel). This historical per-
spective must consider the potential reflexivity and transformation inherent in 
media. Furthermore, focusing on media opens up an analytical perspective 
that can be used for the study of diverse media in the narrower sense (e.g., 
TV, film, internet).
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 The concept of affective economy emphasizes that processes of affective 
exchange and mediation are decisive for the ways in which a political com-
munity negotiates its terms of agreement and its conventions. It is no exag-
geration to state that in recent times these processes have intensified, 
accelerated, and multiplied through (among other things) globalization, digi-
talization, and interactions between the internet and traditional mass media. 
Speaking of affective economies in this sense stresses the close connection 
between spheres of exchange, politics, and history. Our concept refers to 
certain theories of political economy that also emphasize this connection, 
such as Aristotle’s understanding of exchange or Marx’s theory of the value 
form. Our goal in referring to these theories is not to find the most adequate 
model for contemporary capitalism. Rather, we are interested in identifying 
links between economic theory on the one hand and the interplay of media 
and affectivity on the other. Finding such links will help us to analyze and 
define the political function of this interplay.
Historical background and state of research
Addressing the distribution of sensual intensities as affective economies 
assumes that affective relations and economic processes have a structural affin-
ity. This affinity is highlighted by a specific interpretation of Western mod-
ernity that considers the social revolutions of the 18th century as a radical 
re- foundation of the circulation of social energy (Koschorke, 1999). In a 
similar vein, even the implementation and legitimation of modern capitalism 
and colonialism can be analyzed as a theory and practice of affect, since during 
that period man’s moral sentiments, passions, and desires became associated 
with questions of public wealth, exploitation, social exchange, and economic 
calculus in a completely new manner (Vogl, 2004). Situating the concept of 
affective economy within these simultaneous transformations in cultures of 
communication, political power relations, economic systems, and physiologi-
cal sentimentalism does not limit the analytical scope of the concept to social 
formations of Western modernity, but rather emphasizes the historicity of 
affective economies. Following this, the rise of the bourgeoisie as the 
dominant social class in Europe and the formation of the aesthetic paradigm 
can be understood as deeply entangled parts of the same hegemonic project 
(Eagleton, 1990).
 This dimension of historicity aligns with the conceptual history of affec-
tive economies in the work of Sigmund Freud. He addresses relations 
between concrete experiences and abstract fantasies as a quasi- economic 
displacement and transmission of affects. For Freud (2001), psychoanalysis 
is (also) based on what he terms the “economic point of view” that would 
analyze mental processes as the circulation of energy. In contemporary 
affect studies, the usage of Freudian concepts is rather uncommon. Freud’s 
overemphasis on oedipal relations and neuroticism was influentially 
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criticized by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. However, their criticism 
does not invalidate an economic model for understanding affect. In their 
two- volume project on Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Deleuze & Guattari, 
2004a, 2004b), they do not question Freud’s economic point of view, but 
rather seek to radicalize it. For Deleuze and Guattari, the unbound flow of 
commodities becomes central to the production of desire – both literally 
and conceptually. Their approach has strongly influenced the development 
of the concept of affective economies.
 Since the turn of the millennium, affectivity and economic principles 
have been increasingly linked to each other (Ahmed, 2004; Hardt, 1999). 
We can distinguish between two strands of research, differentiated by their 
respective use of the term “affective economies.” One approach (Hardt & 
Negri, 2000; Hochschild, 1983; Massumi, 2015) is concerned with the role 
that emotions and affects play in contemporary neoliberal forms of working 
and living. This account claims that postindustrial economies have intensi-
fied the uses of bodily potentials, especially affects, in a biopolitical fashion, 
placing increased emphasis on knowledge, information, and attention. The 
central epistemological interest of this research is directed toward certain 
current economic regimes. The second approach describes economic prin-
ciples in processes of affective exchange. Its main concern is therefore dir-
ected toward emerging regularities in affective processes that can be 
described as principles of economic exchange and circulation. One of the 
earliest systematic approaches to affective economies in this vein is found in 
Lawrence Grossberg’s work. As with Freud and Deleuze and Guattari, 
Grossberg (1997) is interested in the ways “psychic energy” is organized 
within and by, for example, the aesthetics of television or the affective 
apparatus of Rock ’n’ Roll concerts. Building on the work of Stuart Hall 
and cultural studies, he focuses on the potential of affective intensities to 
empower and thus have political implications. His concept of affective eco-
nomies therefore enables a differentiated perspective on mass culture and 
diverse media that does not equalize asymmetries in power, consumer 
activities, and individual desires.
 Ahmed (2004) has, like Grossberg, analyzed the political dimension of 
affective economies, in particular, the workings of a “politics of fear.” As she 
demonstrates in her study of right- wing discourses, the circulation of affects 
and emotions plays a decisive role in performatively defining and demarcating 
individual as well as collective bodies. The (re-)production of these borders 
and divisions between individual and collective bodies appears to be a crucial 
element of affective economies. Building on Frantz Fanon and Judith Butler, 
Ahmed focuses strongly on the individual processes of embodiment and inter-
nalization of such economies of fear and hate. Regarding their collective 
dimension, however, she follows the assumption that right- wing discourses 
are driven by a massive accumulation of affects analogous to Karl Marx’s 
general formula of capital flow (M–C–M′).
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Reconceptualizing affective economies
The concept of affective economies as understood in this chapter draws inspi-
ration from these research perspectives but develops them further. It does not 
aim for an analysis of economic phenomena in the literal sense. Instead, its 
task is to determine how principles of economic exchange and circulation can 
be constructively applied in the analysis of affective processes. In this context, 
an understanding of economies as always implying community or polis is 
especially relevant. This perspective allows one to describe processes of divid-
ing and distributing in “households” (Greek: oikoi) of different sizes and spe-
cializations – processes which can also be attributed to the circulation and 
dissemination of affects. For instance, this happens when one considers the 
modes of affectivity that structure the genre system of Hollywood cinema, or 
the communicative dynamics of moral feelings such as outrage or solidarity 
that characterize the diverse and fragmented publics of social media. Thus, 
the concept of affective economies works as a powerful core heuristic in 
researching affective societies.
 The term “economy” (Greek: oikonomia, housekeeping) refers to the rela-
tion between the individual and her/his oikos – the environment or com-
munity to which the individual relates. Addressing phenomena as economic 
presupposes a minimal degree of socialization or collectivization and stresses 
the non- chaotic, collectively mediated character of processes of affecting and 
being affected. Of the realms of production, distribution, and consumption in 
an economy, it is distribution that emphatically and unequivocally refers to a 
level of collectivity: although production and consumption are collective pro-
cesses of coordination and interaction, one could possibly imagine them as 
individual acts, whereas distribution cannot be construed in this way. Affec-
tivity is similar in this regard: one might trace back the “production” and 
“consumption” of affects to the sensorium of an individual (even though rela-
tional theories of affect have long since deconstructed this naturalization), 
while the coordination and differentiation of sensations and affects is, by defi-
nition, relational and social. The strength of an economic approach toward 
affect lies in helping us come to terms with this relational and collective 
dimension of affectivity. Therefore, the task is to determine the forms of 
exchange in which processes of affecting and being affected take place. How 
exactly are affects related to each other, how are they mobilized, and what are 
the social forms that enable this mobilization? What are the functions of 
bodies, signs, and media in this context? How is it possible for discrete qual-
ities of feeling to become comparable and exchangeable? These questions 
illustrate the importance of the concept of affective economies, insofar as it 
places exchange and circulation center stage.
 In this context, the distribution or “exchange” of affects is used here in the 
sense of the Aristotelian economy, in which exchange represents a funda-
mental category of the social as such. According to Aristotle (2012), the 
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exchange of goods always implies a form of unity or community, in fact, the 
exchange itself serves to establish such relations. This is because the compari-
son between different goods presupposes a common measure, which Aristotle 
(2012) locates in each exchange partner’s “demand” (V, 8). In this regard, the 
act of exchange (or the sphere of exchange) is defined by a reciprocal deter-
mination of such demands by acts of political negotiation. It is through such 
reflexive acts that a society can come to regard itself as a political community. 
Therefore, at least in this context, Aristotle seems to regard exchange and the 
creation of community as almost the same.
 The concept of affective economy, as presented in this chapter, systemati-
cally centers this question of political self- reflection through exchange and 
mediation in the analysis of media. It transposes Aristotle’s idea from the 
domain of trade, narrowly conceived, onto the mediated and collective forms 
of commerce that structure the circulation of affects. This conceptualization 
of the distribution of affectivity as an open and dynamic process is not associ-
ated with specific value judgments – the mediation and negotiation of affec-
tivity is neither problematic nor desirable in and of itself. The twofold 
concept of exchange in Aristotle’s Nikomachean Ethics (2012) helps us to avoid 
these biases; since the exchange of goods results in equality in relation to the 
demands, we do not need to think of these demands as being fixed. In 
addition, as only unequal goods can be exchanged in a meaningful way, it is 
always possible for asymmetries, hierarchies, or antagonisms to emerge. An 
economic approach to affect takes such processes of affective dissonance into 
account.
 As Ahmed has shown, Marx’s analysis of the value- form at the beginning 
of Capital (Marx, 2004) is particularly useful for this purpose. But whereas 
Ahmed’s reference to Marx remains more or less metaphorical, we take his 
theory of the value- form as a dynamic model for the forms by which col-
lective affectivity is mediated. For instance, it remains highly unclear 
whether the “accumulation of affects” in Ahmed’s conceptualization of 
affective economies is something specific for right- wing discourses or if it 
describes the general logic of affectivity. While Ahmed does not have to 
answer that question in her case study, such an answer becomes possible if 
we consider the role of media in more detail. Here, a more nuanced 
reading of Marx provides fruitful insights: The differentiation between the 
abstract sphere of exchange and discrete processes of affecting and being 
affected elaborated above rests on Marx’s distinction between “exchange- 
value” and “use- value” of a commodity, without assuming a strict equiva-
lence between affect and commodity.
 Marx’s comments on the forms of commodity exchange can carefully be 
reformulated as the basis for a theorization of media and affect. First, 
“exchange- value” addresses the commodity not as singular, but as comparable 
and therefore interchangeable (Tauschabstraktion). By analogy, we assume that 
abstract affective qualities circulate while retaining the potential to relate to 
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the sensory experience of individuals. Second, it is interchangeability that 
constitutes the commodity as commodity in the first place. Therefore, as 
Spinoza and Deleuze have stressed, affects are always relational.
 Marx’s notion of use- value does not imply that things have essential char-
acteristics, but rather refers to the dimension of individual appropriation being 
performed ever anew under changing conditions. Here, the reference to 
Marx invites us to understand the act of feeling as a productive activity, as the 
bringing forth of something (poiesis), although (or precisely because) “feeling” 
always already refers to a level of collectivity. This abstracts individual qual-
ities of feeling, mediates them and makes them exchangeable. Exchange- value 
and use- value refer to two dialectically interwoven quantities, which can only 
be understood in their relation to each other. Again, this parallels the forms of 
affectivity mentioned above. In a structural analogy to Marx’s analysis of the 
value- form as an expression of abstract human labor, the concept of affective 
economy focuses on the forms in which the mediation of affects appears in a 
social context. This is where it becomes necessary to closely link affect theory 
to theoretical considerations of media. In Grundrisse, Marx (1973) writes that 
the abstraction taking place in exchange is necessarily mediated, that is, a 
value- form depends on a specific medium. The exchange- value is realized as 
and in the mediation of commodities:
Every moment, in calculating, accounting etc., that we transform com-
modities into value symbols, we fix them as mere exchange values, 
making abstraction from the matter they are composed of and all their 
natural qualities. On paper, in the head, this metamorphosis proceeds by 
means of mere abstraction; but in the real exchange process a real medi-
ation is required, a means to accomplish this abstraction.
(Marx, 1973, p. 142)
But whereas for Marx money takes the position of the solitary and “general 
form of value” (allgemeine Wertform), the idea of affective economies that 
we propose here presupposes a plurality of forms that mediate affects. In 
line with standard positions in media theory (Luhmann, 1994; McLuhan, 
1964), where money is regarded as one medium among others, the “real 
mediation” of affects is always related to a diversity of generic forms, pathos 
formulae (Warburg, 1906), and means of expression (→ Pathosformel ). As a 
means of exchange, these forms embody and coordinate social relations, 
because they “make sense” for a certain collective and emerge from pro-
cesses of political negotiation. Following Marx, one could call these forms 
“equivalent forms” (Äquivalentform). The term refers to an ephemeral 
interim stage in the analysis of the value- form and therefore emphasizes 
that these forms are always modifiable and somehow incomplete, just like 
their affective equivalents.
Affective economy  147
The affective economy of audiovisual images
This theoretical groundwork enables a precise understanding of affective 
forms of circulation and exchange: affects can take on forms that are 
abstracted from the feeling self, and can thus circulate in a wider sphere. In 
processes of political self- reflection these plural forms become structured in 
different and competing ways of making sense of affective experiences.
 For example, the spontaneous connection between an image of ocean and 
sun (cf. Figure 12.1) and a feeling of relaxation or even freedom cannot be 
explained through a mechanism of stimulus and response, but has to be situ-
ated within interwoven and non- linear genealogies of cinematic images, 
advertisement, postcards, private holiday photography, songs, stories, personal 
experiences, and so forth. Such genealogies provide potentially collective 
forms of exchange in the encounter between image and spectator. Within an 
aesthetic experience, the affective intensities of color (blue) and light (bright 
sunlight) may, depending on the audience, become appropriated as a specific 
feeling of “being- on-holiday,” producing a common way of making sense of 
this experience. This feeling also corresponds to a specific concept of holiday 
that is culturally generated and determined.
 This, in a nutshell, is an affective economy. On the one hand, there are 
the abstracted but yet concrete qualities of color and light that are able to 
Figure 12.1  Philip Scheffner, Havarie, 2016, 1 h 33 m. Courtesy: Philip Scheffner 
and pong film GmbH.
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circulate in a collective sphere of imagination; on the other hand, there is the 
discrete event of an encounter between image and beholder where the affec-
tive intensities open up a specific space of experience that is historically and 
culturally situated. Within this encounter, a generic form (the image of a 
holiday) shapes (but does not fix) the translation of affective intensities into 
subjective feelings. This generic form must be understood as an equivalent 
form (Marx, 2004) insofar as it structures the modality of feeling (relaxation) 
and is the basis for forming an aesthetic judgment of the image.
 The schema outlined here lays the groundwork for analyzing transforma-
tions of affective modalities. For instance, the very same image of the ocean 
can also be associated with states of uncertainty, existential threat, and radical 
isolation. It becomes obvious that such a change is dependent on other 
generic forms coming into play. If we take the example of news footage con-
cerning Mediterranean migration, the re- evaluation of the image is entangled 
with political developments and the discourse on migration that become sens-
ible as a hybridization of generic contexts and repertoires (→ emotion reper-
toires). In such a complex affective economy of conflicting references, the 
process of “real mediation” – between images of the ocean, their sensory 
experience, and the collective identities these images are connected to – is 
destabilized.
 This tension between different ways of making sense is at the core of the 
film Havarie (2016) by Philip Scheffner. For this experimental documentary, 
Scheffner expanded a short YouTube clip of 3:36 minutes to a feature- length 
film of 93 minutes. A tourist on the cruise ship Adventure of the Seas recorded 
the video clip with a mobile phone camera. The ship reported 13 refugees in 
a small boat in distress at the Mediterranean to the Spanish sea rescue on 
September 14, 2012. The camera in the tourist’s hand targets the rolling 
inflatable dinghy that appears in the distance as a dark and blurry spot on the 
screen- filling sea, moving back and forth with the waves. When the camera 
pans toward the ship, it suddenly reveals the standpoint of the videographer. 
While the extremely slow motion of the video clip in Scheffner’s film unfolds 
frame by frame, we hear a sound collage of radio messages between the 
Adventure of the Seas and the Spanish sea rescue, parts of interviews with nar-
rations of personal experiences, and telephone calls. Visually, the film accen-
tuates painterly and graphic effects of pixilation and the play of light on the 
surface of the water. In the soundtrack, the dialogue and narration often func-
tion as a kind of meta- commentary on the activity of viewing, for example, 
when a seaman talks about poor visibility conditions in the dark fog (while 
the image is still filled with bright daylight). His comment “I see that I don’t 
see anything anymore” is inevitably related to the image of the ocean where 
the refugee boat is only a tiny dot. The soundtrack thus mirrors the audi-
ence’s concentration on the image.
 The affective economy of the YouTube clip itself can be described as an 
encounter between a play of extreme visual perspectives (sudden changes in 
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focus, zooming in and out, flattening of the image- space, camera pans, light 
reflexes on the surface of the ocean) and the perspective of the spectator, 
understood as an ethical problem (→ affective witnessing). The clip aims to 
configure the relation between dinghy and cruise ship as a spatial one. It 
shapes the affective intensities of this encounter on the ocean as a feeling of 
precariousness and of suspension in space.
 In appropriating the clip, Havarie translates this problem of perspective into 
the dispositif of the cinema, that is, into another regime of audiovisuality, 
marked by an emphasis on the textural qualities of the image and on the 
interplay between image and soundtrack. By doing so, the film also resists the 
affective potential of documentary images of threatened refugees. Rather, it 
extracts the generic qualities and potentials of the clip’s individual frames by 
means of extreme slow motion. This opens up a historical space of reflection 
in the act of watching the film: on the one hand, the picturesque qualities of 
single frames come to the fore; on the other hand, their graphic, abstracted 
(i.e., two- dimensional) character is highlighted, for example, in moments 
when the dinghy disappears from the frame and we see nothing but the nearly 
motionless surface of the water. This sensual transformation can be analyzed 
with respect to a genealogy of sea pieces – let’s say William Turner’s light- 
flooded painting Slave Ship (1840) or Gerhard Richter’s series of photo-
realistic Seascapes (1960s and 1970s) – or experimental cinematography like 
Derek Jarman’s film Blue (1993) whose soundtrack similarly unfolds against 
the backdrop of screen- filling monochrome blue. This is not to say that 
Scheffner is intentionally quoting these examples or even generic forms. But 
his film inscribes itself into an affective sphere already embodied by these 
examples. The slowing down of images in Havarie leads to an accumulation 
of references the viewer could relate to affectively. However, these references 
are not equivalent to his/her sensory experience. Therefore, he or she is liter-
ally thrown back to his or her role as a spectator – a role that is incommen-
surable with the plight of the refugees on the small boat.
Conclusion
This short example is meant to demonstrate the productivity of understanding 
audiovisual images and other works of art as interventions into the political 
economies of affective societies. The manipulations of temporality and the 
point of view enacted by Scheffner’s film become recognizable as more than 
stylistic trappings: they aim at reconfiguring (or at least re- describing) the 
coordinates of a sensorial and affective regime that governs the way power 
relations are made meaningful and sensible. As shown in this chapter, our 
concept of affective economies provides a critical perspective on such 
powerful affective equivalences and allows for an analysis of artistic interven-
tions in collective imaginaries. Building on Marx’s theory of the value- form, 
we understand the circulation and coordination of affects as inherently 
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political. Collective processes of affecting and being- affected tend to sediment 
historically in generic forms and formulas, which in turn can be appropriated 
and cross- faded in order to produce various articulations of dissent, common-
ality or belonging. In an open process of self- reflection, affective economies 
both reproduce and modify the stereotypes, invisibilities and other asym-
metries of power they are built on. Emphasizing this double- bind also leads 
to a precise, post- romantic understanding of the political potential of art and 
aesthetics: Where the bourgeois ideal of aesthetic autonomy would complain 
of a fetishization and industrialization of affects, our economic point of view 
on affect recognizes that works of art are by no means unrelated to the col-
lective scenarios and fantasies produced by media. Thus, Scheffner’s Havarie is 
an excellent example of an immanent critique of affective economies: The 
film does not shut itself off from popular culture, insisting on its artistic 
immunity from the realm of exchange- value. On the contrary: it appropriates 
and transforms circulating patterns of expression in order to carve out a posi-
tion from where dissent can potentially be uttered. This position emerges in 
the affective encounter between audiovisual image and spectator. This 
encounter is where the imagination of community (Anderson, 1983) and the 
modulation of subjectivity become realized as a process of affecting and being 
affected.
 While philosophers like Jacques Rancière (2004) have formulated theories 
about the politics of aesthetics, there is, at present, no comprehensive 
approach outlining how spheres of politics and aesthetics actually interpene-
trate and influence one another – especially with regard to the question of 
affectivity. Unfolding the concept of affective economy that has been pre-
sented in this chapter would constitute a major step toward such a model.
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Chapter 13
Affects of racialization
Tamar Blickstein
“Race” has repeatedly been debunked as an unscientific social construct, 
yet the virulent persistence – and current resurgence – of racist social 
phenomena makes it imperative to renew analytic tools for understanding 
how racialization operates. This chapter proposes “affects of racialization” 
as a useful conceptual frame for analyzing the various affective processes 
that racialization entails. Racialization – defined here as the naturalization 
of social differences along “racial” lines – is a phenomenon deeply embed-
ded in affective logics, practices, and histories. Affects are central to under-
standing such diverse phenomena as the historical and ongoing colonial 
politics of dispossession, the ways global environmental upheavals dispro-
portionately target the lands, lives, and bodies of racialized populations, and 
the current escalation of white supremacist xenophobia at the borders of 
Europe and North America. While standard approaches to affect theory 
have not made race a central focus of inquiry, the conceptual frame 
presented here builds on recent definitions of affect as a relation of power 
(→ affect) and on Frantz Fanon’s (2008) affect theory, to suggest that raciali-
zation is a paradigmatically affective process.
 Taking racialization as an exemplary rather than a marginal instantiation of 
affect highlights certain features of affective processes more broadly. As power 
relations (Spinoza, 1677/1985, III def. 3), all affects are historically contin-
gent, and reproducible through structural, embodied, and material mecha-
nisms in ways that racializing processes bring into sharp relief. At the same 
time, like all affective processes, racialization typically comprises a strongly 
visceral, pre- reflexive, non- conscious component. This can make its opera-
tions difficult to detect on the surface, even if its logics are also wrought 
through overt discourses, practices, and policies as well as cognitive rationales 
and technologies (e.g., race science, race law, prison- industrial complex). 
Perhaps most notably, racialization powerfully illustrates the relationality at 
the heart of affective dynamics. Racialization is never just an isolated emo-
tional state or feeling lodged within an individual human subject or body, but 
is necessarily a relational dynamic of affecting and being affected that is spa-
tially, geopolitically, and environmentally situated.
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 As a conceptual term, “affects of racialization” foregrounds this relation-
ality. The term refers simultaneously to the implicitly or explicitly racializing 
character of the affective relations that predicate or constitute racialized pro-
cesses, and to the racialized affects that such processes generate, particularly 
(though not exclusively) in individuals and populations naturalized as inferior 
or superior along historically embedded hierarchies of ascribed difference. It is 
thus as much a tool for understanding the structural mechanisms of white 
supremacist affect as it is for understanding the affective impact of racialization 
on populations marginalized within white supremacist societies. Thus, “affects 
of racialization” can be adapted as a framework for analyzing cognate modes 
of distinction, othering, or exclusion that constitute naturalized regimes of 
hierarchical inequality along the lines of gender, sexuality, class, indigeneity, 
ethnicity, or national origin.
 This chapter analyzes affects of racialization through the perspectives of 
history, theory, and environment, respectively. I first historicize affects of 
racialization as an invention of colonial politics, trace some of its shifts, and 
consider the ways affect theories themselves have historically been vectors of 
racialized biopolitics. I then delineate the theoretical contours of the concept 
by drawing on Fanon’s foundational affect theory, and make a case for treat-
ing racialization as a paradigmatically affective phenomenon. Finally, I draw 
on ethnographic case studies of environmental racism in the Americas, high-
lighting how racialized affects of belonging legitimate environmental forms of 
colonial dispossession in the deforestation frontiers of South America, but also 
how dispossession was upended through decolonial affects of “refusal” in the 
#NoDAPL movement in North America. I conclude with future perspec-
tives on affects of white supremacy and climate change.
History
All affects are historically situated, and affects of racialization are no excep-
tion. In this section, I suggest that affective analysis is critical to a histori-
ography of race and racialization and, in particular, to understanding the 
historical biopolitics of domination and dispossession that continue to 
generate affects of racialization today. However, I also stress the ways affect 
theories have themselves been vectors of racialization – a factor that has argu-
ably dissuaded scholars of race and racism from engaging closely with the so- 
called affective turn (Berg & Ramos- Zayas, 2015).
 The concept of race and its affective dimensions merit historicization in 
their own right. As a European classificatory concept, “race” has been 
deployed since at least the 19th century to hierarchize human life according 
to physiological characteristics, imbuing these with emotive, moral, cultural, 
cognitive, and semiotic significance. Though there is disaccord as to when 
the concept arose, most agree that race was invented as a tool of colonial 
domination. Some have argued that modern understandings of “race” 
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originate with Spanish colonization in the Americas in the 15th and 16th 
centuries. The Spanish Crown – borrowing from older religiously defined 
biopolitical concepts of “purity of blood” – developed an organizing tax-
onomy to hierarchize the human life it sought to dominate and exploit, and 
invented classifications, including emotive ones, to distinguish these ranks 
from each other (Quijano, 2000; Todorov, 1999). Others locate the rise of 
“race” to the end of the Enlightenment, and to the post- Enlightenment shift 
from mercantilism to an industrial economy, when the discourses of the 
“rights of man” emerged alongside scientific studies of human biological 
difference (as in studies of craniology) giving rise to pseudo- sciences of 
human distinction and improvability (Wolfe, 2016) and to the consolidation 
of blood quanta laws (Kauanui, 2008). Either way, it is through colonial pol-
itics that race emerged as the organizing grammar through which subjugated 
peoples came to be classified and dominated, and affective classifications were 
always a part of this lexicon. It is instructive to consider Hannah Arendt’s 
(1944) definition of racism or “race- thinking,” which, from an affect studies 
perspective, already includes what we might call race- feeling. As she defined 
it, racism is not an exaggerated form of xenophobic nationalism, as many in 
her day – and in ours – might be tempted to suppose, but rather “the primary 
ideological weapon of imperialistic politics” (Arendt, 1944, p. 41).
 Throughout its history, the concept of “race” has been laden with natural-
ized affective valuations that have serviced regimes of colonialism, slavery, 
and genocide. In turn, affective dynamics have been critical to the racialized 
tools of colonial domination. Yet traditional historiographies have often over-
looked affective sites of racialized governance in their work, while the 
archives of racial violence and resistance are themselves often charged with 
the affective weight of their own “silenced pasts” (Trouillot, 1995). These 
silences are best understood in tandem. Ann L. Stoler’s (1995, 2002) work has 
shown that imperial politics in the European mainlands were thoroughly 
embedded in the private, domestic, sexual, gendered, and emotional negoti-
ations of everyday life in the colonies. By omitting these archives of colonial 
affect from their narratives, standard histories of colonial statecraft have 
obscured how deeply European nation- building in the mainland was 
dependent on racialized power relations in the colonies. Such historical 
silencings reproduce affects of racialization today by reinforcing an archive of 
disavowal. In turn, archival silences produce their own affective scars that 
continue to inform the way racialization is negotiated by historians of chattel 
slavery and colonialism. For instance, Saidiya Hartman (2007) captures the 
painful affective burden of an archival absence that confronted her in Ghana 
on a faltering historiographical quest to “reclaim the dead” of the Atlantic 
slave trade that had dispossessed her ancestors of any recorded trace. For 
Hartman, the affects of archival dispossession – the erasure of life stories, 
memories, origins – are emblematic of the everyday racial calculus of dispos-
session that continues to impoverish, incarcerate, and imperil black life.
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 Affects of racialization are genealogically rooted in long- standing affective 
imaginaries about racialized populations, many of which were produced by 
the academy itself. This includes gendered colonial fantasies about the pur-
ported desire of the colonized or enslaved populations to be subjugated by 
their “civilized” perpetrators, as in the Orientalist representations described 
by Edward Said (1978). It also includes the commonplace stereotypes about 
racialized populations that, following Enlightenment distinctions, portray sub-
jugated classes as inherently more emotional, corporeal, sexualized, childlike, 
and instinctual than their more “rational” and adult dominators. These affec-
tive stereotypes have had concrete impacts on the everyday lives and political 
possibilities of racialized populations, and were routinely enacted in policies 
of imperial nation- state formation and in the legal frameworks of legitimacy 
and belonging such as citizenship rights, suffrage, property, and claims to 
land- title.
 Academic approaches to affect have also serviced regimes of racialized 
biopower, or regimes that cultivate the vitality of some while abandoning 
others to social or biological death. As Kyla Schuller (2018) notes, US race 
science consolidated a sentimental mode of surveillance in the 19th century 
that sought to regulate the circulation of feeling throughout the population, 
and to delineate differential relational capacities of human and non- human 
matter along a racial hierarchy. Whiteness was ascribed a full capacity for 
feeling (both sensate and emotional) while the racialized – and especially 
black populations – were regarded as affectively deficient, a kind of vital 
matter stuck outside time in the unreflexive immediacy of instinct, and incap-
able of eugenic improvement.
 Affects of racialization reflect the distinct historical modes through which 
racialization was used as tool to dominate or dispossess particular populations for 
distinct aims. A comparison between Native American and African American 
racialization illustrates this point: Whereas black lives were made the fungible 
property of a system that accumulated wealth from their labor, Native American 
lives were racially targeted to disappear from their land, whether through geno-
cide or other means. Race law reflected these distinct aims in diverging blood 
quanta laws. Minuscule Sub- Saharan bloodlines were sufficient to make one 
black through the “one drop rule,” reflecting the drive to maximize white plan-
tation wealth, while maximal blood quanta were required for one to be con-
sidered Native, thus minimizing those eligible to pose a counter- claim to white 
settler territoriality (Wolfe, 2016). Affects of racialization mirror these histories, 
resulting in what Tyrone S. Palmer has described as differing epistemological 
contingencies of how affective “capacities” are inscribed onto different bodies 
(Palmer, 2017, p. 38). While the black body is ontologically marked by histories 
of “absolute fungibility,” Native bodies are ontologically marked by regimes 
that still inscribe them as vanished.
 Ulla Berg and Ana Ramos- Zayas (2015) have observed that scholars of 
racism are understandably reluctant to embrace a conceptual frame that has 
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1 See the introduction to Schuller (2018) for further reading about the meme’s significance.
2 An exception among commonly cited affect studies scholars is Ahmed’s (2007) reading of 
Fanon in her phenomenological analysis of whiteness as a bodily “orientation” in space, as I 
mention below. Meanwhile, it is important to note Palmer’s (2017) persuasive argument that 
blackness cannot be subsumed under a generalizable analytic of affective racialization due to 
the historical and ontological condition of absolute fungibility that marks the black body 
differently than other racialized bodies. While recognizing this specificity, I nevertheless 
maintain that Fanon’s intervention offers an exemplary model and framework for under-
standing affective relations.
itself been used as a tool of racial domination, and that appears at face value 
ill- equipped to illuminate the material and structural conditions of racialized 
inequality within white supremacist contexts. This disconnect is so 
entrenched that it was addressed by the Black Lives Matter campaigns that 
arose in 2015 after police brutality extinguished 61 black lives in the space of 
one summer. Though not geared toward academia per se, the Black Lives 
Matter meme that “Black lives > white feelings” captures widespread frustra-
tion with a system that structurally privileges the concerns of white affect 
over the conditions of black life and death.1 As a working concept and heur-
istic toolkit that makes “power” a central rather than a marginal focus of 
inquiry, “affects of racialization” must be able reckon analytically and histor-
ically with the silent white privilege that oversights to this discrepancy 
authorize within affect studies itself.
Theory
While it might appear that race studies and affect studies have mutually 
eschewed a focus on the affects of racialization, I shall propose in this section 
that Franz Fanon’s (2008) canonical philosophical and psychoanalytic treatise 
on racialization, Black Skin White Masks, is also a foundational treatise in affect 
theory. Although scholars in critical race theory and related fields – such as 
Sylvia Wynter (2001) – have written prolifically about the emotional, psychic, 
and affective stakes of Fanon’s treatise, affect studies as a subfield has not 
recognized Fanon’s intervention as a foundational and generalizable model for 
the study of affective phenomena more broadly.2
 Fanon’s theorization of racialized experience is paradigmatically affective in 
several important respects, including its articulation of affective relationality, 
its reading of affective embodiment as intercorporeal, its understanding of 
racism’s structural, pre- reflexive, and visceral transmissions, and its historically 
embedded understanding of these dynamics as a reproduction of colonial 
power relations. Of particular significance for my purposes is his relational 
reading of the “affective disorders” (Fanon, 2008, pp. xii, xiv) that are gener-
ated by colonial racism and sustained by white normativity. Citing the Négri-
tude poet Aimé Cesaire in his introduction, Fanon (2008) addresses the affects 
that colonizing and enslaving societies have heaped on the lives of “millions 
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of men [whom] they have knowingly injected with fear and a complex of 
inferiority, whom they have infused with despair and trained to tremble like 
flunkeys” (Cesaire, quoted in Fanon, 2008, p. xi). As he develops his analysis, 
Fanon (2008) challenges an essentializing interpretation of these predicaments 
as inherent to black experience, in favor of a relational and structural under-
standing of conditions he calls “affective erethism” (pp. 41, 130), “affective 
tetanization” (p. 92), and “the affective ankylosis of the white man” (p. 101), 
to which I shall return. These are not inward psychic states contained within 
an individual body or subject, suspended in time and space. Rather, they are 
activated dialogically by white society, and in particular, by the oppressive 
normativity of the “white gaze.”
 The “white gaze” alludes to much more than the socially and historically 
constructed status of “race.” It invites the reader into an affective predicament 
of existential, phenomenological, and political magnitude, pushing beyond 
Maurice Merleau- Ponty’s raceless phenomenology of the “body schema” to 
expose the racialized affective power relations inherent to phenomenological 
experience. This is most powerfully evoked in Fanon’s (2008) well- known 
anecdote of encountering a white child on the train who beholds the author’s 
blackness with terror: “Maman, look, a Negro; I’m scared!” (p. 91). Fanon’s 
body is hijacked, shattered, and returned back to him in the eyes of the white 
Other as an affective object of horror. White fear unleashes an intersubjective 
affect of racialization. His experience as a black colonized body in white 
French space entirely alters and disrupts the phenomenology of his “body 
schema,” reducing it to its “historic racial schema” and reconstituting it as an 
“epidermal racial schema” (Fanon, 2008, p. 92). The affects of racialization 
then take on a dual nature: not only are they the socio- economic, historical, 
and structural traces of colonial racism, but they are also affectively embodied 
in the black person as an alienating “internalization or rather epidermaliza-
tion” (Fanon, 2008, p. xv) of white terror.
 The incident with the child also captures the ways affects of racialization 
merge visceral, pre- reflexive instincts with consciously reasoned, structural, 
and historical legacies of colonial racism. This is best highlighted alongside 
Audre Lorde’s (1984) similarly wrenching encounter with white “horror” as 
a young girl on the subway, in her essay “Eye to eye: Black women, hatred, 
and anger.” Without quite understanding why, the very young Lorde slowly 
comes to grasp that the disgusted gaze of the woman seated next to her must 
not be directed at a roach or some other vermin crawling between their 
bodies in the subway – since there is none there – but rather at some ungrasp-
able dimension of her own person (Lorde, 1984, pp. 147–148). By drawing 
on childhood encounters, these incidents capture two symbiotic sides of 
racialization’s visceral transmission: one in which a white child reflects French 
society’s deeply habitual, pre- reflexive colonial racism against the sight of 
Fanon (his apparaître), and the other in which Lorde’s pre- reflexive experi-
ence of her movement in the world as a raceless body, is shattered under the 
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disgusted and horrified gaze of a white adult. Both cases illuminate the way 
affects of racialization rely on the internalized immediacy of a visceral and 
instinctive mode of transmission or reception – or otherwise put, of affecting 
and being affected.
 Commenting on Fanon, Ahmed (2007, p. 153) has noted that such inter-
ruptions of his bodily schema by the white gaze also disrupt Fanon’s capacity 
to orient his body in space, since neutral space itself, he discovers, is white. 
Such instincts, habits, and phenomenologies of whiteness are collectively and 
structurally reproduced through recalcitrant power relations that are them-
selves affectively transmitted. Fanon (2008) captures this recalcitrance in his 
invocation of the “affective ankylosis of the white man” (p. 101). “Ankylosis” 
is a medical term for the hardening of joints that have fused into bones. The 
philosopher Alia Al- Saji (2014) argues that ankylosis gestures to the “stuck 
affectivity” of racialized imperial formations that hide their workings, and to 
the unequally distributed impact of the colonial past on the racialized present.
Environment
One of the most provocative and under- explored implications of affect theory 
for analyses of racialization lies in its potential to illuminate modes of environ-
mental racism, including its repercussions for relational rapports among dis-
tinct species and materials. Environmental destruction disproportionately 
impacts the lives, lands, and bodies of vulnerable populations who have 
historically been subject to European imperial expansionism and its racialized 
tools of domination – populations that Mel Y. Chen (2011) has aptly termed 
“industrialization’s canaries” (p. 276). Impacts are seen in inner city rates of 
urban toxicity, carcinogenic pesticide contamination among Global South 
farm workers, climate- induced human displacement (not just South–North, 
but also South–South) and attendant risk of conflict. As the following discus-
sion elaborates, these impacts are also seen in the ongoing territorial dispos-
session of indigenous people in the soy frontiers of South America, and at the 
hands of fossil fuel pipeline construction in North Dakota.
 Affects of racialization act as powerful vectors of colonial dispossession in 
the South American Gran Chaco, where I conducted fieldwork from 2010 to 
2014. The Gran Chaco region is currently one of the world’s deforestation 
hotspots, as agribusiness incursions rapidly swallow dry forests, replacing them 
with massive foreign- owned soyfields and ranches. Largely driven by wealthy 
foreign- owned agribusinesses and cattle- raising developments, this vast and 
rapid deforestation has left an alarming carbon footprint that may be exacer-
bating local drought and flooding patterns in the region, while contributing 
to global warming (Baumann et al., 2017). The consequences are shared by 
diverse local actors in this Global South setting – whether colonized 
indigenous people, mestizo peasants, or white settler farmers. For instance, 
soyfield incursions and more extreme weather patterns have contributed to 
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3 The Gran Chaco region was ruled by militarily autonomous indigenous nations throughout 
the  Spanish imperial era, until that control was wrested from them by the emerging nation- 
states of Argentina, Paraguay, and Bolivia from the 19th to the early 20th centuries. In the 
Argentine Chaco, where I conducted most of my research, indigenous people were violently 
displaced through the early 20th century by state sponsored settler colonization schemes that 
granted farmland to white European immigrants, whom they charged with cultivating the 
uncivilized “deserts” through industry. A racialized labor hierarchy was established in which 
white small farmers relied on labor reserves of colonized indigenous people, as well as on 
peonage of mestizo landless peasants and internal migrants.
the collapse of small- scale cotton and farming industries run by settlers. Mean-
while, the disappearance of bushlands and waterways limits indigenous access 
to these already colonized spaces and resources in particularly profound ways, 
causing displacements. Yet while all groups are impacted, my fieldwork 
revealed that local historically embedded racialization schemas influence 
which local populations are at most at risk.3
 An analysis of racialized affects reveals some of the ways deforestation’s 
impact is unevenly distributed in the wake of a shared destruction. In a post- 
industrial context, previous racial hierarchies of settler colonial labor and land 
relations are reproduced through affective rituals of belonging. For example, 
in one case I observed, descendants of white colonizers who had lost their 
small cotton industries, successfully petitioned the local government (com-
prised largely of settler- descendants) to restore a house built by their grand-
parents whom they call the “first inhabitants” of the land. Relationships to 
the ancestors were performed through European dances, music and family 
stories of sacrifice. Inaugural government speeches mimicked this collective 
sentiment and embodied memory, thus congealing a narrative of this edifice 
and its surrounding landscape as the affective stronghold of settler founding, 
despite historic and ongoing settler colonization. By consecrating affects of 
founding while omitting the colonized, this narrative enacted an ideological 
reversal of the kind that Ojibwe scholar Jean E. O’Brien (2010) has called 
settler “firsting” (see also Rifkin, 2011).
 Racialized hierarchies also privilege settler ontologies of belonging over 
indigenous ones, thus reinforcing a structural colonial politics of property and 
place. An affect- oriented perspective on human–non- human relations sheds 
light on how this racialization occurs. For instance, my settler informants 
described the affective pull that this plantation house had over them in 
animate terms, as a site that drew them toward it, and made them not just 
remember, but “feel” the presence of their grandparents, physically and emo-
tionally. Some described the charge of this site as different and more powerful 
than being in a church. The site also evoked feelings in my interlocutors of 
an inherited connection to the land forged through their grandparents’ and 
parents’ planting. These narratives recurred in media representations and in 
government pamphlets, fueling affects of national territorial belonging among 
settlers in the wake of industrial and plantation loss.
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4 I draw here on Kwek and Seyfert (2018), who usefully outline the ways affect theory can 
illuminate and expand approaches to the ontological turn in indigenous contexts of animacy, 
which they term “heterological.” However, rather than focusing on indigenous difference, 
my own approach to affect here stresses racialized political hierarchies imposed on ontological 
diversities, which necessarily include the ontologies of the colonizers.
5 I observed and participated in this movement from New York as a non- Native ally, demon-
strator, and member of the NYC Stands with Standing Rock Collective (2016), a group of 
Native and non- Native scholars, teachers, and organizers who planned various Native- led 
educational actions, and collectively authored the #StandingRockSyllabus.
 Meanwhile, this same affective regime discounted indigenous affective 
ontologies of belonging grounded in bushland relations with deceased 
human ancestors as well as non- human or more- than-human kin, such as 
waterways and plant and animal species – all of which are under direct 
threat due to deforestation (Kwek & Seyfert, 2018).4 Although these affec-
tive ontological bonds have always also been political and territorial ones, 
local state and non- state actors unsurprisingly do not regard them this way, 
preferring to consider them – at best – as cultural heritage (de la Cadena, 
2010). Indigenous interlocutors in my site were well aware of this double 
standard, often questioning why their own interspecies relations were dis-
missed while those in the missionary’s Bible were upheld as doctrine. This 
discrepancy between politically legitimate ontologies (of the colonizers) and 
depoliticized ontologies (of the colonized) is grounded in racialized 
evolutionist creeds that regard Western religious animacies and mythologies 
as more rational, legible, organized, enlightened, and evolved than those of 
the colonized, deemed childlike, emotional, instinctual, superstitious, and 
magical.
 However, as my second case study shows, the affective politics of 
environmental racism and dispossession can also be “refused” and retooled 
to decolonial ends (Simpson, 2014). This was evident in #NoDAPL, the 
2016 indigenous- led political movement against the Dakota Access Pipeline 
(DAPL), a $3.78 billion, 1,886 km pipeline transporting over 500,000 
barrels of hydraulically fractured (fracked) crude oil per day through the 
treaty territory of the Lakota Sioux Nation (or Oceti Sakowin).5 Due to the 
risk of toxic leaks, the pipeline was rerouted from the mostly white town 
of Bismark to the treaty lands and waterways of the Lakota, reflecting wide-
spread incidents of environmental racism against Native, black and Latino 
water and food supplies in North America (Montoya, 2016). In addition to 
imperiling the only water supply of the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation, 
the pipeline construction disturbed sacred sites and burial grounds.
 #NoDAPL “refused” environmental racism by designing a grassroots 
social movement in their own affective, political, and ontological terms, 
and in particular, by articulating their relationship to water and belonging 
in a manner that elides settler affects of possession and dispossession. 
“Refusal” as conceived of by Kahnawà:ke Mohawk scholar Audra Simpson 
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6 Divestors included the Norwegian bank DNB, the Norwegian mutual fund Odin Fund 
Management, and the city of Seattle which divested its contract with Wells Fargo, a DAPL 
lender (Wong, 2017).
(2014) is not a form of resistance so much as a mode of abstaining from 
colonial paradigms and institutions of recognition that are contingent on a 
denial of Native sovereignty. #NoDAPL chose to frame their cause not 
only as a protest against a policy that threatens their legal right to safe 
drinking water within a US constitutional framework, but also as a move-
ment to protect the water from harm, both as kin and as a vital living 
resource (TallBear, 2016).
 Whereas settler state jurisdictions separate treaty rights from broader Native 
political, philosophical, and relational understandings of waterways as life, 
#NoDAPL refused that distinction, linking “the protection of Indigenous 
peoples and treaty rights” with “the protection of the earth and our other- 
than-human relatives” (TallBear, 2016, para. 1). Thus activists called them-
selves “water protectors,” described the pipeline as the Black Snake in their 
protest signs and symbols – a reference to apocalyptic Sioux prophesies that a 
black snake would one day poison the water before destroying the earth – 
and the movement’s main rallying cry, adopted in transnational campaigns, 
was “Mni Wiconi” (Lakota for “water is life”). In response to police militariza-
tion of the protest camp, water protectors held affectively and politically 
enmeshed tribal ceremonies and other rituals of belonging. Their slogans, 
ceremonies, and tactics pushed beyond an Agambenian “bare life” paradigm 
of water as a material resource for survival, and toward one of water as both 
life- sustaining and coterminous with life itself. Such a platform refuses the 
separation of politics and ontologies that settler governance demands in 
exchange for rights – even in the context of environmentalist and develop-
ment programs.
 Although the #NoDAPL movement’s aims were ultimately upended by 
the Trump administration, it was extremely successful at mobilizing a vast 
Native youth- led campaign that drew celebrity and Veteran endorsements, 
reached millions online (through Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, YouTube), 
and fueled a cross- sectional coalition of regional and global supporters, several 
thousands of whom protested on site. It also led to worldwide protests against 
companies and banks in Europe and elsewhere that were invested in DAPL, 
some of which divested as a result.6 It accomplished all this by disrupting the 
way racialized affects of territorial belonging are framed within the colonial 
state, insisting instead, on the authority to reconfigure the logic of environ-
mental protection in ways that reclaim the right to a politically, affectively 
and ontologically textured relationship with their occupied lands. As Kim 
TallBear (2016) noted, an attempt to “eliminate our relations with these 
lands” is also an attempt to “eliminate Indigenous peoples from these lands” 
(para. 4).
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7 As W. E. B. Du Bois (1903) famously noted over a century ago, it is not blackness that accounts 
for racialized experience, but rather the “color line” and the thriving institutions of white 
supremacy that sustain it.
8 A number of scholars have written about related topics that are helpful for developing such 
an approach. For example, Ghassan Hage (1998) has explored national fantasies of white 
supremacy in Australia, Arlie Russell Hochschild (2016) has studied the emotional life of 
right wing voters in middle America, and Mikko Salmela and Christian von Scheve (2017) 
examine the emotional dimensions of right- wing populism in Europe. None of these 
approaches specifically examines the role of affect in racialization processes.
Outlook
There are numerous future perspectives that merit attention from scholars of 
affect and racialization, however I will highlight only two here. First, the 
vigorous flourishing of white supremacy and white nationalist forms of popu-
lism in Europe and North America at the time of this publication, makes it 
imperative for scholars to develop new tools for examining the affective 
mechanisms of racialization in general, and of anti- immigrant and anti- 
Muslim forms of white supremacy in particular. White supremacy is under-
stood here not only as an overt ideological or political allegiance to the 
notion that white people are racially superior and must dominate over non- 
whites, but also to the more covert, structural, and systemic manifestations of 
supremacy that permeate European and Euro- settler societies.7 Western 
nationalism – including its populist variants – are embedded in the same 
racialized histories of imperial domination as the affects of racialized abjection 
discussed in my reading of Fanon above. Nevertheless, affects of racialization 
have not been a central focus of research on the emotionally charged and 
highly mediatized resurgence of racial xenophobia today.8
 This may be due to the status of “race” as a questionable sociological cat-
egory of analysis, particularly in European social sciences. There is a tendency 
to frame white supremacy as a subset of populist extremism arising in the 
wake of neoliberal deregulation, shifts in the global economy, weakened 
welfare states, post- Fordism, and other socio- economic factors. However, 
without taking affect and emotion into account, such socio- economic expla-
nations risk oversimplifying at best – or discounting at worst – the staunchly 
racialized character of both new and resurgent forms of right- wing populism. 
Scholars of affect can contribute an important set of tools for understanding 
these conjunctures by placing racialization and white supremacist affect at the 
center of their analysis. In particular, new methodological designs and theor-
etical frames must be developed that account for the relational, phenomeno-
logical, and historically situated character of these trends. One recent example 
of an innovative methodological approach is Nitzan Shoshan’s (2016) ethno-
graphic study of right- wing extremism among German youth, which found 
that liberal governance fostered publicly mediated affects of hate that minim-
ized the effectiveness of anti- extremist educational strategies.
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 Second, as I have argued in the case studies above, affect studies scholars 
can contribute to understanding the material and embodied consequences of 
environmental racism, as well as the racialized affects generated by climate 
change. As noted above, many of the global environmental concerns of our 
day disproportionately impact vulnerable populations, who are often those 
who already historically paid the price for industrialization’s advances with 
their lands bodies and lives. Fossil fuel extraction, deforestation, inner- city 
rates of lead poisoning, contaminated water supplies, and carcinogenic pesti-
cides among Global South farmworkers are but a few examples. There is a 
growing need for scholarship that considers the embodied affective worlds 
that these modes of environmental destruction and dispossession yield among 
historically racialized and colonized populations. A current example of such a 
perspective is developed by Vanessa Agard- Jones (2014) who considers the 
affective and sexual body politics of France’s pesticide dumping in its former- 
colony and current French territory of Martinique, where EU- prohibited 
crop- dusting practices were for a time authorized through waivers that were 
not granted on the French mainland. Affective perspectives are also needed 
for a fuller understanding of the racialized impacts of climate change on such 
phenomena as drought, flooding, and wildfire, changing interspecies relations, 
weakened economic and political infrastructure, heightened risk of war and 
social conflict, as well as the various kinds of displacements and dispossessions 
these engender.
 Finally, affective analyses of racialization can challenge us to develop a 
more intersectional understanding of how the phenomena above are inter-
twined. The climate and migration “crises” in the news are enmeshed in 
affective histories, afterlives, and silencings of racialized colonial domination. 
Such affects have been illuminated but also obfuscated or reproduced through 
academic theories. And they may be overturned, inflamed, or retooled in 
unexpected ways by social movements across the spectrum. As climate- 
influenced conflict and displacements reach the barricaded shores of increas-
ingly populist wealthy nations, we cannot afford to ignore the racialized webs 
of affect and power that have steered these tides.
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Chapter 14
Affective witnessing
Michael Richardson and Kerstin Schankweiler
Witnessing an event is an intensity of experience that is not only linked to 
proximity but insists on the relationality of the witness and the witnessed. To 
bear witness means not only giving an account of this experience and making 
the incident accessible to others, but also entails affecting and being affected 
(→ affect). To bear witness is to be brought within the intersection of the 
political and the ethical and in doing so to be affectively entangled in a 
complex web of relations. Yet this affectivity is often elided or relegated to 
the background in political philosophy and critical theory. Affective witness-
ing, then, provides a new paradigm for understanding all witnessing as inher-
ently relational and bodily. At the same time, affective witnessing also 
describes a particular mode of witnessing in which what is witnessed is affect 
itself. New forms and practices of media witnessing in the era of social media 
have brought this specific mode to new prominence. As a result, the prolifer-
ation of new media technologies has made it increasingly important to under-
stand witnessing in this way. Not only does each of us hold the potential to 
bear witness, but pervasive smartphones enable others to become co- 
witnesses, obliging us to capture events to be witnessed in other times and 
places. There seems to be an increasing willingness to connect with others 
through sharing testimonies, for example through social media and into wider 
media networks. Yet media in general and social media in particular has the 
capacity to produce, transmit, and regulate affect, such that acts of witnessing 
rendered into testimony circulate with varying speed and intensity. As the 
temporality of witnessing blurs – the time of the event, the time of viewing, 
the times of circulation – so too do its affective dynamics. All this has con-
sequences for what witnessing does, for the production of veracity and for the 
formation of witnessing communities.
 To illustrate how affective witnessing works in the analysis of events and 
images, we put three bodies of images in relation to one another. First, the 
infamous images from Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, where US soldiers tortured 
and abused detainees, reveals how images entangle viewers in a relation of 
witnessing. From there, we show how affective witnessing in the wake 
of Abu Ghraib produces different ethico- political responses in two resonant 
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yet unrelated instances from 2016: the abuse of juvenile detainees at Don 
Dale Youth Detention Centre in northern Australia and “selfie protest” 
images originating in response to the suffocating conditions for prisoners in 
post- revolutionary Egypt. Separately and together these instances of witness-
ing torture, prisoner abuse, and political protest show how affective 
witnessing provides crucial depth and nuance for understanding testimony. 
Tracing the affective dynamics of acts of witnessing mediated through digital 
imaging technologies, this chapter develops a robust conception of affective 
witnessing suited to the networked terrain of contemporary culture and pol-
itics. In doing so, we make clear that affective witnessing is a crucial cultural 
practice within affective societies.
Witnessing theory
Witnessing and testimony are entangled concepts: witnessing designates the 
act of bearing witness and of experiencing an event, while testimony is a 
product of witnessing, a directed, motivated, and necessarily subjective 
account of the event. Thus, not every act of witnessing leads to testimony, 
but every testimony relies on witnessing. Nevertheless, the boundaries 
between witnessing and testifying easily blur and both terms are often used 
interchangeably or in tandem. Witnessing today is often understood as a prac-
tice that already and inevitably positions and produces the witness as a moral 
and political subject. Since the 1980s, theories of witnessing and testimony – 
and the processes of subjectification they entail – have been largely developed 
in response to the Holocaust (e.g., Felman & Laub, 1992; LaCapra, 2001). As 
Annette Wieviorka (2006) points out, the Holocaust as an historical event has 
led to the largest number of testimonies in the 20th century, proliferating 
across media forms to form a still- incomplete “movement” against oblivion 
(p. xi). Indeed, as witnessing theorist Michal Givoni (2011) points out, the 
Holocaust survivor- witness played a central role in canonizing testimony “as 
the subversive idiom of oppressed and subaltern groups and as the primary 
medium of moral sensibility towards victims of atrocities” (p. 147). More 
recent scholarship has centered on the role of media and mediatization, point-
ing out that globalized media technologies make witnessing an almost 
commonplace mode of relating to the world (Frosh & Pinchevski, 2009; 
Peters, 2001; Vivian, 2017).
 Despite this apparent ubiquity of witnessing, the figure of the witness is 
neither homogeneous nor uncontested. Didier Fassin (2008) has differentiated 
between the allegedly neutral “third party” witness of the court (testis), the 
survivor- witness (superstes) and the blood witness (martyr) who testifies 
through death. Lilie Chouliaraki (2006), Luc Boltanski (1999), Wendy Kozol 
(2014), and others have questioned the distinction between witness and spec-
tator, particular in the context of mediatized encounters with suffering that 
drastically limit the capacity for action. Sibylle Schmidt (2017) and Verena 
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Straub (2019) have examined the specific and often overlooked case of 
perpetrator- witnesses, which further complicates the moral and ethical issues 
of both the act of witnessing and figure of the witness in general. For the 
most part, affect and emotion play implicit roles in these writings. For 
example, in Fassin’s taxonomy the superstes is affected by what they have 
experienced and therefore subjective, while the objectivity of the testis is 
founded on their lack of emotional investment. Our conception of affective 
witnessing makes this implicit role explicit and in doing so brings affect and 
emotion to center stage.
The concept of affective witnessing
Affective witnessing updates this corpus of theory to account for both the 
centrality of affect and emotion to witnesses and witnessing and their inherent 
relationality. It stresses the body in its dynamic relationship to other bodies 
(human or non- human) as central to witnessing. In other words, the focus on 
affect acknowledges witnessing as both social and embodied. Conceptually, 
affective witnessing meets the challenge of understanding and analyzing con-
temporary testimony by recognizing and insisting upon the intensive relation-
ality of the witness, the witnessed and their co- witnesses. Witnesses, after all, 
always bear witness to something; they testify to somebody. To witness an 
event means becoming responsible to it (Peters, 2001). This is an affecting 
experience, even if the intensity and register changes based on the specific 
contours, textures, and positions of any given encounter. On one level, then, 
witnessing is an encounter like any other, one in which bodies, environ-
ments, and happenings are affectively entangled in webs of relations, material-
ities, and matterings (Gregg & Seigworth, 2010). But as testimony theory has 
shown, witnessing is also necessarily bound up with questions of obligation, 
morality, and action (Oliver, 2001). Indeed, this inherent and constitutive 
affectivity of witnessing entails recognizing that witnessing is always on the 
brink of becoming political, of shifting from the moment of the event to its 
proliferation through the body politic (Massumi, 2015). Affect is at work in 
multiple ways: not only in the affectivity of the experience of witnessing, but 
in the witnessing of affect itself – of intensities and forces and encounters – 
and in the circulation, reception, and response to witnessing that becomes 
testimony.
 Witnessing always entails media and mediation (Frosh & Pinchevski, 2009, 
p. 1). At the most basic level, the human body of the witness as the central 
agent of witnessing can be thought of as a medium in the broadest sense. 
More substantively, the question of mediation becomes central when con-
sidering the relationality of witness and co- witnesses, even more so if we take 
the whole set of media testimonies into account that have gained omnipres-
ence in contemporary networked and mediatized societies. Now we live in 
“an era of becoming a witness” (Givoni, 2011, p. 165), one in which the 
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modes, forms, capacities, and potentials of bearing witness are rapidly chang-
ing (Andén-Papadopoulos, 2014). New devices, cameras, and sensors make 
possible the transmission and circulation of witnessing in the event of its 
occurrence, bringing the body of the witness in the face of the event into 
mediated spaces of accessibility that enable proliferating relations of witness-
ing to flourish. Technologies such as these have also rendered witnessing 
increasingly visual, such that today witnessing often produces image testimo-
nies (Schankweiler, Straub, & Wendl, 2019). Police body cameras, smart-
phones, live streaming platforms, social media’s pluralization of voices and 
lethal drone strike footage uploaded to YouTube: these and countless other 
new sites and techniques of witnessing feed into the mediatized activism of 
the protest movements in the Arab- speaking world, Black Lives Matter and 
the #MeToo movement, simply to name some of the more well- known 
examples.
 Consequently, media witnessing can not only dominate the event itself, 
the very logics of events can be shaped by their immediate mediation through 
eyewitnesses, such that mediation becomes an inherent quality – or even 
purpose – of the event. Mediation acts to capture, coalesce, and modulate the 
intensities of witnessing. Its affectivity is the currency of its passage, the charge 
that sets images, videos, and stories circulating in the digital and enables older 
forms of witnessing to also remain vibrant and find new avenues for expres-
sion and transmission. Now more than ever, corporeal and technological 
practices, tools, and techniques of witnessing are increasingly co- composed: 
entangling, converging, and diverging in unexpected ways (Grusin, 2010; 
Chow, 2012; Kember & Zylinska, 2012; Allan, 2013; Murphie, 2018).
 To encounter the witnessing text – the testimonio, the image testimony, the 
event of witnessing captured in media – is to be opened onto the capacity to 
be affected, to becoming co- witness. Yet this capacity of media to generate 
and circulate affect (Gibbs, 2001; Papacharissi, 2014) (→ affective economy) 
means that the economies of meaning within which witnessing takes place 
are also increasingly affective, transitory, and contested. The practices, pro-
cesses, and forms of mediation that enable the vitality, intensity, fluidity, and 
accessibility of witnessing today are also exactly the forces that can place wit-
nessing under duress. If we are indeed in the era of becoming a witness, we 
are also in the era of contestation over the very grounds of truth, which can 
itself play out in the struggle between competing witnesses. Witnessing can 
even constitute modes of relating to events that did not happen with the force 
of responsibility (Richardson, 2018).
 Because of the inherent relationality of (affective) witnessing, bearing witness 
never concerns only a single body. There is always a potential collective 
involved (→ social collectives). Processes of collectivization take place on several 
levels. First, on a very basic level, a witness always needs a (co-)witness; the 
martyr for example needs someone who bears witness to his or her death. 
However, bearing witness in general is a specific way of addressing others. “The 
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encounter with an other is central to any conception of bearing witness,” write 
Guerin and Hallas (2007). “For a witness to perform an act of bearing witness, 
she must address an other, a listener who consequently functions as a witness to 
the original witness” (Guerin & Hallas, 2007, p. 10). Second, and connected to 
this, a witness most often testifies out of a responsibility he or she feels, and this 
responsibility is generally directed toward others (Givoni, 2011, p. 148). Thus, 
testimony points to an (assumed) community and its identity, an identity that 
can be enacted by the witness’s expression of belonging to one group or another 
in the act of giving testimony. If we understand bearing witness as sharing ways 
of affecting and being affected, witnessing and testimony constitute a “we” that 
transforms a collective into a community, often against another community of 
“them” (for instance victims against perpetrators). Third, testimony seldom 
arrives alone or stays that way for long. Testimonies provoke further testimo-
nies, whether accompanying or countering. Collected and archived, such as at 
Yale’s Fortunoff Archive for Holocaust Testimonies (established in 1979), testi-
monies can constitute a movement of accumulating witness statements, preserved 
to account – however incompletely – for what happened. Or, in more recent 
protest campaigns like Black Lives Matter (since 2013) against racially motivated 
police violence in the United States or #MeToo (since 2017) against sexual 
assault and harassment, testimonies circulate so swiftly and widely that they 
become the locus for further testimony, producing co- witnesses who might 
become activists, affected so intensely that they become responsible to events 
beyond and before their immediate world.
 Affective witnessing calls attention to the complex temporalities of 
witnessing. When an event is witnessed, the act of witnessing immediately 
transcends the event. As Derrida (2000) writes, “the singular must be univer-
salizable; this is the testimonial condition” (p. 41). Thus, bearing witness 
means that a singular and unique moment in space and time will become 
repeatable in other spaces and times. For Frosh and Pinchevski (2009), this 
“repeatable singularity” is exemplified by the mediatized spectacle of 9/11, 
which spread through the media sphere in an unstable corpus of images, 
footage, firsthand accounts, and political statements (pp. 7ff.). Thus, witness-
ing and testimony bring about a “spatial and temporal extension” (Frosh & 
Pinchevski, 2009, p. 8). Testimonies can circulate detached from witnesses 
across time and space, opening up new affective dynamics and appropriations. 
Hence, while the mediatized testimony might be repeatable, the unique 
experience is not – whether of the event itself or the encounter with testi-
mony. To encounter again and again the event through media – whether in 
print or social media or simply in the voice of the witness – is to re- encounter 
it, with its intensity damped, amplified, or changed depending on the specif-
ics of body and context (→ affective arrangement). In the most fundamental 
sense, affect itself is inextricable from time: it can never be static or reified, 
but always occurs in encounter. Attending to the affective, embodied, and 
relational dimensions of witnessing means bringing this temporality to the 
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fore. It means attending to the unstable, changeable, and transformative qual-
ities of bearing witness and the way in which an event moves our bodies can 
vary far more than the semantic content of any given testimony might 
suggest.
Affective witnessing as analytical framework
The value of affective witnessing as a conceptual framework can be illustrated 
through the analysis of images of political violence. We put three bodies of 
images in relation to one another in order to trace the dynamics of affective 
witnessing as they emerge, change, and exchange intensities across these dif-
fering contexts. In doing so, we demonstrate the complex, and at times 
blurred, positions occupied by witnesses, co- witnesses, perpetrators, victims, 
and bystanders, as well as the role of mediation in the circulation and trans-
mission of acts of witnessing and image testimonies alike. Here, too, the 
significance of related concepts such as affective economy and affective reson-
ance becomes clear.
 To begin, consider the infamous photographs from Abu Ghraib: naked 
prisoners stacked in pyramids as guards posed with upturned thumbs, or 
leashed like dogs, or forced to masturbate, or dead in a body bag with a 
smiling woman’s face above them (see Figure 14.1). Witnessing plays out on 
multiple levels: the victim who functions as the witnessing figure of the 
Figure 14.1  Abu Ghraib’s Hooded Man, digital photograph by Staff Sergeant 
Ivan Frederick, 2003. PA Photos / AP, 24 October 2003.
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martyr, the perpetrators who are also eyewitnesses, and the co- witnesses who 
see the images after the fact. These are images in which affect is an essential 
element of what is witnessed, but also images that trouble the status of the 
witness and make clear the affectivity at the heart of witnessing’s injunction 
to act. Separately and together, the Abu Ghraib images bear witness to affec-
tive relations between bodies – physical contact, relations of power, expres-
sions of distress, and so on – but also radically varied capacities to act. It is not 
simply the content of the images in a symbolic or representational sense that 
gives them their force, but rather the way in which they capture affective 
dynamics in their arrangement of faces, bodies, and environments. While the 
photographs were taken as souvenirs or mementos rather than to document 
what happened, they nonetheless position the perpetrators as witnesses as well 
as abusers (Richardson, 2016, p. 79). The images place us, the viewers, in the 
uncomfortable position of seeing through the eye of the perpetrator’s camera 
and thus caught in an affective economy of witnessing that begins with the 
images being passed around the prison on CDs until they found their way to 
investigators and the press, who iteratively mediated them: broadcast on 60 
Minutes, printed in newspapers and magazines, circulated online.
 To see these images is deeply affecting – an act of witnessing that provokes 
bodily sensations of uncomfortable proximity to the violence itself. As Anna 
Gibbs (2007) writes, “we have felt the horror of the Hooded Man image 
before we have time to make sense of what we have seen, never mind analyze 
it as an iconographic artifact” (p. 130). These images are entangling in ways 
that are not incidental but rather are fundamental to their capacity to bear 
witness. This “visual archive circulated – and continues to circulate – in 
complex, increasingly untraceable movements,” leaving their affective rem-
nants settled in the skin of their co- witnesses, lurking in the background of 
contemporary networked culture (Richardson, 2016, p. 80). While the 
intensity with which these images function draws on a long history of images 
of violence and abuse, the global distribution, digital dissemination, and 
enduring influence of the Abu Ghraib images shows that affective witnessing 
connects in important ways to the more generalized concept of affective 
economy (→ affective economy).
 A similar troubling of the position of the witness is evident in the footage 
and images of abuse by correctional officers at Don Dale Youth Detention 
Centre in Australia’s Northern Territory from 2010 to 2015 (see Figure 14.2). 
Smartphone and CCTV video obtained by the Australian current affairs 
program 4 Corners reveals how Indigenous and other youth had been tear- 
gassed, stripped, beaten, and shackled, hooded and shirtless, to a chair 
(Meldrum- Hanna, 2016). The functioning of Abu Ghraib as a repertoire for 
affective resonance is clear: the use of hooded masks, the postures, even the 
grainy texture of the images are resonant with the ethico- political intensity 
that demanded response. A shock to conscience on their own, the photo-
graphs of Don Dale obtain an amplified, focused intensity in their testimonial 
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force through the mediated circulation of that affective resonance (→ affective 
resonance). Like Abu Ghraib, the Don Dale imagery bears witness with an 
affective forcefulness that remains potent despite the events themselves occur-
ring at least a year prior to their release. Unlike Abu Ghraib, these are moving 
images: smartphone video and CCTV footage that captures the processes of 
shackling, tear- gassing, beating, and so on in time and motion. The handheld 
footage is rich in affect in different ways: the rapid movements of bodies, 
excited voices, the camera at times tilting unsteadily away from the action to 
focus on walls and floors. In these aesthetics, what one witnesses is the 
intensity of excitement with which the eyewitness is affected. While this 
footage refigures the perpetrator as witness, much of the video is CCTV 
footage with the high, static point of view that lends such recordings a non- 
human dimension (Richardson, 2019). This surveillant quality of the image 
testimonies channels the affectivity of how they bear witness: their forceful-
ness in enabling viewers to become witnesses is bound up with the affects of 
impartiality and veracity that accumulate around the apparent objectivity of 
the CCTV camera as the mediating technology of the event.
 In our third illustration (Figure 14.3), affective witnessing enables the analysis 
of the formation of communities of witnessing. The selfie protest that circulated 
on social media under the hashtags #IWantToBreathe and #SuffocatingPrisoners 
started during a heatwave in Egypt in mid- May 2016 (Schankweiler, 2016). 
People posted selfies with a plastic bag pulled over their head, as a symbol of the 
inhumane conditions in the country’s prisons that have no air conditioning. 
Figure 14.2  Dylan Voller, an Aboriginal man held at Don Dale Youth Detention 
Centre, still from “Australia’s Shame” broadcast on July 25, 2017, 
Four Corners, Australian Broadcasting Corporation.
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This staging immediately recalls torture and the images of the torture scandal in 
Abu Ghraib. At the same time, this body- related protest symbol is a means of 
increasing the images’ affective dynamics. They stimulate discomfort that appears 
to be bodily transmitted when viewed. Yet, the affective dynamics at play cannot 
solely be explained by this, it is in part their relation to the Abu Ghraib images 
and genealogies of other torture images that accounts for and shapes their affectiv-
ity. As a practice and politics of affecting, selfie protests are a very specific form of 
testimony in social networks. The persons taking part in such campaigns are not 
necessarily eyewitnesses of the injustices they are revolting against. They are 
defending the rights of others (and their own) by presenting their bodies as a kind 
of testimony. These image testimonies are then shared to connect with others and 
produce feelings of communality and solidarity. Yet people might take part for 
very different reasons, out of various contexts, attitudes, and political convictions. 
Thus, the selfie protests above all bear witness to the participants being affected. It 
is affect that constitutes belonging to a community of protest as an affective com-
munity (→ affective community). Witnessing, especially when unfolding on social 
media, needs to be defined as a collective and relational practice with the effect of 
forming these communities on the basis of affecting and being affected.
Future directions
Affective witnessing constitutes a significant revisioning of witnessing theory 
and, as such, opens up a number of important lines of inquiry. What might 
be revealed in the comparative analysis of different modes, forms, and 
arrangements of affect that emerge, change, and recede in witnessing? What 
relationship might there be between political action and witnessing com-
munities? To what extent is it possible to bear witness to events that never 
took place yet are affectively experienced? And what, in turn, might affective 
Figure 14.3  Examples from the selfie protest #IWantToBreathe, 2016. Retrieved 
from: www.facebook.com/hashtag/iwanttobreathe?source=feed_text& 
story_id=1790210647868506 [June 2, 2016].
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witnessing tell us about the affect studies and affect theory more generally? 
While this short account offers little space to pursue these and other ques-
tions, some gestures toward key lines of inquiry are possible.
 As has been argued, image practices and politics in social media have 
significantly intensified the affective dynamics of image testimonies that are 
circulated in “real time” on Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and the like. The 
role of these new “mediators” of witnessing is not yet explored. Likewise, the 
specific aesthetic qualities of image testimonies that most matter for experi-
encing and for processes of affecting are another field of potential investiga-
tion (Schankweiler, 2019). New technologies and possibilities of circulating 
testimonies also seems to topple one of the foundations of witnessing and of 
establishing credibility and trust: the identifiable human witness who presents 
her/himself to others. On social media, many testimonies are anonymous, 
and the ones bearing witness are not even visible, they are behind the camera, 
not in front. It is not yet understood what this means for witnessing.
 In addition, affective witnessing also offers the potential for nuanced 
examination of the relationship between material objects and witnessing. At 
issue here is whether non- human objects bear witness or if objects can only 
ever have the status of evidence. If, as much testimony theory insists, witness-
ing is confined to the human and merely mediated by various technologies, 
then autonomous and semi- autonomous technologies (drones, remote 
sensors, artificial intelligence software) are simply vehicles – mediators – of 
events and not themselves witnesses. Yet if what constitutes the body – any 
body – is the capacity to affect and be affected, to be webbed in relation to 
other bodies and to experience the world as it changes, then perhaps non- 
human objects can become bodies that bear witness.
 Finally, affective witnessing contributes a deeper understanding of the polit-
ical dimensions of affect to the wider field of affect studies. In revising witness-
ing theory to account for the relational and affective, it brings the question of 
affect itself into some of the essential questions of political theory regarding 
issues of responsibility, ethics, action, and truth. In doing so, it demonstrates 
that the politics of affect are neither marginal nor absent from affect itself. 
Rather, affect is in fact intrinsic to the political and to figures, practices, and 
processes out of which political theories, orders, and institutions are formed.
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Chapter 15
Writing affect
Anne Fleig
To think of “writing” as a key concept of affective societies means to think of 
writing as an affective practice that unfolds between writer and written text. 
From this perspective, affect is embedded within writing as a dynamic and 
relational process between actors and a highly complex framework of lin-
guistic norms and rules, different types of texts, and their readership. This 
process is reciprocal, and involves the activity of speaking and writing as well 
as the bodily dimension of both writing and language. The affectivity of 
written language forms the body and vice versa. In this sense, “writing affect” 
always has to be understood as “affective writing.” This conceptualization of 
affect counters the strong notion of representation in literary studies; affect is 
not simply a result of writing, but rather, part of the writing process itself.
 Writing – and particularly literary writing – has historically been both a 
bodily activity and a concept. Writing is a material form of “doing” embed-
ded in certain social and cultural patterns, a formative process of subjectiva-
tion, and sometimes even a way of life (Sigmund, 2014). Within 
enlightenment discourse, it is a concept that emphasizes the primacy of the 
written text and the modern author. Writing is thus a “doing” that is 
informed by historical discourses (Schatzki, 2017).
 The concept of writing is affectively charged for several reasons, not least 
because of its importance within literary history and the processes of canoni-
zation and standardization. In particular, it is strongly inflected by gender bias; 
beginning with the emergence of modern authorship since the 18th century, 
writing has been shaped by notions of male originality and uniqueness 
(Koschorke, 2003; Kittler, 2003). Additionally, it contributes to the notion of 
a pure and standardized written language and the emergence of the monolin-
gual paradigm around 1800, itself a gendered discourse (Yildiz, 2012). Since 
this period, literary writing has relied on the idea of possessing one true lan-
guage, the so- called mother tongue that is supposed to express and represent 
affect and emotions authentically.
 Although this chapter cannot elaborate on the history of writing in more 
detail, it is important to note that analyzing “writing” as a key concept 
of affective societies requires an awareness of its entanglement in a number of 
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fields, ranging from education, schooling, bodily techniques, and conceptions 
of spoken and written language, to the invention of monolingualism 
(Gramling, 2016) and other processes of standardization. All these institutions, 
techniques, and processes provide the groundwork for modern literature, the 
rise of the public sphere, and the modern nation state, and form a key part of 
the historical, social, and normative framework in which writing as an affec-
tive practice is situated.
State of research and related concepts
While there is extensive research on the history and techniques of writing in 
literary and cultural studies (Campe, 1991; Stingelin, 2004; Zanetti, 2012), 
only a few studies have addressed writing within the field of affect studies. 
Writing in the making is difficult to analyze, and literary critics tend to deal 
with a written text without interrogating its bodily dimensions. In German 
literary studies in particular, there is almost no research on affect studies. 
However, the last two decades have seen an evolving debate on the “affect of 
language” (Riley, 2005) and the relationship between affect and language 
driven by feminist and queer theoretical approaches to performativity 
(Sedgwick, 2003; Berlant, 2011). These works have substantially influenced 
scholarship that seeks to integrate affect and language (Fleig & Lüthjohann, in 
press) as well as affect and narrativity (Breger, 2017), even as the search for 
affect in literary studies has so far mostly drawn attention to textual repres-
entation. Such approaches in literary studies operate within the broader 
framework of New Historicist thinking of affect in terms of discourse, 
wherein literature is a particular kind of discourse. This interpretive approach 
to affect reproduces the simplistic divide between textual representation and 
reality while dismissing affect in spoken and written language. But, as Heather 
Love (2013) has provocatively stated, New Historicism has “run its course” 
(p. 402), and thus there is new room to think of the relationship between 
affect, language, and writing in touch with the “real.” This may entail, for 
instance, studying these relations in their social and cultural contexts and with 
regard to the historical conditions of their production, and analyzing literary 
writing and literary texts as affective and social practices. Further research on 
“writing affect” could thus profit from two different theoretical approaches. 
The first relates to affect theory, the second to practice theory. Both allow for 
processual thinking. However, neither provides a profound conceptualization 
of language beyond discourse.
 Affect is the dynamic relationship between bodies, including the inter-
weaving of bodily memories, words, and worlds. In writing, affect unfolds 
between the writer’s body and the written text. In the Spinozan/Deleuzian 
branch of affect theory, this movement is dual: it is formative of and trans-
formative for the writer, as well as the process itself (Slaby & Röttger-
Rössler, 2018). If affect is always about “affecting and being affected,” 
180  Anne Fleig
writing affect is about writing and being written. Literary writing in 
particular therefore demands “an involvement that may go so far as to chal-
lenge the fixity of our own bodily limits” (Gibbs, 2006, p. 159). Affect not 
only forms part of the process of writing, but might even change and 
transgress it in moments of flow in which body and word as well as cor-
responding words find each other.
 Thinking of writing in terms of change and transformation raises the con-
troversial question of how affect and language are related to each other. 
While language occurs in speaking and writing, writing transforms different 
genres of speech into texts. Because of the bodily dimension of both speaking 
and writing, and their dialogic relationship in what literary theorist Mikhail 
Bakhtin (1981b) calls a “speech situation,” this process of transformation is 
reciprocal. According to Bakhtin, language is a social phenomenon that has 
no “author.” Rather, it unfolds in a dialogic manner between the writer’s 
body and the written text, which speaks in different genres and voices, and in 
which the writer’s voice is one amongst many. Words and sentences are thus 
not only conventional, but also individual in their specific context. With 
regard to affect, this holds true for the concrete material as well as the discur-
sive level of writing. Still, as Theodore Schatzki (2017) has recently pointed 
out, we must attend to how relationships and transmissions between practices 
and discourse are organized (p. 129).
 Given the dearth of research on the relations between and within affect 
and language, it does not come as a surprise that scholarship on the topic ini-
tially emerged from a field between theory and creative writing (Gibbs, 2006) 
as well as from writing as a concrete strategy for affect analysis (Knudsen & 
Stage, 2015). In this context, Anna Gibbs highlights writing as a relational 
and dialogic process. According to Gibbs (2015), affective writing as a method 
in academia refers “to the process of making sense of the research” (p. 222). 
Crucially, “making” – or “doing” in terms of practice theory – transforms a 
situation and operates directly on the body (Gibbs, 2006). This means that 
writing is not only a way of representation after the research is done, but is a 
central part of the research process itself (Gibbs, 2015, p. 222).
 Gibbs’ concept of writing allows us to think beyond performativity to 
interactivity (cf. Gibbs, 2006). It emphasizes the active act of listening to the 
voices of others, and interrogates the preconceptions of the researcher and 
her theory (Gibbs, 2015, p. 223). As Gibbs is exploring writing as a method 
of research, much of her approach could be transferred to literary writing, 
too. Two aspects are crucial to this approach: First, the underlying concept of 
relationality, and second, the notion of forming the result through the very 
act of writing. Writing has to be understood as a process which is “implicitly 
dialogical, in conversation with the world, other writing, and reflexively, 
with itself ” (Gibbs, 2015, p. 224). Writing therefore highlights resonances 
between text and world and between text and “rhythmic orality as traces of 
bodies in texts” (Knudsen & Stage, 2015, p. 18), but should not be reduced 
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to the primacy and representation of the human voice. Rather, it has to be 
conceptualized as a performative engagement that echoes listening and 
reading in moving between spoken and written registers. Writing is “a 
process in which subjectivity continually risks itself, finds itself, loses itself, 
and makes itself in its dialogic relations with the world to which it attunes” 
(Gibbs, 2015, p. 227).
 Following Gibbs, and re- reading approaches of affect theory, Michael 
Richardson (2016) argues that writing is an affective process “in which words 
resonate with the writing body” (p. 21); it “entails the experience of affect as 
well as its expression” (p. 21). Expression must thus be understood as a move-
ment and exposure of the writing body, not solely as a form of representa-
tion. Citing Brian Massumi, Richardson (2013) argues for a concept of 
semblance, rather than representation, that enables literature to speak beyond 
words (pp. 156, 165).
 At this point, however, it is important to recognize that Richardson’s 
work belongs to the field of trauma studies that is complexly related to prob-
lems of representation. Trauma is an important concern within affect studies 
and vis- à-vis writing. This includes the problem of dealing with an experi-
ence so horrific that words are inadequate to describe it (Gibbs, 2013, p. 133). 
Writing trauma as a gesture of testimony (Richardson, 2016) simultaneously 
reaffirms and rejects the limits of language. Richardson’s approach runs the 
risk of positing language as the “other” of that to which it only can refer, thus 
reproducing the divide of representation and real experience, since trauma 
signals the impossibility of narration (Assmann, 1999, p. 264). For this reason, 
writing trauma provides a limited perspective on writing affect. For instance, 
the affectivity of ruptures as bodily gestures plays an important role in writing 
trauma. While these gestures interrupt processes of narration, they underscore 
an idea of representation emerging from a body’s “inner voice,” while 
neglecting the performativity of language and writing themselves. Instead, we 
must think of writing affect in circulation, condensation, repetition, rhythm, 
or the emergence of sound in writing as a process that covers both the mate-
riality of language in writing as well as its textual representation.
 From this perspective, language in writing could be conceptualized as a 
dynamic practice, which is always entangled with other social interactions. 
This shift in attention can be located within the framework of integrative 
practice theory. The turn toward writing as a practice neither privileges the 
agency of the autonomous authorial subject, as in much of traditional phi-
lology, nor the structuring forces of discursive orders or the literary field, as 
in many structuralist and New Historicist approaches. Instead, it provides a 
dual focus that emphasizes both the embodiment and materiality of all 
forms of “doings” that organize and modulate affectivity in certain ways 
(Reckwitz, 2017). In this respect, practice theory helps to foreground the 
aesthetic, bodily, and performative qualities of writing and literary texts and 
put them at the center of philological inquiry. As an approach that is 
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deliberately “thin” and does not include a grand theory of society, practice 
theory shares an empirical openness with affect studies, as well as the 
assumption that social structures cannot exhaustively explain the specific 
forms of writing and literary texts. However, thinking relational affect 
always implies an inquiry into concrete practices that are situated in histor-
ical frameworks of norms and rules.
 The notion of practice clearly stresses the historical relationality of affect, 
and counters the tendency to think of it as something pre- social or ahistorical. 
This social entanglement of writing, however, is not to be understood in 
abstract terms, for instance, in terms of a “symbolic order,” but, as initially 
noted, in terms of a network of discursive and non- discursive practices such 
as language acquisition, education, schooling, publishing, and so forth. Here, 
power relations like the hierarchy of gender and the monolingual paradigm 
saturate the practice of writing, but do not determine it in a mono- causal 
way. Thinking of writing as an affective practice allows us to analyze it as a 
dynamic and relational process of transformation that is not only entangled in 
the dynamics of the lifeworld, but forms an active part of it. Furthermore, its 
dialogic and interactive character constitutes a “feedback process” (Gibbs, 
2006, p. 162) that is closely related to the material dimension of language, 
sound and rhythm, and circulation and repetition.
Examples from research and future perspectives
Research on writing affect, especially in literary studies, is still in its infancy. 
Examining the inseparable relations between affect, language, and writing as 
dynamic and dialogic remains a substantial challenge. Against the notion of a 
full “autonomy of affect” (Massumi, 1995), language is by no means only a 
system of normalization, regulation, or standardization. Language and affect 
are not mutually exclusive, but should be conceived of in their entanglements 
such that the constitutive role of embodiment, materiality, and performativity 
can be taken into account. The same holds true for the relationship between 
affect and literary form, or rather, the “form of the affects” (Brinkema, 2014). 
Further research in literary studies should therefore embrace a dual agenda. It 
should elaborate on the development of affect and practice theory with regard 
to language and writing to move beyond discourse. Simultaneously, it should 
continue performing analyses of literary texts with regard to form, genre, 
themes and motives, figures of speech, narrative perspectives, and concepts of 
authorship. This perspective might open up a rather new combination of 
“thin” and “thick” approaches to language, in which writing and form coa-
lesce into affective practices over time, particularly within literary history.
 Highlighting the pragmatic and performative dimensions of language 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) and following the literary theory of Bakhtin 
(1981b, 1986), written texts are therefore neither to be understood as arbit-
rary systems of signification nor as cultural discourse. In the literary works of 
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Heinrich von Kleist, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, James Joyce, Virginia Woolf, 
Robert Musil, J. M. Coetzee, Elfriede Jelinek, Emine Sevgi Özdamar, or 
Yoko Tawada – to name just a few – we can find exciting and often agonistic 
forces of encounter within language and between language and writing. They 
take shape in grammar and syntax, in rhythm and rhyme, in the intensity of 
bodily gestures, as in the writings of Kleist (Gumbrecht & Knüpling, 2014), 
or in moving and translating between languages, tropes, and metaphors, as in 
Özdamar’s writing (Martyn, 2005). With regard to writing affect, we must 
therefore not only ask the performative question “How to do things with 
words?” but also “How to do words with affect?” Writing can thus be seen as 
a dialogical mode of doing things with words and as a process that unfolds in 
an assemblage of affective speech genres (Fleig & Lüthjohann, in press).
 Thinking of writing in terms of performativity questions not only the 
affect vs. language opposition, but also the narratological divide of author and 
text. According to Bakhtin, writing must be understood as a dynamic process 
between language as phenomenon of everyday life on the one hand, and 
individual utterances on the other. Further research on writing affect must 
therefore develop non- sovereign concepts of authorship as well as dissolve 
the dichotomy between narratology and performativity (Breger, 2012). 
Emphasizing writing means analyzing and reading words and texts in indi-
vidual works, even if there is no “author” of language and not only one lan-
guage. Bakhtin conceptualizes this type of relationality as a dialogic one: an 
utterance follows another word and is thus always entangled in a speech situ-
ation. In this mode of communication, words and sentences as well as whole 
utterances affect each other and form a process of articulation which cannot 
be reduced to the level of “purely” semantic signification (Acker, Fleig, & 
Lüthjohann, in press). Rather, this process could be described in terms of 
affective relationality that connects written text and world.
 Further research on writing as an affective practice might keep in mind what 
Bakhtin calls “heteroglossia”: “The authentic environment of an utterance, the 
environment in which it lives and takes shape, is dialogized heteroglossia, 
anonymous and social as language, but simultaneously concrete, filled with spe-
cific content and accented as an individual utterance” (Bakhtin, 1981b, p. 272). 
Bakhtin not only relates every utterance to its concrete environment, but also 
stresses dialogism as a structuring affective force. Therefore, the concept of het-
eroglossia is an excellent starting point to think of several differences, for 
instance, the difference between spoken and more standardized written lan-
guage, or between accent and the lack thereof as exemplified in the writings of 
Tawada, where accent is “the face of spoken language” (in the German original: 
“das Gesicht der gesprochenen Sprache”; Tawada, 2016, p. 22). Tawada’s text 
reflects the difference between writing’s own “accentlessness” and the pronun-
ciation and articulation of speech, thus questioning the norm of monolingualism 
in both the productive and political sense of affective dissonance (Acker, Fleig, 
& Lüthjohann, in press). Inseparably linked to this critical view are differences 
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of gender and genre in writing and challenges to the relations between mono- 
and translingualism as explored by different women writers (Hausbacher & 
Gürtler, 2012) dating back to the emergence of modern authorship in the 18th 
century.
 According to Bakhtin’s concept of the chronotope (Bakhtin, 1981a), the 
affective structures of time and space in different genres also open up further 
perspectives for research. The specific relationship between time and space 
structures different dimensions of literary texts. It produces a literary setting, 
but it also shapes bodies, affects, feelings, memories, and words, as well as 
their circulation in their respective social and cultural contexts (Fleig, in 
press). In addition, this relationship also encompasses the relationship between 
writer and written text, as well as that of both to the readership of the text. 
Finally, the affectivity of rhythm and repetition in literary texts clearly corres-
ponds with the technique of writing itself. Writing is learned and repeated 
through training on the one hand, and sedimentations of time and space in 
the dialogism of language on the other. This is reflected, for instance, in the 
literary works of Musil and Jelinek. Both provide an affective structure that 
lays the foundation for the dynamic processes of writing affect and affective 
writing.
 Bringing affect into literary studies and including historicity as well as the 
continual dynamism of language and writing opens up new paths for both lit-
erary analysis and theoretical perspectives. Combining affect and practice 
theory emphasizes processual thinking and the bodily dimensions of literature 
that take shape in interactive dialogue within every single utterance. This 
theoretical approach to affect might help future literary studies come alive.
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Part III
Resonances and 
repertoires

Chapter 16
Affective resonance
Rainer Mühlhoff
Affective resonance is a type of relational dynamics of affecting and being 
affected, characterized as a process of reciprocal modulation between interact-
ants. Resonance is a relational and processual phenomenon. It is neither a 
singular affective “state” nor a one- sided transmission of affect, such as in 
contagion, but arises through a complex interplay between the affective dis-
positions (→ affective disposition) of multiple individuals and contextual factors 
within an affective arrangement (→ affective arrangement). Here, active and 
receptive affects are in a permanent coupling that cannot be explained as a 
chain of unilateral actions (A affects B, then B affects A and so on). Reson-
ance thus differs from echoing and mirroring because it creates its own affec-
tive quality in a “non- linear” interplay of the affective dispositions of all 
individuals involved.
 Phenomenologically, and from the first- person perspective, resonance is 
primarily intensive or force- like (“gripping,” “carrying away,” “explosive,” 
and so forth). Affective resonance is a subtle and ephemeral phenomenon that 
pervades most face- to-face social interaction. The concept is geared primarily 
toward explaining dyadic and small group interactions rather than masses and 
large- scale affective dynamics, although mass affects can also be seen as an 
example of resonance. Elementary cases are the mutual modulation of facial 
expressions and gestures, or of melody, intonation, and accent during a con-
versation or in a persistent relationship. By conceptualizing these examples as 
cases of affective resonance, one can see that the affective coupling mutually 
transforms partners in an interaction, making resonance more than mere con-
tagion or the synchronization of affective states. Since resonance is a dynamic 
coupling at the causal level of affecting and being affected, the affects in 
which a dynamic of resonance manifests “on the surface” for different indi-
viduals do not necessarily resemble each other, though they are jointly co- 
created and shaped by relational interplay.
 Resonance is thus characterized by a fundamental reciprocity at the level 
of the causality of affect. However, this does not imply that this dynamic is 
symmetrical when it comes to resulting affects. This has important systematic 
consequences, as resonance can then also manifest as asymmetric or 
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1 Stern was directly received in affect studies and philosophy, see Gibbs (2010), Guattari 
(1992/1995), and Wetherell (2012).
complementary affective entrainment between individuals, such as the 
dynamic constitution of different “affective roles” in group dynamics or 
asymmetric but dynamically stabilized patterns in couples. From a social 
theory perspective, affective resonance can therefore be used to explain the 
dynamic emergence of micro- social patterns and differentiated affective roles, 
as well as subtle, non- repressive but modulating forms of power relations in 
small groups, such as families or work teams. This, generally, makes reson-
ance an ambivalent phenomenon, such that striving for resonance per se is 
neither a political maxim nor an ethical ideal.
Example: “affect attunement”
Paradigmatic examples of affective resonance can be found in empirical 
studies of the infant–caregiver dyad. In particular, the concepts of “vitality 
affects” and “affect attunement” coined by the American developmental psy-
chologist Daniel Stern (1985/2000) are precursors of the philosophical 
concept of affective resonance proposed here.1 Stern starts from the hypo-
thesis that infants in their first weeks cannot distinguish different things, such 
as objects, persons, colors, or shapes. They are also unable to read affective 
expressions such as joy, fear, sadness, disgust, and so forth, but rather experi-
ence temporal contours, rhythmic patterns, and gradients of intensity that can 
underlie all sorts of actions, gestures, mimicry, or tactile sensations. Distin-
guishing them from “categorical affects,” Stern terms these dynamical qual-
ities “vitality affects.” As contours of intensity, they are best described in 
“terms such as ‘surging,’ ‘fading away,’ ‘fleeting,’ ‘explosive,’ ‘crescendo,’ 
‘decrescendo,’ ‘bursting;’ ‘drawn out,’ and so on” (Stern, 1985/2000, p. 54).
 Based on this, Stern also shows that there are reciprocal processes of affect-
ing and being affected that take place solely in the register of vitality affects. 
Stern observes such dynamics between infants at the age of nine months and 
their caregivers and calls these “affect attunement” (Stern, 1985/2000, 
pp. 138–161). As a form of “intersubjective sharing of affect” (Stern, 
1985/2000, p. 141), affect attunement operates as a matching of temporal 
patterns and contours of intensity, but is different from mere imitation, as it 
does not show perfect symmetry or “mirroring.” Affect attunement is not just 
about copying the child’s vitality affects, but about integrating one’s own 
affects into a dynamic of mutual attunement which then creates a new, shared 
affective experience.
 It is this idea of a dynamically and inter- affectively co- constituted quality of 
being- in-relation that makes affect attunement an example of affective reson-
ance. Stern’s affect attunement (1) is a truly bi- directional coupling, (2) it con-
stitutes an experiential quality of its own, and (3) is experienced immediately 
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as force- like dynamics, not as categorical affects; hence it shares all structural 
properties of resonance. Moreover, according to Stern, the specific capacity of 
affect attunement is acquired around the age of nine months and is never lost 
again. It is active even in adult life, though not always consciously, so that 
affect attunement underlies all kinds of daily interactions between adults. In 
fact, the disposition to engage in affect attunement constitutes a fundamental 
domain of social relatedness. This ultimately provides a central insight into the 
relevance of affective resonance for the genesis of subjectivity (see Guattari, 
1992/1995; Mühlhoff, 2018).
Origin of resonance in classical physics
The concept of resonance has its origins in the physics of mechanical and 
acoustic vibrations, where it describes a particular phenomenon in the inter-
play of multiple oscillating systems. A detailed look at some of these physical 
phenomena will reveal three features of the concept of resonance, which also 
apply in the realm of affectivity. Resonance in classical mechanics refers to 
the fundamental observation that the degree to which an oscillatory system 
can be induced to oscillate by coupling to another oscillating system is highly 
sensitive to the frequency of that other system (Tipler, 1999; Morse, 1948). 
For example, the extent to which a child on a playground swing can be made 
to swing depends on the frequency of the periodic pushes exerted by another 
person or by the child’s own legs. Simple systems usually have one specific 
frequency, called resonance frequency, at which it can much easier be 
induced to oscillate than at other frequencies. In resonance, the coupled 
system hits precisely that frequency. Resonance is thus a very specific and 
selective case of interaction in which the least effort has the greatest effect in 
terms of induced vibration.
 The most interesting cases of resonance occur when multiple oscillating 
systems are coupled to form, as a whole, a new dynamic system. Such com-
posite systems can enter a state of (internal) resonance, which mutually mod-
ulates the oscillations of each subsystem. This is the case, for example, with 
the three Jupiter moons Ganymede, Europa, and Io, which, in terms of their 
rotation around the planet, are in a state of “orbit- orbit resonance,” as it is 
called in celestial mechanics (Murray & Dermott, 1999, p. 9; see also 
Mühlhoff, 2015, 2018). Empirical observation shows that Io turns exactly 
four times, Europa two times faster than Ganymede. These exact integer 
ratios deviate from what is obtained when the individual rotation frequency 
of each moon is calculated using Newton’s law of gravitation. In reality, 
moons do not rotate individually around the planet, but influence each other 
through their reciprocal gravitational forces. They are in relations of mutual 
affecting and being affected by one another that are perfectly simultaneous 
with respect to activity and passivity. This entanglement of moving and 
being- moved in relation causes the moons to mutually modulate each other 
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in their rotational frequencies. This is a phenomenon of resonance, and inter-
estingly, it is a case where resonance does not result in identical motions 
because the frequencies of the moons remain different.
 As it turns out, the solar system is full of such rotational resonance cou-
plings, and that makes it dynamically stable. Through orbital resonance, the 
various rotational objects jointly establish a dynamic in which each of them 
behaves somewhat differently than in the case without interaction (“individu-
alistic case”). But in turn, this dynamic being- in-relation, as a whole, is mutu-
ally stabilizing in the sense that it can withstand minor a- periodic 
perturbations, such as asteroids and comets passing by. This example shows 
how resonance in classical physics describes a joint dynamic of elastically 
coupled sub- components that is only apparent as a whole.2 In resonance, 
these sub- components are held together in an interplay of moving and being- 
moved, that is, of dynamically constituted mutual forces that unite the indi-
vidual objects or systems in a joint motion, thereby constituting a new quality 
of relational stability. This suggests that resonance is more than a mere correl-
ation or synchrony of temporal patterns that can be observed from an external 
perspective. The core of resonance is that it is a dynamic of inherent forces 
that can only be directly experienced in the immanence of its interplay. In 
resonance, each of the moons is, as it were, slightly in the grip of the other 
moons.
 In putting the concept of resonance to use in affect theory, I do not mean 
to describe dynamics of affect as physical phenomena. Rather, the philo-
sophical and affect theoretical concept of resonance can be obtained by trans-
posing the physical concept into the domain of an affect theoretical ontology. 
This is to say that affective resonance and physical resonance share some key 
structural properties. These structural properties are: (1) Resonance is based 
on a simultaneity of affecting and being affected, which prevents the decom-
position of the process into chains of unilateral impacts. (2) Resonance is an 
inherent dynamic of forces and causal couplings, as opposed to an external 
observation of correlations. (3) Resonance constitutes a dynamic quality that 
is more than the sum of individual contributions and thus pertains to the 
whole (cf. Mühlhoff, 2015, 2018).
Systematic elaboration: thinking resonance in a 
Spinozan ontology
The concept of affective resonance can be developed in the framework of a 
Spinozan ontology of affect (see Spinoza, 1677/1985), of which two aspects 
are particularly relevant. First, affect for Spinoza is an ontological principle; 
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every individual (modus) is constituted only through affective relations 
(→ affect). Second, affect implies an entanglement of affecting and being 
affected in which active and receptive roles cannot be separated. Under the 
name of potentia, Spinoza moreover attributes a specific capacity to affect and 
be affected to each individual. This potentia is a product of past relations of 
affecting and being affected and acts in the present context as a set of poten-
tials, which is why I refer to the potentia as the affective disposition (→ affective 
disposition) of an individual.
 In this setup, the concept of resonance can be formalized by looking into 
the question of what kind of dynamic unfolding could arise when two or 
more individuals with their specific affective dispositions are co- present in a 
given situation. To this end, I will use a specifically dynamic reading of the 
Spinozan ontology obtained in connection with ideas from Gilles Deleuze 
and Henri Bergson. “Dynamic” means that a concept of forces is introduced 
that is ontologically primary to states and statically individuated forms. Dis-
cussing affective dynamics instead of just processes of affecting and being affected 
emphasizes that these processes are essentially an unfolding of relational forces 
and not just sequences of transitional states.3 Resonance is a dynamic concept 
as in the perspective of the individual, it is experienced immediately as a 
force- like entanglement of moving other(s) and being moved by other(s); it is 
a movement- in-relation which is only partly under my control. In the 
unfolding of resonance, I contribute to a group dynamic, and at the same 
time, I am gripped by it. The dynamic acts on me, it makes me move – not 
in an externally determined way, but in my own way – and thereby it gets 
enacted and carried further by me. Although the affects of each individual 
may be different, the affective quality of being- in-resonance is not a com-
posite of individual affective states, but something that happens between 
individuals.
 To account for this, an ontology of differential forces can be imported into 
the Spinozan ontology of affect. For this purpose, the concepts of “virtuality” 
and “actualization” known from Bergson and Deleuze are particularly useful 
(cf. Deleuze 1966/1991, 1968/1994). For Deleuze, the virtual is an onto-
logical register of pure forces or “differential elements.” These forces are 
ontologically preceding the actual forms they could bring about in processes 
of their unfolding (see Deleuze, 1966/1991, pp. 94–103; Deleuze, 
1968/1994, pp. 208–214). The conceptual opposite of the virtual is the 
“possible,” because both concepts are connected to different notions of 
processuality. A possibility undergoes the process of a “realization,” which 
194  Rainer Mühlhoff
4 Gilbert Simondon (2009), too, has a concept of (internal) resonance that has strong similar-
ities to the one developed here. However, there is some dispute over how compatible 
Simondon’s thinking is with the immanent philosophy of Spinoza, see Del Lucchese (2009, 
p. 182) and Mühlhoff (2018, pp. 134–150).
Deleuze characterizes as a “brute eruption” or a “leap” from non- existence to 
existence (Deleuze, 1968/1994, p. 211). It is thus a process that limits that 
which arises to a resemblance to what is logically pre- conceivable as a possib-
ility. The virtual, on the other hand, undergoes a process of “actualization” 
reminiscent of how a force performs work in physics. Instead of instantiating 
resemblance to a possibility, actualization is an open process that creates its 
own path of action and is productive in its unfolding (Deleuze, 1966/1991, 
p. 97). Unlike a possibility, a virtuality does not come with a preconceived 
directedness to a target point of its process of actualization. Thus, considering 
the dynamic forces of resonance as virtual allows us to locate them in an 
ontological register that is independent of the manifest affective qualities 
through which they appear “on the surface.”
 As already mentioned, the forces that drive resonance result from the affec-
tive dispositions of individuals, that is, from their capacities to affect and be 
affected in the immanence of a given affective arrangement (→ affective disposi-
tion). It is crucial that Spinoza’s concept of potentia, on which the concept of 
affective disposition is based, refers to relational embedding. That is, an individ-
ual’s capacity to affect and be affected depends not only on past relations, but 
also on present relational configurations. Hence, this capacity must be conceived 
of as a virtuality, as it does not contain the actual affective contours in which it 
unfolds. In light of these theoretical considerations, resonance is (1) a dynamic 
of relational forces, and as such is rooted in a virtual register of being- in-relation; 
(2) these forces result from the affective dispositions of the individuals involved; 
and (3) the actual affective qualities in which this dynamic of forces results are 
not pre- conceivable from the mere sum of individual traits, but result from a 
non- linear interplay of forces in an open process. Resonance is thus a process of 
actualization in a relational field of potentials to affect and be affected that is 
jointly constituted based on the affective dispositions of individuals in an affec-
tive arrangement (see Mühlhoff, 2018).4
Resonance and dissonance
As we have seen, in a process of resonance, the affective power (potentia) or 
disposition of an individual manifests in a specific way. The term “specific” is 
intended to indicate that it depends on the constellation of resonance and 
thus on all other individuals and the surrounding affective arrangement; how 
exactly the potentia of a particular individual can unfold in it. Therefore, 
resonance is a process of modulation that transforms everyone and everything 
to some extent, by amplifying some aspects of their disposition and weakening 
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others, thereby creating something new. Building on this idea, we can now 
introduce further differentiation by taking into account that in Spinozism 
affects are always evaluated according to whether an individual’s power to act 
is “increased or diminished, aided or restrained” (Spinoza, 1677/1985, part III, 
def. 3). A dynamic of resonance that modulates the individual will always 
partially increase and partially weaken one’s potentia. Nevertheless, one can 
identify the special case of an overall restraining and weakening dynamic of 
resonance. This case can be referred to as dissonance: Dissonance is the sub- 
case of resonance in which the virtual force field is experienced as aversive, 
divisive, destabilizing, or even explosive and destructive. Moreover, one 
could now juxtapose this concept of dissonance to a more narrowly con-
ceived concept of amplifying resonance, which would refer to a case in which 
the reciprocal amplification of the potentia of all individuals clearly 
predominates.
Related concepts in affect studies
A variety of concepts have been used in affect studies and other disciplines to 
describe the relational dynamics of affect. In the following, I will touch on 
some of them to briefly point out similarities and dissimilarities to the pro-
posed concept of affective resonance.
 A first group concerns concepts of affect transmission, including emotional/
affective contagion and suggestion (see Le Bon, 1895; Gibbs, 2010; Tarde, 
1890; and for a historical analysis, Blackman, 2012) as well as the trans-
mission of affects by means of “chemical and nervous entrainment” 
(Brennan, 2004, p. 49). These concepts tend to evoke the idea of one- way 
transmissions. “Contagion” comes with a strong connotation of a split 
between active and passive roles, where the passive individual is haunted, 
hit, or infiltrated from outside by an active affective influence. The seman-
tics of contagion and transmission suggests that the result of this process is a 
synchronizing “copy” of the affective state of the “sender” in the 
“receiver.” In addition, the concept of circulation of affect, which has been 
used by a number of scholars (Ahmed, 2004a, 2004b; Clough, 2007; cf. 
Blackman, 2012; Wetherell, 2012), similarly connotes a one- directional 
mechanism underlying the circular movement of affects. In particular, this 
is the case when affect is conceived as a state into which an individual can 
or cannot enter. If what causes such states is transmission of affects, then 
circulation is only a more elaborate form of transmission. As Margaret 
Wetherell puts it, “ ‘circulation’ suffers from similar problems if it implies 
that affect is an ethereal, floating entity, simply ‘landing’ on people” 
(Wetherell, 2012, p. 141). The concept of resonance, in contrast, aims to 
focus on the reciprocity of causal processes, such that the resulting qualities 
of affect are bi- directionally co- constituted, while potentially manifesting 
in complementary and a- synchronic forms.
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 A second group of related concepts is comprised of various notions of 
emotional and affective atmospheres (see Anderson, 2014; Böhme, 1993; 
Brennan, 2004; Latour, 2003; Schmitz, 2014; for an overview: Seyfert, 2011) 
(→ atmosphere). While the exact conceptions vary in detail across disciplinary 
and cultural boundaries, “atmosphere” tends to refer to a form of temporary 
organization of a field of heterogeneous elements and forces. In Anglophone 
discourse, the term is often used “vaguely and interchangeably with mood, 
feeling, ambience, tone and other ways of naming collective affects” 
(Anderson, 2014, p. 137). The German tradition deriving from phenomen-
ologist Hermann Schmitz often understands atmospheres more starkly as 
ethereal, non- localized entities that float through everyone and may even 
“wield authority over the entirety of bodies in a situation” (→ atmosphere). In 
this particular strand of thought, atmospheres are imbued with authority or 
dominance (“eine Atmosphäre herrscht”). Resonance also refers to a form of 
collective affect and thus shares its phenomenal scope with the more general 
understanding of atmospheres as mood or ambience. More specifically than 
that, however, affective resonance names a dynamic of multi- directional causal 
interaction from which this collective affect results and which is not necessarily 
present in all examples of affective atmospheres. Moreover, affective reson-
ance, like the concept of atmosphere in the German phenomenological tradi-
tion, can potentially be used to analyze structures of power and influence 
(Mühlhoff, 2018; Mühlhoff & Slaby, 2018). However, the structure of this 
form of influence is different, since one cannot say that resonance reigns over 
or dominates a situation (“es herrscht Resonanz”). Instead, resonance arises 
“bottom- up” and in an immanent interplay of a multitude of individuals. 
While atmosphere often comes with a connotation of embeddedness- in or 
exposition- to, resonance emerges as an inherent quality from a web of hori-
zontal relations in a potentially open milieu.
 A third group of related concepts is formed by the notions of imitation and 
mimesis, which are often used in affect studies and other areas (Blackman, 
2012; Bösel, 2014; Brennan, 2004; Gibbs, 2010; Seyfert, 2012; Thrift, 2008). 
In particular, those contributions that derive their concepts of imitation or 
mimesis from the work of Deleuze provide an elaborate understanding of 
mimesis as an intensive and constitutive process of joint becoming. Imitation 
is then not just a superficial simulation of identical shapes and contents, but 
deeply modulates and transforms the individual without making it identical to 
the imitated thing. If mimesis can be understood as process of mutual (that is, 
multi- directional) imitation, it resembles the concept of resonance in terms of 
causal reciprocity. At the level of forms, however, it differs from the concept 
of resonance, because mimesis and imitation are generally convergent or syn-
chronizing processes. Unlike resonance, imitation and mimesis do not cover 
cases of asymmetrical attunement of affective contours. Consequently, imita-
tion and mimesis could be considered as the synchronizing special case of 
affective resonance. Or, in other words, affective resonance could inform a 
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causal and affect theoretical approach to how mimesis operates. However, 
there are asynchronic, disruptive, and chaotic cases of resonance that are 
clearly beyond the phenomenal scope of mimesis and imitation.
Applications and outlook
Affective resonance as treated here takes place primarily in the bodily co- 
presence of individuals. Further investigations may clarify how resonance can 
be understood in the context of media techniques. Of course, affective reson-
ance also occurs in situations in which the individuals are not physically 
present but affect each other, for instance through a social medium. A crucial 
point here, however, would be to understand the medium not just as an 
amplifier and transmitter of affect which merely increases the range of local 
dynamics to a global scale. Rather, it must be assumed that the media have a 
specifically formative and constitutive role in the affects and affective reson-
ances made possible therein. Media create resonance spaces that can have 
their own technically and socially conditioned properties to enable reson-
ances, which could lead to completely new dynamics (the tradition in media 
theory that builds on Simondon seems particularly promising in this respect, 
cf. Hansen, 2001; Angerer, Bösel, & Ott, 2014). A related question is whether 
a variant of the concept of resonance can also be used for the situation of 
non- real-time media, for example, in the context of the reception of films or 
novels, where one cannot assert that affects are bilateral in the same way.
 The term resonance is often used metaphorically or even with a romantic 
connotation, for example, in the sense of a kind of longing, or an ethical ideal 
of striving for responsiveness and meaningful engagement with the world 
(see, for example, Rosa, 2016). In contrast, the concept of affective resonance 
proposed here is politically and ethically rather ambivalent. Affective reson-
ance is a micro- modality of power in social relations and affective arrange-
ments because it is a dynamic of mutual modulation and influence. This 
means that in resonance, the power (potentia) of an individual is increased, 
diminished, aided, or restrained in a certain way.
 The form of power that manifests itself in resonance, however, is weaker 
than a one- sided, instrumental, or hierarchical conception of power, such as 
in the tradition of Max Weber. It shares similarities with relational and pro-
ductive understandings of power in, for example, the works of Michel 
Foucault and Judith Butler. The concept of resonance can help broaden the 
understanding of the emergence of subjectivities, investigated as discursive 
subjectivation in the poststructuralist tradition, so that it encompasses the 
domain of affective relationality and affective subjectivation (Mühlhoff, 2018). 
Dynamics of resonance produce affective patterns and forms of relating that 
can sediment, as virtuality, in the affective disposition of individuals, thus 
becoming co- present in future relations of resonance. In this way, the role of 
affect attunement for the constitution of subjectivity, hitherto spoken of in 
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the context of developmental psychology (Stern, 1985/2000), can be 
extended to a social philosophy of affective subject constitution based on 
affective resonance, as Guattari (1992/1995) has suggested.
 The relevance of a particular mode of subjectivation – itself based on 
resonances within affective arrangements – for an analysis of power is evident, 
for example, in modern techniques of Human Resource Management 
(HRM). Certain working environments in the trend of the “new spirit of 
capitalism” (Boltanski & Chiapello, 1999/2007) use deliberately stimulated 
affective resonances to modulate their employees in a non- repressive way to 
“more productive” forms of mutual interaction (Mühlhoff & Slaby, 2018). 
While these new forms of collaboration – such as in startup culture and team-
work formations – are often subjectively rated as positive and empowering, 
the technologies of stimulating appropriate affective bonds between co- 
workers can easily be analyzed as subtle forms of coercion (Gregg, 2011) and 
governance.
 On the other hand, resonance can also contribute to the gradual and tacit 
emergence of empowering new forms of attachment and of intimate related-
ness, for instance in queer spaces and other subcultural movements. Often, 
spaces that are somewhat shielded from dominant affective patterns in a 
society allow for the emergence of such resonances which then, in turn, 
produce new social realities and life forms. This suggests that processes of 
empowerment and social transformation are not just based on deliberation 
and negotiation around external antagonisms and conflicts, but also on 
internal processes that often start from affective resonances in small groups 
and safe spaces. This spectrum of possible examples shows that affective reson-
ance is not itself good or bad, desirable or harmful. The term neither articu-
lates a political maxim nor an ethical ideal; rather, it is a concept that 
facilitates the analysis of the micro- social power of mutually affective 
modulation.
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Chapter 17
(P)reenactment
Adam Czirak, Sophie Nikoleit, 
Friederike Oberkrome, Verena Straub, 
Robert Walter- Jochum, and Michael Wetzels
In a narrow sense, reenactments can be understood as repetitions of past 
events within literature, media, art, and theater. The term derives from the 
field of historical didactics (Collingwood, 1946/1993), and refers to perform-
ances that aim to faithfully reproduce historical events and promise an authen-
tic re- experience. Recent scholarly endeavors, however, outline the fact that 
iterability always implies a shift toward the original event (Fischer- Lichte, 
2012; Schneider, 2011), which allows for new perspectives on these events to 
emerge and highlights their relevance for the present. Forms of reenactment 
operate through a specific (re)structuring of time: Drawing on knowledge of 
the past, they set up performances in the present to (re)construct and (re)live 
events in the face of a future to come. As indicated by the brackets, reenact-
ments, in contrast to other forms of repetition, do not solely historicize or 
actualize their topics, but generate temporal, spatial, and affective tension 
between the horizons of past and present. They can be described as perform-
ances of non- simultaneous simultaneity (Otto, 2015). Under preconditions of 
dynamic transformation, a reenactment can reevaluate its (historic) subject 
and produce varying meanings for the present as well as the future.
 Although reenactment has attracted substantial attention over the past years 
(Heeg et al., 2014; Roselt & Otto, 2012), it is only recently that scholars 
(Czirak et al., 2019; Kaiser, 2014; Marchart, 2014) and artists (e.g., Hofmann 
& Lindholm, Interrobang, or Friendly Fire) have begun to address the future- 
oriented dimension inherent in forms of reenactment. Many performances no 
longer deal with the revision or replication of a historic event but orient 
themselves toward an imagined future and set out to experiment with ficti-
tious time(s) and space(s). For example, in Interrobang’s experimental game 
Preenacting Europe (2011), the audience is encouraged to vote for new forms 
of European government. Taking as its starting point the current phenomena 
of social and political crisis across Europe, it ponders more sustainable and 
pleasant forms of government, such as the “Lottocratic Republic of Europe” 
based on raffle and luck. Such hypothetical scenarios of the future are staged 
and anticipated as actual realities, as dystopias or utopias, in which the “now” 
– for example the present- day situation in Europe – already appears as part of 
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the past. As this artistic production contains both directions of temporal 
movement, the terms “re-” and “pre-enactment” do not designate clearly 
distinguishable performative genres. Rather, they have to be considered as 
different accentuations of temporal relations in performance art, accompanied 
by different affective dynamics.
 Whereas the term “preenactment” has occasionally been used to indicate 
this shift in the temporal structure of reenactments, we propose adopting the 
specific notation of (p)reenactment to emphasize the fundamental intercon-
nectedness and interdependence of pro- and retrospection as well as the 
instability of each temporal perspective. At an experiential level these tem-
poral crossings are accompanied by a multilayered assemblage of affective 
dynamics that may even lead to a haptic sensation bridging times (Schneider, 
2011). Such an entanglement of temporal layers forms an affectively charged 
situation that opens up a realm of possibilities in which the unexpected seems 
likely to happen and the unfamiliar or unknown might appear. It is precisely 
this entanglement that makes (p)reenactment interesting for affect’s temporal 
dimensions. We thereby encourage a new perspective on pre- as well as reen-
actment practices in which reoccurrence, repetition, or duration no longer 
form the center of attention; instead, we conceptualize (p)reenactment as an 
affective means of reorientation, transition, and transmission. As a key concept 
for understanding Affective Societies, (p)reenactment might then best be 
described as a heuristic tool to analyze inquiries into questions of affectivity 
and temporal order in the context of performance.
Toward an affective understanding  
of (p)reenactment
The entanglement of past, present, and future in (p)reenactments accounts for 
a “dys- position” (Didi- Huberman, 2011) of its materiality and thereby fosters 
tensions in affectivity. With the term “dys- position,” Didi- Huberman refers 
to a conflicting disorganization of things that he encounters, for example, in 
montage practices in the arts during the 1920s. Rather than disposing of and 
ordering things and thus only underlining prevailing structures, continuities, 
and regularities, montage techniques of dys- positioning produce collisions of 
heterogenous elements that subvert or counter each other. Understanding 
(p)reenactments as forms of dys- positioning thus requires a specific focus on 
temporal and spatial ruptures and contradictions as well as on affective ambi-
guities generated in a performance.
 In (p)reenactments, the capacity to affect and be affected takes place 
between the poles of memory/history and vision(s) of the future. Compre-
hending (p)reenactments as events whose affective potentiality in the present 
is orientated toward the past and the future allows us to focus on aspects cur-
rently overlooked in literature on reenactment and preenactment. Drawing 
from research within the field of affect and media studies, we might think of 
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affect as a central vector that links the past and the future to the present. By 
taking up concrete objects, events or actions from the past, (partly) detaching 
them from their historical context of origin, and transferring them to a histor-
ically and semantically different context, reenactment potentiates dynamic 
interpretations, contextual relations, and experiences. As part of a collective 
or cultural memory, events in the past or imagined future always carry an 
emotional value, or appear as affectively charged.
 (P)reenactments’ multiple transpositions thus also concern the affective 
dynamics in place that relate to the contexts of origin and those of the actual 
performance. These trans- positions may be captured and further analyzed 
using concepts from affect theory such as agencement (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1987) or affective arrangement (→ affective arrangement) whereby the concept 
of (p)reenactment highlights the temporal and experiential dimensions inher-
ent in these notions. (P)reenactments thus not only provide a narrative frame-
work for a retrospective or prospective investigation in a highly codified 
setting, but also set their scenes in material surroundings shaped by social ges-
tures and corporeal behaviors. Accordingly, one might conceive of 
(p)reenactments as the installation of complex scenarios (Taylor, 2003) that 
frame and produce shifting affective experiences not only of temporality, but 
also of spatiality and sociality. In contrast to ritual practices of repetition, in 
performance art or neighboring contexts, these shifts may be intentionally 
staged in order to convey certain messages, evoke specific interpretations or 
provoke predestined affective responses. This is exemplified in cases of polit-
ical theater performing alternative or utopian realities in order to create an affec-
tive drive toward political change, for instance, the tribunal performances 
staged by Swiss producer Milo Rau in Moscow (2013), Zurich (2013), or 
Bukavu (2015) (Walter- Jochum, 2019). In these cases, the affective impact of 
(p)reenactments is often shaped by changes in historical contexts and 
topographical settings. However, the actual reception of these affective poten-
tials can never be fully determined or predicted and is thus beyond the control 
of the performers. In our view, this aspect of contingency in reactions to 
(p)reenactments is central to their specificity.
 Uncovering (p)reenactment’s potential to affect is also important in under-
standing processes of collectivization. Understanding affect as a formative 
force that establishes relations between bodies (Slaby, 2016) (→ affect), 
(p)reenactments can also be a useful tool with which to examine the emerg-
ing dynamics between individual actors and social collectives as well as non- 
human actors (→ social collectives), including questions of belonging and parti-
cipation that arise in relation to different historical or topographical settings 
and experiential spaces. (P)reenactment can take an affirmative stance here in 
that it repeats or reinforces already existing social relations, but given its 
potential of iterative dys- positioning, it also contains the subversive power to 
expose or question the historical contingency of power relations or relations 
between human and non- human actors. Furthermore, (p)reenactment enables 
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“role playing” in the sense of adopting the perspectives of others and experi-
encing how these depend on historically and culturally specific relationships.
Embodiment and bodily memory
As embodied performances, (p)reenactments can address the somatization and 
bodily registers of cultural memory, which is often predominantly thought of 
in terms of its semantic and cognitive aspects (Taylor, 2003). In doing so, 
(p)reenactments may figure as a corrective toward a cultural memory cen-
tered on written records: by acting in the realm of (p)reenactment, bodies are 
embedded into historical and iterative contexts and thereby emphasize that 
agency and identity are always influenced by historical and cultural frame-
works. The aesthetic and political expressivity of bodily figurations in 
(p)reenactment draws on the ambiguity of their points of reference, as these 
figurations oscillate between different layers of time, subjectivities, and affec-
tive arrangements, making it impossible to contextualize their actions definit-
ively. In some cases, the (p)reenacted event is itself mediated and transgresses 
the physical presence of the body. As such, it has to be understood in terms 
of recursivity, absence, or withdrawal. Here, forms of bodily memory and 
their historical variability play a vital role, so that (p)reenactments even open 
up dimensions of analysis concerning facial expression, gesture, posture, and 
speech. Questioning the privileging of texts and narratives over embodied 
performances, (p)reenactments can also be read as scenarios that rework cul-
tural memories and have the potential to make marginalized positions visible 
and recognizable (Taylor, 2003).
Situatedness and space
To rework and re- imagine past events, (p)reenactments literally take place. In 
The Battle of Orgreave, for example, the artist Jeremy Deller (2001) occupies 
the original location of the iconic 1984 strike of English miners in a York-
shire coking plant to reenact the violent confrontation between police and 
strikers with 800 historical reenactors and 200 former miners. Re- staging this 
strike in situ, Deller used the place’s historical value and aura to generate an 
immersive effect (→ immersion, immersive power), which proved successful: 
Despite the artistic framing of the performance, the inclusion of props such as 
plastic truncheons, fake blood, rocks made of foam, and years of preparation, 
the reenactment was perceived almost as a flashback of the events of 1984. 
The aim of this long- term project was to re- configure, re- evaluate, and re- 
politicize the events of the past – an approach closely linked to place by 
Deller (2001): “I’ve always described it as digging up a corpse and giving it a 
proper post- mortem.”
 Whereas Deller seeks the “original” scene for his reenactment, perform-
ances such as Preenacting Europe profit from the spatial distance between 
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theater and everyday life. Rather than conjuring up the affective sediments of 
historical places, Preenacting Europe conceives of the stage as a laboratory for 
future forms of government and addresses the heterotopian qualities of theat-
rical space. Deller’s and Interrobang’s different orientations toward places 
reveal a spectrum of spatial delineation through (p)reenactments. While their 
levels of affectivity differ significantly in this regard, both examples show that 
localized experiences and emplaced practices always generate spaces of 
(p)revision and (p)reimagining (de Certeau, 1984). Consequently, analyses of 
(p)reenactments have to consider scenic arrangements as deeply entangled 
with temporal dimensions and vice versa (Massey, 1994). Jeremy Deller’s 
work makes obvious that such crossings of time and space (“practiced place”) 
occur at the interstices of live performances and mediatization. The Battle of 
Orgreave relied heavily on media coverage of the literally iconic 1984 strike to 
re- stage the events; it was also documented by film director Mike Figgis and 
broadcast as a 60-minute documentary in 2002 on the UK’s Channel 4. Thus, 
shifting the focus to media- based forms of (p)reenactment contributes to a 
deeper understanding of the (real, imagined, and symbolized) interruptions of 
time and space in (p)reenactment.
Mediatized (p)reenactments
While current scholarship largely employs the notion of (p)reenactment to 
analyze embodied performances in live situations, we aim at widening its 
scope to mediatized phenomena as well. Contemporary artistic practices, 
social phenomena such as role play and gaming, and political (p)reenact-
ments can be highly mediatized. Some (p)reenactments are staged explicitly 
for a camera, others are “enacted” in the mediated realm itself, for example, 
within digital games. In his video installation Serious Games (2009–2010), 
German filmmaker and artist Harun Farocki demonstrates how virtual 
reality scenarios are used as re- and preenactment strategies in contemporary 
warfare. In Serious Games I. Watson is Down, Farocki shows a training unit 
at a Marine Corps base in California, in which young Marines rehearse 
future combat scenarios with the help of computer simulations to train 
rational and strategic decision- making and reduce disturbing affective 
impulses. A similar technique is used in Immersion, part III of the series; in 
this case not for training purposes, but rather as a means of therapy. The 
video displays a workshop for psychologists working with war- veterans and 
introduces them to new virtual reality software that can be used to reenact 
and relive traumatizing situations. The alleged veteran in this software 
demonstration is in fact an actor who imagines the potential reactions of a 
future patient; in this example, the entanglement between different tem-
poral layers becomes even more intricate. Virtual reality thus seems to 
function as a prism that enables both projections into the future as well as 
reflections of the past.
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 Thinking with the concept of (p)reenactment in interactive realms such as 
digital simulations or computer games in which the actor operates as a virtual 
avatar makes clear that performance theory’s notion of reenactment as an 
embodied repetition of a past event needs to be expanded. Including the 
possibility of mediatized forms of (p)reenactment should disassociate the 
concept from the paradigm of “liveness” (Phelan, 1993) which continues to 
inflect recent developments in theater and performance studies (see, e.g., 
Auslander, 1999). What becomes crucial and obvious in mediatized 
(p)reenactment practices is that their occurrence in the “here and now” can 
dissolve into a multiplicity of situations of “enactment”: Mediatized 
(p)reenactments are not bound to the temporal or spatial co- presence of the 
actors involved, which is why they can no longer be regarded as singular 
events but as events that continually circulate in the media (→ affective eco-
nomies). Thus they can be performed, actualized, and experienced at different 
times and places, which reaffirms (p)reenactment’s potential to rearrange tem-
poral and spatial layers. Whereas live performances take place in a rather 
closed situational arrangement, mediatized (p)reenactments have a much 
bigger range and rate of reception, and are thus able to affect societies on a 
much broader scale. In some respects, our understanding of mediatized 
(p)reenactment resonates with Richard Grusin’s (2004) concept of premedia-
tion which highlights the fact that all possible scenarios of the future have 
always already been remediated, meaning they have been anticipated through 
the media before they even occurred. The main aim of premediations, 
according to Grusin, is to establish a low level of anxiety as a form of affective 
prophylaxis. This is exactly the case with the soldiers in Farocki’s Serious 
Games, whose future war experiences are anticipated by the affective arrange-
ment (→ affective arrangement) of the computer simulation. Even though it 
seems problematic to reduce the affective potential of premediation to “neg-
ative” affects such as traumatizing experiences, “affect” can be seen as one 
crucial vector that relates the future to the present and the past. Similar to 
premediation, the (p)reenactment of future events not only shapes present 
affectivities, but also has the potential to transform, lower, or heighten their 
intensities in the future – be it as a “prophylactic” or, more positively, as a 
form of training, preparation, or pleasant anticipation.
(P)reenactment as a pattern central to social 
forms of action
Given affect’s relational potential of building collectivities (→ affective com-
munities), we think of (p)reenactment not only in relation to artistic perform-
ances, but also as an essential part of everyday life. Everyday acts of playing, 
presenting, and performing (Goffman, 1956) need to be constantly actualized 
or reenacted. They are also linked to future forms of actions, even if their 
ongoing accomplishments are contingent (Garfinkel, 1967/2015). Established 
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theories such as social phenomenology and social constructivism can help to 
underline the relevance of (p)reenactment in everyday life. As discussed in the 
works of Husserl (1985), Schutz (1974), or Berger and Luckmann (1966), the 
structuring of time is a determining part of social action. Alfred Schutz (1971) 
conceives of past, present, and future as analytical categories that are always 
connected to each other and form an essential part of human concepts of 
action. The routines and dynamics of everyday lifeworlds are always based on 
modes of repetition, actualizations, and concepts of action developed in the 
past. This enables people to see things through the eyes of others in perform-
ances of everyday life (Schutz, 1974; Goffman, 1956). In line with this, we 
would argue, (p)reenactments as specific performances in the field of art seem 
to rely on the repetitive character of (p)reenactments in everyday life in a 
more general sense. In both cases, then, (p)reenactments can thus be con-
ceived of as mutually influential processes, in this iteration, performance 
appears as “restored” or “twice- behaved behavior” (Schechner, 2002). 
Accordingly, every human action, be it in the context of art, ritual, or 
everyday life, depends on actions that have been trained, rehearsed, or per-
formed before. In this capacity, however, all performances also actualize and 
alter these ways of behavior. Despite the dialectical relationship between art 
and everyday life, we should note that we must still distinguish between 
(p)reenactments as a form of art and as a form of everyday life. While most 
forms of re- and preenactments in everyday life routines can be characterized 
as being performed in a “typical” way, even though another “reality” (Schutz, 
1971) is always possible, artistic (p)reenactments are often based on the inten-
tions of and reflexive decisions by producers, and thus emphasize their autho-
rial agency (Warstat, 2012). Thus, (p)reenactments can serve as a useful tool 
to reflect on the patterns of everyday lifeworlds, and can make obvious their 
political potential.
(P)reenactment and the political
Conceiving of a performative event as a form of (p)reenactment entails a 
combination of acting in the present, drawing from the past, and establishing 
future perspectives. Thus, many performances question stable temporal modes 
and thereby establish various modes of (political) inquiry. (P)reenactments 
may, for instance, enable a critical stance toward a linear understanding of 
history and emphasize the construction of time. By closely bundling different 
temporal orientations, practices of (p)reenactment also expose current acting 
and experiencing as culturally and historically imprinted, albeit never fully 
determined and open to change. Insofar as all patterns of human actions 
depend on the logic of iteration (Derrida, 1972/1988; Butler, 1993), thinking 
in terms of “origins,” “beginnings,” or “endings” seems problematic, if not 
obsolete. In line with this, the concept of (p)reenactment allows us to rethink 
different temporal aspects as indeed mediated and mutually dependent on 
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each other, but at the same time sets up a tension between the possibilities of 
past, actual, and future scopes of action.
 Subsequently, (p)reenactments may draw on written as well as on bodily 
transmitted knowledge to address and enact realms of a possible future or to 
render visible and attainable constellations that have been precluded from col-
lective memory thus far. In doing so, they also interrogate how to conceive 
of a possible future informed by the losses, misrecognitions, and unrealized 
potentialities of the past. (P)reenactment performances can explore how 
future- oriented actions, for instance, the rhetoric and practices of change such 
as revolution, creation, or the foundation of something new, can be modeled. 
As Oliver Marchart (2014, 2019) has argued with reference to the interven-
tionist work of the Israeli collective Public Movement, pre- enactments 
operate as anticipations of desired political changes and thereby already 
generate transformative experiences. An especially powerful example of the 
constitutive and active dimension of (p)reenactments are the on- camera per-
formances of would- be suicide bombers who claim their status as “living 
martyrs” before the actual suicide attack. On the one hand, the individuals 
reenact preceding video testimonies from the past by relating to the aesthetic, 
rhetoric, and performative qualities of the genre and by explicitly referring to 
their predecessors. On the other hand, the performances are as much directed 
toward the future and can be viewed as bodily preenactments of their ima-
gined persona as “martyrs,” and thereby set the stage for what is about to 
happen (Straub, 2018). Some of these videos were further appropriated and 
reenacted by artists (e.g., Rabih Mroué, Sharif Waked) who added additional 
(and critical) dimensions to the complexity of these (p)reenactments. In sum, 
the concept of (p)reenactment is deeply entangled with political practices, and 
raises further questions about the relationship between artistic, social, and 
political realms.
Outlook
While studies on reenactment can build on a growing body of literature, the 
field of research on (p)reenactment demands further elaboration. Future work 
on (p)reenactment must emphasize its affective dynamics. Informed by affect 
studies, such scholarship should center its analysis on bodily perspectives, 
bodily memory, and the dynamization of affective arrangements, and should 
inquire into differences arising from embodied and mediatized performances. 
The latter effort seems especially promising given the peculiarities of 
globalized and connected communities, as the scope of (p)reenactments and 
their potential audiences increases rapidly through the use of networked 
media (→ affective publics). Comparative studies of forms of (p)reenactment in 
bodily co- presence and mediatized forms of (p)reenactment remain an 
important endeavor and have the potential to contribute to a better under-
standing of affective modes prevalent in mediated and live situations.
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 Furthermore, work on (p)reenactment should accept the challenge of grasp-
ing the full range of the concept, from concrete artistical performances to meas-
ures of political protest and proceedings in everyday life. In considering the 
iterative nature of social interactions, the concept of (p)reenactment can be used 
to underline the interconnectedness of the realms of art, politics, and the social 
world. (P)reenactment can highlight the stability of traditions, rituals, and social 
norms, but can also open up new perspectives on the possibilities of social and 
political change and their affective circumstances.
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Chapter 18
Poetics of affect
Hermann Kappelhoff and Hauke Lehmann
The term “poetics of affect” originates in the Aristotelian theory of tragedy, 
understood as a founding document of poetical thinking. It describes the 
manner in which a given work of art – in this chapter, we shall be concerned 
with cinematic images – structures the affective involvement of its audience. 
Aristotle’s concept of catharsis (1953) informs perhaps the most prominent 
model of modulating affects by means of media. It differs from other artistic 
means of emotionalizing in that it implies a specific dynamics of affect. 
According to Aristotle, tragedy aims at successively heightening the arousal of 
“tragic feelings” (fear and pity) through the dramaturgical arrangement of 
scenes. Here, it is the rhetoric intention that dictates the nature, intensity, and 
gradation of affects. Affects are aroused in order to be purposefully released, 
purified, or discharged.
 This concept of “poetics of affect” can be applied not only to drama but to 
all forms of audiovisual movement- images. It encompasses the dimension of 
dramaturgy, which entails laying out a succession of scenic complexes with 
the intention of shaping a distinct course of feeling. This course of feeling is 
based on spectators’ perceptions of a given representation. It also comprises 
the dimension of rhetoric, meaning the employment of expressive modalities 
of the cinematic image to elicit a particular desired emotional effect. Finally, 
poetics of affect also encompasses the economic function of media practices, 
defined by Aristotle as catharsis: 
Tragedy, then, is an imitation [mímesis] of an action [práxis] of high import-
ance, complete and of some amplitude; in language [lógos] enhanced by dis-
tinct and varying beauties; acted not narrated; by means of pity [éleos] and 
fear [phóbos] effectuating its purgation [kátharsis] of these emotions. 
(Aristotle, 1953, p. 24)
It is important to note that the much- discussed notion of purgation or purifi-
cation in Aristotle’s definition does not refer to the psychic states of individual 
spectators, but rather to the affective economy (→ affective economy) of a 
political community, that is, to the intersection between individual feelings 
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and collective imagination. Thus, it is not possible to simply apply a modern 
psychological understanding of emotions to a poetics of affect, as is the tend-
ency, for example, in cognitivist film theory (cf. Grodal, 2009; Plantinga, 
2009). Contrary to what those approaches imply, the “purgation of these 
emotions” cannot be reduced to a model based on a linear scheme of stimulus 
and response, but rather points to an argument about the political function of 
aesthetic pleasure and aesthetic judgment. On the other hand, historically, 
poetics of affect have always been conceptualized and deployed with explicit 
intentions of achieving specific effects. In what follows, we will elaborate on 
this tension, first by laying out its theoretical groundwork, then by focusing 
on the example of the classical Hollywood war film. The specific pathos 
of this genre cannot be dissociated from media techniques that seek to 
aesthetically modulate the feelings of spectators.
Theoretical orientation
On some level, the question of what constitutes a poetics of affect does not 
seem to be difficult at all: one simply has to refer to those affective phe-
nomena which form the basis of all genre- poetical reflection in the Western 
tradition: laughing and crying. Both forms of expressive behavior have histor-
ically been linked to essential cultural practices and cultivated, in tragedy and 
comedy, into two paradigmatic subjects of poetical theory.
 While under present- day conditions one might not simply follow Helmuth 
Plessner (1970) in positing laughing and crying as a decisive criterion to dif-
ferentiate humans from animals, we still consider both reliable indicators of 
affective belonging (→ belonging) and solidarity in social communities. We 
may simply be unable to recognize laughing and crying outside our own 
species because “we” do not belong there. In this context, laughing is intuit-
ively accessible as an expression of conviviality and sociability: particularly in 
cases where it happens at someone else’s expense, it equally expresses and 
motivates processes of community building. In contrast, crying often is a plea 
of the lone individual, experiencing her- or himself as excluded, isolated, and 
disparaged by such communities.
 Since Aristotle, the theory of poetics can be understood as a poetics of 
affect – based on the concept of catharsis. Most approaches concerned with 
the relation between media (especially film) and emotions presuppose a 
psychological definition of the latter (e.g., Carroll, 2008; Grodal, 2009; Plant-
inga & Smith, 1999). They usually ascribe these emotions to more or less 
clearly identifiable personal actors who express them before they become 
modulated or coded by “the media” (meaning cultural practices that become 
identifiable through specific media technologies). In these approaches, emo-
tions generally denominate affective judgments of the object world. They are 
understood as physiologically grounded processes based in subjects that 
remain consistent.
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 Proceeding instead from a concept of relational affectivity (→ affect), we 
will focus on those media practices in which we can observe affects as effects 
of specific media formats and forms of mediated communication. From this 
perspective, affective dynamics are not attributed to individual emotions – on 
the contrary: they themselves refer back to processes of subjectivization. The 
“I” in the phrase “I feel” is always a mediated effect of being affected that has 
found its symbolic form of expression (→ feeling). This form of expression is 
itself grounded in discursively produced epistemic regimes and media prac-
tices. These practices can be motivated artistically (the generation of aesthetic 
pleasure), socially (for the purposes of education, for example), or religiously 
(ritual purposes). They can aim at entertainment, the formation of a certain 
habitus, or the production of belonging. Such practices determine the posi-
tions that make it possible to experience and formulate something like “I 
feel” in the first place. This “I feel,” in our conceptualization, is always an 
effect of subjectivization referring back to historical discourses, cultural prac-
tices, and techniques of power and control, which are all structured by 
various media.
 From Aristotelian tragedy to Hollywood cinema and entertainment TV, the 
problem of affect is situated in the contested territory between processes of 
political collectivization, media practices, and human actors. The forms of 
representation as well as the contents and techniques of media use are them-
selves parts of operations in which processes of affecting and being affected are 
being cultivated into shared “feeling- worlds” (→ orders of feeling). “Feeling” in 
this context aims at the sensation of experiencing oneself as affectively con-
nected to the world in a variety of manners. This implies both long- term affec-
tive stances – the phenomenological “being- in-the- world” (cf. Merleau- Ponty, 
2002; Slaby, in press) – and the dimension of “belonging” in collective feelings 
(cf. Pfaff- Czarnecka, 2012; Röttger-Rössler, 2016) (→ feeling). It also refers to 
passing moods and atmospheres in given situations (social constellations, land-
scapes, entertainment, play), which can activate or modulate the former. These 
processes of embedment are always structured by symbolic and media practices.
Aesthetic experience and reflexivity
Conceptualizing feeling in this way positions the concept as an intermediary 
between psychologically grounded theories of emotion and the notion of a 
constitutive inter- affectivity (in the Deleuzian interpretation of Spinoza, cf. 
Deleuze & Guattari, 1994) (→ affect). Feelings can thus be understood as pro-
cesses in which a given dynamic of affectively evaluating the surrounding 
world is being correlated with the basic affective embedments of an individual 
(their feeling for a world shared with others). This involves the ongoing 
reflexive monitoring of affective changes in dynamic situations as well as 
feedback to the symbolic forms of these embedments. Poetics of affect 
intervene in and make use of the entanglement between these different 
Poetics of affect  213
dimensions – that is, between momentary shifts in intensity on the one hand 
and symbolic operations on the other.
 This notion of feeling follows John Dewey’s (2005) concept of aesthetic 
experience. If we want to understand how a poetics of affect can realize 
itself in concrete, socio- culturally located situations, it makes sense to integ-
rate his concept into our approach. For Dewey, the specific character of an 
experience is formed in an act of perception that integrates its individual 
elements as a complex entanglement into a coherent temporal unity. 
Feeling means grasping and seizing the unity of a temporal form, which 
consists of elements entwined with each other. Feeling is the form in which 
an experience emerges from the stream of everyday life as a holistic tem-
poral Gestalt. In this respect, experience for Dewey is aesthetic in and of 
itself: the quality of the aesthetic is the quality to “round […] out an 
experience into completeness and unity as emotional” (Dewey, 2005, 
p. 43). Dewey clarifies his use of the term emotion: “In fact emotions are 
qualities, when they are significant, of a complex experience that moves 
and changes […]. All emotions are qualifications of a drama and they 
change as the drama develops” (Dewey, 2005, p. 43). From this per-
spective, an understanding of emotions as categorically defined becomes 
secondary: “Experience is emotional but there are no separate things called 
emotions in it” (Dewey, 2005, p. 43). Instead, emotionality serves to delin-
eate the gradual difference between everyday and aesthetic perception. Per-
ception is given in its full sense only when it becomes experience, that is, 
when it becomes aesthetic:
There is, therefore, no such thing in perception as seeing or hearing plus 
emotion. The perceived object or scene is emotionally pervaded 
throughout. When an aroused emotion does not permeate the material 
that is perceived or thought of, it is either preliminary or pathological.
(Dewey, 2005, p. 55, emphasis in original)
The activity of the artist, like the perceptual activity of the spectator, belongs 
to a realm of cultural practices that intentionally disengage operations like 
perceiving, thinking, and making from their everyday context to become an 
object for aesthetic pleasure. In this process, the sensitivities of the spectator 
are intensely linked to the object of perception. The pleasure of experience 
consists in perceiving oneself as being affected and closely connected to an 
object. A state of being affected is transformed into a reflexive state of being- 
in-the- world; experience in its full sense denotes an affective relation of 
exchange, in which the perceiving subject is linked to the world they experi-
ence while possessing a reflexive insight into this linkage.
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The spectator feeling
In examining the feeling of film viewing, we first and foremost inquire about 
the temporal form of this reflexive act of perception. Neither the actors in 
their performance, nor the characters in their actions, neither the social spaces 
in which the characters are located, nor the relations between them are given 
as representations in cinematic images. Rather, they are produced by the acts 
of perceiving, feeling, and thinking by spectators as they view films. The con-
nective tie between the image on the screen and the spectators in the audi-
ence can be found neither in the plot, nor in the narrative, but in the capacity 
to affect other bodies and be affected by them. To understand the inter- 
affective structure in which the technical and the human, the artificial and the 
organic body are entangled, we need to understand the matter in which both 
are grounded. This matter – for all cinematic forms of audiovisual images, at 
least – is movement itself.
 According to Vivian Sobchack (1992), movement unfolds outside of the 
physical material of film, in front of the screen. The movement that is gener-
ated in the medium of cinematic images gains another, physical reality in the 
perceiving body of the spectator: as the lived- body’s sensation of being 
affected. The movement of the cinematic image becomes materialized and 
embodied in the sensations of the spectators – their perception and cinematic 
expressivity are immediately connected to each other.
 The movement of the cinematic image is thus comprised of discrete but 
symbiotic dynamics taking place at completely different levels. First, there is 
the movement of bodies in space – the movement of represented bodies and 
objects in a space which spectators presuppose as the homogeneous space of 
our everyday world. Second, there is the movement of the audiovisual image 
– the conjunction of different dynamics of montage, framing, camera move-
ment, sound, music, and so forth – that creates an image- space for the audi-
ence. And, last but not least, there is the affective involvement of the 
perceiving body – a fluid dynamics of sensuous impressions, unfolding feel-
ings, and mental operations in which this image- space is transformed into a 
mode of perceiving the world. This mode is embodied by spectators but con-
stitutes a subjectivity that is not identical to those of the spectators. The cine-
matic image encompasses both the movement of bodies in space and the 
spectators’ embodied process of perception in the movement of an image- 
space that unfolds and transforms over the course of the duration of the film.
 In this sense, we can understand the cinematic image as a mediated form 
of experience that, by relying on its embodiment by spectators, penetrates the 
realm of affects and absorbs it. Thus, it gives rise to a form of movement that 
can no longer be objectified but realizes the connection between screen and 
audience during the act of viewing a film. Sergei Eisenstein (1988) called this 
movement the “fourth dimension in cinema”; in typically laconic fashion, he 
notes that this is time itself. This temporality of the cinematic image becomes 
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manifest on all levels of staging (acting, music, montage, etc.). Each level con-
tributes to the dissociation of the exterior movement of bodies from the 
homogeneous space of everyday perception and thus connects it to the affec-
tive dynamics of film- viewing. The cinematic image itself becomes the 
“fourth dimension” of a perception- space in which all three dimensions of 
movement listed above (movement in space, movement of the image, and 
the process of affecting the audience) can relate to each other and can be gen-
erative of each other. To put it differently: The staging of the image refers 
both to the movement represented on the screen and to the bodies of spec-
tators who are being affected by what they perceive. Because of this, the 
cinematic image emerges as the fourth dimension of a space in which the 
cuts, divisions, and junctures between different dimensions of movement can 
be experienced as shaped time and as a temporal form.
 The compositional form of movement- images thus marks the interface 
between movement on the screen and the processes of embodiment in the 
sensations of spectators. In this theoretical model, the episodic unfolding of a 
complex montage of movements can be described as the compositional mod-
ulation or stylization of the affective experience of spectators. It is precisely in 
this dimension of movement that Sobchack locates the intersubjective dimen-
sion of the cinema: Spectators realize the cinematic image as a specific mode 
of perceiving the world (Sobchack, 1992, pp. 8–9). They realize it as a spe-
cific way of being- in-the- world, which is unfolded in the process of staging. 
The temporal form of this unfolding provides the basis for the spectator 
feeling. This is what Dewey aims at when he writes that “emotions qualify 
the experience as a unity”, and that this unity is the unity of its temporal 
unfolding: “The experience is of material fraught with suspense and moving 
towards its own consummation through a connected series of varied inci-
dents” (Dewey, 2005, p. 44, emphasis in original). In the remainder of this 
chapter, we will show how a particular, historically specific poetics of affect – 
that of the Hollywood war film – can intervene into and modulate the basic 
inter- affective structure of the cinematic image in order to make sense of the 
world culturally, historically, and politically.
A particular pathos: the shell- shocked face
At the center of the Hollywood war film, we do not find heroes or heroic 
deeds, but rather the melodramatic image of the suffering individual soldier. The 
“shell- shocked face” constitutes the signature of this genre. It recurs in images of 
faces that bear witness to an excess both affective and inherently mediated: the 
insisting amazement of Willard in Apocalypse Now (Coppola, 1979) or the cold, 
restrained cruelty of Colonel Kurtz in the same film, the paralyzed face of Tom 
Hanks in Saving Private Ryan (Spielberg, 1998), the madness of the humiliated 
Marine in Full Metal Jacket (Kubrick, 1986), or the crystallizations of sacrifice in 
Platoon (Stone, 1986).
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 Throughout these and other films, the shell- shocked face can be read as a 
deeply ambivalent image. On the one hand, it is the imago of sacrifice, in 
which the horror of war and the agony of the soldier have transformed him 
into an overdetermined icon of suffering. On the other hand, it is a cinematic 
image seeking to testify to this suffering as precisely that: naked, physical suf-
fering (→ affective witnessing). It is testimony to the utterly senseless destruc-
tion of human life. This face thus becomes an emblem of the mythology of a 
community, which sees itself and its values confirmed in the sacrifice of the 
individual. At the same time, it refers to the practically immeasurable number 
of photographic and cinematic images documenting the victims of the violent 
wars and genocides of the last century.
 Simultaneously a mythical icon of community and document of crime, 
emblem and testimony, the ambivalent image of the suffering soldier articu-
lates a contradiction that directly confronts the foundations of political culture 
in the United States. The destruction of individual life violates the core value 
constituting the purpose of the political community itself. Today, over 70 
years after World War II (during which the war film genre emerged), this 
conflict concerns Western culture as a whole – although perhaps in less expli-
citly political terms.
 In all its variations, the shell- shocked face articulates a deep moral dilemma 
in affective terms: it combines moral outrage with devout reminiscence, accu-
sation with the solemn commemoration of those who gave their life to pre-
serve the political community. In this sense, we can understand the 
shell- shocked face as the “pathos formula” (→ Pathosformel ) that has gener-
ated and structured the war film genre as a genre in the first place. However, 
if we speak of pathos formula, we do not mean iconographic subjects or 
motifs that can be traced as serial unities across the manifestations of visual 
culture. Rather, we are referring to the circulation of affects, namely, passions 
(i.e., pathos) that are transferred onto a community, whether an audience, a 
cultic, or a political community. For Aby Warburg (2010), who coined the 
term “Pathosformel,” certain primal affects (fear, pain, and so forth) function as 
generic factors that find their expression in innumerable figurations of 
dynamic movement across the history of visual culture. Even if we do not 
share this anthropological explanation, the concept enables us to link aesthetic 
systems of reference, like genres, with the affective economy of political 
communities.
 In the recurrent restagings of the pathos formula, an affective collision is 
worked through repeatedly, which appears to us in the double meaning of 
the shell- shocked face. If the image of sacrifice links the war film to archaic 
rituals of community building, the image as evidence of crime refers to the 
violation of the articulated goals of such a political community. In this second 
meaning, the image aims at the pathos of moral outrage, at a wrath that turns 
against any attempts of bestowing significance to suffering. The iconography, 
plots, and narrative patterns of the genre develop along the lines of this 
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affective collision. In this manner, the variations of the pathos formula of the 
shell- shocked face structure the history and poetics of the Hollywood war 
film genre (cf. Kappelhoff, 2018).
An affect theory of genres
Without prematurely comparing the practice of film viewing to cultic activ-
ities and rituals, it seems apt to highlight one ritual aspect of this practice that 
helps us understand the generic function of the pathos formula and its lineage 
in the war film genre. That is, we can link the Hollywood war film genre to 
a form of collectivity that can be understood as the affective substratum of the 
political, as sensus communis or a feeling for that which is common: a sense of 
commonality. Analyzing the poetics of affect of the war film genre is neces-
sary to understand and conceptually identify this sense of commonality in 
relation to the sphere of politics. Affect theory is naturally predisposed to the 
study of relations: between the individual and the collective, between bodies 
and media, and between politics and aesthetics.
 Defining the generic function of the pathos formula can help us to 
develop an affective theoretical understanding of the poetics of genre, 
instead of understanding genres taxonomically and deriving this taxonomy 
from historical description, as is usually the case. The Hollywood war film 
genre provides a good example to implement this approach: Here, it is 
possible to observe how, within a clearly defined period (1940 to 1945), 
in a relatively homogeneous technological environment (cinema before 
1950) and in a fully developed genre system (Hollywood), a new genre 
emerges, drawing from propaganda and publicly funded educational films 
as well as from popular entertainment. One can thus closely study the 
dynamics of the transformations through which the Hollywood genre 
system reacted to the symptoms of crisis appearing in a democracy at war. 
Insofar as the war film can be defined by a particular pathos, this pathos is 
closely tied to a crisis in the affective economy of the political system in 
the United States.
 The pathos formula of the shell- shocked face corresponds to a crisis of 
political forms of community – a crisis whose manifestations are more than 
obvious after the excesses of state power in the wars and genocides of the 
20th century. The crass contradiction between a meaningful sacrifice “for” 
and the senseless death of individuals “through” the political community is a 
conflict charged with affective tension. This conflict is unsolvable for any 
society invoking no higher authority in its political actions than the ordinary 
lives of many individuals. Consequentially, the Hollywood war film unfolds 
not as a heroic, but a melodramatic genre. This distinction appeals to a variant 
of aesthetic pleasure that initially does not appear particularly dignified in 
terms of political judgment. But the question of the relation between a sense 
of commonality and the political is intricately linked with the question of 
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how different modalities of aesthetic pleasure function in constituting such a 
feeling for what is common.
 The war film genre makes an excellent case for the argument that the 
media practices and symbolic forms through which a society assures itself of 
its political cohesion are shaped by those modalities of experience that are 
usually located in the genres of art and entertainment. In any case, the staging 
strategies and poetic concepts of the Hollywood war film always refer to the 
affective tissue of a culture, advocating an emphatic idea of community. This 
is true whether individual films seek to affirm, mobilize, criticize, refuse, or 
renew these affective collectivizations in their pathos. Since this never takes 
place in the form of mere intellectual reflection, but is always mediated 
through the pleasure of being affected, we can speak of the Hollywood war 
film in terms of a poetics of affect. This perspective makes it possible to 
conceptualize the ritual dimension as an exemplary poetics of cinema under-
stood as a media praxis through which a society understands itself as a political 
community.
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Pathosformel (pathos formula)
Kerstin Schankweiler and Philipp Wüschner
The work of German art and cultural historian Aby Warburg can be described 
as a fragmented theory of affect that can address issues of formalization of 
affect, its circulation and dissemination (→ affective economy) as well as its tem-
porality and historicity. In particular, Warburg’s notion of “Pathosformel” or 
“pathos formula” could become a key concept for an affect theory that seeks 
to address the affective in conjunction with the formal qualities of an object. 
Warburg introduced the term “Pathosformel” to describe expressive gestures 
of heightened affective intensity. For Warburg, pathos formulas are closely 
linked to primal bodily affects such as intoxication, ecstasy, pain, and the like, 
in their superlative form, such as highest arousal or deepest contemplation. 
The structural extension of the concept to all affective phenomena that we 
suggest in this chapter has emerged only through its reception by other 
scholars. Warburg saw these affects as being formalized, historically in objects 
of art. Understanding this non- trivial idea of formalization is key to a precise 
understanding of the notion of a pathos formula and to its affect theoretical 
potential. For Warburg, the formalization in question is primarily a matter of 
movement: certain aspects of artworks function such that they effectively 
“freeze” a movement into a dynamogram and thereby make it accessible and 
transferable (Gombrich, 1970, p. 248). Warburg’s idiom suggests that he 
thought of formalization along the lines of aesthetic or philosophical forms 
but also with respect to mathematical formulas. In science, a formula is a 
concise, symbolic expression of a certain relationship between given variables. 
This allows one to extract information about this relationship irrespective of 
quantity, and insert it into different calculations alongside other elements. In 
conjunction with the aesthetic notion of form, the concept of a formalized 
affect means that a certain relation or distribution of affective intensities can be 
given an aesthetic form, as in a classical painting. This form, for example, a 
gesture of ecstasy, can in turn serve as a formulaic manifestation of this rela-
tion of affective intensities. As such, it can be reused again by artists in 
different contexts. Thus, pathos formulas are an expression of the changing 
interference between stored or formalized affective energy and its forms of 
cultural dissemination. They not only reveal a long history of being handed 
Pathosformel (pathos formula)  221
down by tradition, but also shape this history dynamically as they are shaped 
by it. As a formalization in this complex sense, a pathos formula enables affec-
tivity to circulate: what has been an individual event becomes formulaic and 
can thus be copied and shared.
 Only by formalization can affective events become simultaneously analytic-
ally accessible and affectively repeatable (→ (p)reenactment). This connects to 
yet another Warburgian term: “Nachleben” (afterlife). Probably taken from 
British anthropologist Edward B. Tylor (1871), “Nachleben” refers to the 
afterlife of images, motifs, and affects, and links the work of the art historian 
to that of the anthropologist. It is here that Warburg’s theory develops its 
most speculative idea of some sort of “mnemonic” triggering through which 
the pathos formula can animate its observer to reenact or relive stored affec-
tive intensity (Warburg, 1929/2010, p. 631). It is not just the observer who 
assimilates the images; the images themselves show a form of agency as they 
affect the observer actively. By offering an interpretation of Warburg that 
foregrounds this part of his theory, we focus on the relation of form and 
intensity in affective processes. With Warburg, we believe that there is no 
“pure” affect independent of its formalization and that affect, in turn, can be 
stored and released only by way of formalization. Warburg himself did not 
use the word “affect,” and his fragmented work, spread over many articles, 
notes, letters, and diary entries, demands more elaboration and requires a 
hermeneutical effort to excavate a Warburgian theory of affect. However, 
within the scope of this chapter we open up a line of interpretation that 
makes Warburg’s ideas productive for affect theory.
Historical orientation and neighboring concepts
The historical sources, inspirations, and precursors for Warburg’s concept are 
diverse and do not necessarily form a coherent whole (Böhme, 1997). Dar-
win’s view of the continuity of expression in human beings and animals is 
among them, as is Nietzsche’s theory on the conflict between the Apollonian 
and the Dionysian. In addition, his work is influenced by linguistic, medical, 
and anthropological theories of his time. Briefly, we touch on a small selec-
tion of the disciplines and theories drawn on by Warburg.
 Perhaps least surprising given his own profession, Warburg was influenced 
by historians such as Jacob Burckhardt and Karl Lamprecht, who expanded 
the reach of historical scholarship to include art and culture and, in the case 
of the latter, offered new sociological and psychological methods. In par-
ticular, Burckhardt’s “rediscovery” of the Renaissance as the cradle of mod-
ernity resonated with Warburg’s own interests. However, while indebted to 
these innovators, Warburg felt dissatisfied by their self- restrictive compart-
mentalization of history and the subsequent synthesis of its segments 
(Warburg, 1902/1980, p. 67). Instead, he sought out new ways to emphasize 
the heterogeneity of this particular epoch by looking at the many forms and 
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1 Tylor’s theories on “Primitive Culture” (1871) might also be the source for Warburg’s own 
primitivist views (e.g., Schlangenritual). On Warburg’s primitivism see also Maupeu (2016).
2 We write this chapter from the point of view of visual culture studies and art history. The 
reception of Aby Warburg is of course not limited to these fields. We cannot account for the 
diversity and interdisciplinary literature on Warburg in the scope of this chapter.
traces of an afterlife of antiquity within the Renaissance. He claimed to have 
found these traces in pathos formulas that survived from antiquity through 
the Middle Ages, re- emerging suddenly in Renaissance art.
 The concept of an afterlife of pathos formulas came to Warburg from 
Tylor by way of Warburg’s colleague and friend, art historian Julius von 
Schlosser. Like von Schlosser, Warburg sometimes used the English “sur-
vival,” found in Tylor’s cultural anthropology, synonymously with “Nachle-
ben” (Didi- Huberman, 2003).1 Survivals are cultural phenomena that persist 
even after the demise of the conditions that brought them about. Therefore, 
when Warburg uses the term afterlife in relation to pathos formulas, he 
assumes the survival of certain affective intensities via their artistic formaliza-
tion. The enduring presence of the past makes any linear and monolithic his-
toriography questionable.
 Warburg’s general outlook, although not synthesized in a theory, influ-
enced his contemporaries and disciplines outside the realm of art history. It 
laid the groundwork for an iconological method of art history, later known as 
the Hamburg School. Warburg’s personal library in Hamburg played an 
important role here. In the preface to the second volume of his Symbolic 
Forms, the philosopher Ernst Cassirer specifically mentions the library’s 
set- up. It appeared to be organized not according to disciplinary conven-
tions, but arranged around a “central problem” (Cassirer, 1955, p. xviii), 
which concerned the expression and symbolization of a pre- rational, affec-
tive understanding of the world, clearly prefigured in Warburg’s idea of 
pathos formulas.
 Lastly, this central idea of a cultural anthropology of affect and its formali-
zations can also be traced in an alternate genealogy, leading from Erwin 
Panofsky’s idea of the habitus of an epoch to Pierre Bourdieu’s sociological 
theories. This broad reception is very telling about the nature of Warburg’s 
ideas, and scholars like Giorgio Agamben and Georges Didi- Huberman have 
branded any disciplinary reduction of Warburg’s undertaking as contrary to 
its very essence (Agamben, 1999; Didi- Huberman, 2002/2017).2
Aby Warburg’s Pathosformel
Definitions of what a Pathosformel is or does vary heavily in the literature or 
remain entirely absent, mostly because Warburg himself never further elab-
orated on the notion himself. At its most basic level, the word “Pathos-
formel” describes the depiction of expressive gestures; and, with regard to 
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Warburg’s writings, more specifically those found in works of (Renais-
sance) art echoing antique portrayals of almost archetypal affect or pathos. 
Warburg uses the paradigmatic examples of dancing female figures like 
nymphs, gestures of death and the dying as seen in the figure of Orpheus, 
or scenes of erotic pursuits, such as the Zephyrus chasing Flora on Botticel-
li’s Primavera. However, pathos formulas are not studies of facial emotion 
expression. His interest lies not in the individual actualization of a general 
or basic emotion – like fear, anger, or desire – but in the generic repro-
duction of an expressive, affective formula that can, in fact, serve many 
different purposes. Warburg was neither looking for universal pathos for-
mulas that would occur in all cultures, nor did he claim that every pathos 
would necessarily become a formula (Krois, 2002, pp. 300–302). Rather, 
he wanted to describe a transformation: something that is individual and 
refers to a specific event, in this case pathos, becomes generic and perma-
nent, that is, formulaic. It is this formulaic character that enables circulation 
and reiteration, in contrast to bodily expressions that are situational and 
ephemeral (Krois, 2002, p. 295).
 Under the impression of Charles Darwin’s The Expression of the Emotions in 
Men and Animals (1872), Warburg understood pathos as inseparable from but 
neither identical with nor causally related to its expression. Therefore, he did 
not follow the path of physiognomy, which conceptualized expression as 
mere effect of underlying (mechanical) goings- on in the soul. With Darwin, 
he understood expression as one of three behavioral phenomena: (1) as the 
result of the conflicting forces of affect intensity, in the sense of a will- and 
habit- independent, biologically necessary “direct action” of a nervous system 
that is being affected; (2) as a product of the faculty of association, which could 
trigger the same expressive reaction even without biological necessity and 
could bridge the gap between natural reaction and willful communication by 
the force of habit; (3) according to the principle of antithesis, by which forms of 
expressions are invented not by biological necessity, but by an inversion of 
already established movements; that is, the creation of forms of expression 
which stay immanent to communication, for example, shoulder shrugging as 
inversion of aggressive behavior without any biological necessity (Didi- 
Huberman, 2002/2017, ch. 3).
 The word “Pathosformel” appears for the first time in a talk about Dürer and 
the Italian Antiquity, where Warburg uses it to refer to the defensive gesture of 
Orpheus, who is about to be slain (see Figure 19.1; Warburg, 1905/1998, 
p. 447).
 Warburg claims an expressive or gestural genealogy connecting Dürer’s 
depiction of the Death of Orpheus to similar representations, and, through 
Angelo Polizianos play Fabula di Orpheo and the writings of Ovid directly to 
the expressive repertoire or formal vocabulary (Formensprache) of antique art. 
Warburg is not interested in an evolution of styles, but in the formal iteration 
of expressions of pathos that constitute a memetic series, which he calls 
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“afterlife” (Nachleben). For instance, some affective intensity belonging to the 
Death of Orpheus, or the War against the Amazons of the Amazon Frieze from 
the Mausoleum at Halicarnassus has survived changes in time, lying latent 
during medieval times in its varying forms of expression. Equally, it survived 
Figure 19.1  Albrecht Dürer, Death of Orpheus, 1494, ink sketch. © bpk, Hamburger 
Kunsthalle, Christoph Irrgang.
Pathosformel (pathos formula)  225
geographic changes from antique Rome, to Renaissance Florence, to Dürer’s 
Nuremberg, as well as changes in its cultural context, in this case from 
paganism to Christianity. Afterlife is not a theory of the evolution of emo-
tional expression, where an original image is simply copied and slowly 
changed over time until it reaches its current form, as in the case of the devel-
opment of pictograms to letters. Instead of an evolutionary model, it follows 
a psychoanalytical model of a symbolic relation between singular or collective 
experiences and symptomatic reiterations (Didi- Huberman, 2003), wherein 
the image of Orpheus’ death, for example, could be a formula for all affects 
concerning death, murder, loss, mourning, and so forth. To view the Death of 
Orpheus as formulaic reiteration of the “same but different” pathos of experi-
encing violence and death throughout history is to regard the representational 
nature of the image as second to its affective genealogy. Obviously, this is not 
the only possible way to look at it, nor does it contradict a merely representa-
tional reading.
 To make this clearer, Warburg draws an analogy between his ideas and 
Hermann Osthoff ’s linguistic theory of intensification (see Gombrich, 1970, 
p. 178). In this theory, the Latin word “bonus” (good) changes to suppletive 
forms: bonus, melior, optimus. The same happens to some infinitives when con-
jugated: to be – am – is – are. However, the sense of what is expressed by these 
words survives the semantic changes, remaining the same in essence, but 
changing form. Accordingly, what is “stored” or encoded in pathos formulas 
is not a particular emotion but its intensity in a particular formation (Warburg, 
1929/2010, p. 631). The intensive peaks of pathos generate “extremes of 
physiognomic expression in the moment of highest excitement” (Warburg 
1903–1906, as cited in Gombrich, 1970, p. 179), which no longer belong to 
one fixed emotional regime, like fear, agony, or lust, but mark the point of 
their possible transition.
 This allows Warburg to trace pathos formulas independently of their 
emotional contexts. He goes as far as claiming that the emotional, cultural, 
or religious context attributed to a pathos formula may not only change 
slightly over the course of history but can be completely inverted to its 
opposite, for example, from the desire of pursuit to the fear felt in escape, 
or from the agony of death to the ecstasy of lust. He calls this shift “ener-
getic inversion” (energetische Inversion) to express the dynamic and ambiva-
lence of tension- filled movement (Gombrich, 1970, p. 338). Evil demoness 
or avenger angel, fighter or dancer – both are developed with the help of 
the same pathos formula. Hence, what Warburg is interested in is not indi-
vidual expressions of emotion, but the generic or formulaic capturing of affec-
tive intensity. These formulas of intensity are not semantically fixed. 
Although they might have been connected to relatively stable semantic 
content over long periods of time and in many artworks, pathos formulas 
can also be recoded. Thus, they first and foremost function as a sign of 
affective intensity and energy.
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Pathos formulas as intensifiers
For Warburg, the most basic formula for any intensity is motion or movement. 
In his dissertation on Sandro Botticelli, he pays special attention to the external 
and ornamental movement of things like drapes or hair in the wind (Warburg, 
1893/2010). They add little to the narrative content of the image, but intensify 
the image. According to Warburg, these ornamental motions, which he calls 
“dynamograms” (Dynamogramme), fascinate and affect us, because they create the 
illusion of movement and liveliness in something that stands still, just like the 
term pathos formula itself binds together the event of affecting and being affected 
(→ affect) and the timeless, motionless idea of a formula. We miss the point of 
the dancing nymph, an allegory of Spring, who welcomes Venus on the shores, 
if we take her dancing (only) as dancing, while it actually works as an intensifier 
of the whole scene (see Figure 19.2). Warburg locates the affective intensity, or 
pathos, not on the faces of the goddess or any of the other three depicted figures, 
but rather sees it in the wave of Venus’ hair, in the joyful tumbling of the flower 
petals in the wind, as allegorized by the two figures on the left, and in the dance 
movements of the welcoming nymph to the right. These moving elements – 
fluttering garments, flying hair, drapes, and so forth – act like accessories. 
Warburg calls them “bewegtes Beiwerk” (moving accessories; Warburg, 
1893/2010, p. 4) and traces them through time and artistic genres alike. Thus, 
Warburg posits, if artists wanted to add affective intensity to an image, they 
could accessorize them with formulaic props that reach back to antiquity; this 
would work independently from the facial expression of emotions.
Figure 19.2  Sandro Botticelli, The Birth of Venus, c.1480, Tempera on panel. 
© Photographic Department of the Uffizi Galleries, Florence.
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Storage and release of affect
As we have seen, the semantic framing of a pathos formula within an image is 
not essential to its affective intensity. The content or sujet of the image and its 
affective intensity might drift apart. This can create oscillating effects, 
between, for instance, pain and lust, or serene calmness and chilling lifeless-
ness. When analyzing affects via the description of an image, attention must 
be paid to the internal resonances and possible dissonances between the 
context of the picture and the intensity of its affective qualities. A pathos 
formula does not have a fixed meaning of its own, but helps to generate 
meaning by arranging the affective dynamics within an image. In other 
words, a pathos formula does not illustrate a specific content, but almost liter-
ally moves or arranges the elements of an image, and thereby also moves and 
arranges the affective relation between the image and the viewer. Building on 
Warburg, we understand these two conjoined processes, affectively arranging 
the elements of an image and, consequently, arranging the relationship 
between image and viewer, as “storing” and releasing or reenacting affective 
intensity in a certain dynamic form. It is precisely this mutual affective rela-
tionship to which the art historical description of artifacts and images testifies, 
and no analysis of an image can step outside this affective relation. Hence, 
Warburg’s idea of a pathos formula is not only of value for art historians, but 
also for every researcher of affectivity who finds herself affectively entangled 
with the very objects she studies (Schankweiler & Wüschner, 2019).
 This leads to the most speculative element of Warburg’s concept, which is 
the idea that affectivity is not only stored within pathos formulas but can also 
be released or reenacted by the beholder. According to Philipp Ekardt (2011), 
there is mimesis between objects and objects – for instance, different render-
ings of the same expression – constituting the afterlife of pathos formulas, and 
there is a mimetic relationship between object and subject, constituting the 
afterlife of the affective intensity within the beholder. This mimesis, there-
fore, is not only bodily but also psychological. Against the backdrop of 
Robert Vischer’s “Einfühlungsästhetik,” Ekardt claims, Warburg sees a mimetic 
element in the act of perception itself (Ekardt, 2011, p. 105). This mimetic 
assimilation within perception itself is possible only, because art, as Ekardt 
puts it, does not imitate or represent nature as such, nor even nature as 
experienced in perception, but “mimes the effects [emphasis added] of percep-
tion itself, understood as affects” (Ekardt, 2011, p. 105). Therefore, whenever 
they create or describe pathos formulas, artists and beholders alike refer to the 
same experience of being affected, which is stored in antique forms. This is a 
process that Vischer, too, calls “Nachleben,” thus adding to the possible sources 
for Warburg’s concept (Ekardt, 2011, p. 111). Thus, once perception and 
mimesis are fused together in affect, no “decoding” has to precede the 
reenactment of said affect. Strictly speaking, not even a transmission of affect 
is necessary, for affect itself is this transmission.
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 However, as intriguing as this theory might be, its empirical and theoret-
ical foundations remain opaque or sometimes doubtful. At times, Warburg 
even seems to have followed a “biological- behavioral stimulus- response 
theory” and appears to argue for the dissemination of affective repertoires via 
genetic retransmission (Knape, 2008, p. 126). This is but one of several 
instances where Warburg leaves the reader with a feeling of uneasiness. It 
serves as a reminder that despite being a visionary thinker and practitioner, 
who is rightly considered a pioneer of visual culture studies today, Warburg 
needs to be understood in the context of the scientific landscape of the early 
20th century. He followed in this tradition rather eclectically, while only 
turning his critical astuteness against his own discipline. Nevertheless, 
 Warburg’s concept of the pathos formula entails an affect theory in its own 
right that we believe is not necessarily compromised by the rather problem-
atic parts of his thinking.
Toward a theory of affective formulas and 
their iteration
It cannot be denied that Warburg developed his idea of pathos formula with 
reference to the human body. He was predominantly looking at figurative art 
and was especially interested in the depiction of human bodies, and of human 
affectivity that certainly affects the beholder in a particular and very direct 
manner. However, we deem it important to stress that pathos formulas are not 
conceptually bound to the human figure, just as being affected by an image 
cannot be reduced to feeling empathy toward who or what is represented. In 
Warburg’s efforts to address accessories in motion, we can already see a trajec-
tory that leads beyond the human body, despite the fact that he identifies ele-
ments that are bound to the human body and its excited motion, like the 
aforementioned flying hair or draping. We would suggest expanding the scope 
of Warburg’s idea toward moving accessories that are detached from the human 
body. A painting or photograph of a dark sky, shrouded in clouds, above a tur-
bulent sea, for example, could also be described as a formulaic movement gen-
erating affect, even as pathos. Moreover, even art or images that are not 
figurative at all could possibly be read along these lines – abstract painting like 
the scribbled, calligraphic elements in Cy Twombly’s work or Jackson Pollock’s 
abstract expressionism come to mind. The literal meaning of pathos in pathos 
formula might be strained by such examples, but we still would suggest a con-
ceptual continuity between pathos formulas in the narrow sense and these for-
mulaic arrangements of things and non- representational elements, a continuity, 
which for us is expressed best in Warburg’s own words as dynamograms.
 Given the importance of movement, another point seems worthwhile to 
address: Warburg developed his ideas in relation to still images, such as paintings, 
prints, photographs, and did not include film – even though the emerging 
culture of cinema in the 1920s would have given him ample opportunity. In 
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view of the fact that Warburg also found pathos formulas in literary works (e.g., 
in Ovid), it must come as a surprise to us today that he himself did not include 
the kinaesthetic experience of the moving image that might even intensify affec-
tive dynamics. Although he did not rule out the application of the concept of 
pathos formula to moving images and thinking of formulas that unfold in time, 
Warburg focused on still images for a reason. For it is precisely the tension 
between movement, in the double sense of motion of bodies (and things) as well 
as being moved emotionally, and stillness that makes a pathos formula work 
(Krüger, 2013). Its formulaic character makes it easy to grasp, and easier to 
repeat, and to travel across time and space. Although videos are increasingly used 
in everyday communication, we tend to remember still images. As Julian 
 Stallabrass (2017) writes: “Even in an age of instantly available video, iconic 
images – those that are reproduced insistently in the media and dwell most sali-
ently in collective memory – are more likely to be still photographs” (p. 29). 
Since Warburg’s idea of pathos formula is connected inextricably to memory 
and mimesis and to the question of how affectivity can be stored and “survive” 
over time, it seems less surprising that he ignored moving images. The issue of 
memory gained center stage in Warburg’s unfinished project of Mnemosyne Atlas. 
At the end of his life it consisted of 63 boards covered in heavy black cloth with 
(mainly) photographs of pieces of art, illustrations from books or albums, news-
paper clippings and other media pinned onto them. The atlas, named after the 
goddess of memory in Greek mythology, offers insights into formalized affectiv-
ity and its historical transmission. It is Warburg’s attempt at a cartography of 
pathos formulas as they are actualized in an iterating series of images. As such, 
the atlas emphasizes the dynamic historicity of both imagery and affectivity.
 To summarize, our reading of Warburg’s ideas, especially that of his key 
notion of pathos formula, contributes to the field of affect studies with regard to 
three main aspects: First, the concept of pathos formula enables us to address 
affective intensity as a formal quality. Second, the idea of dynamic formalization 
stresses that affect can indeed be stored in objects of art and in images in general, 
and can be transmitted across time and space. Third, and connected to the latter, 
the idea of formalized affective intensity enables us to theorize the issue of the 
historicity of affect. As a particular formation, affectivity can have an afterlife that 
can be traced back, and at the same time dynamically shapes future affectivity 
connected to images.
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1 The term “spect- actors” refers to spectators that are strategically activated to engage in a 
certain role or function within a performance.
Chapter 20
Immersion, immersive power
Rainer Mühlhoff and Theresa Schütz
Immersion is a specific quality that emerges through dynamics of affecting 
and being affected, and is characterized by a dense involvement of the subject 
in an interactive and inter- affective context that entangles thinking, feeling, 
and acting. Immersion is based on the subject’s affective disposition, selected 
aspects of which are activated in an immersive situation (→ affective disposi-
tion). Thus while the individual brings a certain potential to be immersed, it is 
the specific framing of an inter- affective and relational context that unleashes 
and harnesses this potential in a particular manner. While this happens, any 
possibility of distancing on the part of the subject is temporarily blocked. The 
immersed subject is “at the mercy of ” the inter- affective context, but also 
simultaneously contributes to and participates in that context. From the per-
spective of the immersed subject, the affective quality of immersion is charac-
teristically accompanied by experiences such as absorption or uneasiness with/
in the micro- social dynamics of the respective situation.
 Examples from two specific domains are paradigmatic for studying the 
phenomenon of immersion in the context of affect theory. The first domain 
is part of a current trend called “immersive arts.” This umbrella term gathers 
a range of artistic formats that “immerse” their recipients into the perform-
ance event in different ways: by mobilizing the spectator, through the use of 
Virtual Reality (VR) or Augmented Reality (AR) tools, or through partici-
patory techniques that involve the audience members in a situation, narration, 
or instruction. Here, we focus on performance installations that create fic-
tional worlds actualized in large- scale site- specific environments. The audi-
ence is invited to roam freely and explore the fiction through various modes 
of interaction with performers, props, and other audience members. Specifi-
cally, works of the Danish- Austrian performance collective SIGNA are exem-
plary in provoking situations in which “spect- actors” are involved in 
inter- affective and interactive micro- situations in which they cannot but act 
and affect according to their personal dispositions.1 Immersion in these 
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performance installations is, for the subject, a specific mode of situational 
(re)enacting of emotions, states, or evaluations. Immersion unfolds as a result 
of finding oneself embedded in an affective arrangement (→ affective arrange-
ment), which can activate the full range of someone’s affective and psycho-
logical dispositions. These might include traumata, shame, inferiority 
complexes, and other sensitivities.
 The second domain we discuss is modern Human Resource Management 
(HRM) in post- industrial work cultures. Current corporate governance tech-
niques increasingly tend to create lifestyle environments at work. In these set-
tings, employees engage in a full spectrum of social, affective, psychological, 
and cognitive registers. In intensive and holistic environments, workers are 
simultaneously stimulated and harnessed at the level of their intrinsic motiva-
tional dispositions. As these dispositions are social and affective in nature, 
their activation during work tends to blur the boundaries between work and 
leisure. This facilitates a form of micro- governance that modulates people’s 
behavior for the company’s benefit by stimulating affective dynamics that 
strategically prevent moments of distancing and critique.
 In this chapter we pursue the claim that these phenomena of immersion 
reveal a significant structural aspect of contemporary societies at large. Immer-
sion is less a particular phenomenon in art and corporate governance than an 
increasingly poignant theme in a general cultural diagnosis. A willingness, 
readiness, or even a manifest desire of subjects to become immersed and to 
immerse themselves is evident in a range of domains; at the same time, new 
techniques of post- disciplinary micro- governance and power are based on 
immersion. Since public debate tends to limit immersion to VR technology, 
in this chapter we will counter such techno- centricity by presenting an 
affect- theoretical approach geared toward understanding immersion as a lived 
form of intersubjectivity and affectivity in a spectrum of lifeworld settings 
(Mühlhoff & Schütz, 2017).
Different phenomena of immersion
The English term “immersion” derives from the Latin verb immergere and 
offers a constellation of at least three slightly different meanings. First, it can 
refer to the act of immersing, and second, to the state of being immersed in a 
surrounding medium, for instance a person in water. In both cases, immer-
sion is used transitively: somebody or something is immersed into another 
substance, in the sense of submersion or “diving in.” Notably, both the 
immersed object and the medium remain distinct in this connotation of the 
word. A third meaning of immersion refers to the extensive exposure of a 
person, for instance, to a foreign culture or language environment for the 
purpose of learning. In this case, immersion addresses a way of deep bodily 
and mental involvement up to the point of absorption and amalgamation 
aimed at transforming the individual. This third facet of meaning derives from 
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the verb “to merge,” which is connected to “immersion” through the Latin 
verb immergere. Immersion in the sense of merging suggests the amalgamation, 
fusion, or coalescence of an immersed individual within something else. Our 
affect theoretical conceptualization of immersion selects and highlights this 
third meaning because it provides a way of overcoming a static subject–object 
divide. Relationality among different individuals and within specific environ-
ments is key to the understanding of immersion. The examples we take up 
below suggest that an immersed individual and the social group or environ-
ment into which they are immersed are no longer the same objects. Immer-
sion is therefore not to be understood as a one- directional absorption or 
submersion of someone into something, in which each entity remains discrete 
and fixed, but rather as a mutual transformation of both.
 Because of its spectrum of connotations, the term immersion has been 
adopted by a broad range of scientific and cultural discourses. For instance, in 
film, literature, and game studies the term is used to describe a mode of 
reception. The reader of a piece of literature is considered to be immersed if 
they are mentally or imaginatively traveling into the represented world. Anal-
ogously, this effect of absorption in a mediated world may describe the 
experience of watching a movie or a realistic play in a theater. Immersion is 
also a trending keyword in the lively field of gaming, where it refers to a 
mode of being- in that is not merely a quality of reception but a visual and 
tactile strategy facilitated by special technological media devices. Research in 
game studies describes immersion as a special moment of presence, as an 
impression of sensory and motor involvement in a represented and mediated 
world. The development of VR and AR technologies and their interfaces 
aims to increase this effect of presence by systematically connecting the 
human perceptional apparatus with hardware devices producing an as- if effect 
based on physical stimulation, algorithms, and digital data.
 In response to this somewhat vague and often metaphorical use of the 
term immersion in art, media, and game studies, Gordon Calleja (2011, 
pp. 26–27) calls for a differentiation between immersion as absorption and 
immersion as transportation in the context of reception theory. Immersion as 
transportation addresses the reception of the mediated “possible world,” its 
environment, the characters, the storyline, and so forth (see also Ryan, 
2001, pp. 99–105). Immersion as absorption, however, focuses more on the 
quality of the medium, that is, on its capabilities of undisturbed mediation. 
Beside the often vague and heterogeneous usage of the term immersion in 
art and media studies, the discourse also tends to remain entrenched in a 
binary mode of thinking, frequently evoking a range of dichotomies such 
as active versus passive, absorption versus reflection, proximity versus dis-
tance, or manipulation versus agency. This binary thinking finds parallels 
with the rather simplistic way of evaluating the phenomena of immersion 
in a dichotomous scheme of either optimistic and affirmative or pessimistic 
and dismissive critiques.
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 While no systematic history of the concept of immersion exists, Oliver 
Grau (2003) argues that the history of immersion as a mode of reception is as 
old as the history of illusionist art. With each new medium of illusion, the 
relationship between the power of the image (or, the power of the medium 
mediating the image) and the recipient’s strategies to distance themselves from 
perceptional or imaginary immersion had to be renegotiated. Raising the 
question of the subject’s self- positioning toward ongoing perceptual, sensual, 
or affective manipulations in immersive contexts is therefore key to the 
debate on immersion. This holds not only in the field of art but also within 
the widespread aesthetic use of immersive techniques in everyday life. The 
phantasmatic topos of “total immersion” combines both the desire for immers-
ing oneself in a pleasurable mode of manipulation and the fear of being 
immersed without recognizing it. This is why current research in film and 
theater studies analyzes the moment of experienced immersion as a perma-
nent oscillation between diving in and resurfacing (Schweinitz, 2006, p. 147).
 In contemporary neoliberal capitalism, immersive techniques have become 
increasingly ubiquitous phenomena (Curtis, 2008, p. 79). Several strategies of 
binding subjects (in)to a specific and intense surrounding in consumer capit-
alism, experience industry and affective computing could also be described as 
techniques of immersion. Retail and trade corporations in different fields 
increasingly rely on elements of scenography and scent design in order to 
transform their stores into exceptional “places to be.” Their idea is to create 
an environment with a pleasant atmosphere in order to capture the multi- 
sensorial attention of the consumer. Architecture and city marketing, which 
increasingly utilize immersive techniques or so- called “scripted spaces” (Klein, 
2004), like small model versions of Venice, are another example of an attempt 
to immerse consumers into constructed everyday worlds. Dark restaurants and 
immersive fitness centers are only a stone’s throw from entertainment sector 
events like “secret cinema” venues, transgressive nightclub formats, “escape 
room games,” or popular “immersive theater” performances. All of these 
forms work with the marketing promise of an extraordinary experience and a 
unique, unforgettable event. In addition to normalizing escapism in a way, 
these sectors work on temporally and spatially embedding the subject in a 
designed but real space. In this context, processes of gamification can also be 
analyzed as governance techniques producing a subject’s motivation and 
desire to take part in these forms and events.
 At this point, it becomes clear that immersion is used as a metaphor to 
describe vastly diverse phenomena. In contrast, the examples we use below 
facilitate an analysis of the (affective) impact of social- relational arrangements 
that embed subjects in a specifically affective way. It is therefore important to 
distinguish between two different senses of immersion. First, as a broader 
understanding of processes that emphasize a subject’s embeddedness in the 
world, that is, the state of being immersed in a language, an environment, or 
within culturally and socially constructed feeling rules (→ feeling rules) or 
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behavioral patterns. Second, it is a mode of experiencing situations as immer-
sive due to a specific affective intensity or impact.
 Returning to our first example, the work of SIGNA offers a striking case 
study to elaborate our affect theoretical conception of immersion. Unlike 
in the case of film, VR, or AR, the specific mediality and materiality of 
theater in SIGNA’s performance installations do not use technological 
devices to stimulate or facilitate the spectators’ “plunge” into fiction. 
Rather, the spect- actors’ state of immersion is the result of direct face- to-
face involvement and inter- affective relations with the performers within 
the performance space. The artistically designed environments in SIGNA’s 
performance installations work as hyper- realistic simulations of closed 
milieus. For instance, spect- actors are invited to experience themselves as 
patients in a psychiatric hospital (Ventestedet/Waiting Room, Copenhagen 
2014), as employees in a tightly hierarchically structured corporation (Söhne 
und Söhne/Sons and Sons, Hamburg 2015), or as potential members of a 
mysterious sect (Das Heuvolk/Peoples of Hay, Mannheim 2017). Although 
audience members are mostly aware of being spectators within a theatrical 
scenario, the installation consistently creates situations that lead them to 
neglect this frame by crystallizing the bare immediacy of acting and react-
ing in an intense affective dynamic. Characteristic of SIGNA’s installations 
is a rigid power structure of the represented (fictional) world that involun-
tarily implicates and binds audience members. At the immediate level of 
embodied interaction, the often dystopian narrative of SIGNA’s fictions is 
supplemented by transgressions such as exposing spect- actors to performers’ 
intense gazes or to instructions given in a commanding tone. The multi- 
sensory perception of the closed space often involves purposefully instigated 
disgust (for instance, through exposure to vomit or bodily fluids) and 
unease (for instance, through being questioned on intimate topics or being 
approached in a sexually explicit manner). This turns SIGNA’s installations 
into a very specific affective arrangement (→ affective arrangement) in which 
each individual enters into an immersive interplay of affecting and being 
affected in situ, which produces a degree of immediacy beyond fictionality 
and technical mediation.
 Another remarkable aspect of SIGNA’s dramaturgy is the staging of scenes 
of violence. Spect- actors see performers become victims of physical or 
psychological violence in their immediate proximity. Such acts are part of the 
fiction but enacted in a real, material scenario of face- to-face interaction. This 
exposure forces spect- actors to react and take a possibly moral or political 
stance toward what they see. In these situations, individuals might find them-
selves immersed into a dense affective struggle based on their own ethical and 
political values and normative rules of behavior and feeling. SIGNA’s drama-
turgy catalyzes such struggles and the potential re- actions and interventions 
by audience members by purposefully stimulated group dynamics and politics 
of gazes between the audience members.
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An affect theoretical approach to immersion
In our approach based on an affect theoretical framework (→ affect; → affective 
disposition), immersion names a certain mode of emotional and affective involve-
ment in a situated or mediated dynamic of affecting and being affected. This 
mode of involvement is characterized by the inherent entanglement of the indi-
vidual contributing to and participating in this dynamic. Simultaneously, the over-
arching context is subtly modulating the individual’s feeling, thinking, and 
acting. This is what constitutes the mutually transformative aspect of immersion, 
overcoming a static subject–object divide in which the immersed subject and 
the medium remain distinct. From a subjective perspective, the affective tonality 
of an immersive mode of involvement may best be described as absorption or 
coalescence within the local affective arrangement (→ affective arrangement) that 
frames the situation. Importantly, this absorption or coalescence is not solely 
externally induced, but rather builds on the individual’s specific affective dispo-
sition (→ affective disposition) that shapes their potential to contribute actively to 
an affective dynamic. For an affect theoretical understanding of immersion, we 
propose the following explication in three steps:
1 First, immersive involvements are characterized by the relationality of 
affect. That is, immersion is based on reciprocal dynamics of affecting and 
being affected, of activity and passivity, movement and sensation, action 
and experience. Immersion does not solely render passive, overwhelm, or 
overpower the immersed subject. In an entanglement of active and 
passive involvement, how the subject is affected depends irreducibly on 
how it affects others within the same dynamic.
2 Reciprocity of affect is a necessary but not sufficient criterion of immer-
sion. The specific and distinguishing criterion of immersion is a recipro-
cal dynamic of affect accompanied by the experience of absorption by 
the subject being immersed. By this, we mean constellations in which the 
relational dynamic seems to cast a spell on the subject, capturing them 
completely in a specific local frame that functions as a social, affective, 
discursive, symbolic, and institutional force field. Absorption is the 
moment where one’s own (affective, cognitive, bodily) potential is har-
nessed in such a way that it turns into an integral part of the ensemble at 
hand. It is accompanied by emotional involvement that shapes the spec-
trum of possibilities for the subject to think and act in that situation. In 
immersion, these possibilities diverge from those the subject has at their 
disposal outside the immersive framing and with respect to their whole 
biography. Depending on the situation, this may mean a limitation of the 
spectrum, so that only part of one’s affective disposition is in play. Or, it 
could have a productive and constitutive effect: the specific experience of 
immersion might open up surprising new forms of feeling, acting, and 
embodiment that could be transformative for subjectivity.
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3 From the perspective of affect theory, it is important that immersion is 
neither a property only of a certain situated arrangement or ensemble, nor 
of the immersed subject alone, but rather of the interplay of both. The 
subject is immersed into an affective dynamic by means of specific aspects 
of their affective disposition (→ affective disposition). In immersion, the reci-
procity of affecting and being affected stabilizes into a certain pattern by 
means of feedback processes between the individual’s disposition and the 
environment’s affective stimuli. In such a feedback loop, the subject is 
already susceptible to this particular mode of being absorbed – it is part of 
their affective disposition. At the same time, this mode of being absorbed is 
selectively intensified and possibly deliberately stabilized in the local 
framing. As a result, changing one’s mode of involvement to different pat-
terns of affecting and being affected – for instance, by means of deliberate 
interventions, volatile behavioral strategies, or reflexive distancing – is pos-
sible in principle, but made difficult by the specific design of immersive 
contexts. This is why immersion typically limits a subject’s scope of atten-
tion, sensitivity, and action to the present context. The immersed subject is 
thus in a state of absorption in the situation in either a pleasurable or dis-
pleasing way. One could get carried away by an immersive dynamic or get 
framed in a disturbing way; in both cases, one’s powers of thinking, feeling, 
and acting would be modulated by that specific mode of involvement. 
Because of this mechanism of relational co- constitution, immersion does 
not overwhelm or overpower the individual from without, nor does it 
make it passive. Here, our conception moves beyond those approaches 
that describe immersion as a mode of illusionist reception related to 
technological or artistic frames that imply mental, imaginary, or virtual 
traveling into a fictional world (Ryan, 2001; Griffiths, 2008; Wolf, Bern-
hart, & Mahler, 2013), whether in games (Jennett et al., 2008), films 
(Rose, 2011), multisensory immersive theater environments (Machon, 
2013), or everyday settings (Bieger, 2007). Our understanding of immer-
sion, in contrast, focuses on affective dynamics in which deeply rooted 
psychological and affective dispositions of specific individuals enter into a 
feedback loop with environmental stimuli. In this approach, immersion is 
not primarily based on being separated or shielded from an outside world. 
Rather, it starts from inherent and intensive forces of involvement so that 
closure of the interactive sphere of an immersive situation is not a cause, 
but an effect of immersion. This understanding facilitates critical analyses 
in which immersion may be seen as a mechanism of immanent rather 
than repressive power.
Immersive power
As a broader cultural diagnosis, the adaptation of immersive techniques in 
marketing and consumer spheres can be deciphered as indicating a prevalent 
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readiness or even longing to be immersed. This observation leads to the social 
theoretical observation that the cultural disposition toward immersion does 
not only correlate with certain forms of entertainment or modes of aesthetic 
reception. It is also being discovered and (sometimes furtively) adopted by 
modern techniques of micro- governance and subjectivation. This is particu-
larly evident in contemporary Human Resource Management, our second 
exemplary domain: a field in which applied psychology, digitization, and 
micro- economics all interact with each other. For instance, in the current 
trend of “start- up culture” copied from Silicon Valley companies into many 
classical branches of knowledge work industries, science, research, and even 
public administration, companies seek to attract employees with the promise 
of holistic work environments and intense social dynamics in a closed sphere 
of “amazing” co- workers. These work environments powerfully integrate 
elements of work and leisure in the workspace, functional and aesthetic con-
siderations in the design of offices and interactions as “lifeworlds,” and work 
relations with implicitly orchestrated forms of social and affective attachment. 
All this fits with the “post- industrial” paradigm of production (cf. Liu, 2004) 
and the subjectivity of the “entrepreneurial self ” (Bröckling, 2016). The lines 
between work and life, duties and pleasures, and company goals and personal 
goals are thereby increasingly blurred (Mühlhoff & Slaby, 2018).
 Melissa Gregg (2011) shows in her workplace ethnographic study that 
workers’ immersion in modern HRM formations is not only a face- to-face 
interaction in the presence of co- workers. Due to the proliferation of net-
worked media, work is, in fact, no longer spatially contained. Yet paradoxic-
ally, increasing spatial dissolution due to digital connectivity does not mean 
work is less immersive. In fact, the demand for availability on electronic com-
munication platforms, from real time emailing to chat programs or video tele-
phony, penetrates into the most intimate spheres of life such as bedrooms and 
evening hours, activating even the most remote portions of a worker’s time 
and mental capacity as a resource for company benefit. An immersive work 
environment is thus a complex heterogeneous ensemble of persons, architec-
tural designs, company visions and discourses, and technological infrastruc-
ture. These elements interplay to form a dense web of involvement.
 The trend of immersive governance at work, which is evident in the 
design of office spaces as holistic environments and in the ubiquitous connec-
tivity of networked media, is part of a wider dispositif of the psychologization 
of micro- management in the New Spirit of Capitalism (Boltanski & Chiapello, 
1999/2007). Resulting from intellectual precursors such as cybernetics and 
group dynamic research in the second half of the 20th century, techniques 
such as “team work,” “soft skill trainings,” “bonding exercises,” and regular 
“performance reviews” that also cover personal and social competences build 
today’s standard repertoire of corporate socialization measures. Seen from a 
critical point of view, such measures exist to produce suitable affective dispo-
sitions in co- workers, which allows for a form of corporate governance that 
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operates almost exclusively by “positive” forces. The older techniques of dis-
cipline, internalization of role expectations, and functional assignments are 
thus replaced by an immersive style of governance that strategically addresses 
co- workers’ social and interpersonal motivations and needs; in short, their 
affective attachment patterns.
 While work in such environments often feels free and self- organized, 
which is in fact one of its promises and a result of its specific subjectivation, 
discourses and modes of reflexivity in such environments are strategically set 
up in such a way that conscious distancing, critiques of this form of involve-
ment, or temporal withdrawal often come at high psychological and emo-
tional costs. In a sphere where work relations are meant to blend with social 
relations, duty with pleasure, and company goals with subjective goals, an 
effort to distance oneself or have upfront conversations on critical points is 
easily a paradoxical and self- destructive endeavor that goes against one’s own 
social bonds and motivations (cf. Gregg, 2011). This is why we consider 
HRM an example of immersion – of the strategic production of absorption 
and amalgamation based on one’s own affective disposition – on a subtle and 
everyday scale. The case shows that the design of immersive environments is 
used as a modern technique of affective governmentality. In this way, our 
affect theoretical approach to immersion sheds new light on the diagnosis of 
“societies of control” (Deleuze, 1992), and shows how control is imple-
mented by the implicit stimulation of affective mechanisms. Immersion, then, 
appears as a certain modality of subjectivation and power that operates in the 
register of affective relations more than in discourse. A critical analysis of gov-
ernmentality based on “immersive power” (Mühlhoff, 2018) provides an 
important contribution towards the as of yet insufficiently developed theory 
of power and subjectivity in control societies.
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Chapter 21
Emotion repertoires
Anita von Poser, Edda Heyken, 
Thi Minh Tam Ta, and Eric Hahn
Emotion repertoires are specific configurations of cultural repertoires 
(Swidler, 2001) that guide human action and meaning in durable, practica-
ble, and relationally intelligible ways. Emotion repertoires endow indi-
viduals and collectives with the agency and security to display, negotiate, 
and thus regulate felt experiences in socially and culturally appropriate 
ways. These repertoires take shape during processes of socialization but 
remain flexible due to a life- long formation of feeling as well as due to 
ongoing affective experiences and societal transformations. Based on such a 
dynamic and agentive understanding, we argue that individuals and collec-
tives variously draw on emotion repertoires to create relational spheres of 
affective resonance. Within these spheres, individuals and collectives either 
build and enact, or unbind, attachments and affectional bonds and can thus 
both facilitate and hinder feelings of belonging. In other words, emotion 
repertoires are the “glue” that connects individuals within different affec-
tive communities as part of Affective Societies.
 Our theoretical foundation of the concept of emotion repertoires builds 
on and brings together ideas from a variety of related disciplines such as 
cultural sociology and cultural anthropology (Coe, 2013; Swidler, 1986, 
2001), theater and performance studies (Davis, 2009), psychological anthro-
pology and its subfield of cognitive anthropology (Lowe, 2018; Röttger-
Rössler, 2004), and the philosophy and history of emotion (e.g., Reddy, 
2001; Slaby, Mühlhoff, & Wüschner, 2016). Based on our interdisciplinary 
anthropological- psychiatric research in heterogeneous Vietnamese lifeworlds 
in Berlin (Heyken et al., forthcoming; von Poser, Lanca, & Heyken, 2017; 
Ta, Hahn, Nguyen, & Spennemann, 2017), we use the framework of “reper-
toires” in order to present and discuss three distinct, yet constantly interlinked 
analytic dimensions, which we consider as paramount to and constitutive of 
emotion repertoires. The first dimension addresses the durability and intransi-
gence of emotion repertoires, whereas the second and third dimensions relate 
to the practicability as well as to the relationality of emotion repertoires. We 
build on recent theories of affect and emotion in the social and cultural 
sciences (von Scheve, 2017; Slaby & Röttger-Rössler, 2018) to explore the 
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affective efforts that individuals and collectives undertake in processes of 
readjusting internalized emotion repertoires within contexts of migration. 
The aforementioned dimensions, as well as the interlinkages between them, 
have the potential to become the subject of inquiry in several disciplines. 
They have yet to be thoroughly addressed within transdisciplinary emotion 
and affect research and in the context of research on Affective Societies. More-
over, emotion repertoires relate to other salient emotional and affective phe-
nomena studied in various disciplines. Therefore, the conceptual value of 
emotion repertoires transcends disciplinary boundaries.
Conceptualizing emotion repertoires
Our concept of emotion repertoires might be thought of as an expansion of 
what cultural sociologist Ann Swidler (1986, 2001) defines as a “cultural 
repertoire,” which is a prominent theoretical framework relating back to 
the work of social anthropologist Ulf Hannerz (1969). Recently, the 
concept has been taken up by a number of scholars (e.g., Coe, 2013; Lowe, 
2018) to refine investigations at the interface of culture, agency, and social 
and emotional navigation. According to Swidler (2001), a cultural reper-
toire is a kind of toolkit that “allows people to move among situations, 
finding terms in which to orient action within each situation” (p. 30). In 
framing culture as a set of repertoires, analogous to those of an actor, a 
musician, or a dancer, Swidler argues that individuals have learned to rely 
on an available array of cultured skills, resources, arguments, or strategies in 
responding to a given social situation. Swidler, moreover, grounds culture 
and the concept of a repertoire in action, experience, and practice. 
Thereby, she deploys a praxeological, highly dynamic, and agentive notion 
of repertoire, which she explains as follows:
We can ask not only what pieces are in the repertoire but why some are 
performed at one time, some at another.[...] Just as a musician may have 
easier, more assured mastery over some parts of her repertoire than 
others, so our mastery of culture varies. Some cultural orientations are so 
ingrained that they require neither effort nor self- consciousness. Others 
require laborious concentration. And still other parts of a repertoire are 
insecurely learned, so that one may act out a cultural attitude without 
being very good at it.
(Swidler, 2001, pp. 24–25)
Scholars interested in repertoire theory and emotion theory have indeed 
drawn on performance theory (e.g., Coe, 2013; Röttger-Rössler, 2016; 
Sarbin, 1986). Anthropologist Cati Coe, whose research on the social naviga-
tions of Ghanaian migrant families is theoretically informed by work in per-
formance studies (e.g., Tailor, 2003), argues that:
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a person only enacts some of his or her repertoire in the world. A reper-
toire can contain other possibilities for action that are declined, for what-
ever reason, including personal history, or as people reflect on their 
actions and situations.[...] People may know more than they enact or be 
aware of greater possibilities of action than they believe is right to do.
(Coe, 2013, p. 19)
Following this tradition, we take theater and performance theorist Tracy D. 
Davis’ (2009) definition as a productive point of departure to explicate the 
durability and resistiveness to change of emotion repertoires. However, this rel-
ative intransigence does not mean that they are fixed, stable, or rigid. Rather, 
they are characterized by possibility, adaptability, and creativity. Davis (2009) 
states that repertoires are “multiple circulating recombinative discourses of intelligi-
bility” (p. 7; italics in original) that provide audiences with the ability to com-
prehend and interpret different performative tropes as well as incorporate new 
ones by means of creative improvisation. Based on a “phenomenology of 
experiencing” (Davis, 2009, p. 7), collectives are thus explicitly able to draw 
on the possibilities produced by performances of interacting bodies in reitera-
tive and recombinative ways.
 Emotion repertoires, as part of cultural repertoires, enable individuals and 
collectives to communicate durable meanings out of a number of possibilities 
and perform actions in intelligible ways on various levels at which emotions 
evolve (Svašek, 2010). At the level of “discourse,” emotions evolve in rela-
tion to social and cultural categorizations, associations, imaginations, interpre-
tations, and evaluations. At the level of “embodiment,” emotions evolve in 
relation to bodily and sensory perceptions, reactions, and expressions 
(Wetherell, 2012). At the level of “practice,” emotions shape and are shaped 
by behavioral patterns, habits, and modes of action and interaction 
(→ emotion, emotion concept; → affective practice). When acquiring cultural rep-
ertoires, individuals and collectives thus also learn to encode felt experiences 
as discrete emotions, how and when to display and respond to feelings in 
certain ways, and which positive or negative sanctions to anticipate in view of 
their own and others’ affective and emotional enactments (Röttger-Rössler, 
2004; Röttger-Rössler & Markowitsch, 2009).
 Emotion repertoires are significantly shaped during implicit as well as 
explicit processes of socialization. A comparative study of childrearing prac-
tices in two different societies in Taiwan and Madagascar found that the 
“enactment of culture- specific socializing emotions leads to different trajectories 
of emotional development and thus to different emotion repertoires” 
(Röttger-Rössler et al., 2015, pp. 191–192, italics in original). It is within 
processes of socialization that emotion repertoires gain a quality of durability as 
children imitate and habituate these repertoires, often in deeply embodied 
ways, and simultaneously test their practicability in the relational affective set-
tings of different social and spatial fields. In her research on emotions in an 
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Indonesian society, Röttger-Rössler (2004, pp. 70–79) draws on approaches 
from cognitive anthropology to argue for how deeply “cultural models of 
emotion” become ingrained. According to her view, human emotionality 
develops in relation to cultural schemas (as information- processing mecha-
nisms) and cultural models (as the more complex interconnections of different 
schemas) that individuals acquire and that are collectively recognized, avail-
able, and shared (see also Lowe, 2018). In terms of durability, individuals con-
stantly rely on schemas in their structural/categorical and hierarchical 
organization of subjective and shared experiences. In terms of practicability, 
individuals repeatedly draw upon and process these schemas whenever they 
face similar experiences. Finally, in terms of relationality, schemas unfold in 
dynamic ways during interactions with one’s environment. A child seeing 
his/her parents warmly hugging one another in situations of happiness, for 
instance, is likely to apply this embodied schema of hugging someone he/she 
likes in a similar situation in a similar fashion. Importantly, as Röttger-Rössler 
(2004, pp. 97–98) highlights, the schemas that are imbued with feelings in 
interaction become most salient and ingrained in the social and emotional 
makeup of individuals and collectives.
 While much is set during earlier phases of socialization, which ideally 
provide individuals and collectives with a noticeable sense of emotional 
security and competence, emotion repertoires nevertheless remain malleable 
over the course of people’s personal “affective lives” (von Poser, 2018) and in 
accordance with the life- long formation of feeling (→ Gefühlsbildung). In 
these ongoing processes, a “repertoire is creative, flexible, and adaptable, 
because it has to be applied to a situation that is not exactly similar to the 
situations that have come before” (Coe, 2013, p. 20). Due to their social, 
spatial, and temporal situatedness and due to changing experiential horizons 
in the lives of both individuals and collectives, emotion repertoires thus 
remain flexible and are therefore not always or equally binding for all indi-
viduals and collectives. Accordingly, some cultural schemas within broader 
repertoires may prove impractical in new situations whereas others might 
become vital in organizing experiences.
 Our conceptual proposal to introduce the notion of “repertoire” to affect 
and emotion research foregrounds an actor- centered approach (see also 
Wetherell, 2012) as pursued within the framework of our anthropological- 
psychiatric research. In line with philosophers of emotion (Roberts, 2003; 
Griffiths & Scarantino, 2009) and historians of emotion (Reddy, 2001; Scheer, 
2012), we systematically incorporate a “situated perspective on emotions” 
(Griffiths & Scarantino, 2009) into our concept of emotion repertoires. Recog-
nizing that situatedness matters greatly, scholars from the fields of cultural 
anthropology (Coe, 2013), social psychology (Wetherell, 2012), and the philo-
sophy of emotion (Slaby et al., 2016) have variously preferred the term “reper-
toire” over Pierre Bourdieu’s famous notion of “habitus.” We agree with Coe, 
who argues that the emphasis of “habitus” on embodied and unconscious 
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dispositions “slights the moments when such dispositions become visible and 
discussed” (Coe, 2013, p. 16). Although Coe does not systematically link “rep-
ertoire” with emotion theory, her argument that “the historical moments when 
something commonsensical becomes the subject of commentary […] are 
important, because they signal change” (Coe, 2013, p. 16) is in line with our 
understanding of the dynamic and processual nature of emotion repertoires. 
Social psychologist Margaret Wetherell (2012), too, takes a critical stance toward 
“habitus.” She criticizes the relative fixity of the correspondence between indi-
vidual embodied schemas and the normative patterns of a social field in 
Bourdieu’s account. Instead, she proposes a more flexible, domain- and 
practice- specific repository of affective and emotional enactments.
 We think that the answer to Swidler’s question of why some parts of a rep-
ertoire are performed at different times and with varying levels of mastery, must 
come from an in- depth analysis of the dynamic interplay between the durability, 
practicability, and relationality of any repertoire in a given situation. Our empirical 
example focuses on the imbalance between the durability, practicability, and 
relationality of emotion repertoires as a possible reason for the heterogeneous 
and fraught affective complexities that migration caused in the lives of our inter-
locutors. Indeed, in today’s increasingly pluralized and complex societies, 
encounters with different emotion repertoires become much more frequent, as 
do encounters between persons with highly different worldviews, normative 
orientations, and values. Under these circumstances, the practicability of inter-
nalized emotion repertoires might be hampered and the “act of transposing 
one’s repertoire to a new resistant situation causes repertoires to shift slightly or 
abruptly, whether consciously or not” (Coe, 2013, p. 22). Such shifts in prevail-
ing emotion repertoires, we believe, may occur with increased affective intensity 
when individuals and collectives socialized with different emotion repertoires 
become suddenly and forcefully entangled with one another. Depending on the 
quality of affective resonance that these entanglements instigate between indi-
viduals, collectives, surroundings, materialities, and objects, emotion repertoires 
are shared or solidified in different spheres of belonging, or are contested and 
transformed and thus attuned to ever- changing environments (→ belonging; 
→ affective communities; → affective resonance).
Illuminating emotion repertoires
Our empirical insights stem from observations and conversations in clinical 
and everyday encounters with first- generation Vietnamese migrants within 
the framework of psychiatric anthropology (Heyken et al., forthcoming). Our 
interlocutors were born and raised in different parts of Vietnam. They left 
their country of birth either as contract workers or refugees. Years after their 
arrival, they are now participants of an innovative group therapy setting 
offered at a specialized psychiatric outpatient clinic in Berlin (Ta et al., 2017). 
In illuminating the concept of emotion repertoires, we concentrate on affective 
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dissonances as felt frictions that manifest as clashing emotion repertoires. We 
also highlight the possibilities of overcoming these frictions using therapeutic 
intervention.
 In long- term ethnographic encounters with one of the authors (Heyken), 
Mr. N, for instance, repeatedly referred to his difficulty in addressing situ-
ations of unease in a direct manner. These were situations in which he felt he 
was treated unfairly or felt disempowered through the actions of others. 
Instead of immediately voicing his complaints, he remained silent, which, in 
turn, led to a felt affective dissonance that he described as “inner turmoil” or 
“pressure.” These affective tensions then negatively reverberated in him upon 
remembering such situations. To contextualize this affective dissonance, 
Mr. N recalled a situation in which his German colleagues argued with each 
other but still remained friends. Mr. N said that this would be impossible 
among elderly Vietnamese men, instead symbolizing a loss of face and the 
termination of friendship, and eventually culminating in emotions of anger, 
frustration, and rage. According to the emotion repertoire he and his genera-
tion had acquired during socialization in Vietnam, one needs to follow a rela-
tional approach in communicating complaints. Thus, Mr. N explained that 
one is supposed to deploy an indirect approach, which avoids phrasing one’s 
argument openly and which often requires appropriate acquaintances to 
negotiate the problem and figure out solutions with the opposing party. Apart 
from verbal modes of expression, the acquaintances would also need to 
deploy nonverbal modes such as taking respectful and reserved body postures 
or avoiding direct eye contact. Mr. N further reported that, when directly 
confronted by a German colleague, he became petrified, as he was not able to 
spontaneously react to this confrontation. Upon Mr. N’s reaction, his col-
league mocked him. In narrating his experiences, Mr. N said that he had 
observed his colleagues’ bodily and verbal reactions in situations of stress – 
such as clapping on one’s thigh or briefly shouting out – and that he had tried 
to perform similar actions but failed because these expressed repertoires were 
so diametrically opposed to his own deeply internalized modes of dealing 
with stress. In interactions with Vietnamese friends and acquaintances in 
Berlin, his emotion repertoire still proved practicable, whereas it caused dis-
sonance in the relational context of his German- dominated environment.
 Within the therapeutic context of the specialized outpatient clinic, Mr. N 
voiced his affliction to the psychiatrist for the first time. Later, he agreed to join 
an innovative, interdisciplinarily conceived group therapy focusing on emo-
tional and affective experiences, which helped him to understand that other 
Vietnamese patients suffered from similar conflicts and related feelings of insec-
urity. All patients placed experiences of affect either within frames of sympathy, 
coherence, and belonging, or of estrangement, disempowerment, and non- 
belonging. Learning to flexibly adjust one’s repertoire takes center stage in the 
innovative group therapy. During an exercise, the psychiatrist conducting the 
group therapy asked the patients – three women and four men – to take a seat 
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1 Before addressing the sensitive topic of implicit dispositions and affective dissonances thera-
peutically, it was paramount to create a safe environment and invest in sustainable mutual 
trust to encourage patients to leave behind old and, speaking in psychiatric terms, dysfunc-
tional patterns in situations of increased distress.
in two matching rows, face each other in pairs and make direct eye contact for 
at least one minute, and then move on to the next chair and make eye contact 
with another partner. The psychologist, along with the three anthropologists of 
our interdisciplinary research team (see Heyken et al., forthcoming) participated 
in the exercise while the psychiatrist, a native Vietnamese herself, directed the 
formation. In several therapy sessions before, we had observed how the patients, 
when uncomfortably affected, relied on durable nonverbal repertoires of inter-
action: they averted their gazes, lowered their voices, or took reversed body 
postures. Given that seeking direct eye contact may be fraught with cultural dif-
ficulties within Vietnamese codes of conduct, the exercise was especially chal-
lenging. It exposed the patients to a stressful situation and “deprived them” of 
their habituated emotional responses. The therapist explained that she intended 
to trigger affective responses from the patients and thereby draw their attention 
to the connections between embodied emotions and affects, and to related cul-
tural notions and practices.1
 Shortly before the exercise began, we could sense palpable tension: some 
patients sat down rather reluctantly, apparently weighing up who would take 
the opposite seat, while others either looked serious or giggled. During the 
exercise, we observed that, in terms of gendered embodiment, most of the 
patients were able to maintain eye contact with a same- sex counterpart, 
whereas, with an opposite- sex counterpart they clearly employed a strategy of 
avoidance. One patient, a man of comparably younger age, also responded 
with avoidance vis- à-vis other men. We observed that the male patients 
either stared up or pursed their lips to restrain laughter in front of an 
opposite- sex counterpart, whereas the female patients tipped their heads 
down and closed their eyes. After the exercise, the male patients spontan-
eously stated that, “from Vietnamese perspectives,” looking into one anoth-
er’s eyes, as they had just done, would be considered an act of social 
transgression of the norms and rules tied to principles of hierarchy, seniority, 
and status, as well as an act of aggression and provocation. The female patients 
affirmatively nodded; compared with the male patients, however, they were 
reluctant to openly voice their opinions. As the psychiatrist asked the patients 
to jointly relate the affective intensity felt during the exercise to bodily and 
sensory perceptions (embodiment), to modes of interaction and behavioral 
patterns (practice), and, finally, to cultural categorizations, associations, and 
interpretations (discourse), she created space for the patients to reflect on the 
durability, practicability, and relationality of emotion repertoires.
 A few days later, in a conversation outside of this setting (Heyken, forth-
coming), Mrs. D, one of the female patients, offered a further and more 
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2 Eckert, Biermann- Ratjen, and Höger (2012) define emotion- focused therapy by placing the 
emotional processes of the patient in the center of the therapeutic work. Arguing with 
Greenberg (2004), the authors contend that emotions are principally adaptive and serve the 
organism to process complex and situated information to perform actions thereby supporting 
and protecting it (Eckert et al., 2012, p. 316).
detailed explanation of the affective intensity she experienced, which was 
gendered and anchored in early memories. During her childhood and youth 
in Vietnam, she had experienced the cultivation of a social and physical sepa-
ration between girls and boys as part of her socialization and institutional 
education in school, which included gendered behaviors of shame expressed 
by the avoidance of eye contact and close body contact. As Röttger-Rössler 
et al. (2015) have argued, the socialization of emotion repertoires involves 
implicit and explicit practices of cultural transmission that confirm their prac-
ticability and durability. Mrs. D remembered that girls and boys were not 
allowed to sit next to each other in school and that there were hardly any 
occasions for girls and boys to meet outside the school casually. This mode of 
interaction still persisted in her generation, Mrs. D emphasized. Seeking eye 
contact was a sign of intimacy between lovers or spouses and thus clearly 
confined to those relationships. Later, in the aftermath of the war in Vietnam 
and the subsequent political and societal changes in the South, she further 
internalized that directly looking into others’ faces is a sign of disrespect and 
may cause aggression.
 While the therapy exercise was only a short and “staged” moment, the 
reactions and explanations that followed made clear that a coherent and 
shared sense of the predictability and intelligibility of emotions and affects, 
acquired during the socialization of emotion repertoires at younger age in 
Vietnam, was prevalent in this arrangement of individuals. All patients discur-
sively linked direct eye contact with feelings of aggression and provocation or 
shame. They all showed practiced forms of avoidant behavior, which varied 
according to gender and embodiment (and according to age in the case of 
one younger male patient). The exercise thus elucidated facets of a relation-
ally constituted emotion repertoire.
 Our observations in the clinic and beyond, in fact, show that the intensity 
of affects as “felt differences” (Röttger-Rössler, 2016, p. 6) depends on who 
or what exactly “the other” is and what is at stake within a given relational 
encounter. Moments of disempowerment felt by patients were interpreted as 
a loss of face according to their habituated understanding. This is because 
conversations about one’s personal or medical issues, according to Vietnamese 
conventions, are to be held relationally within the family. Our observations 
indicate that the patients were more likely to develop an understanding of the 
complexity of conflicting emotion repertoires when therapeutic explanations 
were based on experiences made during affect- eliciting exercises like the 
“contest” of eye contact.2 By connecting these new experiences to the 
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broader context of relationally attuned and flexibly performed emotion reper-
toires, patients regained a stronger sense of agency.
 The above case thus reveals the significance of an analysis that addresses 
the durability, practicability, and relationality of emotion repertoires.
Conclusion
Our concept of emotion repertoires creates a new avenue of thought for 
researchers analyzing the dynamics of societal and affective coexistence in 
today’s globalized and profoundly entangled worlds. We adopted the term 
“repertoire,” as discussed in cultural sociology and theater and performance 
studies, to convey the idea that individuals and collectives use recombinative, 
communicable, and mutually intelligible enactments to organize felt experi-
ences in socially and culturally appropriate ways. Moreover, we have com-
bined these ideas with insights from cognitive anthropology and recent 
research on affect and emotion. We find that the enactment of emotion rep-
ertoires inevitably unfolds within distinct spheres of affective resonance. Such 
spheres of resonance modulate the processuality, malleability, and transforma-
bility of emotion repertoires. Nevertheless, emotion repertoires tend to resist 
change even in the face of ongoing transformations of societal coexistence in 
mobile worlds. The difficulties that the first- generation migrants of our study 
faced when they had to adjust emotion repertoires acquired at a young age 
prove that emotion repertoires can be somewhat intransigent. Our examples 
have made clear that the relevance and impact of conflicting emotion reper-
toires needs to be addressed in studies of migration. Such a perspective reveals 
the underlying dimensions of affective dissonance and consonance, which are 
tied to implicit and more unconscious modes of interaction, to bodily and 
sensory perceptions, and to socially and culturally saturated interpretations.
 In paying particular attention to the interplay of the durability, practicability, 
and relationality of emotion repertoires, we hope to have paved the way for 
thinking about this concept as truly relational, agentive, and creative. Beyond the 
ethnographic and psychotherapeutic settings of our interdisciplinary research 
frame, the concept could be applied as well in other and broader societal and 
political terms (→ sentiment; → political affect). The relational concept of emotion 
repertoires holds theoretical and transdisciplinary value, and could be applied in 
various spatial and temporal contexts beyond the particularities of migration- 
related experiences. The following questions provide fertile ground for further 
inquiry: How intensive or fleeting are affects as “felt differences” in the contexts 
of ageing, im-/mobility, and shorter or longer educational, work, or internal 
migrations? What role do new forms of mediatizing affects and emotions play 
for different generations of individuals and collectives? How and why do indi-
viduals as well as collectives feel empowered to readjust and master emotion 
repertoires to avoid losing their efficacy as a communicable and performable 
means of affective relationality and as sources of creative expression?
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Chapter 22
Audience emotions
Doris Kolesch and Hubert Knoblauch
Audience emotions are not yet established as a theoretical concept, neither in 
audience research nor in emotion and affect studies. This chapter outlines an 
understanding of audience emotions based on research and theory in the 
social sciences (sociology) and the humanities (theater and performance 
studies). The concept is developed from our research on physically present 
audiences in live events and goes beyond comprehending emotion as an indi-
vidual psychological or physiological process. It stresses forms of expression, 
display, and feeling that emerge from the affective relations between a poten-
tially heterogeneous social collective and a performance, an artifact, or any 
other act or object that forms part of a common focus of attention. While 
audiences have mostly been studied with respect to mass media and, more 
recently, digital media, the concept of audience emotions underlines the 
relevance of immediate audiences, that is of audiences that are bodily co- 
present at an attended event. We are thus concentrating on audiences that 
interact jointly with and are corporeally directed toward a common focus of 
attention. Audience emotions are not a mere aggregation of the emotions of 
spatially assembled individuals. While it is still the individual member of an 
audience who feels, experiences, and displays emotions, the concept of audi-
ence emotions highlights those aspects of emotions which emerge in the 
context of a gathering of individuals. Some striking examples of audience 
emotions are the enthusiasm in performing the “Mexican wave” in a soccer 
stadium, the mesmerized silence of a theater audience watching a gripping 
scene, or the excited applause at the end of a rhetorically brilliant speech.
 Audience emotions are both material and cultural manifestations; they 
merge social and individual dimensions and they often linger on the blurred 
boundaries between affective dynamics and discrete emotions. We suggest an 
understanding of audience emotions as bearing the following key characteris-
tics: (1) Collectivity: Audience emotions are a form of collective emotion. They 
are essentially bound to a collective, a bodily co- present gathering of several 
individuals or even large crowds. (2) Activity: Audience emotions, like most 
other emotions, do not represent an “inner” state of being, but are an action, a 
dynamic activity. Audience emotions are thus an important element of the 
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audience’s activities and of their involvement in an event. (3) Reflexivity: Audi-
ence emotions connect an audience or part of an audience with a specific 
situation and the entire event. At the same time, they constitute specific rela-
tional dynamics within members of the audience themselves. Audiences not 
only act as a heterogeneous ensemble of individuals, but as individuals relat-
ing to an audience of which they are part as audience in a way that bestows 
them with agency and power. This is why audience emotions have been 
associated with political potentiality as well as with threats to social order 
since antiquity. (4) Temporality and spatiality: Audience emotions are charac-
terized by a certain spatio- temporal immediacy depending on the funda-
mental co- presence of bodies, on spatial- material settings, institutions, 
discourses and interpretative frames that structure an event. But they can also 
exceed the temporal frame of the present by influencing and affecting sub-
sequent events, or by evoking a strong and/or long lasting impression on 
memory, prompting people to seek out similar intensive collective experi-
ences again. (5) Shared contingency: Although audience emotions are shaped 
and formed by a multifactorial set of elements pertaining to a performance, an 
artwork, or object in focus, this array of elements is not the only powerful 
influence on audience emotions. They enact an experience of shared situative 
contingency, which is why their emergence is, to some extent, unpredictable 
and also uncontrollable. This moment of social contingency is often experi-
enced as an intense and empowering experience, crossing the boundaries 
between the individual and the collective as well as between the audience, 
the event, and their broader context.
 In the following, we will briefly sketch major trends in audience research 
and outline crucial factors that have resulted in the neglect of audience emo-
tions. We will then develop our understanding of audience emotions by elab-
orating on the five key characteristics mentioned above and by discussing the 
potential of the concept for understanding societies as Affective Societies.
Audience studies, performance, and the focus
Audiences have been the subject of extensive theoretical reflection in the 
social and cultural sciences (for an overview see Abercrombie & Longhurst, 
1998). Although their association with masses and collectives (Blumer, 1954) 
has stirred heated theoretical debate, there is surprisingly little systematic 
empirical research on bodily co- present audiences across various socio- 
cultural fields such as theater, music, or dance. One most notable exception is 
media audiences. A large part of audience studies is devoted to audiences of 
mass media and, more recently, digital media, and some ethnographic studies 
have addressed interactions between audience members and forms of interac-
tivity mediated by digital technologies (Sullivan, 2013; Webster & Phalen, 
1997; Papacharissi, 2015). However, the interactive dimension of bodily co- 
present audiences and the interdependence and connectedness of audience 
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and event (“autopoetic feedback loop,” Fischer- Lichte, 2008) cannot be ade-
quately understood solely with established concepts of reception and theoret-
ical models developed in fields such as media studies. This is because the 
bodily co- presence of audience and performers allows for real- time, face- to-
face interactions between audience and performers and their reciprocal influ-
ences that differ categorically from mediatized forms of interaction.
 The distinction between audiences and mass media was established by 
propaganda studies in the 1930s, a field that also stressed the role of emotion-
ality (Brooker & Jermyn, 2003). In subsequent studies on mass communica-
tion, the role of emotion has been addressed, for example, by Critical Theory 
(Adorno, 1991) as well as in an increasing number of psychological, physio-
logical, and, recently, neurological studies on the effects of media on emo-
tions. Many audience studies in the social sciences have capitalized on 
statistical analyses of audiences, for example pertaining to class, gender, age, 
or lifestyle. Since these studies mostly deal with structural social aspects, there 
is only limited knowledge of the qualitative features of audience activities, 
their emotions and affects (Clevenger, 1966; Das & Ytre- Arne, 2017).
 In the humanities, the rise of semiotics, reader response theory, studies on 
spectatorship and poststructuralist theories since the 1960s highlighted the 
agency of readers, spectators, and/or the audience in (co-)creating a text or 
work of art and completing it through interpretation. In these perspectives, the 
audience is placed at the center of a performative event. The desire to reconfig-
ure the relationship between audience and event has also been a recurring topic 
in the arts since the avant- garde movements of the early 20th century and the 
neo- avantgarde since the 1960s. However, in contrast to the relevance of the 
audience as a theoretical concept, studies focusing exclusively on audiences and 
their activities in live events have remained scarce. Dennis Kennedy (2009) 
identified the paradox that despite persistent claims about the audience’s impact 
and influence, the term audience often remains a theoretical construct, “a pale 
hypothetical inference of the commentator’s imagination” (p. 13). Extant 
scholarship has investigated audiences as interpretative communities (Bennett, 
1997) and looked into the individual responses of spectators to consider the 
cognitive, corporeal, and affective activities of audiences (Tulloch, 2005; 
McConachie, 2008). Historical studies have explored what audiences did during 
performances, how they acted and experienced the event they attended, and 
how the historical contingency of audience behavior aligned with social, cul-
tural, and political questions and with various processes of inclusion and exclu-
sion (Fisher, 2003; Müller, 2012; Beushausen, 2018).
 While classical models of communication adhered to the transmitter- 
receiver model and considered audiences as the “other side” of a performance 
enacted for them, recent societal and technological developments have given 
rise to the observation that performances have been widely extended in scope 
and reach. Abercrombie and Longhurst (1998) propose a new “performance 
paradigm” according to which audiences are becoming “diffused” (ch. 2), 
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1 This dominant role of performance in everyday life, observed by many authors over the last 
decades, has already been established by Goffman (1959), who argued that rituals increasingly 
revolve around the individual in modern society so that every action becomes a performance. 
Even those actions performed in the absence of others are oriented to them so as to consti-
tute “public actions” (Goffman, 1963).
such that “being a member of an audience becomes a mundane event” (p. 37) 
and “everyone becomes an audience all the time” (p. 68). In addition to this 
extension of the audience, we can witness a complementary extension of the 
performance: it is no longer restricted to what is happening on a stage. 
Rather, every action tends to become a social performance.1 Of course, there 
were and still are cases in which the distinction between performance and 
audience is often marked temporally and spatially, and where it is highlighted 
by architectural markers, visual effects, conventions of genre and repertoires 
of emotion (→ emotion repertoires), as in classical theater or music halls. Yet, in 
an increasing number of contexts in our networked and mediatized world, 
these distinctions are hardly recognizable or even lacking entirely, for 
example, as in current forms of performance art and participatory theater 
where the audience is often an active part of the performance.
 In terms of the study of audiences, this also implies that the activities of 
audience members themselves should be examined, observed, and analyzed as 
performances. Moreover, to the degree that audience members act differently, 
we cannot maintain the idea of one homogeneous audience, but must concede 
that there are split, highly heterogeneous or even disparate audiences. Con-
sequently, there are crucial ramifications for an understanding of audience 
emotions: 
So, although it is possible to speak of “an audience”, it is important to 
remember that there may be several distinct, co- existing audiences to be 
found among the people gathered together to watch a show and that 
each individual within this group may choose to adopt a range of viewing 
positions. 
(Freshwater, 2009, pp. 9–10)
Audiences are not only given but are constituted “by virtue of being 
addressed” (Warner, 2002, p. 50) and by a shared focus, such as a sports 
event, a theater performance, or a music concert. A complex process of co- 
constitution binds audience and focus together. Obviously, the audience of a 
soccer game behaves differently than the audience of a classical string quartet. 
In addition, the course of the soccer game might be influenced by the sup-
portive cheering, shouting, and singing of fans, just as the inattentive atmo-
sphere of a distracted audience might cause an inaccurate execution on the 
part of the string quartet. Audiences are thus co- constituted by the very event 
they are focusing on and which they are themselves actively co- constituting.
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2 Therefore, affect theory leads to the “prioritization of communication” in audience research 
(Gibbs, 2011, p. 252).
 From this backdrop, audience emotions can be understood as collective 
emotions directed toward the object of audience attention and, at the same 
time, directed to the audience itself, within the frame of a specific event. This 
dual perspective allows us to ask how audience members relate to (1) what is 
constituted as the focus of attention, (2) to one another, and (3) to other 
aspects of an event (such as objects or the spatial setting). Thus, the acts of 
observing, hearing, or perceiving and of being observed, being heard, and 
being perceived are fundamental aspects of audience emotions. As audiences 
are affected by their focus as well as by themselves and their surroundings, 
audience emotions are not only a “reaction” to what is happening, they also 
perform and reflect specific situational entanglements and communicate an 
embodied evaluation of them, whether by way of laughing, crying, and clap-
ping or by other forms of collective bodily expression and display.2 Last but 
not least, audience emotions are often experienced as ecstatic and intensive 
moments of communitization and as a social relationship based on the sub-
jective feeling of (parts of ) the audience in that they – even if only tempor-
arily – share an emotional experience of the world (→ affective communities).
Shortcomings of audience research
So far, audience research has mostly neglected the diversity and the artistic 
as well as social and political potentials of audience emotions. There are 
several barriers to a better understanding of audiences and, in particular, 
audience emotions: a historical suspicion toward the emergence of col-
lective emotions among a gathering of people and, more recently, a skepti-
cism based on an understanding of modern societies as predominantly 
rational and enlightened formations (see Borch, 2012, for an overview). 
Specifically, the taming and suppression of affective dynamics and emotions 
are a conventionally established paradigm in the tradition of the analysis of 
societies (e.g., by Max Weber, Norbert Elias, Jürgen Habermas, Talcott 
Parsons). A better understanding of audience emotions is also obstructed by 
a tendency to confuse or merge individual and collective responses. 
Further, it is impeded by the fact that one specific formation of an audience 
– a disciplined, corporeally immobilized group of people concentrating to 
make sense of an event – is implicitly assumed to represent the analytical 
paradigm for audiences per se. Historical research, however, has shown that 
those audiences whose expressive conduct is strongly regulated are a recent 
and modern invention, starting from the 1850s to the end of the 20th 
century. Audience activities in the 21st century, with their uses of social 
media, interactive feedback loops, and other forms of participation (Burland 
& Pitts, 2014) seem to confirm that the model of the mostly immobile, 
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silent, and concentrated audience is a historical exception and a theoretical 
construct rather than a historic reality (Kattwinkel, 2003).
 Against this background of the (allegedly reduced) repertoire of emotional 
expressions, most existing studies on the emotions of audiences consider 
emotions to be internal and individual psychological phenomena (Schoen-
makers, 1992; Abercrombie & Longhurst, 1998, ch. 3). Therefore, their 
methodologies typically address individual audience members, for instance, in 
the form of questionnaires offering different scales for “engagement” or 
“attention” and relating them to physiological measures of arousal of a relat-
ively small number of selected individuals (Stevens et al., 2014). In order to 
understand our perspective on audience emotions, it is important to recog-
nize how these methodologies one- sidedly focus on audiences that have been 
subject to a history of self- discipline and their related dispositifs, such as 
concert halls for classical music or play houses for middle- class theater. In par-
ticular, the rise of bourgeois culture has led to a massive disciplining of affects. 
This disciplining encompassed both the repression of undesired emotions and 
the generation of desired emotions (Kolesch, 2006). Before the 19th century, 
strong affective displays like shouting, crying, or spitting had been common 
at music, theater, or rhetorical events (Campbell, 1987). From the 19th 
century onward, audiences increasingly tended to be sanctioned for “expres-
sive behavior” and for all activities which might undermine full concentration 
on the performance at hand, such that even “noise made by unwrapping 
chocolates” was offensive to theater actors in the 1950s (Kershaw, 2001, 
p. 142). Except for framing activities at very specific, highly conventionalized 
points, like applause before and after the marked end of the performance, 
audiences had to reduce their activities to the operation of specific sensual 
modalities only, such as listening in concert halls, seeing in museums and 
galleries, seeing and listening in the theater, etc. Audiences were thus trans-
formed into mere perceptual apparatuses. What once was active participation 
became “passive” experience which could then be addressed as a psycho-
logical phenomenon: “Spectators are thus trained to be passive in their 
demonstrated behaviour during a theatrical performance, but to be active in 
their decoding of the sign systems available” (Bennett, 2014, p. 54).
Key features of audience emotions
To overcome the shortcomings of audience research mentioned above, we 
stress the following five key features of audience emotions: collectivity, activ-
ity, reflexivity, spatiality and temporality, and contingency.
Collectivity
While most existing studies on audience emotions often confuse individual and 
collective reactions, we understand audience emotions as forms of collective 
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emotions (von Scheve & Salmela, 2014; Sullivan, 2015). It is crucial for the spe-
cificity of audience emotions and their societal relevance to note that immediate 
audiences are a temporal gathering of (mostly) strangers coming together at a 
certain place and sharing a short span of time together to watch a performance 
or see a work of art. Audience emotions are thus intricately linked to the spe-
cific modality of being a member of an audience. They display how collectives 
are affected by and affect performances and how these dynamics affect audiences 
themselves (→ social collectives). The common tendency to think of an audience 
as a single entity cannot do justice to the heterogeneity assembled in an audi-
ence or to the variety of audience emotions. Audience emotions are the col-
lective experience of a momentary corporeal synchronization and of a sensuous 
transmission. They reflect the emergence of intercorporeal resonances among a 
group of assembled people – a process often referred to as one collective body 
transgressing the individual bodies of the assembled audience members. Most 
audience emotions empirically depend on a “law of large numbers” in terms of 
forms of communication that presuppose coordinated collective action, such as 
the unison of sound produced by large numbers of voices, thundering applause, 
or standing ovations.
 This collective dimension can also be actualized ex negativo when a single 
audience member experiences himself as being out of sync with the majority. 
Not being amused at what the rest of the audience is enthusiastically laughing 
at or being moved to tears by something that seems to leave others unmoved 
are audience emotions which are only possible in relation to and in contrast 
to fellow audience members.
Activity
The collectivity of audience emotions does not mean that audience emotions 
are just “passive” responses to an object or performance in attention. 
Although often referred to as “spontaneous,” audience emotions are a crucial 
part of the communicative, evaluative and energetic activity of audiences. This 
activity often is coordinated and prepared.
 Audience emotions can be coordinated situationally with respect to certain 
formats. Thus, rhetorical formats, such as contrast pairs, may allow the audi-
ence to clap collectively at exactly the same time (Atkinson, 1984). Similar 
situational ways of affecting audience emotions can be found in the case of 
religious sermons, but also, in a less verbal manner, with respect to certain 
moves in football games (Knoblauch, Wetzels, & Haken, 2019). Audiences 
may be instructed explicitly to perform certain “choreographies” either 
bottom up, by fans or social movements, or top down, by event managers 
and organizers. The “capo” orchestrating the collective emotions of football 
fans, the cheerleaders in a basketball arena, or the “claque” of a political 
speaker initiating applause are paradigmatic cases. In some contexts, audience 
emotions can be highly ritualized and become part of the “script” of these 
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performances, such as cheering in pop- music concerts or at comedy shows. 
Furthermore, with the use of social media, activities such as posting, liking, 
or tweeting become important catalysts as well as expressions of audience 
emotions. The agentive and collective dimension of audience emotions is also 
a crucial economic as well as a political factor, with corporations and com-
panies using them to create and/or reinforce a special bond between brands 
and their consumers and with social movements or political parties trying to 
enact forms of participation, empowerment, or voter commitment.
 Even the presumed “inactivity” of an audience may be ritualized, such as the 
short hush after the final move of a symphony where no one wants to spoil the 
moment by applauding, or the silence during the transubstantiation at a Catho-
lic mass. These collective forms of silence can be considered as performances of 
specific emotions, such as awe (in terms of “aesthetics” or “religion”).
 Audience emotions are not only coordinated, they are often also prepared 
in advance. Knowledge relevant for audience emotions may be transmitted 
beforehand, that is by fanzines, social or other media. As the coordination of 
audience emotions depends on the knowledge of different conventionalized 
forms and collective repertoires of emotions (→ emotion repertoires), they also 
vary according to the venue, its cultural sphere and corresponding affective 
arrangements (→ affective arrangement). Audience members can also prepare 
themselves (through dressing, makeup, equipment with flags or other 
emblems, ritualized behaviors, etc.) before the event in order to facilitate the 
generation of audience emotions.
Reflexivity
To enable audiences to act as collectives, audience members need to direct 
themselves not only to the focus of the audience’s attention, but also to the 
audience as audience. Thus, audience emotions are reflexive in a very specific 
manner. Members of an audience are not only perceiving, acting, or perform-
ing, but are being seen by other audience members as undertaking these actions. 
This reflexivity is essential for audience emotions: Instead of being instances of 
imitation, as mass- psychological theories maintain (Brooker & Jermyn, 2003, 
pp. 1–2), collective displays like clapping, cheering, or singing depend on audi-
ences orienting themselves toward the conduct of others and on collective forms 
of communication. The diverse ways in which audience members relate (or do 
not relate) to each other, how they act and interact with one another and with 
objects, technologies, spatial settings, and the specific temporal order of an 
event, distinguish audience emotions from other kinds of emotions.
 This relationality of audiences is twofold: First, audiences are affected by 
the shared focus that co- constitutes them as an audience. Second, there are 
also intra- audience relations. If these relations are homogenous and intensive, 
they may be compared to what Durkheim (1912/1965, pp. 250ff.) calls 
“effervescence.” In most empirical cases, they are highly variegated, thus 
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evidencing the heterogeneity of audiences. In immersive theater, for example, 
there may only be one audience member interacting individually with a per-
former, while in a sports stadium, thousands of fans may be coordinating their 
activities in order to sing or gesture collectively. While individualized audi-
ence members may act in a multitude of ways, the affective relations between 
audiences – as collectives – and the focus of their attention can take typical 
communicative forms – like applause, booing, stage diving, and so forth. – 
displayed and performed in the collective corporeality of an audience.
Spatiality and temporality
The situational entanglements audience emotions perform and reflect are 
characterized by certain forms of spatiality and temporality. Audience emotions 
are affected by material settings and architecture, by objects, atmospheres, and 
media technologies (Quirk, 2011). These spatial alignments can be material-
ized (e.g., in the architectural construction of theater buildings or sports stadi-
ums), but they may also be situative, as in the case of the physical formation 
of a street musician’s audience forming a circle. Audience emotions can be 
experienced as an intensive, transitory moment of synchronized immediate-
ness and commonality; they can also unfold sequentially and spatially – 
sequentially, such as in the metachronal rhythm of the “Mexican wave,” 
performing enthusiasm and elation; spatially, such as by walking from stage to 
stage at a music festival (Heath, vom Lehn, & Knoblauch, 2001). As markers 
of intensity and transpersonal collectivity, audience emotions exceed the tem-
poral frame of a live event by affecting future behavior, by prompting people 
to engage with future situations in specific ways, and by leaving a strong and/
or long- lasting impression (→ Midān moments).
Shared contingency
Highly metaphorical language is often used to describe audience emotions 
and their enactive, transmissive potential (“contagion,” “emotional infec-
tion,” “electricity,” etc.). These metaphors indicate that audience emotions 
are not determined by material settings, genre conventions, cultural practices, 
etc., but that they always are processes and experiences of shared social contin-
gency. The generation of a sensual sphere of shared movements and actions 
and the emergence of a mutual, albeit temporary, feeling of belonging is as 
unpredictable as it is uncontrollable. The potential to act as a collective body 
paradoxically results from a highly contingent occurrence, thus bestowing 
audience emotions with the transgressive power to transcend the self- 
conscious identity of individual audience members and generate a momentary 
feeling of community and belonging in a gathering of mostly strangers. This 
contingency has provoked a long tradition of suspicion toward audience 
emotions and various efforts to enclose and contain them.
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Relevance of audience emotions
Audience emotions are episodic realizations of affective relations between audi-
ence, performance, and the surroundings. Based on routines and patterns of 
behavior shaped by collective knowledge, cultural practices, and repertoires of 
emotion, but also influenced by material and situative settings, genre conven-
tions, social structural aspects like class, age, or gender, and regimes of power, 
audience emotions perform the collective engagement with others attending the 
same live event, feeling and sensing others’ actions and reactions. Audience 
emotions thus constitute temporary moments of social cohesion and belonging. 
The temporal community formed by audience emotions lies on the border 
between “emotional communities” (Rosenwein, 2006) and affective com-
munities (→ affective communities). While emotional communities share certain 
values, ideas, and social structural elements like class, status, or age, as in the 
highly homogeneous audience of a classical music concert, affective com-
munities constitute intermediary realms of affective exchange and collective 
immediacy which transgress socially defined categories and culturally valorized 
positions. Understanding the specificity of audience emotions and their poten-
tial to instigate processes of communitization thus has important ramifications 
for future research on collectives and collective agency. This is because audience 
emotions indicate the relevance of shared emotions for experiences of social 
cohesion, whereas personal or collective interests, values, and shared ideas 
appear to be secondary for the experience of communality.
 Until recently, audiences have been and are still considered as a kind of public. 
Some highly disciplined, individualized, and standardized audience formations 
were even considered as an idealized model of the public, without regard for 
the uncontrollability or even the destructive potential of audience emotions. In 
contrast, theater audiences have been constructed as a homogeneous public 
sphere of bourgeois society. Today the conceptualization and better under-
standing of audience emotions is a key factor in researching the impact of audi-
ence activities in various fields of civil societies and their relevance for the 
comprehension of contemporary neoliberal systems at large, where being a 
member of an audience becomes a ubiquitous and everyday experience. Audi-
ence emotions emerge not only as an outcome of certain venues, but also as a 
driving force for social gatherings and for attending public events. Conducting 
research on audience emotions is thus an essential aspect of grasping the func-
tions and current modifications of public spheres. Accordingly, the study of 
audience emotions may contribute significantly to a contemporary under-
standing of the public and its transformations in various global communities.
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Part IV
Collectives and 
contestations

Chapter 23
Social collectives
Christian von Scheve
Social collectives are assemblages of actors that affect and are affected by 
others or by a specific object or situation, and eventually share a common 
situation- specific understanding of the self as part of a collective. Contrary to 
widespread uses of the word “collective” as an umbrella term for various 
social formations, such as groups, communities, organizations, crowds, audi-
ences, or gatherings, the concept developed here conceives of collectives as 
specific though fragile and transient episodes of dynamic stabilization in the 
reciprocal affections and relational self- understandings of actors involved in 
these formations. Because of the situational nature of affect, social collectives 
are therefore more expediently conceptualized and analyzed as constantly “in 
the making” rather than as “substantial social formations.” Most social forma-
tions are well theorized in view of their distinct structures and organizing 
principles. Social groups, for example, are primarily characterized by social 
interactions amongst all group members; organizations are described by 
formal membership, common goals, and hierarchies; communities are defined 
by enduring emotional bonds and a collective identity which tie community 
members to each other; and concepts of crowds and gatherings emphasize the 
spatial proximity of participating actors as a defining element. None of the 
existing principles of social organization, however, account for the specific 
ways in which human and non- human actors mutually affect – and are 
affected by – one another. These formations prefigure and enable these effects 
and relational self- understandings, much in the sense of specific affective 
arrangements (→ affective arrangements).
 Groups, organizations, crowds, communities, and other formations may 
thus transiently become social collectives under certain circumstances and for a 
certain time: Some social formations, such as organizations and communities, 
involve specific self- understandings, for instance through formal membership 
or kinship ties, whereas others, such as masses and gatherings, do not neces-
sarily require a well- developed collective self- concept. Likewise, some social 
formations can more easily be understood as affective arrangements than 
others, making it more likely for actors to affect and be affected by one 
another or a situation in certain ways. Contingent on the culture and 
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historicity of a social formation, mutual affection is also more or less likely to 
become categorized and labeled using pertinent emotion words (→ emotion; 
emotion concept). Indeed, many of the exemplary social formations mentioned 
above often develop dedicated instrumental strategies and cultural practices to 
shift their ontology – at least momentarily – toward that of a social collective, 
that is, a formation in which actors mutually affect one another and conceive 
of themselves as parts of a collective. In line with ritual and conflict theory 
(e.g., Durkheim, 1912/1995; Collins, 2004), these strategies often aim at 
achieving an “embodied grounding” of the social formation in question. Dis-
cursive episodes of intense national pride, collective feelings of religious 
offense, or effervescence during rituals are obvious examples. This also points 
toward the important consequences social collectives bear for individuals and 
social formations. Existing research suggests that collective emotions – to 
which social collectives are highly conducive – promote collective action, 
social cohesion, solidarity, collective identity, and belonging (→ belonging), 
while at the same time constituting or promoting boundaries, exclusion, and 
the derogation of others. The proposed concept thus entertains the possibility 
that social collectives become precursors to other, more stable social formations 
in that they instigate and motivate processes such as ritualization, symboliza-
tion, and institutionalization.
Requirements of social collectives
The conceptual sketch outlined above begs the question of what it is that 
contributes to the transient becoming of a social collective. The under-
standing proposed here assumes that social collectives require two essential 
conditions to be fulfilled: first, the existence of relational self- understandings, 
and second, the existence of infrastructures that promote the dissemination 
and exchange of ideas, symbols, practices, or beliefs and allow for actors to 
affect and be affected by one another. Both are somewhat related to Georg 
Simmel’s (1959) distinction between content and form, and, regarding the 
relevance of affect, to ideas in new materialism and relational ontology, albeit 
without compromising the importance of language, thought, and cognition 
for social coexistence.
Relational self- understanding
The first criterion for the emergence of social collectives is the existence of 
some kind of relational self- understanding (Mead, 1934), of which self- 
categorization is amongst the most basic forms (Turner et al., 1987). Self- 
categorization refers to the social psychological processes by which actors 
conceive of themselves as being part of a specific social formation and – 
potentially – act according to this form of self- construal. This criterion clearly 
distinguishes social collectives from related concepts, such as swarms or 
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aggregates of individuals exhibiting similar behavior, for instance, in mass 
panic. A social collective hence comes into existence if and only if multiple 
individuals situationally self- categorize as being part of a larger number of 
individuals who likewise self- categorize in similar ways. Analytically, this 
requires insights into two different epistemological domains.
 The first domain is concerned with a specific first- person or “phenomeno-
logical” perspective on the world, that is, with actors interpreting events, 
objects, and the self as being a part of a larger collection of individuals. This 
can be highly rudimentary and unspecific, as in “us against them,” where the 
“us” may remain entirely unspecified. Or it may be very specific and involve 
some form of collective identity, such as “us fans of Michael Jackson” or “us 
counter- protesters” against a rally of a despised political party. Importantly, 
this sort of relational self- understanding does not necessarily mirror a (for-
mally) existing social formation. For example, political parties as formal 
organizations with clear membership rules and hierarchies of power rely on 
unambiguous self- categorizations and a collective identity. But different social 
collectives may well emerge within such an organization, for instance, when 
groups of dissenters are affected by a certain policy decision and momentarily 
self- categorize as “the dissenters” rather than as members of the party.
 The second domain involves an analytical third- person perspective which 
is necessary to actually circumscribe a collective – the “multitude” of actors – 
which is, at least in principle, capable of collective behavior or collective 
action. A solitary individual might simply imagine that he or she is part of 
some social formation and see the world accordingly. An example might be a 
historical group or community that ceased to exist long ago. Unless there is 
an actual multitude of individuals self- categorizing in this way in a specific 
situation, there can be no mutual affecting one another, no collectively shared 
emotion, and no collective action or behavior. Of course, both criteria will 
usually co- occur empirically. In other words, people know or believe that 
they are part of some larger social formation and this social formation actually 
exists, meaning that there are indeed a larger number of individuals self- 
categorizing in a similar way. But how do individuals become aware of the 
existence of a social formation in the first place and how do they generate 
beliefs about a significant number of others who are part of this formation? 
And how do beliefs regarding the existence of a specific social formation 
emerge within or spread across larger numbers of individuals? And how can a 
multitude of actors mutually affect one another in a specific situation which is 
potentially not bound to the same physical space?
Infrastructures
The second condition for the becoming of social collectives addresses these 
questions and pertains to the necessity of some sort of infrastructure which is 
required for any of the social formations in question (cf. for a related 
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proposition Stäheli, 2012). Infrastructures can be as immediate as a shared 
physical space where face- to-face interaction is possible amongst some – 
though usually not all – actors occupying that space. Crowds and gatherings 
are usually situated in a specific material space. This space is often transformed 
into a socially meaningful place that can be conducive to actors’ mutually 
affecting one another, for example, through nonverbal bodily cues (e.g., 
Brennan, 2004). Tahrir Square in Cairo during the Arab Spring uprisings as 
well as large sports stadiums may serve as good examples here (→ Midān 
moments). Infrastructures can also consist of media and communications tech-
nologies and mechanisms of “connectivity,” through which ideas and imagi-
nations about the collective are transmitted in a peer- to-peer or centralized 
fashion and through which actors can directly interact with and affect each 
other (e.g., Thacker, 2004). Classical understandings of the public in a Hab-
ermasian sense (like “communicative infrastructures,” cf. Habermas, 1989, 
p. 327) as well as online social networks would be examples (→ affective 
publics). Mass media communications with centralized promulgators also 
belong to this category, although they may transmit ideas and imaginations 
that do not require any form of interaction, such as in authoritarian regimes 
where a genuine public in Habermas’ sense does not exist. Infrastructures can 
also consist of symbol systems which hardly involve any social interaction, but 
in which affect – in the sense of affecting and being affected – works through 
exposure to and reception of cultural artifacts, such as monuments, architec-
ture, sites, novels, poetry, lyrics, and other artworks. Nation states are a para-
digmatic example given how various mnemonic practices and invented 
traditions fuel the symbolic realm of the “imagined community” (Anderson, 
1983) as well as a range of structures and institutions that themselves affect 
and preconfigure being affected in specific ways (→ affective citizenship).
 Of course, these distinctions are purely analytical and ideal- typical and one 
would expect to find amalgamations of these in social reality. It is also worth 
mentioning that both self- categorizations and infrastructures are highly con-
tested and conflictual since they essentially involve elements of social inclu-
sion as well as exclusion. The physical space at a political rally is contested 
between protesters and police, the space in a stadium between supporters of 
opposing teams. Communications in social networks struggle for attention 
and persuasion, and the symbolic universe of a nation state is, by definition, a 
matter of constant contestation.
 Social collectives are therefore not void of any social presuppositions, as 
scholars of spontaneous crowds and gatherings often suggest. Instead, situation- 
specific self- categorizations and infrastructures are prerequisites for actors to 
mutually affect and be affected by each other and for the eventual categorization 
of these affections into culturally established and linguistically labeled prototypes 
of emotion and collective action or behavior. The existing literature, briefly 
reviewed in what follows, has pointed at these two requirements as defining 
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1 See, for example, the concept of neo- tribalism (Maffesoli, 1996) for social formations that are 
abstract and localized at the same time.
features of various social formations, for which, however, the term “collective” 
is almost exclusively used as an umbrella term.
Background and related concepts
The history of the concept of collectives in different disciplines has been 
highly politicized and can be read as a story of social order and unrest rather 
than one of thorough social theorizing, which is probably why the term has 
not gained a strong foothold in social theory. Very broadly, two contrasting 
perspectives on social collectives can be distinguished. First, substantialist 
accounts emphasizing the enduring and orderly features of collectives, rooted 
in what people have in common, in particular “mental” properties such as 
beliefs, attitudes, and values that gradually consolidate into the capacity for 
collective action. Second, “interactive” accounts highlight the ephemeral and 
situational nature of collectives and their respective forms of collective behav-
ior, in particular in crowds and gatherings, widely considered to be disruptive 
to social order.
Substantialist accounts
Substantialist accounts strive to develop taxonomies and classifications of 
different kinds of social formations, for instance associations, bodies, or organ-
izations ( Jonsson, 2013, pp. 70ff.). This strand of research aims at distinguish-
ing more “abstract collectives” from localized collectives sharing the same 
physical space, in particular crowds and gatherings.1 Abstract collectives are 
supposed to be more enduring (and stable) social formations characterized by 
a certain degree of shared beliefs, values, and goals (so- called “Dauerwerte,” cf. 
von Wiese, 1956) that motivate coordinated forms of social action rather than 
the allegedly irrational behaviors of crowds. Past research has suggested 
different pathways that connect shared psychological properties to collective 
action. Ferdinand Tönnies (1931/2012) argued that actors are simultaneously 
embedded in a multitude of social relations; collectives could be distinguished 
according to the degree of actors’ willful commitment to these relations and 
their potential to pursue common goals. Most social relations would involve 
mutual dependency regarding the satisfaction of basic needs, such as kinship, 
cooperation, or exchange. Although these relations entail the sharing of 
resources or values, they are usually not intentionally conceptualized as relations 
by the parties who constitute them. Instead, Tönnies (1931/2012, pp. 249ff.) 
used the term “Samtschaften” to denote arrays of social relations which are 
deliberately and consciously intended by constituent actors bearing a number 
of commonalities like preferences, desires, customs, language, feelings, and 
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thoughts. Social collectivities in this understanding include social classes, 
nations, or certain religious communities. These collectivities, however, are 
incapable of proper collective action since they cannot form a “common 
will” on which those actions might be based. Tönnies (1931/2012, pp. 251ff.) 
used the term “social corporations” (Körperschaften) to denote collectives 
bearing an institutional structure through which members could form and 
articulate a common will that precedes collective action. Clans, local com-
munities, or unions are examples of these social corporations that are referred 
to as “collective actors” in the contemporary social sciences. The idea of a 
lasting orientation toward values and of the trans- individual character of social 
formations is also mirrored in Durkheim’s (1901/1982) holistic conception of 
“social facts” as collective realities that are “external” to individuals. He used 
the term “collective consciousness” to broadly refer to thoughts, representa-
tions, and emotions that are shared across a community and hence have their 
very own laws (Durkheim, 1901/1982, p. 40).
 These taxonomies already foreshadow more contemporary distinctions 
between formal and informal collectives prominent in organizational behavior 
and social movements research. In informal collectives, actors do share beliefs, 
norms, and goals. However, membership is usually not governed by formal rules 
(as in formal collectives) but rather through similar social practices (e.g., Della 
Porta & Diani, 2006). Taken together, substantialist perspectives on social for-
mations as collectives by and large revolve around the sharing of certain stances, 
attitudes worldviews, and phenomenological aspects in which intentions and 
self- categorizations refer to a collective, and which entail the capacity to engage 
in some sort of coordinated and intentional action.
Interactive accounts
In contrast to the focus on shared ideas and worldviews and collective agency, 
a second strand of work has considered social collectives as situational and 
ephemeral patterns of interaction processes. This perspective capitalizes on 
non- organized and localized collections of individuals in specific social situ-
ations. These collectives have traditionally been investigated in terms of their 
“collective behavior,” meaning “unconventional” and, for the most part, 
spontaneous, non- institutionalized behavior in public places.
 Crowds and gatherings are probably the most exemplary forms of this sort 
of social collective. A classical definition by Gustave Le Bon (1895) conceives 
of a crowd as a collection of individuals assembled in the same physical space, 
sharing a common focus of attention. Immersed in crowds, people show 
patterns of behavior that render all individual attitudes and characteristics 
irrelevant in favor of the emergence of a “collective mind” or “mental unity” 
(Le Bon, 1895, p. 57) (→ immersion, immersive power). Le Bon not only 
emphasized the importance of the crowd for instigating collective behavior, 
but also pointed at the essential role of emotions in characterizing collective 
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behavior as “irrational” and “exaggerated.” Essential for crowds is the process 
of contagion through which attitudes, emotions, and behaviors involuntarily 
and rapidly spread across individuals. Tarde (1962) proposed a similar per-
spective on crowds, although he argued that rather than contagion, imitation 
(which, in contrast, is essentially based on beliefs and desires (see King, 
2016)), is the key process driving the convergence of thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviors. Durkheim (1912/1995) criticized both concepts for being overly 
individualistic and for disregarding the importance of extra- individual social 
facts, in particular shared values and beliefs. However, he too suggested that 
individuals in crowds are often carried away by emotions, for which he 
coined the term “effervescence.”
 These views are more or less mirrored in later works, such as Robert 
Park’s and Ernest Burgess’ (1921) account, according to which a crowd is 
characterized by the dominance of a common drive amongst its members that 
results from the suppression of all individual impulses. This is achieved 
through “circular reactions,” which Herbert Blumer (1946) later defined as a 
form of “interstimulation wherein the response of one individual reproduces 
the stimulus that has come from another individual and in being reflected 
back to this individual reinforces the stimulation” (p. 170). Teresa Brennan 
(2004) has elaborated how these concepts of circular reaction and interstimu-
lation can be understood as processes through which actors mutually affect 
one another.
 Blumer furthermore developed a typology of crowds that reflects gradual 
shifts in their degree of institutionalization. In “casual crowds,” members only 
briefly turn their attention to some source of stimulation, such as a row in the 
streets (Blumer, 1946, pp. 178ff.). “Conventionalized crowds” share some 
similarities with rituals when they come together on a more or less regular 
basis, for instance when watching a football match. “Expressive crowds” 
gather for the purpose of exaltation, excited feelings, and bodily movements, 
as in dancing. In contrast, “acting crowds” are captivated by a common 
object and the pursuit of an external goal related to this object (see Dolata & 
Schrape, 2014; Borch, 2012, pp. 147f.).
 Quite some effort has been put into identifying criteria that distinguish 
localized, actually assembled crowds from the “substantive” kinds of collec-
tives discussed above and into delineating the ways in which both types might 
interact. Durkheim (1912/1995) proposed a well- established account of how, 
in rituals, shared beliefs and values as well as processes of affecting and being 
affected coalesce. Taking a different perspective, Wilhelm Vleugels (1930) 
coined the distinction between “latent” and “active” crowds. Latent crowds 
(or “separated crowds” in Tönnies’ terms) are first and foremost 
“communities of feeling” (Gefühlsgemeinschaften), meaning those parts of a 
population that share a certain way of evaluating or assessing events or states 
of affairs (often with respect to their rights and duties), and thus develop a 
latent feeling of being connected in solidarity (cf. Menzel, 1931). Members of 
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latent crowds do not directly interact with each other, but develop similar 
beliefs, ideas, and, eventually, emotions, by being exposed to mass media, in 
particular newspapers and political propaganda. Active crowds (or “assembled 
crowds” in Tönnies’ terms), on the other hand, are physically assembled 
crowds as described by Le Bon and others. They can be outcomes or trans-
formations of latent crowds, but may also emerge from mere gatherings of 
otherwise entirely unrelated individuals (Vleugels, 1930). Active crowds are 
characterized by “affects, aroused passions, and instincts” to which particip-
ants irrationally succumb (von Wiese, 1956, p. 32).
 These ideas have been taken up by the Chicago School, which further 
elaborated typologies of crowds and masses. Whereas crowds are character-
ized by the dominance of a common drive that results from the neglect and 
suppression of all individual impulses, a public retains all of these individual 
impulses. A public is not characterized by a common drive, but aims at delib-
eration and the rational exchange of arguments regarding a specific issue. It 
can therefore even be understood as a platform that promotes the emergence 
of individual impulses in the first place (cf. Borch, 2012, p. 143). Although 
crowds and publics are distinct forms of social formations, they are both dis-
tinguished from social groups in that they share an ahistorical character. 
Crowds and publics may precede other kinds of social groups, and it is only 
through interactions and communications that they gradually develop shared 
goals and values. Crowds are, in a sense, an innovative force that propels 
actors out of old ties into new ones.
 A further relevant distinction is that between crowds and masses. Blumer 
(1935) introduced the mass as a type of social collective that is unique to 
modern societies because it requires modern media, such as motion pictures 
and newspapers. Masses are considered “a homogeneous aggregate of indi-
viduals who in their extra- mass activities are highly heterogeneous. In the 
mass they are essentially alike, are individually indistinguishable, and can be 
treated as similar units” (Blumer, 1935, p. 118). Importantly, however, indi-
viduals in masses do not interact with each other and masses do promote col-
lective behavioral dispositions. Blumer (1935) mentions “war hysteria, the 
spread of fashion, migratory movements, ‘gold rushes’ and land booms, social 
unrest, popular excitement over the kidnapping of a baby, the rise of interest 
in golf ” (p. 115) as examples.
Examples from research
Given this extraordinarily broad array of concepts traditionally filed under the 
label “social collective,” it is not intuitively clear how a social collective can 
be meaningfully conceptualized as ontologically distinct from other social 
formations such as communities, organizations, movements, or crowds. 
The understanding of social collectives proposed here assumes that they are 
specific and distinct social phenomena – not merely an umbrella term for 
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various social formations. In a nutshell, substantialist accounts would argue 
that collectives are trans- situational social formations in which actors share 
beliefs, values, feelings, and eventually a common will, whereas interactive 
accounts emphasize that collectives are those social formations that manifest 
situation- specific collective behavior. Both provide, by way of different 
infrastructures, critical potentialities through which actors mutually affect 
each other and eventually come to share a common emotion. Substantialist 
understandings hint at existing commonalities that promote – as the small-
est common denominator – similar self- categorizations. Interactive accounts 
emphasize the necessary material, symbolic, and technological infrastruc-
tures that enable (latent or active) sharing and reciprocal awareness of this 
sharing, allowing for actors to mutually affect and be affected by each 
other.
 The proposed understanding of social collectives subscribes to the inter-
active view that they are transient and situation- specific “aggregate states” 
or “dynamic stabilizations” of other social formations, rather than an 
enduring and substantive social entity. Such situations are, however, not 
bound to Goffmanian “encounters” (Goffman, 1961) in a shared physical 
space, but also encompass spatially dispersed actors. Nevertheless, collec-
tives require an infrastructure that facilitates mutual affectivity and being 
affected, which may even be a media space or symbolic universe. Borrow-
ing from the substantialist perspective, the proposed understanding also 
holds that actors need to have an (episodic) self- understanding as part of a 
group of actors that self- categorizes and is affected in similar ways. The 
proposed sharing of beliefs, goals, and values in the substantialist account 
is, in a very rudimentary sense, a precondition for these transiently con-
verging self- categorizations, and would likewise require a corresponding 
infrastructure.
 Existing research has emphasized the utility of this notion of social collec-
tives in many ways. For example, a study of the embodiment of belonging 
through religious practices amongst members of a Pentecostal church and a 
Sufi order in Berlin conceives of collectives as constantly “in the making” 
(Dilger, Kasmani, & Mattes, 2018). Focusing on notions of space and place, 
the study demonstrates how social collectives are actively generated, per-
formed, and experienced through the physical co- presence of several actors. 
These spaces (and their mediatized analogues) provide the infrastructure for 
the embodied ways in which actors mutually affect each other. The religious 
backdrop of Pentecostalism and Sufism respectively provides the basis not 
only for congregating in ritual practices but also for shared self- categorizations. 
The study thus helps to make sense of how collectivity is articulated and 
stabilized beyond gathering in a shared physical space. It conceives of reli-
gious communities and gatherings as social formations that constitute specific 
affective arrangements, which in turn promote certain modes through which 
actors affect and are affected by each other.
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 A second study has looked at social collectives in the context of film and 
cinema. Subscribing to philosophical notions of community, Hauke Lehmann 
(2017) conceives of social collectives as emerging in between individual and 
idiosyncratic self- understandings, and historicized and cultural forms and pat-
terns of the (collective) self. This in- betweenness carries a specific affectivity 
and is conceptualized in its potential to create shared sensibilities and modes 
of world- relatedness. This shared sensibility, although highly transient and 
ephemeral, may culminate in perceptions and concepts of “we- ness.” In this 
context, film and cinema assume a critical role in that they project individual 
and corporeal forms of feeling and being affected toward collective forms of 
affectivity and self- understanding. In other words, they simultaneously 
provide the infrastructures for shared self- categorizations and the capacity to 
affect and be affected, and are a privileged means for re- instantiating transient 
social collectives.
Conclusion
Social collectives, as proposed here, are distinct types of social formations that 
come into being at the borderlines of transient social situations and certain 
forms of relational self- understanding. These relational self- understandings are 
not without presuppositions, but instead draw upon existing views of the self 
in social contexts and material as well as medial infrastructures that can enable 
actors to affect and be affect by others. Social collectives by no means render 
other sorts and theories of social formations obsolete. On the contrary, the-
ories of social groups, organizations, communities, crowds, or nation states 
provide the necessary insights into social processes that enable or promote self- 
categorizations and infrastructures. Their hierarchies, histories, political strat-
egies, institutions, networks, etc. all inform the different ways through which 
common self- categorizations and reciprocal affect can be achieved, either 
intentionally or as unintended consequences. Given that actors categorize 
themselves as part of a larger collection of individuals and given that infrastruc-
tures allowing for relational affect between actors and for similar self- 
categorizations are in place, social collectives can situationally emerge for 
certain episodes. These episodes can be conceived of as specific transient 
“states” or modes of being of other (already existing) social formations or may 
contribute to the generation of these (often more enduring) social formations. 
This collective becoming thus provides an “embodied grounding” of various (also 
more abstract or latent) social formations and contributes to collective actions, 
behaviors, and emotions.
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Chapter 24
Mida-n moments
Bilgin Ayata and Cilja Harders
Emotions and protest has been a growing field within social movement 
studies over the past two decades. Focusing on the political practice of occu-
pying public squares, we develop the concept of “Midān moments” to 
analyze the emotional and affective dynamics of such mass protests. The term 
“Midān moment” emerges from our research on the 2011 occupation of 
Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, and the 2013 Gezi Park protests in Istanbul, 
Turkey. “Midān” refers to the Arabic word meaning “square” or “battlefield” 
that highlights the spatial and antagonistic dimension of the concept, while 
“moment” refers to its temporal component. Midān moments are episodes 
within a delineated space that are characterized by intense affective relational-
ities engendered through the bodily co- presence of protesters as well as prac-
tices relating to these spaces. We define Midān moments as moments of 
rupture in which pre- existing emotional repertoires of fear, hate, repression, 
or respect for the political order are destabilized. They can potentiate new 
ways of being and relating to each other, but can also raise new conflicts and 
tensions. Midān moments are imbued with a sense of possibility for social 
change as well as ambivalence, as they may already contain – and make vivid 
– the limits of these possibilities. Looking at Tahrir Square, Gezi Park, and 
other sustained occupations through an affective lens complicates both the 
narrative of a utopian square and the narrative of a “failed revolution or upris-
ing.” Moving beyond a simple assessment of failure or success, a focus on the 
affective dynamics of extraordinary episodes of collective protest reveals as 
much about a society’s past tensions as its future ones. Furthermore, Midān 
moments are not fixed to a particular space and event, but can travel in time 
and space, extending to distant localities. When Midān moments travel, they 
can evoke new political practices that often escape the level of research and 
media coverage afforded to sustained mass protests. These new forms of local 
political practices, in which actors may engage in formal or informal, local or 
national, violent or peaceful types of participation, may feed into political 
pluralization and lead to the intense politicization of substantial parts of par-
ticipating protestors. At the same time, such participation may contribute to 
processes of polarization and political and sectarian violence instigated from 
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above, but felt and practiced “from below” as well. Thus, the concept of the 
Midān moments allows for an analysis of political transformations during and 
after mass protests that can account for the non- linear, multidirectional, and 
at times contradictory developments in the aftermath of such struggles. In 
contrast to much of the scholarly work in Social Movement Studies (SMS), 
the concept we propose combines agency, time, and space in relation to 
emotions, which enables one to account for the more inchoate and incoher-
ent dimensions of political emotions.
Historical orientation and state of the research
While passions have had a productive and important place in the early con-
ceptions of politics, such as in ancient Greece, the modern social sciences 
treated people’s emotions and affects as dangerous and in need of control. 
This was because they could be stimulated (and abused) by able despots and 
politicians and could develop disruptive powers. Sociologists from Gustave 
Le Bon to Max Weber were wary of crowds and their allegedly uncontrolla-
ble, dangerous, and even pathological emotions. Liberal and deliberative 
political thought in particular advocates the idea that participation in the 
political sphere is performed by rational actors, who are moved by identifiable 
interests and engaged in tempered public deliberation about the collective 
good (Greco & Stenner, 2008). Postwar US- American and continental polit-
ical science, both underpinned by rationalist foundations and normative 
interest in democracy and good governance, followed this line of reasoning. 
Broadly speaking, affect and emotion were neglected, feared, and/or analytic-
ally relegated to lower- class “dangerous masses,” non- democratic forces, 
women, or colonial subjects (Bargetz & Sauer, 2010; Staiger, Cvetkovich, & 
Reynolds, 2010). In the same vein, political participation was largely thought 
of in legalistic, institutional, and conventional ways, and understood narrowly 
in terms of rational citizens making informed electoral choices according to 
their interests.
 Yet with the emergence of the field of SMS after various mass mobiliza-
tions in the 1960s, the picture changed. With anti- colonial movements flour-
ishing in the former colonies and emergent civil rights, peace, students’, and 
women’s movements in many countries of the world, protest, participation, 
and the complexities of mobilization attracted more scholarly attention. The 
new field of SMS dedicated itself to the analysis of movements, their reper-
toires of protest, and street politics as important aspects of the democratic 
process rather than disruptive political contestation (McAdam, Tarrow, & 
Tilly, 2001). Early proponents of SMS stuck with rationalist paradigms, ana-
lyzing the mechanisms of mobilization, resources, and political opportunity 
structures which enabled contentious politics. They did so in an effort to 
shield both movements and the emerging scholarly field from allegations of 
irrationality and irrelevance (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001). Yet after the 
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“cultural turn” in SMS over the past two decades, these rationalist and func-
tionalist approaches were increasingly questioned, and emotions were pushed 
to the forefront of the study of movements, protest, and participation 
(→ emotions, emotion concept). In a number of seminal publications, social 
movement scholars emphasized that in contrast to political psychology, which 
is interested in individual emotional states, the social and political dimension 
of emotions are critical for a complex comprehension of collective action and 
protest (Della Porta, 2016; Flam & King, 2005; Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 
2001, 2004; Gould, 2009; Jasper, 2011).
 Emotions are highly relevant when analyzing repertoires of contention, 
framing strategies, the recruitment of movement members, the mobilization of 
protest, and the sustainability of movements; they are crucial to understanding 
how movement identities as well as a sense of belonging are forged (→ emotion 
repertoires). Typological distinctions have been proposed between short- term and 
long- term or reciprocal versus shared emotions (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 
2001) and between “affective loyalties” as attachments or aversions and “moral 
emotions” as feelings of approval or disapproval (Jasper, 2011, p. 287). In her 
study of the Arab Uprisings, Wendy Pearlman (2013) shows how participation- 
constraining emotions such as fear, grief, and shame turn into anger, joy, and 
pride, which lead to mass mobilization even in the face of violent repression. 
Similarly, Helena Flam (2005) distinguishes “cementing emotions” and “sub-
versive emotions” in an effort to understand the dynamics of “emotional libera-
tion,” a process in which actors disrupt old feelings of loyalty and construct new 
(oppositional) emotional bonds (p. 31). Cognitive and emotional liberation, she 
holds, need to be conceptualized as mutually reinforcing processes. Mass pro-
tests and occupations can set such processes into motion due to the intense 
emotional and affective dynamics in the squares, allowing for new feelings and 
the disruption of an established emotional habitus. Such new feelings can be 
very disquieting and thus protests do not only need material and immaterial 
resources, resonant frames, ideological orientation, moral shocks and engaged 
actors, but also require an understanding of these as emotional processes 
(Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001, 2004; Flam & King, 2005; Hogget & 
Thompson, 2012) in order to be sustained. Movements engage in “emotion 
work”; protesters need ways to “read” anger or frustration in order to translate 
feelings into activism and even create specific, emotionally attuned repertoires 
or “emotional habitus” (Gould, 2009).
 Given that collective mobilization tends to be much less “tidy” than the 
typologies of SMS suggest, emotion work is even more important. Research 
on mass protests and occupations show that, more often than not, protesters 
experience mixed feelings, ambivalence, and ambiguity (Ayata & Harders, 
2018). Their assessments can change from one moment to another, just like 
the situation in an occupied square might change from boredom and anxiety 
to the sudden intensity of an expected attack by security forces or counter- 
movements. The nonlinearity and complexity of emotions was emphasized in 
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Deborah Gould’s (2009) study of the ACT UP movement in the United 
States. Her approach to the role of affect and emotions in protest refuted 
categorizations of emotions as “positive” or “negative” for protest, which still 
inflect SMS scholarship on emotions. For instance, in her reading, despair can 
lead to mobilization, but also to immobilization. Her approach to human 
motivation derives from an understanding of affect as “non- conscious, non-
linguistic, noncoherent, nonrational, and unpredetermined” (Gould, 2009, 
p. 23) (→ affect). Approaching human motivation in this way enables scholars 
to make sense of what drives people to cast a vote or join a demonstration, or 
why people become members of a party or stay in a group even though the 
meetings are boring and the agenda is not very promising. Mobilization is 
driven as much by cognition as by affect and emotion. Gould emphasizes that 
perceptions of rational interest, of rights, of dignity, and of being included or 
excluded are shaped, informed, and structured by affects and emotions 
because they are formed through our embodied practices in the social world. 
Following these important insights, the concept of Midān moments offers a 
shift of perspective. Rather than asking why people protest, which is still one 
of the core questions in SMS literature, we ask what protest does to people. 
How does experiencing the highly intense affective dynamics of protesting 
together affect participants? What do the collective experiences of inchoate, 
nonlinear, and immediate feelings that become registered as bodily intensities 
and connectivity do in the aftermath of protest? What does protest do to an 
individual’s relationship to the collective, to the self, to the political com-
munity, and to political transformation? These are the questions we seek to 
explore with our analysis of Midān moments.
Systematic explication of the concept Mida-n 
moments
Following the series of popular uprisings in North Africa and the Middle 
East after December 2010 that led to massive changes in the region, the 
occupation of public squares once again became a popular form of protest 
around the globe. Our concept of the Midān moment emerges from the in- 
depth study of two occupations of public squares, namely the occupations 
of Tahrir Square (Cairo 2011) and Taksim Square/Gezi Park (Istanbul 
2013). However, our analysis of the intricate dynamics of affect, emotion 
and politics also offers important insights for other forms of protests that 
take place over a sustained period of time. Midān moments refer to episodes 
in a specific space that are characterized by intense affective relationalities 
through the bodily co- presence of protesters and the practices experienced 
in these spaces. Some of these practices relate to political deliberation, 
decision- making, and basic forms of political protest. Crucially, the very act 
of occupying and maintaining a space requires daily maintenance and 
service provision.
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 These intense bodily experiences are embedded in new political practices of 
hitherto unlikely personal and political encounters across existing social and 
political cleavages and can evoke different affective attachments. The sustained 
practices of protest and occupation by the collective in the public square are 
embedded in a complex web of affective arrangements marked by capacity and 
potentiality (→ affective arrangements). Midān moments are a “time out of time” 
(Sabea, 2013) during which new ways of being, both at the individual as well as 
collective level, are experimented with. They are moments of rupture that 
destabilize previous emotional and political constellations, for instance, the fear 
of repression or respect for the current political order (→ emotion repertoires). 
Participants can experience “emotional liberation” (Flam, 2005) which enables 
new alliances, new political practices, and new ways of relating to each other. 
Hardt and Negri (2012) have called the occupation of squares “factories” that 
are producing political affect, which in their reading necessarily leads to emanci-
pation and new political subjectivities. However, our study of the Tahrir and 
Taksim protests show that the experiences in the square are too manifold, 
messy, and at times contradictory to be categorized in such a linear manner. 
Even though romanticized notions of protest movements are rather common in 
analyses of recent protests, it is important to account for the ambivalences, 
ambiguities, and limitations that emerge from spatially inflected affective 
dynamics (Soudias, 2018). Fear and hope, excitement and boredom, love and 
hate, affective community building and alienation, and a range of other personal 
and collective experiences are felt in parallel during the protests. All contribute 
to the highly intense affective relationality on the square. While at times they 
enable new alliances and new encounters across intersectional hierarchies based 
on race, gender, class, religion, they can also intensify and consolidate existing 
hierarchies, conflicts and antagonisms. Therefore, we argue that Midān 
moments are imbued with a sense of possibility and ambivalence as they may 
already contain – and make clear – the limits of these possibilities.
 Our choice of the term Midān moment captures this Janus- faced dimen-
sion. The Arabic word midān refers primarily to a field, place, or square, but 
it also means a battlefield (Viré, 2012). Etymologically, the word midān refers 
to the field on which princes and noble youth were trained in martial arts in 
Persian antiquity, lending weight to the notion of the midān as a locus of 
physical battle and contestation (Knauth, 1976). Just like the English “field” 
or the German “Feld,” it also hints figuratively at intellectual or political 
“battlefields.” A midān is a well- defined place, a locus of everyday practices 
that in turn create and structure urban fabric. The midān is embedded in a city 
as a multi- scalar site, which is – in a Lefebvrian sense – a socially produced 
space, and thus as much a product of power structures as a site of resistance 
(Brenner, 1999; Lefebvre, 1991). The square is thus a socio- political space in 
which power struggles unfold.
 To emphasize the directness and instantaneousness of relational affect, we 
use the term “moments” as a temporal register of momentum, rather than 
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situations, events, hours, or days. A Midān moment consists of many different 
encounters in a distinct temporality. It combines two temporal registers: the 
immediacy of, for instance, an affective atmosphere, which imposes itself in a 
matter of seconds and can lead to an immediate rupture of the well- known; 
and the emergence of new ways of feeling, which can last longer. In this 
sense, a Midān moment is a “transformative event.” Transformative events 
“come to be interpreted as significantly disrupting, altering, or violating the 
taken- for-granted assumptions governing routine political and social rela-
tions” (McAdam & Sewell, 2001, p. 110). At the same time, moments can be 
repeated, remembered, and lived again, due to the affective attachments they 
carry. As such, they gain momentum over time, a process which is important 
to explore for a better understanding of the more mid- to long- term effects of 
such events.
 To illustrate the Midān moment from our case study of the occupation of 
Tahrir Square, we can point to at least two important overlapping affective 
arrangements structuring the affective and emotional dynamics in the square: 
one is related to the midān as battlefield; and the other is geared toward the 
political practices that created and sustained Tahrir as a utopian space – as the 
“independent republic of Tahrir” (Keraitim & Mehrez, 2012; Sabea, 2014; 
Telmissany, 2014). The midān is configured here both as a utopian place and 
a socio- political battlefield in which class, gender, and religious and political 
difference were momentarily less relevant, or open for renegotiation. At the 
same time, these differences and latent conflicts were still present, reappearing 
both visibly and subtly, sometimes openly violent, sometimes less so, thus 
creating important constraints to the desire to begin anew in a utopic moment 
(Ayata & Harders, 2018). For instance, it was possible to experience becom-
ing a collective when shouting and protesting in concert, loudly demanding 
“bread, freedom, dignity, and social justice.” This resulted in moments of 
deep affective resonance between men and women, old and young, Christian 
and Muslim, secular and religious, leftist and conservative, and rich and poor 
Egyptians. Yet on the other hand, moments of dissonance, embedded in mul-
tiple layers of conflicting emotions and differing affective arrangements, were 
also experienced on the ground. Counter to what social movement research 
usually suggests, participants often do not recount the dominance of one spe-
cific mobilizing emotion. Different affective arrangements, which might be 
dissonant and resonant at the same time due to the various possibilities of 
affective attunement, interweave complexly to shape individual experiences 
in the square.
 Even though the term Midān moment highlights the locality and time of 
the event itself, it is important to underline that the affective dynamics of the 
square can travel in time and space (Schielke, 2015). The protests themselves 
involve varying levels of participation. For instance, certain activists sleep and 
live in the square during the occupation, while others join only at certain 
times, thus connecting the occupied square with their homes, districts and far 
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beyond spaces. The in- and outflow already carries the Midān moment to 
distant localities during the protests. But Midān moments also travel over 
time, in the aftermath of protests in which personal and collective memory 
creates an affective archive that can be reinvigorated at different times and 
different places. For instance, memories of victory, violence, and loss are 
important reference points for local mobilization long after the initial protests. 
As Midān moments travel in time and space, they feed into new political 
practices. Political participation in such practices may be formal or informal, 
local or national, and violent or peaceful. Instead of merely looking at mass 
uprisings as events that are too often hastily described as successes or failures, 
it is this capacity of the Midān moment to travel in time and space that allows 
us to understand and analyze political transformation below the level of 
regime change. This is true of Turkey and Egypt, which on the one hand 
have become much more authoritarian, repressive, and polarized after the 
mass uprisings, but on the other hand, have seen resilient and sustained local 
political practices from below as a result of the protests (Harders & Wahba, 
2017), which feed into larger protests or resistances that challenge the regimes 
from time to time. Thus, tracing the trajectory of the Midān moment enables 
us to analyze the medium- and long- term processes of transformation that 
continue to take place long after cameras and people have left occupied 
squares.
 In order to empirically capture how Midān moments travel, we propose to 
approach them as participation rather than protest because the latter is a spe-
cific and comparatively rare type of participation. Conventionally, participa-
tion has meant public, collective, voluntary, and non- professional activities 
directed toward the government or politics. In the last decades, this notion 
has continuously expanded to include the ever- growing diversity of forms 
taken by citizen agency, such as contemporary modes of “creative, personal-
ized and individualized” action from street parties to consumption boycotts 
(van Deth, 2016, p. 1). Lately, these debates have been informed by 
approaches that stress the affective dimension of such agency (→ affective 
citizenship).
 Even with these new re- conceptualizations, research in the field has mainly 
focused on democratic politics and has thus missed out on more refined 
debates about informal and less visible types of agency in anthropology and 
critical area studies. For example, Asef Bayat (2009) hinted at the public 
impact of individual agency in the “quiet encroachment” of massive, though 
individualistic, informal “non- movements” in Egypt and Iran. Diane Singer-
man (1995) alluded to the importance of neighborhood networks to the prac-
tices of ordinary citizens in Egypt, and James C. Scott (1985) famously 
analyzed the “weapons of the weak.” Similarly, our broader conceptualiza-
tion of participation includes informal, individual, hidden, illegal, and “non- 
political” actions and networks, as well as organized public collective action 
within and beyond institutionalized frameworks. In more abstract terms, it 
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includes all practices geared towards “involvement in the social, political, and 
economic processes of formal and informal resource- allocation in a society” 
(Harders, 2013, p. 116). Such involvement is always informed by intersec-
tional categories of social inequality, such as class, race, religion, ethnicity, 
and gender. Thus, when Midān moments travel in time and space, they 
might turn into less visible, informal ways of keeping the utopian or dysto-
pian quality of the moment alive as they inform political practices.
Outlook: from protest to participation
Sustained mass protest is not the rule but rather the exception, both in demo-
cratic and authoritarian polities. Thus, in order to grasp the emotional and affec-
tive dynamics of mobilization beyond highly visible mass events, we suggest the 
concept of the Midān moment that enables us to study both the potential and 
limitations of such highly intense forms of collectivization and mobilization. 
Highlighting the temporal and spatial components of mass protests, we concep-
tualized Midān moments as being highly charged affectively and emotionally. 
They are transformative moments, which inform and feed into manifold sym-
bolic, discursive and praxeological references in their aftermath and in various 
locations. Once the moment gains momentum, it develops its own affective 
economy that feeds into a diverse array of practices and discourses, which we 
conceptualize as participation (→ affective economy). At the same time, the affective 
and emotional charge of such extraordinary events is fundamentally open and 
contingent. Egypt and Turkey underwent extraordinary mobilization and polar-
ization. For some, feelings of enthusiasm and solidarity turned into hate and 
violence. High hopes led to deep exasperation and disillusion. Such polarization 
was also carefully orchestrated “from above,” when state- controlled media and 
security apparatuses deliberately targeted those groups which challenged the 
status quo, such as the urban poor, leftists, women, LGBTQ, or religious or 
ethnic minorities. Both states intensified their so- called “war on terror,” 
unleashing state violence and permitting popular violence. At the same time, 
both the Erdogan and the Sisi governments were alluding to the “Gezi-” or 
“Tahrir- experience” when organizing mass rallies, tapping into the affective 
archive of the Midān moment with the intention of replicating it for their own 
purposes. In addition, as Midān moments travel in time and space, they erupt 
and show their potentiality during conventional political events such as elections 
and referendums. Such conventional opportunities for participation then are 
used by activists to refresh the memory of the Midān moment and increase 
electoral mobilization. These are the more visible and tangible layers of deeper 
socio- political transformations. They are fundamentally contingent in the sense 
that a struggle for “bread, freedom, and dignity” can at least in the short and 
medium term lead to more authoritarianism, but leaves its mark on a citizenry 
which can then tap into the experience and memory of Midān moments.
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Chapter 25
Affective communities
Veronika Zink
Affective communities do not only evolve from processes of collectivization, 
but are themselves a mode of relating individuals toward each other. Mutual 
affectability serves as a prerequisite for the construction of communal rela-
tionships. In this respect, affects function as implicit translators between social 
bodies that sensuously converse and create a dynamic sphere of sensual 
experiences. Transgressing the plurality of socially defined and culturally val-
orized positions, by means of affectivity, people consolidate intermediary 
realms of affective exchange and situationally generate a sense of affinity and 
collective immediacy. The notion of affective communities draws attention 
to processes of producing a temporal solidarization between affected and the 
affecting social bodies. The creation of ephemeral milieus of communality is 
characterized by an intense and immersive form of social integration.
 Instead of understanding social forms as the product of pre- established 
rules, hegemonic norms, and imposed structures, the concept of affective 
communities focuses on sensual infrastructures of social encounters and on 
modes of affective exchange that make up the fabric of the formation and 
transformation of the social. The idea of an affective communality, at first 
sight, seems to counter the notion of systemic integration maintained by the 
administrative- economic complex of societal order. The concept of affective 
communities, thus, conjures a prevalent social imaginary that reflects the 
structure of contemporary social reality; a social imaginary driven by the 
withering of belief in the idea of an “iron cage” (Weber, 2005, p. 123). By 
understanding social constructs as the ever- changing product of timely, affec-
tive social connections, the social is imagined to assume a rather vital form. 
The notion of affective communities, hence, envisions the social as a net of 
pulsating spheres of sociability instead of depicting society as a self- contained 
corpus composed of organized elements (Giesen, Zink, & Le Maitre, 2016).
 In this respect, affective communities are social collectives inasmuch as 
they are transient aggregations of individuals (→ social collectives). Nonetheless, 
the concept of affective communities depicts a specific form of collectivity 
that can be characterized by a shared sensuality eliciting an implicit sense of 
commonality and immediateness. This understanding of affective communities 
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has a conceptual affinity with the notion of emotional communities 
(cf. Rosenwein, 2006; Weber, 1978). Emotional communities are thought of 
as evolving from affectively intense social encounters of fellow feeling that 
(re)produce the belief in an indissoluble community of shared values and like-
 mindedness. In comparison to the compulsory bonds that define emotional 
communities, affective communities describe the mutual constitution of social 
associations. Affective communities are momentary connections of social 
immediacy that are driven by “the impulse of sociablity” (Simmel, 1971, 
p. 254), that is, of a playful form of practicing convivial connectivity. Accord-
ingly, the concept of affective communities is to be located between the idea 
of society (Gesellschaft) in terms of a rational association modulating the per-
sonal interests of distinct individuals, and the notion of community (Gemein-
schaft) in terms of an affirmative subjugation to an emotionalized, transpersonal 
collectivity
Assembling social bodies: sensory infrastructures 
of social cohesion
Describing an American football match, Brian Massumi (2002) illustrates the 
“political economy of belonging and the logic of relation” (p. 68) at work in 
the collective realm of the match. Independent of the antagonism of the 
teams, the players, the ball, and the field that is polarized by the two goals 
turn into a “unity of movement” (Massumi, 2002, p. 75) driven by dynamic 
relations of force. What is at work between the moving and the moved 
bodies are the reciprocal affections that continuously process communality 
and a mode of belonging that Massumi (2002) defines as the “incorporeality 
of the event” (p. 64). This sensual and sensory interpositioning of the bodies 
opens up an intermediary space of mutual dependence between the ball, the 
player, and the goals. For the duration of the match these bodies belong to 
each other, since they affectively and expressively reflect one another and 
thus condition each other’s “actionability” (Massumi, 2002, p. 74):
The player’s body is a node of expression: not a subject of the play but a 
material channel for the catalysis of an event affecting the global state of 
the game. Whereas the ball is the catalyzer, and the goal are inducers, the 
node of expression is a transducer: a channel for the transformation of a 
local physical movement into another energetic mode, that of potential 
energy.
(Massumi, 2002, p. 74)
This affective realm of mutual sensual impressions and bodily expressions not 
only groups the formerly separated bodies into “a state of intensive readiness 
for reflex response” (Massumi, 2002, p. 74), but literally puts the bodies into 
play: The affective movement implies a temporal suspension of the socially 
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ascribed identity of what is an object and what is a subject. Not only is the 
ball “the subject of the play” (Massumi, 2002, p. 74), but the players need, as 
Massumi suggests, to transcend their position as self- conscious and self- 
interested agents and arrive at a sensory state open to the ever- changing 
dynamics of movement.
 For Massumi, transcending one’s individual identity for the sake of consti-
tuting an affective community requires that the players enter a state of pre- 
reflexivity and pre- consciousness. From a sociological perspective, this idea is 
arguable. Georg Simmel (1971) points to the fact that within the realm of 
sociability there is no room for individual personalities, interests, and feelings. 
Self- confident subjects, according to Simmel, emphasize their distinctness 
and, thus, oppose the social form of a convivial association. The belief in the 
equivalence of elements is a central principle of sociable associations allowing 
mutuality between potentially heterogenous bodies. Affective communities 
are thought of as impersonal spheres consisting of beings that leave aside both 
objective differences and the personal intensity of life. Nonetheless, the 
concept of affective communities discounts a naturalistic vision of the social, 
since the impersonal sphere of affective communality is a superficially con-
structed sphere. The more heterogeneous the bodies are, the more important 
it becomes to create the imaginary of a pre- personal and pre- reflexive realm 
of interaction “among equals” (Simmel, 1971, p. 133). Accordingly, being 
sensitive to the dynamics of a social movement and temporarily voiding one’s 
identity should not be confused with the image of a pre- socialized and 
unformed body. Mutual affectability presupposes the capability of resonance 
(Seyfert, 2012) and an educated social sensibility (→ affective resonance). Being 
sensible to the resonances of a movement and reflecting its dynamics requires 
a specialized training of the body (Bourdieu, 1996) and, thus, hyperconscious 
agents that are acutely aware of affective movements. The example of sport in 
particular makes clear that the socialization of the body and the incorporation 
of a field- specific, sensual knowledge is necessary to intuitively react and to 
enter the flow of an “affectual nebula” (Maffesoli, 1996, pp. 72–78) that is 
itself very sensitive to change (cf. Seyfert, 2012).
The development of the concept: images of the 
social and mechanisms of association
Due to their capacity to relate and repel social bodies, affects play a vital role 
in the moving of the social, in the collectivization and singularization of 
bodies (→ affect). By focusing on sensuously perceptible mechanisms of social 
cohesion, the concept of affective communities not only stresses the social 
power of sensuality, but concentrates on a specific form of the social: the 
community. Within modern social theories, the idea of community is 
opposed to the notion of society. Reflecting a modern imaginary of the 
social, society is formed by the functionally rational, socially contracted, and 
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formally impersonal organization of social coexistence. The vision of a tech-
nocratic, ordered society is perceived to be the civilizing product of bureau-
cratically organized industrial modernity, in which the market economy, the 
nation state, and legal justice become the central institutions of life (Weber, 
1978). In contrast to this mechanic imaginary of the social, the notion of 
community reflects an organic teaching and is grounded in the belief in 
socially close, personal relations and in an emotionally grounded solidarity. 
This said, the idea of a community reveals a fundamentally different 
perspective on integration. While associative relationships (society, 
Vergesellschaftung) rest on, as Max Weber (1978) defines, “a rationally motiv-
ated adjustment of interests or a similarly motivated agreement” (pp. 40–41), 
communitization (Vergemeinschaftung), at least in its pure form, describes a 
social relationship “based on a subjective feeling of the parties, whether affec-
tual or traditional, that they belong together” (p. 40).
 This very notion of community has often been characterized as a socially 
mobilizing form with political potential. Against the backdrop of the modern 
industrial age, the idea of a personalized, emotionally indissoluble community 
augurs the image of a warming “fireplace” (Bauman, 2000, p. 1) and promises 
relief from the alienating “iron cage” of modern society. Modern social theo-
rists, indeed, conceptually distinguished these two modes of social formation. 
However, they frequently pointed to the fact that community and society are 
not two separate entities, but that modern social life must be understood as a 
permanent recombination of associative and communal relations. In this line of 
thought, Weber (1978) famously conceived the modern nation state as being 
driven by the reenacted belief in an imagined community of sentiment (p. 925) 
(→ affective citizenship). Siegfried Kracauer (1998) enunciated the dialectics of the 
modern organization of the salaried masses that is characterized by the systemic 
integration into the functionally rational order of the modern firm but also enli-
vened by the ecstatic experience of the community orchestrated through opera-
tionally organized sport events. And, as a result of his analysis of the totemic 
cultures of Australian tribal societies, Émile Durkheim (2001) assumed that the 
collective, affective arousals and the libidinal virtue of assembled bodies fulfill a 
socially cohesive function revitalizing the social corpus, especially within func-
tionally differentiated, modern societies.
 Modern theories of communitization certainly inform current conceptions 
of affective communities. Most notably, one is reminded of Durkheim’s 
description of the corroboree feasts. The collective realm of a ritual assembly is a 
highly resonant sphere produced by sensual transmissions, mutually affective 
stimulations and “emotional infections” (Denzin, 2009, p. 149). As a result, 
the diverse elements of this cultic encounter (the totem, the clan members, 
the music, etc.) coalesce into a movement of perpetual affections:
Once the individuals are assembled, their proximity generates a kind 
of electricity that quickly transports them to an extraordinary degree of 
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exaltation. Every emotion expressed is retained without resistance in all 
those minds so open to external impressions; each one echoing the 
others. The initial impulse thus becomes amplified and reverberates, like 
an avalanche gathering force as it goes.
(Durkheim, 2001, pp. 162–163)
Using highly metaphorical language, Durkheim aims to signify the social 
potency of this reciprocal mode of sensual affections that unresistingly and 
transversally moves through bodies and becomes intensified and amplified by 
them. Similar to Massumi’s football scene, the conducted electricity and the 
contagious echo- like effect transfigure a mediating social force that, by means 
of affects, constructs a sensual space of mutual belonging and shared move-
ments (→ belonging).
 Apart from Durkheim’s pictorial description of affective communities, 
studies in social psychology, most prominently that of Gustave Le Bon, have 
continuously tried to understand the mechanism at play. For Le Bon (2001) 
the crowd is a “provisional being formed of heterogeneous elements” 
(p. 15). Due to the “suggestibility” (Le Bon, 2001, p. 23) or impressionabil-
ity of its elements, the temporarily released affective community is a highly 
contagious social realm. Certainly, Le Bon’s portrayal of the members of the 
crowd as suggestible puppets in the hand of the all- infusing will of the col-
lective has often been criticized for neglecting the role of its members in 
transducing the affective community. Nonetheless, the idea of affective con-
tagion makes the basal effects of intercorporeal resonance, of sensual trans-
mission and of sensorial synchronization clear. More recent approaches offer 
a nuanced view on socio- psychological mechanisms carrying affective conta-
gion. These studies focus on seemingly automatic, unintentional, and pre- 
reflexive modes of synchronizing and coordinating facial, bodily, mimicked, 
or vocal expressions. Elaine Hatfield (1998), for example, describes the 
motoric mimicry of agents unconsciously tending to imitate the expressions 
of their fellow participants: “By attending to this stream of tiny moment- to-
moment reactions, people can and do ‘feel themselves into’ the emotional 
landscapes inhabited by their partners” (p. 73). While these studies are 
mainly interested in the social dynamics that undergird a shared emotionality 
and engender intersubjectivity among human agents, social political theorists 
like Teresa Brennan (2004) emphasize the diversity of affectively transmit-
ting bodies. Here, affective contagion is understood as a multi- sensorial 
mode of relationality between multiple bodies at a hormonal, olfactory, 
visual, or vocal level. Affective contagion serves as the prerequisite for com-
munal relationships that instantaneously form shared “affective atmospheres” 
(Anderson, 2009) and immerse the multiple bodies that generate it (→ affec-
tive atmosphere). In this regard, affective communities depend on an 
 experiential proximity. Spatial closeness of bodies propels affective trans-
missions, but is not a precondition. Experiential proximity rather rests upon 
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a communicative infrastructure of sensory transfer that connects sensuously 
trained bodies and enables affective exchange.
 Focusing on processes of affective communitization means analyzing situa-
tionally prevailing logics and sensory modes of transmission that constitute the 
infrastructure of social life. This perspective suggests understanding the sensual 
texture of sociality as a generic structure. Portraying affects as the pulse of social 
formation reminds one of Henri Lefebvre’s (2004) materialist study of rhythms 
forming and being formed by the social. Rhythm, for Lefebvre, is the most 
immanent and concrete mode of sociability producing manifestations of the 
social. But, in their very presence and precisely because they are social move-
ments, social rhythms are “fleeting objects” (Lefebvre, 2004, p. 28) that present 
themselves through their sensible imprints on the body. Just like Lefebvre’s idea 
of rhythm, affective communities are to be understood as the ever- changing 
products of material relations of force unfolding between bodies that are “per-
petually forming and deforming” social reality (Anderson, 2009, p. 79).
 In classical social theories the community is thought of as a solid collective 
entity temporarily enlivened by means of affectively arousing rituals that 
authenticate the belief in the shared values of the collective (Durkheim, 
2001). In contrast to the image of a persisting social body, affective com-
munities are spontaneous communities that generate collectivization (Turner, 
1969). Comparable to Simmel’s reading of sociability, the ideal type of an 
affective community gives weight to the form of associating, while content 
only serves a secondary purpose, namely, “sociation” (Simmel 1971, p. 24). 
For Simmel, emphasizing content – be it personal interests or transpersonal 
values – disturbs rhythmic interactions, since content monopolizes the auto-
nomous process of social formation: “For ‘good form’ is mutual self- 
definition, interaction of the elements, through which a unity is made […] in 
sociability the concrete motives bound up with life- goals fall away” enabling 
“the pure form, the free- playing, interacting interdependence of individuals” 
(Simmel, 1971, p. 129). The form of sociability constitutes the realm of affec-
tive communities. Accentuating the formal aspect as well as the instantaneous 
nature of communitization should not be confused with a lack of common-
ality. On the contrary, affective communities are characterized by an intense 
affinity between bodies that share interest in the affective production of com-
monality as well as the mutual “feeling of the worth of association” (Simmel, 
1971, p. 129). The concept of affective communities focuses on affective 
dynamics of processing communality. Affective communities are transient 
social formations. But, in parallel with Randall Collins’ (2005) notion of 
emotional energy, the sensual affinity produced during the time of communi-
tization imprints on affected bodies, be they human bodies, artificial objects 
(like a ball), or collective symbols (like a totem). Even though affective com-
munities dissolve the moment experiential proximity disperses, affective 
impressions of communality generate an affective memory that can be reacti-
vated, enabling the transition into a durable emotional community.
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 Franco Mazzucchelli’s (1971) film Alfa Romeo documenting an artistic 
intervention serves as an illustrative example of an instantaneous affective 
community. The film documents the mutual affectivity between workers of 
the Alfa Romeo factory in Milan interacting with the moving materiality of 
inflatable objects placed by Mazzucchelli in an urban public space. Jumping 
on the objects, hitting others, and penetrating traffic with them, the workers 
are affected by these inflatable bodies and in turn affect the objects’ move-
ments. Concurrently, the laborers create a highly contagious and affectively 
dynamic atmosphere of instantaneous commonality. The film depicts the 
unfolding of an effervescent social event carried by mutual sensuality and 
emotionality, by reciprocal movements consonant with the material charac-
teristics of the objects, and by a collectively produced unbounded exuber-
ance. The filmic example can be understood as a prototype of an affective 
community driven by the play- form of association. The affective community 
appears to be content- less only driven by the shared interest in sociation and 
in producing affective interdependence. The potency of this transient form of 
solidarization rests upon the common creation of unity through movement. 
Certainly, the affective community will abort the moment experiential prox-
imity among the bodies in the square dissipates. However, it is not clear 
which social form the affective community will take: the community might 
just disaggregate, the enactment might also activate the belief in a shared, 
more solid class consciousness, or the components – the workers and the 
objects – might translate the emotional energy generated during the event 
into economic productivity.
Affective communities: beyond societal order and 
communal solidity
Whether in Durkheim’s depiction of the feast or in Massumi’s representation 
of a football game, affects are passing transmitters of communal relations. 
They enable the transcendence of one’s socially determined, enclosed indi-
viduality by breaking with one’s ordinary identity as well as by creating space 
for intense affective impressions and the effervescence of sociality:
It is not difficult to imagine that a man in such a state […] no longer 
knows himself. Feeling possessed and led by some external power that 
makes him think and act differently […] he naturally feels he is no longer 
himself. He seems to have become a new being […] it is as though he 
really were transported into […] a setting populated by exceptionally 
intense forces that invade and transform him.
(Durkheim, 2001, pp. 163–164)
The concept of affective communities does not initially appear as a new 
concept as such. Thinking of Durkheim’s (2001) notion of effervescence, 
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Weber’s (1978) ideal type of emotional communities, Le Bon’s (2001) depic-
tion of the libidinal masses, Turner’s (1969) analysis of the spontaneous com-
munitas, or Lefebvre’s (2004) Rythmanalysis, social theorists have frequently 
described affective processes of communitization by pointing to the political 
potentialities as well as the societal dangers of this affectively mobilized social 
form. Classical as well as contemporary social theories on affective com-
munities describe the mechanisms that engender communality in a compar-
able manner. They refer to the idea of an intermediating affectivity, they 
depict the socially transgressive potential ascribed to this form of collectiviza-
tion, and highlight the communal production of a sensory rhythm of the 
social as well as the notion of a punctual dissolution of the socially and sym-
bolically ascribed status of its elements. Nevertheless, despite the mechanisms 
depicted, the social theoretical perspective on affectively construed com-
munities has changed.
 In classical social theories, the affective mode of producing communality 
appeared as a precarious social phenomenon. Due to the affective responsive-
ness of its members, it was considered to be highly susceptible to ideological 
instrumentalization and to authorities monopolizing and controlling the 
diversifying affects. At the same time, the socially vital and mobilizing 
potency of the sensual was depicted as an anti- structural and, thus, potentially 
anomic state that, without solidifying into a representable collective form, 
would dissolve the moment affective energies were exhausted. To use a 
 Durkheimian metaphor, it would be an effervescent social moment that 
would liquidate like a spume and thus lack any sense of political and socially 
transformative direction. However, translating an affective community into a 
solid, emotional community in turn bears the risk of monopolizing affectivity 
for the sake of a substantial unity. Transforming the process of affective com-
munitization into a substantial social form involves the belief in a hegemonic 
center of values that subjugates the communality of the individual bodies to 
the emotionally solidified will of the collective and defines the socially exclu-
sive limits of affinity. The transient character of the affective community like-
wise denotes the threshold of communality. In both ways, the vitality of the 
affective community was thought to dry up; it would either dissolve or 
congeal. For modern sociologists, the affective production of communality 
thus functioned as an instantaneous infusion of the social. This enabled the 
belief in an imagined, emotionally indissoluble community that occasionally 
enchants the abstract corpus of modern, rationally ordered societies.
 In the aftermath of poststructural thought and buoyed by new materialist 
approaches within contemporary theory, the fragile and diversifying rhythm 
of affect conceptually turns into a social category in its own right that under-
scores the creative logics of sensory relations. Herein, the social is not thought 
of as a substantial form that consists of agents and is ordered by social struc-
tures, but as a continuously transforming organism. Understanding the social 
as a process in the making, contemporary theorists invoke belief in the 
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1 To distinguish between two forms of power, Maffesoli (1996) uses the term puissance in order 
to describe the horizontally affective potential and the vital force of affectual communality. 
Here, puissance is used as a counter- concept to pouvoir reflecting the hegemonic, vertically 
structuring power apparatus ordering the individualized modern societies.
precarious openness of affective communities. The works of Leela Gandhi 
(2005), David Featherstone (2012), and Michel Maffesoli (1996) in particular 
reflect this vital notion of the social, as well as the political potentiality of this 
all- encompassing mode of connection. Building on Derrida’s notion of 
friendship, postcolonial theorist Gandhi traces the imprints of 19th-century, 
cross- cultural affective communities that evolve on the basis of global, impe-
rial structures facilitating these connections, but simultaneously enable an 
affective global politics of friendship aiming to subvert the imperative nature 
of colonial structures. Similarly, studying historical geographies of solidarity, 
Featherstone theoretically reframes the notion of solidarity. Instead of under-
standing solidarity in terms of an unquestionable loyalty to a pre- established 
collectivity, he points to the vitality of transnational alliances and transversal 
modes of relating. And sociologist Maffesoli (1996) suggests understanding 
the fragmented structure of networked society as the configuring infrastruc-
ture for the emergence of volatile and transient “affectual tribes” (p. 6) or 
“affectual networks” (p. 113) characterized by a vitalism that enchants tech-
nocratic structures.
 In terms of an instantaneously intense and immersive form of practicing 
sociability, affective communities are the modus operandi of contemporary 
affective societies. The global network economy of modern societies charac-
terized by amplifying ties of connection requires sociable bodies that, despite 
of their individual differences, are capable of processing affective associations 
that transiently congeal and dissolve (Elias, 2000). Against this backdrop the 
renewed interest in affective communities reflects the belief in the decentral-
ized infrastructuring of society characterized by the ontology of the network. 
Simultaneously, the concept of affective communities conjures a notion of 
sociality that aims to subvert technocratic visions and instead accentuates the 
social potency or puissance of convivialist forms of being- together and of 
sensual modes of temporal solidarization.1 The idea of a sociality formed, 
transmitted, and propelled by affections echoes this very imaginary as well as 
the hope in the “sensed potential” (Massumi, 2002, p. 75) of collective 
movements. The social value ascribed to affective communities is informed 
by the belief in a seemingly enlivened and, hence, basic form of collectivity 
that is in direct contrast to modern visions of a functionally organized, alien-
ating society governed by instrumental reason. While at first sight the empha-
sis on sensual social bonds might appear as a mere repetition of the classical 
dichotomy between community and society, contemporary notions of affec-
tive communal relationships, on the contrary, aim to dissolve this sociological 
distinction. Though the classical model of community underlines the 
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emotionally grounded solidity binding its members together, within con-
temporary theory the concept of affective communities gives weight to the 
continuous process of associating and dissociating and, thus, serves as a par-
adigmatic expression of a pulsating sociality. The recurrent idea of affective 
communities appears as a promising concept since it is formulated in 
opposition to the notion of a functionally ordered society and concurrently 
liquidates the belief in an indissoluble community. Accordingly, the pro-
posed notion of affective communitization puts forth the idea of a vital 
conviviality occasionally enlivening the globally operating, instrumentally 
rational infrastructures of the network society. The transient construction 
of sociability infuses the network with the belief in re- enchanted, imagined 
affective communities that form and deform, and that temporarily congeal 
and dissolve again.
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Chapter 26
Belonging
Dominik Mattes, Omar Kasmani, 
Marion Acker, and Edda Heyken
The concept of belonging bears significant analytic potential for the explora-
tion of a wide range of phenomena related to globalization, collectivity, 
mobility, and migration. Within the social sciences, belonging has been delin-
eated in emotional, social, and local terms evoking ideas of commonality and 
mutuality, modalities of allegiance, and attachments, whether spatial, senso-
rial, material, or immaterial (Anthias, 2006, 2016; Lähdesmäki et al., 2016; 
Pfaff- Czarnecka, 2012; Röttger-Rössler, 2016). It has been defined as “an 
emotionally charged, ever dynamic social location – that is: a position in 
social structure, experienced through identification, embeddedness, connect-
edness and attachments” (Pfaff- Czarnecka, 2013, p. 7). The notion’s potential 
thus stems from its ability to address widely heterogenous social experiences 
that encompass not only interactions between humans but also between 
humans and the non- human world. This brings into view the multiplicity of 
affective relations that become relevant in processes of displacement, replace-
ment, inclusion and exclusion in migratory and other contexts.
 Notwithstanding these considerations, it is often claimed that the concept 
of belonging evades rigid definition (e.g., Antonsich, 2010), not least 
because it glides freely between everyday and scientific registers, making it 
“at once slippery and axiomatic, flexible and self- evident” (Wright, 2015, 
p. 391). The seemingly paradoxical notion that its ability to form collectives 
and transform lives can result from its violence and failures equally speaks to 
its complex character (cf. Ahmed, 1999). It is not surprising, then, that 
Sarah Wright (2015) turns to the term “puzzling” as a way to underpin the 
myriad uses and theorizations of belonging. How might we work with the 
notion of belonging conceptually while cherishing its contradictions and 
inconsistencies? How might we use it if we do not wish to shut down its 
drive for multiplicity (Wright, 2015)? Such questions are particularly salient 
if we are to attend to the emotional registers, affective arrangements (→ 
affective arrangement), and the more- than-human processes that co- constitute 
belonging in particularly relational ways. These involve people and other 
agents: animals, plants, spirits, places, things, institutions, memories, and 
discourses, to name just a few.
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1 This chapter has benefited from discussions and feedback of participants in a multi- 
disciplinary working group entitled “Belonging” (2015–2017). For further information on 
the group, see www.sfb- affective-societies.de/forschung/themengruppen/2016/belonging/
index.html.
2 For a more detailed discussion of the conceptual distinctions (and overlaps) between belong-
ing and identity, see Anthias (2013, 2016) and Pfaff- Czarnecka (2012, pp. 23–28).
 One possibility is to follow Floya Anthias’ (2013) suggestion to use the 
notion of belonging in heuristic terms, recognizing that its analytic worth 
comes to be attributed to its aims. In the same vein, the study of belonging 
calls for and benefits from a multidisciplinary context where a wide range of 
materials and methods can be brought into conversation with one another.1 
Taking this stance, in what follows, we first discuss some key dimensions of 
belonging, which, though distinctly elaborated here, are always already 
entangled. Subsequently, we present two examples from different disciplinary 
perspectives alongside one another. These include an ethnographic study of a 
Vietnamese migrant community in Berlin and a literary studies analysis of 
writings of the contemporary German- language author Herta Müller.
Key dimensions
A basic concern of “belonging” has to do with its relation to neighboring 
concepts such as “identity” and “affiliation.” “Belonging,” one may argue, 
better accommodates people’s affective, partially pre- reflexive attachments to 
places, landscapes, languages and material objects than the notion of cultural 
identity. The latter, even if understood as multiple and fragmented (cf. Bru-
baker & Cooper, 2000; Hall, 1994; Krönert & Hepp, 2015), usually refers to 
conscious processes of categorical identification with particular cultural values 
and social collectives, as well as the discursive and political malleability of 
such processes. At the same time, belonging is to experience a sense of being 
accepted as part of a community. Yet it cannot be reduced to collective iden-
tity, since it does not place equal emphasis on the idea of homogeneity and 
sameness within a social collective to which one feels a sense of belonging 
(Pfaff- Czarnecka, 2011).2 More than that, the notion of “belonging” distinc-
tively accounts for the practice and performance of commonality, reciprocity, 
and mutuality. It is thus understood to better address and represent the rela-
tionality involved in affective processes of collectivization than the categorical 
notion of identity (Pfaff- Czarnecka, 2011).
 “Belonging” also demands a conceptual distinction from “affiliation,” which 
generally describes a form of often formalized membership and the accompanying 
interaction between actors and institutions in what may be called affiliation 
spaces (the family, peer groups, schools, clubs, occupational fields, the nation 
state, etc.). Each of these spheres has their own rules, defines particular rights and 
duties, and determines claims and entitlements that come with affiliation.
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 When concerned with similar issues, “belonging,” however, with its affec-
tive measure, offers a richer perspective that includes its emotional, social, and 
moral registers. This refers to what Yuval- Davis (2006) has called the politics 
of belonging, that is, a distinct sphere that corresponds with questions of cit-
izenship, refers to entitlement to belonging, involves privileges and alle-
giances, and relates to civil and political rights. It also takes into account 
questions of socio- spatial exclusion, such as territoriality and assimilation, as 
well as those of access involving groups that are vulnerable and discriminated 
against. This notion of politics is inflected by factors like age, gender, class, 
race, ethnicity, disability, and sexuality, which points to the fact that belong-
ing, whether at the level of the collective or the individual, is never free of 
dynamics of power.
 A further essential aspect in theorizing “belonging” as both process and 
outcome of affective interrelations is spatiality. Much of contemporary 
theory on mobility, transnationalism, and globalization conceives “the 
migrant” as the embodiment of “borderless belonging”: fluid, transitory, 
un- rooted, and un- mappable. However, people’s longing for and practices 
of creating a “home” in a new place amidst experiences of displacement 
stand in stark contrast to such conceptions. In the context of “belonging,” 
migrants’ practices of place- making and their narratives and imaginaries of 
“home” speak for a profoundly relational notion of place (Ingold, 2000; 
Malpas, 1999; Massey, 2005). References to left- behind places thus play an 
important role, whether in the form of people’s practical engagement in 
local diasporic communities or particular (institutionalized) forms of 
remembering and memorializing their places of origin. Such mobility may 
contribute toward feelings of in- betweenness or multi- sited forms of 
belonging. In other instances, it may also lead to people’s longing for less 
transnational ways of being.
 A related feature of “making a home” is the aspect of “building,” which 
both in a literal and metaphorical sense is an essential performance of 
belonging by entering into a productive relationship with place and time. 
This also refers to one’s emotional attachment and engagement with places, 
for example, feeling at home, experiences of familiarity, or feeling safe, 
legally secure, and economically rooted in place: social and affective 
dimensions captured in the idea of place- belongingness (Antonsich, 2010). 
Sara Ahmed offers a more complex understanding of ideas of home and 
puts it in conversation with temporal questions of estrangement such that 
categorical distinctions between being home and being away come to be 
radically questioned. It destabilizes ideas of security, familiarity, and fixity 
and situates possibilities of strangeness, movement and dislocation within 
the home. Ahmed does so to explain how the question of being home is a 
matter of affect: “how one feels or how one might fail to feel!” (Ahmed, 
1999, p. 342). Sensing and making sense of one’s place in both spatial and 
temporal terms also include feelings of estrangement, discomfort, an 
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impossibility to extend or return, and discontinuities of past and present; 
queer conditions, so to speak, that foster forms of belonging and enable 
the emergence of communities. Elizabeth Freeman (2007) argues that 
belonging is just as much a question of who is connected to whom as it is 
of one’s extendability into the future. This is particularly relevant to her 
discussion of queer bodies, for whom belonging goes beyond the mere 
longing to be or be connected. Queer belonging is the name she gives to a 
longing to “be long,” by which she means “to endure over time, beyond 
procreation” or “to be bigger not only spatially, but also temporally” 
(Freeman, 2007, p. 299).
 Also worth mentioning is the role of memory and its failures in 
dynamics of belonging. Texts, artifacts, buildings, anniversaries, icons, 
feasts, symbols, stories, rituals, rites, images, bodies, food, and landscapes 
become materials and mediums through which belonging is actively real-
ized, sensorially perceived, and mnemonically lived. Questions of sensuous 
perception become particularly relevant in situations of unfamiliar and suc-
cessively or suddenly transforming spatial and material environments. 
These, as Amanda Wise (2010) notes, can lead to incongruence between 
people’s day- to-day sensuous experiences (e.g., with regard to smell, sight, 
and proprioception) and their embodied place- memory, a dynamic she 
identifies as dis- synchronization. This includes feelings of discomfort, 
estrangement, disorientation, and “unbelonging,” which can be read as 
affective dissonance (→ affective resonance). Sara Ahmed (1999) also points 
to the crucial interplay between place, memory, and belonging (cf. also 
Assmann, 1995; Palmberger & Tošić, 2016; May, 2017). She lays an 
equally rigorous emphasis on remembering in processes of community for-
mation, which she describes as collective acts of remembering in the 
absence of a shared knowledge or a familiar terrain. She also points to the 
act of forgetting, which may also be generative of belonging, as holding on 
to memory allows a subject to identify with a history, not in the sense of a 
shared past, but in the very loss of it.
 Here, we present two case studies that originate from research projects of 
the Collaborative Research Center Affective Societies (Freie Universität Berlin). 
The ethnographic example drawn from Edda Heyken’s research (Heyken 
et al., 2019; von Poser et al., 2017) expresses the fragile efforts of belonging: 
how people moving across places, cultural settings, and social milieus, strive 
to manage in the face of radical transformations, but also fail to develop new 
bodily ways of being and belonging. In comparison, the literary example 
drawn from Marion Acker’s work (Acker & Fleig, forthcoming) also addresses 
feelings of rupture and alienation, but does not exclusively tie it to experi-
ences of migration and mobility. Instead, it situates unbelonging in the very 
context of Heimat. While both examples illustrate prominent concerns of 
belonging as outlined above, they also highlight aspects that have hitherto 
remained under- addressed.
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3 The end of the war in 1975 and the subsequent reunification of Vietnam mark a transition of 
living conditions toward socialist ideals. Since 1978, approximately 38,000 people have been 
accepted as “humanitarian” refugees to West Germany (Su & Sanko, 2017).
4 Predominantly South Vietnamese refugees arrived in former West Germany after 1978 
whereas mainly North Vietnamese contract workers migrated to former East Germany during 
the 1980s (von Poser et al., 2017).
Affective drivers of (be-)longing: remembrance 
and place- making among Vietnamese refugees 
in Berlin
Shared experiences of discontinuity and disruption serve as affective drivers 
for individuals in movement, through which they are able to deal with feel-
ings of longing and estrangement (cf. Röttger-Rössler, 2016). This case study 
from research among elderly Vietnamese refugees3 in Berlin illustrates place- 
making strategies that evoke, in the words of one interlocutor, the desire to 
“transport a piece of Vietnam to Germany” (March 2016). This relates to 
larger anthropological- psychiatric research that studies the affective efforts of 
migration in “Vietnamese Berlin” (von Poser, Lanca, & Heyken, 2017), a 
heterogeneous field resulting from different “regimes of mobility” (Glick- 
Schiller & Salazar, 2013).4 Among other questions, the project inquires when 
and how experiences of mobility, rupture, and alienation turn into affective 
crises leading to the utilization of psychiatric- psychotherapeutic help. This is 
explored in an emotion- and affect- focused group therapy. The project also 
focuses on the lifeworlds of individuals beyond the clinical setting and aims to 
understand their experiences of belonging in the context of biographic rup-
tures, mobility, and migration.
 Data from our research in psychotherapeutic group sessions show that 
many refugees had already experienced feelings of unbelonging even before 
fleeing Vietnam, as the socialist North took over the former authoritarian- 
anticommunist South. In its aftermath, new political, economic and social 
boundaries were drawn that interfered with individual life courses altering 
people’s prospects for societal participation (Su & Sanko, 2017). This led to a 
continuous movement of people out of the country, many of whom ended 
up in former West Germany. Even though such refugees were granted the 
right to stay in Berlin – the legal means to affiliate with the state as a political 
entity – a sense of unbelonging persisted: language barriers, adjustment to the 
requirements of everyday life, cold weather, and alien customs engendered 
feelings of disorientation, isolation, and estrangement. The conjunctive social 
experience of displacement and the affective dissonances between Vietnamese 
and German emotion repertoires can be said to have jointly shaped processes 
of un-/belonging (→ emotion repertoires): The following passage aims to illus-
trate the temporal and spatial dimension of practices and performances in the 
context of diasporic belonging, where bonds and boundaries of identification, 
affiliation, and “feeling at home” are continuously attuned over time. After 
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5 This example forms part of the CRC research project “Mixed Feelings – Shared Feelings” 
that analyses dynamics of heteroglossia and narratives of multiple belonging in contemporary 
German- language literature. For further information, see: www.sfb- affective-societies.de/en/
teilprojekte/A/A03/index.html.
arriving in Germany, Vietnamese refugees from all ages and heterogeneous 
backgrounds came together in various non- governmental support programs. 
By talking in Vietnamese and sharing a meal in such contexts they were able 
to nurture feelings of mutuality, familiarity, and relatedness. As one interlocu-
tor put it, “every black- haired person was regarded as one of us, with the 
same story” (January 2017).
 Among Vietnamese refugees with a Buddhist background, one can observe 
a similar sense of longing that manifests in their desires to continue religious 
practices and remember left- behind places. This is illustrated in their efforts to 
build a place of ritual congregation (see Svašek, 2005). When a pastor allowed 
them to perform Buddhist rites in his church, a statue of Buddha was placed 
next to the cross, fostering the community’s emotional attachment to the 
place. Their official registration as an association eventually allowed the 
growing Buddhist community to rent an apartment and secure a sustainable 
place of gathering. Finally, a bigger place was purchased, and distinct archi-
tectural features were added to the existing structure. This included erecting 
an elaborate and widely visible Pagoda, a protruding staircase, and an ancient 
bell. The place’s unambiguous visual authority in the landscape arguably con-
tributed to the community’s material- spatial sense of belonging. In addition, 
monks, nuns, and volunteers filled the garden with scenes and statues of 
Buddha and planted Asian vegetables and herbs. Inside the prayer hall, incense 
sticks, the sound of singing bowls, and the smell of orchids continue to stimu-
late the senses, forming an affective arrangement whose familiar sensations 
offer ways of embodied belonging. And finally, the Buddhist section of a 
graveyard in the same area points to people’s concern of being buried next to 
each other and contributes to an enduring attachment to Berlin.
 Home- making strategies like the ones discussed above can also serve as an 
empowering resource in the clinical setting, where their tactical utilization 
helps arrive at belonging psychotherapeutically. Enabling situational affective 
attachments and negotiating experiences of belonging assists patients in 
dealing with feelings of rupture and alienation while establishing a productive 
relationship with self, others, and their environment.
Continuities of rupture: ambivalences of 
(un-)belonging in Herta Müller’s work5
In one of her lectures Herta Müller, born in the German- speaking Banat- 
Swabian part of totalitarian Romania in 1953, describes belonging as a feeling, 
“in das man sich, während man es abstreift, nur tiefer verstrickt” [in which 
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6 For further discussion of this double movement, see Acker and Fleig (forthcoming).
one gets further trapped the more one tries to strip it off; own trans.] (Müller, 
2004, p. 143). It is exactly this ambivalent dynamic between belonging and 
unbelonging that is explored again and again throughout Müller’s entire 
work.6 Feelings of (un-)belonging are explicitly expressed and articulated, 
critically reflected upon and re- created in her various texts of different genres. 
Moving beyond the mere representation of (un-)belonging, these texts reveal 
a performative memory that involves the persistent repetition and variation of 
specific, autobiographically based constellations of (un-)belonging. These 
often evoke the environment of Müller’s childhood as a heterogeneously 
constituted relational setting. By talking about her loneliness as a child tending 
the cows in the river valley, Müller draws attention to the materiality of 
(un-)belonging and the active role non- human agents play in this context:
I ate leaves and flowers so I would belong to them, because they knew 
how to live life and I didn’t. I spoke to them by name: milk thistle was 
supposed to mean the prickly plant with milk in its stalk. But the plant 
didn’t listen to the name milk thistle. So I tried inventing names with 
neither milk nor thistle: THORNRIB, NEEDLENECK. These made-
 up names uncovered a gap between the plant and me, and the gap 
opened up into an abyss.
(Müller, 2009)
“Gap” and “abyss” – these are key words of a poetics that programmatically 
refuses the somewhat romantic idea of a primordial sense of belonging. 
Rather, feelings of un- belonging prove to be the affective source and driving 
force of Müller’s writing. These feelings are not caused by migration but are 
experienced from early childhood on. The “gap” creates a desire for related-
ness that is already inscribed within the notion of be- longing itself and is 
“increasingly performed in the knowledge of the impossibility of ever really 
and truly belonging” (Probyn, 1996, p. 8).
 Müller’s repetitive practice exceeds the borders of single texts, thereby calling 
into question conventional hierarchies of genre. It further illustrates that 
(un-)belonging is not an entity one possesses but rather a process of becoming, 
something that is always “continually (re-)made and (re-)constituted” (Wright, 
2015, p. 400). Consequently, Müller’s work not only rejects nostalgia or the 
lament for an idealized past, but equally opposes the normative optimism that 
underlies teleological narratives of belonging. In contrast to the linearity charac-
teristic of traditional storytelling, she offers an anti- teleological view on belong-
ing that resists closure. The incessant dynamics of (non-)belonging can be 
interpreted as a continuous attempt to relate to the world, but they may also be 
considered a “vicious circle” (Müller, 2009), to cite the title of Müller’s lecture 
at the Nobel prize ceremony. Repetition produces and stabilizes patterns of 
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affective relatedness. At the same time, repetition, with its inherent potential for 
transformation, opens up the opportunity to detach from these aporetic 
dynamics. It offers a chance to question and reconfigure these patterns, and pro-
vides the possibility to create liberating lines of flight that escape from oppressive 
“regimes of belonging” (Pfaff- Czarnecka, 2011).
 Müller’s work is characterized by a strong “antagonism towards any norm-
ative notion of belonging” (Cooper, 2009, p. 488). In her first book, for 
example, a collection of stories entitled Niederungen (1982/1984),7 she satiri-
cally analyses the ritual practices of her native village that promote conform-
ism and seek to eliminate individuality. The book unmasks the village 
community’s exclusionary politics of belonging and its totalitarian- like mech-
anisms of control. In so doing, Müller rejects the notion of “Heimat,” stress-
ing instead the multiplicity of belonging as well as the potential for resistance 
that non- belonging holds in store. Since Müller’s texts lead us to question the 
understanding of belonging as “a positive phenomenon” (Lähdesmäki et al., 
2016, p. 242), they offer possibilities to re- imagine the concept itself.
Encounters of belonging: open questions
Our discussion of the literature is in no way exhaustive of the scholarship on 
belonging. The material we have presented in our case studies follows but 
also complicates some of its dominant narratives.
 Despite their particularities in terms of material, method, and discipline, 
both examples point to belonging as a performatively lived, long- drawn and 
ongoing process. They highlight the constitutive role of temporality and 
(dis-)continuity in affective experience, thereby questioning the under-
standing of affect as a brief and ephemeral event. In addition, they offer a 
cross- scalar view that helps tie micro interactions and macro processes.
 Building on the sources we have discussed, the two cases point to hitherto 
under- addressed aspects of belonging. They highlight the simultaneously 
cohesive and disruptive forces at play in relational processes of belonging and 
bring into view the heterogeneously constituted settings where such processes 
unfold. Finally, despite the importance of migration, they effectively disturb 
the causal logic that belonging necessarily stems from conditions of mobility.
 In light of our reflections and examples, we propose that belonging be 
explored further along the following lines: What shapes can belonging take 
when not imagined as linear, teleological, and success- oriented? In what ways 
can the discussion on “multiple belonging” be enriched by our understanding 
of how this multiplicity is relationally experienced in light of its inherent fric-
tions and contradictions? What opportunities are to be found in belonging’s 
queer forms? And finally, to what extent can belonging inspire us to keep 
asking how societies thrive affectively?
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Chapter 27
Orders of feeling
Thomas Stodulka
“Orders of feeling” are conceived in relation to the concepts of symbolic and 
normative orders. They refer to discursive orders that leave their marks on indi-
vidual and collective appraisals of feelings, and they shape socially, culturally, 
and politically proscribed feeling and display rules. Orders of feeling relate to 
societies, places, social groups, and communities, and impact subjective experi-
ences vis- à-vis institutionalized social or political hierarchies. They influence 
whether, how, with whom, where, and when affects, feelings, and emotions 
can be verbally articulated or visibly performed through gestures, mimicry, 
bodily postures, and positioning. Moreover, orders of feeling nurture belonging 
and exclusion. They ensure that persons and collectives “fall in line” through 
more or less subtle societal, economic, legal, political, cultural, and affective 
arrangements (Röttger-Rössler & Stodulka, 2014; von Scheve, 2017) (→ affec-
tive arrangements). Orders of feeling act on the subjective and collective experi-
ences of social structures and hierarchies and reproduce them. Yet, underscoring 
the relational dimension of affects, feelings, and emotions vis- à-vis social orders 
and norms, they are susceptible to transformations and contestations that tran-
spire within social and political movements (Britt & Heise, 2000), the imple-
mentation of new laws, societal and cultural changes, or formations of resistance 
(Stodulka, 2014, 2017a, 2017b).
 As an analytical concept, “orders of feeling” enquires into subtle discur-
sive arrangements (how is subjective experience and its verbal and embodied 
communication structured along social and political hierarchies?), explicit 
authoritative commands of governing and disciplining (how do institutions 
address individuals and whole collectives and make them comply?), and 
related forms of endurance, resistance and subversion (how do people 
respond to and influence these?). This focus on the discursive formation, 
institutionalized governance, and emergence of affective orders of feeling 
opens up interesting methodological pathways. When compared to rules, 
structures, norms, and values, the understanding of order as a relationship 
between them allows for the methodological and epistemological integration 
of the researcher’s positionalities and emotions within the orders they study 
(Davies & Stodulka, 2019).
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 The following section describes established concepts in the study of sub-
jective feeling and social structures. Subsequently, the chapter carves out an 
integrated perspective within the framework of an ethnographic case study. It 
concludes with a brief summary of main arguments and an outlook on future 
research and relational and affectively aware methodologies.
Feeling rules, structures of feeling, and 
emotion norms
The concept of “feeling rules” is a classic sociological concept that has been 
employed over the past three decades to explore how feelings and emotions 
shape and are shaped by social and cultural norms. Arlie Russell Hochschild 
(1979, p. 554) explains feeling rules as a form of social control that is less 
explicit than other normative orders. Following Peter and Carol Stearns 
(1985), who distinguish between collective emotional standards and actual 
individual experiences (pp. 813–814), feeling rules link the individual with 
the group or the collective in structural terms. Feeling rules are inherent in 
etiquette, tact, and ethics as well as in moral and cultural values (Sakti, 2018). 
They require cognitive bodily emotion work by altering, masking, reinterpret-
ing, or physically releasing what our social environment deems to be (in-)
appropriate feelings (Hochschild, 1979, p. 560). Christian von Scheve (2012) 
writes, “in addition to valued feelings – they play a crucial role in shaping the 
‘emotional culture’ of a society” (p. 5), that, according to Peggy Thoits 
(2004), is comprised of “beliefs about the nature, causes, distributions, value, 
and dynamics of emotions in general as well as of specific feelings” (p. 362; 
see also Illouz, 1997; Reddy, 2001).
 From a Marxist perspective, feeling rules can lead to a person’s affective 
exploitation and alienation from one’s self, personality, and feelings (Hoch-
schild, 1983). Ferdiansyah Thajib (2017) relates such affective ambivalences 
within and between individuals and emotional collectives to cultural the-
orist Raymond Williams’ (1977) “structures of feeling”, a concept that 
focuses on the asymmetries of power that shape how members of margin-
alized groups experience their feelings. While “socially deviant” persons 
and collectives at the margins of societies may share emotional climates 
(Barbalet, 1998; de Rivera, 1992), their identification with and feelings of 
belonging to a vulnerable community raises the question of whether dis-
cursive structures translate social vulnerabilities into differences in status 
and privilege. Anthropological and sociological research on the relation-
ship between social structures, asymmetries of power, affects, emotions, 
and feelings has highlighted the role of emotions in both resisting and 
responding to normative orders, cultural, and moral values (Scheff, 2000; 
Stodulka, 2017b). For example, emotions like shame may serve to alienate 
and discipline marginalized communities, whereas emotions like pride 
might promote integration. Foucauldian and poststructuralist approaches 
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1 Quoted from the opening paragraph of the by- law Peraturan Daerah Daerah Istimewa 
Yogyakarta, Nomor 1, Tahun 2014, Tentang Penagnanan Gelandangan dan Pengemis; translated 
by the author.
2 See footnote 1.
have highlighted the affective power and resonance of public discourses as 
subtle dispositifs disciplining and controlling the “deviant” (Gould, 2009; 
Ahmed, 2004).
 As an integrative concept, “orders of feeling” focuses on discursive and 
structural arrangements, the emergence or collapse of feeling rules, and struc-
tures of feeling within and between different social groups. It encompasses 
institutionalized political and legal imperatives of authorities as expressed 
through social, cultural, and emotion norms. In its empirical application, the 
concept can be operationalized as an analytical lens to study affective practices 
that construct and shape local orders of feeling and individual and collective 
responses of “falling in line,” as well as the forms and practices of resisting and 
subverting these orders. The concept dismantles the dominance of cognitivist 
structural- functionalist approaches in social scientific emotion research that 
ignore their political dimension, and grounds cultural studies perspectives that 
would otherwise extend the “affective turn” into thought experiments in 
which everything and nothing becomes affect (White, 2017).
Cultural values and emerging orders of feeling
To make these claims tangible in the context of empirical research, I will 
illustrate how a focus on “orders of feelings” contributes to the study of 
newly emerging moral values and subaltern strategies of contesting and resist-
ing normative orders. The following exemplary case study relates to my long- 
term research in Indonesia. It analyzes how the political instrumentalization 
of feeling rules, emotion norms, and social, cultural, and moral values plays 
out in urban public spaces and curtails the visibility, movement, and mere 
existence of communities marked as “deviant.”
 In 2014, the government of the autonomous Special Region Yogyakarta, 
Java, Indonesia, adopted a by- law that is promoted in terms of improving 
social welfare and ensuring public order. The law prohibits citizens to look or 
behave like a “homeless person” who has no identification card, no fixed 
abode, no steady income, and “no future plans either for themselves or for 
their children.”1 It also bans the figure of the beggar, defined as person 
a. whose income generation depends on the sympathy and compassion of 
others, and exerts pressure or induces anxiety and fear in others, b. who 
wears dirty and disheveled clothes, c. who loiter in busy or strategic 
places, and d. who applies the abovementioned and similar practices in 
order to induce sympathy and compassion in others.2
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 The increased regulation of public spaces promoted as “social welfare” and 
“public order” coincides with other national developments of subject forma-
tion and public disciplining related to sexual, religious, and other minority 
identities. What is striking here is that a law directly targets local orders of 
feeling and the affective practices of a whole society. According to the law it 
is prohibited to work as a “beggar” or a “homeless person” in public spaces if 
wearing inappropriate clothes, and to try to evoke sympathy or compassion 
in passers- by. Offenders are arrested and brought into camps, where they are 
sorted into the main categories of “homeless,” “psychotic (psikotik) home-
less,” “beggars,” or “unproductive women” with regard to their behavior, 
local origin, social provenience, age, and gender. Motorists are reminded by 
warning signs at the road junctions not to give money, but to transfer dona-
tions to the government’s social welfare department instead. Other street 
banners and signs are less subtle and directly refer to the fines and charges 
established in the law. Article 24 targets and regulates how passers by may 
(not) be affected by now no longer only “deviant” and “immoral,” but 
“illegal” emotive practices that aim to evoke sympathy and compassion: 
Any person (including NGOs and legal entities), who violates the regula-
tion not to give money and/or other goods to the “vagrants” publicly 
[…] is sentenced with up to ten days of prison and/or a maximum fine 
of 1,000,000 Indonesian Rupiah [70 euro].3
Sympathizing is now “illegal,” and giving a few coins, bills, or small gifts to 
homeless persons or “beggars” is now a criminal act. The local government 
has curtailed street- related community participation in the city and publicly 
regulated sympathy and support. The new law controls citizens’ feelings and 
behavior in public spaces, and alters prevalent cultural ethics (etika Jawa) and 
local practices of compassion and care (the Javanese budi pekerti). Ignoring 
busking homeless persons and beggars is not an individual’s moral dilemma 
any longer. It is a legally prescribed “good practice” of civil obedience and a 
new order of feeling directed against vulnerable “deviant” social groups. 
Although religiously, culturally, and ethically contradictory (Retsikas, 2016), 
the existence and emotive income- generating practices of vulnerable com-
munities, as well as sympathy and action on the part of citizens in public are 
illegalized. Citizens are ordered to structure their subjective feelings in 
accordance with national policies of “development and progress.”
 This comes as surprise in the city of Yogyakarta, whose residents stress that 
their city is the cradle of “Javanese culture” (budaya Jawa), which promotes 
refined, respectful, and harmonious social interactions and relationships. In 
order to deal with the complexities of community life, persons are expected 
to know their position within social hierarchies and behave accordingly. 
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Acting as if one does not know one’s place within Javanese social order is 
perceived as “ignorant,” “wild,” “not- yet Javanese,” and even “not- yet-
human.” Being aware of one’s social position in social encounters, persons 
are expected to behave deferentially toward those with higher status, never 
loud or lacking in self- awareness, and particularly generous but never “arro-
gant,” “ignorant,” or too “proud” toward those of lower status. Complying 
with what has been dubbed Javanese “virtue,” “courtesy,” “character,” or 
“ethics” is key to avoiding unrest, agitation, and conflict in personal and 
community life.
 The new law sustainably changes local Javanese ethics and practice and 
hijacks them discursively: non- normative subjects and collectives are excluded 
from society and public spaces through re- ordered language and dispositifs of 
care and social welfare. If we understand the new law not only as modified 
normative order, but as politically restructured orders of feeling, the affective 
and emotional experiences and practices of individuals and communities can 
be studied systematically. In the context of Yogyakarta, we can take into 
account how historically, socially, and culturally emerged forms of sympathiz-
ing and generosity have been re- structured by the state.
 In contrast to feeling rules or emotion norms, “orders of feeling” take into 
account the relationality between subjective and structural dimensions of 
affects, feelings, and emotions and are particularly focused on newly emerging 
practices of dominance, compliance, negotiation, and resistance. With regards 
to the case study, the analytical focus of the concept elaborates both on the 
political implementation of new laws targeting the transformation of local 
emotion norms, feeling rules, and cultural values, and brings into focus its 
social and affective consequences, as well as the related practices of those 
affected. In the context of these newly illegalized vulnerable communities, 
previous strategies of transforming scarce resources, marginality, and stigmati-
zation into affective bonds and vital socio- economic cooperation in public 
spaces have been disciplined, curtailed, and pushed into oblivion. Formerly 
effective emotional economies (Stodulka, 2017b) of “beggars” and “the 
homeless” in terms of relating to, bonding with, and emotively orchestrating 
feelings of compassion, sympathy, and care in passers- by and motorists, which 
had socially and economically manifested in cultural practices of alms- giving, 
were restructured by national laws and policies. Local cultural values of 
mutual respect, support, and sympathy with vulnerable communities were 
politically re- aligned, and now framed as discourses of modernization and 
progress that impinged on individual and social bodies, and their feelings and 
practices of relating to each other.
 Despite being discursively glossed as “assistance,” “welfare,” and “care,” 
these newly emerging orders of feeling invest in the criminalization, margin-
alization, stigmatization, and exclusion of non- normative individuals and 
collectives. The government has curtailed the discursive spaces and local 
places of subalterns’ opportunities for income- generation without providing 
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alternatives. In addition, as a concept, “orders of feelings” allows us to 
broaden our scope beyond “structures of feelings” and to attend to spatial and 
affective arrangements of the social fabric. Over the last decade, public spaces 
and empty land lots in Yogyakarta have been privatized and transformed into 
shopping malls, hotels, restaurants, or theme parks. In the administration’s 
aspiration to promote the city as a Southeast Asian hub of cultural tourism, it 
has issued dozens of new laws and licenses for hotels and leisure parks. From 
what I describe as an “integrated” perspective, we can unearth the rigorous 
application of the new law as a historicized and long- term political project 
that feeds into the city’s restructuring of desires in terms of modernity and 
progress at the cost of those previously constructed as socially deviant or non- 
normative, who are now illegalized. Coupled with the emotive power of 
politico- religious narratives that circulate on- and offline, new laws and orders 
contribute to public shaming, stigmatization, and (affective) violence toward 
vulnerable collectives (Mills, 2007). Local media practices that support 
politico- religious hardliners for the sake of “public harmony” and “social 
welfare” suggest that the city’s once renowned liberal atmosphere transformed 
into new orders of feeling. These give rise to new nationalisms and affective 
arrangements that build on and feed into newly emerging emotional and 
affective economies (Ahmed, 2004). In response, vulnerable street- related 
communities have become almost invisible to the public eye. They have been 
pushed into urban niches and newly established “educational camps” run by 
the local government. Ongoing studies suggest that spatial and social niches 
of street- related communities’ agency have narrowed dramatically over the 
years. A systematic focus on emerging orders of feeling promises to not only 
analyze how spaces, places, and citizens “fall in line,” but reveal how vulner-
able communities create new forms of resistance, “blend in” to the margins 
of the city, and reclaim their belonging.
Conclusion
Anthropology, sociology, and critical cultural studies have produced robust 
concepts that attend to the analysis of experience and structure, domination 
and resistance, cultural and moral hierarchies of feeling and emotion, or affect 
and politics. As a concept, “orders of feeling” expands on the scholarship of 
“feeling rules,” “emotion work,” “structures of feeling,” “emotion norms,” 
or “cultural values” that are often unnecessarily construed as mutually exclu-
sive. It calls for an integrated perspective when analyzing the affective prac-
tices of individuals and collectives vis- à-vis structural, organizational, or 
institutional power relations. Orders of feeling put persons and collectives in 
place, and promote social and political hierarchies in terms of gender, age, 
social position, or status, and so forth. Orders of feelings structure societies 
and communities and impinge on body and language in social interactions 
between persons of similar or different social status. Yet, considering affect, 
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feeling, and emotion as relational phenomena, orders of feelings are suscepti-
ble to change, challenge, and contestation. As an analytical lens, the term 
lends itself to the study of human experience, social and cultural practice, and 
social structures in various localized and transcultural contexts. As the case 
study above illustrates, when researching processes of social or spatial margin-
alization (Yang, 2014), it analyzes orders as commands, hierarchical arrange-
ments, and structured experiences: how did orders emerge that prescribe who 
is allowed or expected to express certain feelings toward whom and in which 
spaces and contexts?
 Other domains of inquiry are studies of suffering and affliction, or systems of 
care and therapy. The concept lends itself to the critical analysis of taken- for-
granted orders of medicalization and “patient” disciplining (Davies, 2013; 
Yoshimizu, 2014). It may be asked what emotions are to be regulated in the 
realm of diagnosed mental illness, and for what purpose, or what diagnostic 
manuals are at play. Who constructed these and for what purpose, and who 
benefits from them? Do patients respond to these in treatment, do they attend 
therapies that follow other orders of feeling, or do they form self- help groups 
that collectively carve out their own? In the study of economies and labor 
markets, orders of feeling are at stake in economic trajectories or gift exchange 
(Lindquist, 2008): why are certain decisions taken and not others? How does 
economic cooperation between different parties come into existence, and how 
can it be sustained or refuted? What emotional economies do persons engage in 
by using and manipulating dominant orders of feeling in order to achieve their 
goals? “Orders of feelings” is also particularly relevant in the analysis of ritual 
structure, practice, and experience (Röttger-Rössler, 2012) in their focus on 
speech patterns and their affective tones and spatial arrangements. What is con-
veyed in plenaries or ritual spaces and what is communicated online? For what 
purpose? Furthermore, analyses and postcolonial critiques of globally circulating 
norms of human rights, democracy, international law, sovereignty, secularism, 
justice, and development might profit from a systematic focus on the affective 
dimensions of transnationally implemented post- Enlightenment “modernities” 
(Dhawan et al., 2016) by inquiring into why some political ideas resonate better 
with some local worlds than others.
 The application of the concept is manifold because of the semantic diver-
sity of “order.” When compared to rules, orders take their origins and ontolo-
gies into account: who or what constructs the rules? And how can this 
process be historicized? In relation to structures, orders are less static and imply 
hierarchies of scale that mutually constitute each other in particular, shifting, 
and dynamic contexts: to what extent do structures affect individuals and col-
lectives, when and in what contexts? And how do the latter position them-
selves and express their feelings on various scales both on- and offline? With 
regard to norms, orders are always already contested and in flux, hence con-
tinuously constructed: who directs orders at whom and for what purpose, and 
how do those affected respond and “shape back”?
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 Similar to other concepts that attend to the scientific analyses of affects, 
feelings, and emotions, the empirical study of “orders of feeling” invites sys-
tematic self- reflexive and relational methodologies. Affect studies and emotion 
research that take seriously the embodied and experiential dimensions of nor-
matively regimented feelings profit from an increased methodological atten-
tion to whether, how, and to what extent studied orders of feeling affect 
researchers, who are also socially and affectively positioned subjects within 
the orders they study (Stodulka, Dinkelaker, & Thajib, 2019; Stodulka, Selim, 
& Mattes, 2018). How else, one might conclude provocatively, could we 
possibly research and write about the dynamic entanglements of orders, 
arrangements, or dispositions in relation to their affective dimensions struc-
tured as feelings or emotions?
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Chapter 28
Affective publics
Margreth Lünenborg
The concept of the public is a notion long associated with rational 
argument, discourse, and deliberation, following Jürgen Habermas’ 
(1962/1991) formulation of “the public sphere.” “The public,” under-
stood in the singular as one coherent entity, thus encompasses normative 
assumptions about public discourse as a primarily deliberative structure 
that legitimizes democratic forms of governance. Numerous critiques have 
been leveled at the concept of the public for its normative character and 
its dichotomy of the public and the private (Fraser, 1992; Benhabib, 1992). 
These critiques have shown the need for a new understanding of public-
ness to account for the increasingly convergent, networked, and mobile 
character of media technologies, and of the diversified modes of public 
communication they entail. This chapter proposes that affect is central to 
the constitution of publics – in the plural – and that an understanding of 
publics through affect focuses on their relational, processual, and perfor-
mative character, thus being able to account for the complex mobile media 
environment constituting new networks of communication. Affective 
publics is a term introduced by Zizi Papacharissi in 2015 to describe the 
small, fragile, and fluid quality of these publics. In the analysis of political 
communication, the notion of affective publics emphasizes their 
“turbulent” and thus unstable character, which causes severe concerns as 
established structures, such as legacy media institutions, and actors, such as 
professional journalists, are losing relevance and influence (Margetts et al., 
2016). A traditional understanding of current publics is based on clear 
distinctions between audiences and publics and between consumers and 
producers (→ audience emotions). However, the ubiquitous availability of 
digitally networked communication technologies in the everyday suggest 
that those traditional distinctions have failed to capture current processes 
of public communication. Terms like “networked public” (boyd, 2011) or 
“hybrid public spaces” (van Dijck & Poell, 2015) offer new understandings 
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of the complex and dynamic constellations of public articulation.1 Yet 
these concepts mostly focus on the technology- based, but socially adapted 
structures of participation. The concept of affective publics thus adds a 
missing, specifically affective understanding of publics. Affect here, and 
elsewhere in this volume, is understood not as an antagonist to discourse, 
but rather as a part of it. Affect in this sense becomes a key term to capture 
the fluid dynamics between digital technologies and human behavior. 
Affective dynamics can help illuminate the temporal logics by which new 
publics emerge, for example, in moments of crisis and conflict or in search 
for solidarity or joint action. As an alternative to normative under-
standings, the performative character of publics (Warner, 2002) becomes 
obvious in the dynamic emergence of online as well as offline publics. 
Understanding publics as performative emphasizes that they are temporally 
and situationally sustained in the mediated and/or localized co- presence of 
actors (Lünenborg & Raetzsch, 2018). Recent research on protest commu-
nication of social movements suggests an understanding of publics as 
 affective due to the highly dynamic character of news distributed instanta-
neously, usually through social media, during an ongoing event. In this 
context, publics take part affectively in waves of solidarity within online 
and offline communities (Papacharissi, 2015). At the same time, mobiliza-
tion strategies of right- wing extremists can rely on comparable dynamics, 
producing disgust and outrage. Thus, the ambivalent character and conflic-
tive potential of affective publics becomes apparent.
From public sphere to fragile publics
The idea of “the bourgeois public sphere,” initially conceptualized by 
Habermas (1962/1991) as a historical analysis of the upcoming nation states in 
Europe, has since been applied to societies far beyond this particular historical 
period. In its Anglo- American reception, the conceptual legacy of this norm-
atively grounded framework has been understood as a fundamental precondition 
of modern democracy. The very foundation for a joint public sphere in this 
understanding is deliberation, based on the mode of ongoing exchange of 
rational arguments that arose, for instance, in salon debates and literary 
1 The concept of articulation follows Stuart Hall’s understanding outlined in an interview with 
Lawrence Grossberg (1986, p. 53):
Thus, a theory of articulation is both a way of understanding how ideological elements 
come, under certain conditions, to cohere together within a discourse, and a way of asking 
how they do or do not become articulated, at specific conjunctures, to certain political 
subjects.
“Articulation” here is understood as the contingent form of speaking out in the variety of 
media texts within given unequal power constellations.
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pamphlets in its beginnings. Habermas did already describe the professionali-
zation and commercialization of journalism and the media as fundamental 
shifts enabling social engineering and as diminishing the quality of public dis-
course. Nevertheless, the ongoing success of his conceptual work praised the 
quality of the rational exchange of ideas as a public good.
 The concept of the public sphere thus encompasses normative assumptions 
about public discourse as a primarily deliberative structure that legitimizes 
democratic norms of governance. Two elements of the public sphere are seen as 
essential within this normative perspective. The first element is the virtual and 
physical spheres, which are regarded as an institutional setting of communica-
tion among strangers. The second element is the public sphere’s facilitation of 
reasoned public choice. This dualism of the idea of the public sphere has proven 
to be exceptionally popular and problematic at the same time. Almost coincid-
ing with the publication of The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere in 
English (Habermas, 1962/1991), a critical discourse about the alleged uni-
versalism of the public sphere took shape against the background of the end of 
the Cold War (Calhoun, 1992). Scholars pointed out that the public sphere is 
both a mechanism for debate and choice, and a space for solidarity and for 
building a sense of belonging. In particular, Nancy Fraser (1992) and Seyla Ben-
habib objected to the “unexamined normative dualisms” (Benhabib, 1992, 
p. 95) that had informed Habermas’ conception of the public sphere. Fraser and 
others pointed out that a lack of attention to gendered categories, such as the 
distinction between an intimate private sphere and a political public, legitimized 
structures of inclusion and exclusion. Some scholars argued that the public 
sphere as a notion left unexamined the gendered divisions between men as 
public and women as private, and that this distinction is a crucial argument 
against the universality of the idea of the public sphere (Klaus, 2001). Criticizing 
the nation- based and thus unifying view of the public sphere, scholars have also 
highlighted that counter- publics and deliberately oppositional social formations 
need to be taken into account (Castells, 2007). Opposing the idea of a shared 
understanding by deliberation, scholars like Chantal Mouffe (2005) have argued 
for an “agonistic public” intensely relying on passion as a driving force, where 
conflicting positions are maintained rather than resolved. Another stream of cri-
tique has come from scholars in Islamic studies and postcolonial studies. Scholars 
in this line identified the idealization of rational discourse and deliberation as a 
core concept of a secularized, Western notion of the public sphere. They thus 
argue for a focus on the corporeal, ethical, and religious dimensions and prac-
tices in the constitution of publics outside the European- American context (e.g., 
Mahmood, 2012). With such a variety of critiques, it has become obvious that 
the normative assumption of a public sphere – though proclaiming openness 
and accessibility as its precondition – heavily relies on power structures, hier-
archies, and mechanisms of exclusion.
 These critiques of “the public sphere” have inspired alternative concepts, 
like Michael Warner’s (2002) “counter publics” or Mouffe’s (2005) “agonistic 
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public.” Additionally, some have suggested the pressing need for a systematic 
inclusion of emotions and modes of emotional communication in the consti-
tution of publics. Chris Peters (2011) criticizes an “undertheorized” approach 
to emotion in journalism studies, suggesting an understanding of emotion as a 
constitutive part in journalism’s history. Peters (2011) moreover notes that in 
recent years “the diversity of emotional styles […] and attempts to involve 
the audience have become more explicit” (p. 297). Likewise, Barry Richards 
(2010) has called for “placing emotion at the heart of our understanding of 
politics” (p. 304). He argues for establishing “a healthier emotional sphere” 
(Richards, 2010, p. 309) by taking into account the emotional patterns of 
news making and the strategies of emotionalization that are used in public 
communication to reach a broader audience. However, my argument for 
“affective publics” goes beyond such an addition. Instead, I regard affect as a 
dynamic, processual, and fluid capacity arising in the relational interaction 
between actors and artifacts in any kind of social practice, and embedded in a 
variety of temporal and spatial contexts (→ affect).
 These contexts are not fixed. They have changed radically with the ubi-
quitous rise of accessible digital networked communication technologies. 
This shift calls for a new understanding of the emergence and establishment 
of public articulations. Traditional distinctions between audiences and 
publics, and between consumers and producers of media, are increasingly 
inadequate to capture processes of public communication that emerge 
through circulation rather than distribution and broadcasting, at a time 
when media technologies are increasingly networked, convergent, and 
mobile (Livingstone, 2005).
 Any adequate understanding of publics needs to take into account its 
fluid, unstable, fragile, and dynamic character. This is especially so at a time 
when publics can forge transnational avenues of protest via networked 
communication constituted via hashtags (e.g., #MeToo, #TimesUp, 
#BlackLivesMatter) and through the coordination of online and offline 
activities, for example as flashmobs or as forms of “connective action” 
(Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). The ongoing pluralization of media formats 
and technologies challenges the established hierarchy of communicative 
actors. The normative concept of deliberation relies on a regulated system 
of privileged actors, in which journalism is an institution that delivers infor-
mation of prioritized social relevance. However, today’s dynamic and often 
chaotic constellation of speakers and observers does not rely on such a 
given hierarchical structure. In hybrid media systems (Chadwick, 2013), 
the coexistence of traditional media institutions with personalized, net-
worked media establishes conflicting settings of articulation where the tone, 
modality, volume, and dominance of speakers in a given public is part of an 
ongoing struggle. The concept of affective publics proposed here does not 
argue for a technology driven understanding of new communication 
settings. Rather, it provides an analytic approach to describe and understand 
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ongoing turbulences and new opportunities in public articulations. Affect 
theory seeks to capture these seminal shifts based on dynamic forms of inter-
action between (media) technology and human actors. It does so by provid-
ing a theoretical framework for researchers to re- conceptualize the relation 
between individual actors and institutions, as well as between technology and 
(human) agency. Based on a relational understanding of affect (Slaby & 
Röttger-Rössler, 2018), I consider publics as performative, processual, and 
thus affective. We will show how such an understanding goes beyond the 
inclusion of emotional aspects of public communication.
Understanding publics and counter- publics: the 
performative character of publics
Decentering the association of publics with deliberation urges us to acknowl-
edge that a public is not an institution. Publics cannot be reduced to particu-
lar organizations such as the media, or to particular “spheres.” Publics come 
into existence through modalities of communication between very different 
kinds of actors, networks, and groups in societies. Warner (2002) regards 
publics as performative as they emerge through a “dependence on the co- 
presence of strangers” who pay attention to individual articulations (p. 76). 
His argument about the necessary co- presence of articulation and attention 
becomes even more salient in today’s context of social media and its public 
articulations. Individual articulations can originate from a personal context, 
but are simultaneously accessible to others. Articulation and attention are 
necessary components of publics, or in Warner’s words, “publics are only 
realized through active uptake” (Warner, 2002, p. 87). Such a performative 
understanding emphasizes the “doing” of publics instead of its normative 
character addressed by deliberation. “Doing publics” can be understood as 
part of a social analysis based on practice theory interested in an “open set of 
practices relating to, or oriented around, media” (Couldry, 2004, p. 117). By 
analyzing routinized and iterative practices with media, patterns of emerging 
performative publics can be identified. Understanding publics as performative 
emphasizes that they are temporally and situationally sustained in the medi-
ated and localized co- presence of actors. This emphasis on the spatiality and 
temporality of publics nowadays becomes even more relevant as aggregation, 
searchability, and live feeds create their own temporalities and networks of 
followers. Co- presence can be physically localized or might become mediated 
and thus translocal, though quite often both modes coexist and mutually 
reinforce each other. Thus, co- presence implies an evolving and changeable 
social relation between actors and spectators, wherein differing levels of 
agency, social hierarchies, and gendered speaker positions become apparent 
and can be challenged. Like the performativity of gender, the performativity 
of publics is based on a “stylized repetition of acts” that constitute “social 
temporality […] through sustained social performances” (Butler, 1990, 
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pp. 140–141). In the iteration of gendered communicative acts, the concept 
of performativity allows for the analysis of negotiations over the terms that 
regulate social hierarchies. Performativity here describes “that reiterative 
power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and con-
strains” (Butler, 1993, p. 2). Thus, a public must be brought into being 
through practices and actions.
 Conceiving of publics as performative, I highlight that the co- constitution 
of actors and spectators creates alternating positions, rather than exclusive 
ones. This reflexivity of speaker and audience positions captures the particular 
modalities of public articulation that are embedded in quotidian practices of 
digital networked communication. Online communication is then inherently 
performative, because it demands of actors to negotiate predefined features of 
media platforms within their specific social environments.
 Based on such a performative understanding, the temporal dynamics through 
which publics arise or vanish are of specific relevance, and should be considered 
in detail. Current networked communication has generated new temporalities 
and spatialities for public participation. These are beginning to alter the consti-
tution of publics, as users of social networks switch between personal and public 
modes of communication, and contribute to the spontaneous emergence (and 
often quick dissolution) of publics (Sheller, 2004). Digital modes of mediated 
communication, such as mobile telephones and social networking sites, have 
been incorporated into quotidian user practices. Thus, mediated publicness is 
becoming a default mode of online communication that further complicates the 
empirical basis of identifying publics. A multitude of communicative actors are 
now connected as “networked publics” with high frequency, dynamism, and 
intensity (boyd, 2011). This context requires analytic approaches that account 
for the mutual influence of each actor on the other. These “networked publics” 
describe “a space constructed through networked technologies” and “the imag-
ined collective that emerges as a result of the intersection of people, technology, 
and practice” (boyd, 2011, p. 39). It is important to stress that networked 
publics are spaces and communities at the same time. These forms of connect-
ing, gathering and constructing sociality are established in their own temporal 
dynamics, becoming visible as “shit storms” as well as waves of solidarity, and 
forging intensities and dynamics that can best be described as “affective flows” 
(→ social collectives). In such a way, temporality becomes constitutive of publics 
themselves. The agency inherent in these kinds of publics is no longer located 
in individual actors or in technology itself, but lies beyond human capacity in 
the interactive relation between media technology and a network of actors. This 
is exactly where affect comes into play.
Affective publics: dynamics of protest and outrage
In social movement research, the role of social media is critically addressed 
with regard to different tasks such as mobilization of followers, organization 
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of actions, and the articulation of joint demands. Examples like Occupy 
Wallstreet (#ows) have also shown that a multiplicity of roles and functions 
become available as actors perceive each other as joining around a common 
interest (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). Social movement research has begun to 
investigate how political subjectivity is negotiated in digital media environ-
ments, and under what conditions unstable associations of actors come to 
establish structures of contestation. Yet, the focus remains indebted to the 
political nature of participation. Forms of protest have changed due to social 
networked media and institutional preconditions have lost their relevance. In 
such a context, individual articulations – which cannot always sharply be 
distinguished as either private or public – can become starting points of joint 
action. Particular sites (understood both as physical locations and as commu-
nication platforms) serve as catalysts of communality and contestation. 
Personal networks of individuals here are crucial for mobilization and the 
organization of protest. There is a marked shift from researching institutional-
ized movement structures to researching individualized media practices of 
ordinary citizens. This shift in research objectives acknowledges a certain 
de- institutionalization of political activism while investigating new modalities 
of public articulation and contestation that emerge from networks of actors, 
quotidian practices of communication, and the circulation of common 
symbolic repertoires (Cammaerts, Mattoni, & McCurdy, 2013). W. Lance 
Bennett’s and Alexandra Segerberg’s (2012) notion of a shift from “collective 
action” to “connective action” captures this point.
 In addition to this established work on social movements, recent research 
on hashtag activism has shown how public protest becomes effective with 
almost no institutional structures and backing, even if many such protests rely 
on pre- digital social networks as well. So- called “ad hoc publics” do not rely 
on formal prerequisites, but mostly on those digital devices that are part of 
everyday life. Online activism against everyday forms of sexual harassment, 
for example, is increasingly becoming a focus of research. Even before the 
ongoing and global attention to #MeToo, diverse forms of digital feminist 
activism like Hollaback!, #BeenRapedNeverReported, or #aufschrei (German 
for “outcry”) relied on translocal publics that emerged and grew dynamically 
in a limited period of time mostly without any formal hierarchical structure. 
The performative character of such activism is indicated by its affective flows. 
As I have argued, affective flows characterize the temporal dynamics that are 
central to this form of digital mobilization (cf. Lünenborg & Raetzsch, 2018, 
pp. 26–28, including further examples).
 These different types of protest show how mediatized modes of articu-
lation and participation form publics, however small, fragile, or short- lived 
such publics turn out to be. Grounded in routinized daily practices with 
digital media, public forms of articulation and participation continue to diver-
sify and increase. Such affective practices include producing and circulating a 
meme, posting a message, liking and sharing, as well as commenting on 
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others’ posts. Embedded in networked technologies, these affective practices 
enable users to shift gradually from personal to public communication and 
become part of affective publics. The affective character of such publics 
becomes apparent in the blurring of established dichotomies that were previ-
ously understood to characterize the public sphere. Indeed, participants in 
communication processes navigate a continuum between personal and public 
communication, combine formal and informal modes of speaking, and switch 
constantly between producing and consuming information. Crisscrossing 
historically distinct spheres, roles, and modes of articulation, these digital 
communicative arrangements allow for a more diverse participation of 
speakers and users who may simultaneously be involved as individuals, 
citizens, activists, parents, professionals, or politically engaged actors. As these 
media practices rise, affective dynamics move to the forefront while estab-
lished forms of regulation and self- regulation – in terms of access, modes of 
speaking, and the forms of addressing – have lost their assertiveness. 
Twentieth- century journalism was convincingly described as the “most 
important signifying system of modernity” (Hartley, 1996, p. 36). As a form 
of organized gate- keeping, journalism offered a professional procedure of 
selecting, priming, and framing information. Nowadays, however, digital net-
worked and convergent communication works without any gate. As a multi-
plicity of speakers with diverse forms of articulation become publicly visible 
and audible, they give rise to a number of unprecedented and contingent 
dynamics that can be described as affective formations. These affective forma-
tions are not opposed to discursive structures. Instead, they entail an ongoing 
interrelation between arguments and emotions and between technological 
affordances and social appropriation.
 A focus on the affective formation of publics enables a new understanding 
of actors mostly perceived as citizens and thus widens the common under-
standing of citizenship (→ affective citizenship). Most of the research in this 
field is driven by the normative idea that more inclusive publics offer diverse 
citizens the opportunity to articulate their interests and thus feed their per-
spectives into ongoing discourse, especially in moments of political change. 
In this vein, Papacharissi (2015) established the notion of affective publics in 
her analysis of the Egyptian uprising in 2011. Studying the Twitter feed, she 
points out: “The affective rhythms of news storytelling on #egypt reproduced 
and reinforced feelings of community for an existing public of indignant 
citizens who had had enough” (Papacharissi, 2015, p. 62). Her reference to 
rhythms draws our attention to the temporal structure of affective publics, in 
which a single articulation becomes part of a flow produced by retweets and 
mentions. The intensity of such repetitions, modifications, and re- articulations 
does not serve the interest of information, but rather contributes to an affec-
tive stage of togetherness, solidarity, and belonging. Such an “affective flow” 
produces its own intensity and temporality, sometimes referred to as 
“contagious” (Papacharissi, 2015, pp. 18–21). However, such a recourse to 
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biological terminology, which draws on an ontological understanding of 
affect following Brian Massumi (2002), has its risks. The risk is to place affect 
outside of agency. Unlike that approach, we have argued here for an under-
standing of agency that emerges in the interaction between human actors and 
(digital) technology itself.
 Of course, affective publics are by no means solely devoted to the produc-
tion of solidarity and empathy. A comparable type of intensity can be 
observed in “networks of outrage” (Puschmann et al., 2016). Within such 
networks, for instance, Islamophobic groups on Twitter perform a close 
network of sources that produce mutual affective attunement. Claudia Alvares 
and Peter Dahlgren (2016, p. 54) raise their concern as well when they discuss 
right- wing populism and its relation to media. Opposing traditional normative 
perceptions, “publics can espouse anti- democratic values while nevertheless 
remaining ‘publics’. Such publics constitute a risk for democracy due to the 
possibility of mobilization and ‘self- education’ through violent actions.”
Final remarks
Critical considerations of publics in contexts of right- wing populism remind 
us that a number of normative implications are still relevant for a proper 
understanding of publics. The concept of affective publics elaborated here 
acknowledges and builds on its ambivalent character. Publics are diverse, ago-
nistic, and fragile, and they continually emerge and disappear. The affective 
character of such publics highlights the dynamic and processual mode of 
public articulation itself. We must acknowledge that affect is constituted rela-
tionally, through the interaction between humans and non- human artifacts 
like media technology and public space. Further research about how publics 
are constituted should consider the affordances and capacities that go beyond 
human intentionality. This conceptual proposition mostly sheds light on 
affective publics in political discourse. However, the concept also opens paths 
for a more inclusive understanding of publics and their contemporary relev-
ance in digital media environments. By overcoming dichotomies between 
public and private and between the political and the personal, an analysis of 
affective publics enables us to describe affective articulations from an indi-
vidual standpoint. Affective articulations thus come to encompass personal 
participation in domains where cultural forms of inclusion and exclusion are 
performed, such as viewers commenting on media coverage on social TV and 
debates surrounding topics of public interest that need not be explicitly polit-
ical. Such articulations might manifest in diverse ways, from forms of hate 
speech to expressions of collective empathy.
 I have argued here for an affective understanding of publics that goes 
beyond the mere insertion of emotions into public discourse. Nevertheless, 
future research should be directed toward furthering our understanding of the 
specific implications and relevance of emotions in the constitution of publics. 
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Communication studies offers one promising avenue for doing so. In par-
ticular, the field can help analyze rising rates of emotional communication in 
the context of increasingly personalized politics, as well as the strategic uses of 
emotions in communication about crisis and risk, and in contexts relating to 
terrorism and insecurity. Indeed, these are concerns that straddle traditional 
mass media as well as digital communication. In sum, further analysis is 
needed about the interrelation between emotions and affective dynamics in 
the constitution of publics.
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Chapter 29
Affective citizenship
Bilgin Ayata
The concept of affective citizenship advances a new understanding of citizen-
ship whose affective components have largely been neglected in the social 
sciences. Citizenship is conventionally understood as a rights- based political 
membership that forms the key institutional tie between the state and the 
individual. Even though in very early conceptualizations, such as by Plato, 
affects and emotions play a critical role in discussions of what constitutes a 
good citizen, it is only in the past two decades that scholars have increasingly 
attended to the affective dimensions of citizenship. Building on feminist, 
queer, and postcolonial critiques, the concept of affective citizenship departs 
from rationalist paradigms that undergird most scholarly approaches to the 
state, bureaucracy, and citizenship. Focusing on the affective and emotional 
dimension of citizenship, the concept enables us to decipher and problem-
atize how states “govern through affect” (Fortier, 2010), how citizenship pol-
icies endorse particular feelings as legitimate while discrediting others, how 
desire configures state–subject relations, or, to put it more broadly, how 
affects and emotions are employed within mechanisms of exclusion and inclu-
sion. While a plethora of scholarship has pointed to the various forms of 
inclusion and exclusion enacted through citizenship policies and practices, 
focusing on the affective dimensions of citizenship allows us to analyze those 
hierarchies and differentiations that exceed the level of formal access or legal 
equality. Since crude legal discrimination based on race, gender, and class 
have become more complex to sustain in light of contemporary international 
human rights laws, political boundary- making has shifted more pronouncedly 
to affect and emotions to reinforce difference and differential treatment. For 
instance, while two individuals may be equal citizens from a legal point of 
view, their perceived difference in terms of religion, race, sex, gender, or class 
may result in identifying one individual as the proper, true citizen who is nat-
urally entitled to the privileges and status of citizenship, whereas the other 
may be identified as a “quasi” or “technical” citizen, whose belonging to the 
political community remains in question despite holding citizenship. In this 
case, additional affective and emotional efforts must be performed to confirm 
rightful political belonging. Thus, it no longer only matters where “one is 
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really from,” but also “how one really feels” (toward the nation, state, or polit-
ical community) (Fortier, 2008). With the declaration of the Global War on 
Terror by the United States and its allies, as well as with the problematization 
of migration, difference, and plurality as potential threats to social cohesion 
and national security, such boundary- making and governing through affect 
has increasingly attracted scholarly attention, and rightly so. The concept of 
affective citizenship allows us to critically analyze differential regimes of 
inclusion and exclusion by attending to the role of affect and emotions in 
state–subject relations, both from the perspective of states as well as that of 
individuals and communities (→ affective communities).
Historical background and context
Citizenship is one of the most elementary concepts in political life that refers 
to rights, status, belonging, identity, and participation (→ belonging). Broadly 
speaking, citizenship distributes rights, confers status upon its members, 
ascribes identity and belonging to the political community, and facilitates 
modes of participation. It is both a socio- cultural and legal concept as well as 
a political institution that sets the boundaries of national and political mem-
bership. Hence, citizenship is a powerful mechanism of both inclusion and 
exclusion. In the long historical journey from the polis to the nation state, cit-
izenship has consolidated itself as the foundational principle that orders the 
relationship between states and subjects. States can employ citizenship both as 
a rewarding as well as a punitive measure through the legal act of naturaliza-
tion or denaturalization.
 Contemporary citizenship rests on the principle of equality and provides pro-
tection from arbitrary treatment; it builds on the fundamental idea that humans 
are right- bearing subjects. This is a result of many struggles and historical devel-
opments that have shaped the tenets of citizenship over centuries. At its incep-
tion, citizenship was directly linked to the protection of property and exclusively 
granted to a few male property owners, but over the past two centuries, many 
struggles by excluded subjects such as the colonized, the enslaved, women, and 
migrants have led to an expansion of citizenship rights. Today, there is hardly 
any country in the world that has not invented, amended, or radically trans-
formed its existing laws and regulations of citizenship. In the classic account of 
sociologist Thomas Marshall (1950/1992), first published in 1950, the consolida-
tion of nation states around the globe as well as the expansion of capitalism as an 
economic order that perpetuates inequality has broadened the scope and content 
of citizenship. Accordingly, in the 18th century, citizenship related to civic 
rights, in the 19th century, its scope extended to political rights, and in the 20th 
century, social rights were added with the expansion of welfare states (Marshall, 
1950/1992). While his analysis captures the larger trajectory of citizenship, his 
linear and limited perspective has been criticized both by feminists and 
postcolonial scholars, as Marshall’s analysis rests firmly on the history of white 
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European men. Moreover, scholars have pointed out that welfare states had 
indeed first strengthened social citizenship as a means of redistribution but then 
retracted exactly those rights under neoliberalism (Brown, 2015). Hence, it 
would be misleading to think of citizenship as continuously expanding in a 
linear, progressive way. For instance, the pressures of globalization, neoliberalism, 
and migration have resulted in flexible citizenship (Ong, 1998). To illustrate this 
with an example: you can purchase citizenship in the EU member state Malta 
for 1.15 million euro through investments in the country, and for much less in 
six other countries in the world (Tanasoca, 2016). Yet at the same time, thou-
sands of migrants are dying each year at the shores of Europe when crossing the 
Mediterranean (Ayata, 2017).
 To account for the multitude of developments that change or shape cit-
izenship, myriad theories and alternative conceptualizations have amassed in 
the past decades. The literature on citizenship is flourishing. Scholars have 
explored how migration (Balibar, 2004; Bauböck, 1994; Brubaker, 1992; 
Joppke, 1998; Soysal, 1994), globalization (Falk, 2010; Urry, 1999), neo-
liberalism (Fraser, 1997; Somers, 2008), gender and sexuality (Lister, 2003; 
Plummer, 2003; Richardson, 1998; Siim, 2000), multiculturalism (Modood, 
2011; Taylor, 1994), technology (Barns, 2005), media and culture (Klaus & 
Lünenborg, 2004) or political participation (Isin, 2009) have transformed the 
practice and theory of citizenship. While citizenship has attracted interest 
across the social sciences and humanities, the bulk of research on this topic 
has focused on the territorial, economic, legal, historical, political, and cul-
tural aspects. The affective and emotional dimensions of citizenship, however, 
have been rather neglected, even though the importance of affects and emo-
tions for political life is increasingly acknowledged (Connolly, 2002; 
Nussbaum, 2013; Protevi, 2009) (→ political affect). This neglect is highly 
problematic, given that affect and emotions have always formed critical com-
ponents of citizenship. For instance, in Plato’s dialogues on The Laws, the 
emphasis on the emotional commitment of the citizen to the laws of the state 
already points to the affective dimension of citizenship, as Cohen De Lara 
convincingly demonstrates (2017). Later, during colonization, affects and 
emotions figure as critical components in legitimizing the withholding of 
rights and citizenship from colonized subjects by juxtaposing European 
rationality and reason against the allegedly affective states in the colonies 
(Fanon, 1963, 1991; Grovogui, 2006; Stoler, 2007). The historic exclusion of 
women from and the contemporary restriction of citizenship rights for 
LGBTI communities also reveal how intimately citizenship, affects, and emo-
tions are linked (Berlant, 1997). A growing body of research has recently 
been emerging under the rubric of “affective citizenship.” This work analyzes 
the affective and emotional dimensions of citizenship from various perspec-
tives. New insights are provided into the seemingly rational apparatus of the 
state, administrative processes, and wider state–subject relations in the context 
of increasing societal and political pluralization.
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Systematic explication of the concept
The concept of affective citizenship contributes in crucial ways to a better 
understanding of societies. It seeks to “destabilize citizenship as a purely 
rational and administrative exercise of state authority by attending to the role 
of affect in production of regimes of inclusion and exclusion” (Di Gregorio & 
Merolli, 2016, p. 934). Importantly, it highlights the relational dynamics of 
political boundary making in affective societies that are marked by plurality 
and heterogeneity. While at the horizontal level a further increase of formal 
equality is to be expected through naturalization processes, citizenship as a 
differential regime will continue to contribute to internal hierarchization 
among designated “true,” “proper” citizens and those who are viewed only 
“technically” as citizens, a prominent trope in ongoing European and US 
debates on Islam and migration (Volpp, 2002). The concept of affective 
citizenship helps us to understand what else is required for a rightful belong-
ing to the community that the legal obtaining of citizenship does not confer, 
such as an affective disposition toward the right feelings for the state, nation, 
or political community (→ affective disposition). Take the example of debates 
on Islam and migration in Europe. After terrorist attacks in London in 2005, 
Paris in 2015, and Berlin in 2016, the political belonging of ordinary Muslim 
citizens was put under heightened scrutiny, questioning their emotional alli-
ance with the victims or the “injured nation.” This phenomenon was similar 
to the governance of public feelings after 9/11 in the United States (Anker, 
2014). Relatedly, the latest modification of naturalization laws in the UK 
explicitly highlights the importance of feeling British (→ attachment). While it 
was previously possible to apply for citizenship by mail, now numerous 
requirements and ceremonies are included into the naturalization process to 
ensure that citizenship is emotionally desired by the applicants (Fortier, 2013). 
Thus, it is not sufficient to ideologically identify with the principles, laws, and 
values of the state whose citizenship one seeks to obtain, but also to “feel the 
right way.” What one grieves about, fears, enjoys, cheers for, or cherishes 
becomes part of proper citizen conduct. The lines of demarcation between 
insider and outsider are thus affectively (re)drawn. The concept of affective 
citizenship allows us to study the creation of “internal outsiders” even when 
they formally belong to the political community (→ affective communities). It 
enables us to decipher the affective contract between allegedly entitled 
members of the community and state institutions that permeates discourse, 
policy, and practices through the production of citizenship. Studies on 
nationalism and patriotism have long addressed the affective and emotional 
components of political belonging, yet the relegation and confinement of 
emotional affairs to nation and nationalism has helped to maintain the mis-
conception that the apparatus of the state is free of affects and emotions. As 
recent ethnographies on affective state bureaucracy by Didier Fassin and his 
colleagues (2015) have shown, this is hardly the case. In this vein, the concept 
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of affective citizenship contributes to dissolving the juxtaposition of the emo-
tional nation versus the rational state, and instead pushes for an understanding 
of states as affective entrepreneurs, or as “affective states” (Stoler, 2007).
 As a conceptual lens, affective citizenship explores practices of govern-
ance relating to people’s feelings toward those they identify as “alike” and 
those they identify as “different” (Ahmed, 2000, 2014), and how feelings of 
comfort, unease, anger, empathy, (mis)trust, (dis)respect, love, and hate 
toward an imagined “us” and “others” are regulated and reproduced in offi-
cial policies, discourses, and practices. Fortier (2010) has described this 
regulation of feelings as “governing through affect” (p. 22). This has con-
sequences both for the relationship between states and subjects, but also for 
the relationship among subjects and different communities. Therefore, the 
concept of affective citizenship cannot simply be reduced to the practices of 
the state. Equally important is how citizens and non- citizen subjects nego-
tiate, contribute to, or contest the state’s efforts to govern through affect. 
For a comprehensive understanding of how citizenship in its broadest and 
multiple senses is produced by governance through affect, the analysis of 
affective citizenship must take place at the level of the state, the community, 
and the individual. This includes questions such as how citizens themselves 
respond to, engage in, or practice affective citizenship and what forms of 
resistance, contestation, compliance, or adaptation are expressed in acts of 
affective citizenship.
Affective citizenship in research
Multicultural, plural societies in which migration or the naturalization of 
former migrants are still publicly problematized as challenges for the social 
and political cohesion of the national community are the main context for 
discussions within literature on affective citizenship. By researching the affec-
tive dimensions of integration policies (Fortier, 2010; Merolli, 2016), natural-
ization (Fortier, 2013, 2017), community cohesion (De Wilde & Duyvendak, 
2016; Johnson, 2010) or cultural difference (Mookherjee, 2005), scholars of 
affective citizenship have contributed to a more nuanced understanding of 
how citizenship as a mechanism of inclusion and exclusion is affectively 
employed by encouraging certain feelings that create desirable states and 
citizens. For instance, by analyzing integration documents in the UK, Fortier 
(2010) traces community cohesion policies as an attempt to manage the 
unease of white Britons regarding cultural and religious difference. Recogniz-
ing the social character of feelings such as unease, discomfort, and suspicion is 
critical to understanding how citizens are affectively produced in the course 
of integration policies or naturalization policies. Hence, one of the key ques-
tions to ask when analyzing affective citizenship is how states construe them-
selves and citizens as “desirable” and how the “fantasy of state power and 
desirability” is produced (Fortier, 2013, p. 700).
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 While Fortier and other authors employ the concept of affective citizen-
ship as a theoretical and analytical lens that allows us to explore neglected 
aspects of the production of citizenship, some scholars have proposed to think 
of affective citizenship as an alternative and more inclusive political model of 
belonging, and have pointed to the transformative potential of affective cit-
izenship (e.g., Hung, 2010). In her discussion on the ban of the Muslim veil 
in France, Mookherjee (2005) seeks to reconcile both postcolonial and fem-
inist discussions on female subjectivity and the autonomous subject by offer-
ing affective citizenship as an alternative model of recognition. Accordingly, 
this model can integrate different understandings of identity and autonomy in 
multicultural societies. Mookherjee takes up the dispute over headscarves, in 
which feminist philosophers argued that by wearing the veil women would 
deny their autonomy, while postcolonial critics pointed to the universalizing 
language in which the feminists’ critique was articulated. They criticized fem-
inists for taking the Western liberal idea of a self- constituting autonomous 
citizen for granted. Seeking a productive resolution of these two positions, 
Mookherjee argues that the autonomy of citizens is embedded in multiple 
affective bonds to families, intersecting communities, and so forth, that need 
to be equally accounted for. Support for the rejection of the veil, then, 
disregards these affective bonds in multicultural societies. Thus, she develops 
a model of affective citizenship from a postcolonial feminist perspective that 
responds to the need to be transformative with respect to acknowledging cul-
tural differences and to be critical with regard to social inequality. In this 
model of affective citizenship, the recognition of multiple affiliations and 
affective belonging then unsettles the “majority and minority’s perceived 
distinction between ‘identity’ and ‘difference’, and between ‘insiders’ and 
‘outsiders’ ” (Mookherjee, 2005, p. 37). Mookherjee places hybridity, group 
representation, and the recognition of minority values at the center of her 
concept. Affective citizenship, in her reading, is an inclusive concept that 
provides equal space for minority values and recognizes hybrid modes of 
female subjectivity (Mookherjee, 2005, p. 47). She suggests a concept that 
facilitates democratic communication and reciprocal transformations in post-
colonial, hybrid societies without abandoning universal critiques of social 
inequality and oppression.
 While Mookherjee develops her concept of affective citizenship based on 
ongoing debates on identity and value in Europe regarding Islam and migra-
tion, Ruyu Hung’s (2010) concept of affective citizenship stems from an 
engagement with pragmatist and phenomenological philosophers within the 
field of citizenship education. He proposes affective citizenship as a more 
inclusive, caring, sensitive model of citizenship that can contribute to a more 
open public sphere. What is important to highlight is that both Mookherjee 
and Hung employ affective citizenship as a normative concept which carries 
an inclusive potential that could better account for diversity and plurality in 
contemporary societies than conventional notions of citizenship. Thus, in the 
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current research on affective citizenship, the concept is employed both 
analytically and normatively in a manner that points to its productive quality. 
Future research can further develop the concept at both levels, yet the strong-
est potential of affective citizenship arguably lies in its ability to analyze rather 
than formulate policies.
Outlook
In his awarding winning book Between the World and Me, US- American 
author Ta- Nehisi Coates (2015) writes a lyrical letter to his teenage son that 
offers a powerful account of what it feels like to be a black citizen in the 
United States. He narrates how fear, disembodiment, and affective control are 
daily components of black survival in a country in which formal equal cit-
izenship does not offer equal belonging for members of visible minorities. 
Instead, Coates highlights the physical vulnerability of black bodies to institu-
tional racism that informs and permeates intimate family relations, school 
education, neighborhood relations, and all other critical spheres of life. What 
it feels like to be a black citizen in the United States is a state of fear, insec-
urity, and vulnerability. It is a life that is not protected by the state but rather 
has to protect itself from the state. Written roughly 50 years after the Civil 
Rights Movement, the book uncompromisingly shows that achieving full cit-
izenship rights has not protected the non- white population in the United 
States from racial injustice, which also relies on the governance of affect and 
emotions. One example of such governance of affects and emotions in this 
case is the normalization of the perception of young black males as threating, 
violent, and irrational. This has led, through various court verdicts, to the 
justification of their murders by police as acts of “self- defense.” In a similar 
vein, the construction of Muslim citizens in the United States after 2001 as 
threatening and dangerous also operates at comparable affective registers that 
delineate two categories of citizens: those who are naturally entitled and those 
whose citizenship is conditional, ambiguous, or relegated to a formality if 
they do not feel, behave, or act in desired ways. This phenomenon is of 
course not restricted to the United States but can be found in many countries 
around the world to varying degrees and in varying forms. For instance, with 
the ongoing polarization and problematization of migration, identity, and 
belonging in contemporary debates in Europe, the importance of the affective 
dimensions of citizenship are reinforced for dual citizens and former migrants. 
For decades, it was European countries themselves that encouraged countries 
such as Turkey, Algeria, and Morocco to set up religious and educational 
institutions in Germany, France, the Netherlands, and so forth from the 1970s 
until the 2000s. The aim of this policy was to ensure that Muslim migrants 
would explicitly maintain their affective bonds with their countries of origin 
and thus eventually return. Yet now, with increasing naturalization and the 
realization that former migrants and their children will stay in Europe for 
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good, any undesired display of affective bonds with their countries of origin 
can lead to questioning their rightful belonging to Europe. In light of the 
global intensification of struggles over entitlement, national belonging, and 
collective identity, our understanding of citizenship can no longer afford to 
exclude the realm of feelings, emotions, and affect. Affective citizenship is a 
promising concept with which to explore the affective ties between states and 
citizens from their respective vantage points. It allows us to decipher the mul-
tiple experiences, power relations, and policies that emanate from the politics 
of exclusion and inclusion in contemporary and future constellations of affec-
tive societies.
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Chapter 30
Political affect
Jan Slaby and Jonas Bens
All political practices are affective. Political action and its institutional and 
organizational architectures are embedded in and productive of affective 
dynamics. At the same time, political practices and institutions are dependent 
on specific forms of affectivity, which may crystallize into prevailing senti-
ments and emotional orientations. These, in turn, are either conducive to 
modes of governance or foundational in efforts to resist such demands. The 
longing for radical change, the wish for soothing security, the commitment to 
a set of communal values, the denouncement of certain deeds as morally 
wrong – acts and orientations deeply embedded in all kinds of political pro-
cesses – cannot be conceived without taking affect into account.
 The theme of political affect encompasses a broad spectrum of phenomena 
and issues, as evidenced by the massive amount and diverse orientation of recent 
work on political affectivity (e.g., Connolly, 2002; Protevi, 2009; Massumi, 
2015; Lordon, 2016; Bargetz & Sauer, 2015) and on political emotions (e.g., 
Clarke, Hoggett, & Thompson 2006; Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001; Nuss-
baum, 2013; Marcus, 2002; Mihai, 2016, Mohrmann, 2015). For the purpose 
of this chapter, we propose a relatively broad conceptual outlook that is system-
atically divided into two segments, corresponding to the two main parts of the 
chapter. These segments reflect a basic distinction in recent political thought – 
the one between “politics” and “the political” (Marchart, 2007).
 The first segment – affect and the political – is predominantly philosophical 
in nature and asks about the general relation between the political and affec-
tivity. In this regard, the concept of political affect functions in part as a 
reflective notion, engendering considerations on the ultimate “point” of pol-
itics. To substantiate this perspective, we revisit the thought of the early 
modern philosopher Spinoza, whose work contains crucial aspects of a soph-
isticated understanding of the relation of affect and the political that we deem 
exemplary for contemporary approaches. Central is a social conception of 
freedom that aligns Spinoza’s perspective with more recent associative 
approaches to the political (e.g., Arendt, 1961). Political affects, in this regard, 
are chiefly affects of allegiance. By contrast, a dissociative understanding of the 
political, defended by proponents of radical democracy (e.g., Mouffe, 2000), 
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1 Our reading of Spinoza is indebted to the interpretive tradition initiated by Deleuze 
(1981/1988, 1968/1990), and relatedly by the political readings provided by Balibar (1997, 
1998) and Negri (1991). More recent inspiration comes from feminist elaborations of Spino-
zan themes (e.g., Gatens, 2009a; Gatens & Lloyd, 1999; Armstrong, 2009; Sharp, 2005, 
2011); from a study by Martin Saar (2013) and an article by Dorothy Kwek (2015).
emphasizes difference and intergroup conflict. Here, political affects are 
primarily adversarial – affects of antagonism.
 The second segment – affects in politics – deals with politics as a regulated 
sphere of collective action and inquires into the role that affect and emotion 
play as part of the routines and practices of this sphere. Accordingly, in the 
second part of this chapter, we provide various exemplary considerations that fit 
the rubric of “affective governance, affective resistance,” starting from a broadly 
Foucault- inspired perspective. Affect and emotion come into view as means and 
targets of governance, but also as fueling resistance to being governed. This 
includes a policing of styles of belonging and displays of partisanship – in effect, 
politically implemented orders of feeling that inflect the practice of government 
since at least the advent of the European nation state (Fortier, 2010). Moreover, 
the second part of our chapter also covers broader cultural programs of con-
structing and regulating historically specific political formations. Powerful dis-
cursive and practical regimes centered on feeling and sentiment were involved 
not only in the historical construction of race and gender but also more specifi-
cally in the construction of certain subpopulations as politically problematic, 
marking them as targets of biopolitical intervention. This development has been 
aptly labeled “sentimental biopower” (Schuller, 2018; see also Strick, 2015). 
Such techniques of affective governance provoke passionate resistance and 
attempts at destabilization. Analyzing affective struggles in a dialectic of govern-
ance and resistance within the realm of politics opens up empirically grounded 
perspectives on the affective dimension of the political itself.
Affect and the political: power, collectivity, 
and freedom
Spinoza is among the central philosophical sources informing important 
strands of affect theory, including the conceptual perspective on relational 
affect developed in this volume (e.g., → affect; → affective disposition; → affec-
tive resonance). This pertains not only to his ontological understanding of affect 
as a constitutive relationality between all bodies, entities, and realities (what 
Spinoza calls “finite modes”), but also to his political thought. Given the cen-
trality of affective relations as the basic form of constitutive efficaciousness 
between all that exists – formative power, capacity, or potentia – it is not sur-
prising that Spinoza’s views on affect and his political philosophy are closely 
entwined.1 In this first part of the chapter, we sketch considerations on the 
connections between affect and the political that we deem eminently relevant 
to contemporary concerns of political theory.
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 Right at the outset of his Tractatus Politicus, Spinoza (1677/1951) gives 
pride of place to “the passions”:
Philosophers conceive of the passions which harass us as vices into which 
men fall by their own fault, and therefore, generally deride, bewail, or 
blame them, or execrate them, if they wish to seem unusually pious.[…] 
For they conceive of men, not as they are, but as they themselves would 
like them to be. Whence it has come to pass that, instead of ethics, they 
have generally written satire, and that they have never conceived a theory 
of politics, which could be turned to use, but such as might be taken for 
a chimera, or might have been formed in Utopia.
(p. 287)
This is a striking plea for realism in political thought, and realism with regard 
to the affective constitution of human beings in particular. Spinoza con-
sequently theorizes politics not based on the ideas of political philosophers, 
who tend to take a detached stance of idealized normativity, but rather with 
regard to political practitioners – Machiavelli notably among them – who 
derive their insights from their own practical experience (cf. Walther, 1990, 
pp. 247f.). The particular practical reality that thereby appears is to a fair 
extent that of affective relations. One can generally say that, for Spinoza, 
social and political life consists of myriad configurations and arrangements of 
affective relations and their ongoing dynamics, which, on his perspective, are 
relations of power. Both individuation and collectivization are affective 
through and through; by implication, the same is true of the development, 
modes of existence, and eventual transformation of operative political entities, 
from the various institutions of government to the state or commonwealth as 
a whole. The “art” of politics, then, amounts to the beneficial arranging and 
harnessing of the affective energies that circulate within a given social forma-
tion, while finding the means to contain or productively re- channel destruc-
tive affects.
 Four ideas render Spinoza’s approach to the affect–politics nexus particu-
larly relevant for a contemporary understanding of political affect: (1) consti-
tutive relationality; (2) the thesis that power equals right; (3) the notion of the 
multitude; (4) freedom as the “point” of politics.
(1) The first and most basic idea is that of an encompassing onto- formative 
relationality of affecting and being affected among all that finitely exists 
(→ affect; → affective resonance). This means that every constituted body or 
entity – including human individual and collective bodies – is effectively 
embedded within a historically specific “ecosocial matrix of other bodies, 
affecting them and being affected by them” (Protevi, 2009, p. 50). This 
“dynamic sociability grounded in the powers of bodies” (Gatens & Lloyd, 
1999, p. 54) leads to a perspective on the inevitable interdependence and 
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2 Not surprisingly, this is an issue of much debate among Spinoza scholars. We tentatively side 
with Moira Gatens’ (2009b) assessment; see also Saar (2013, pp. 57–63).
3 See Kwek (2015) on the complicated theme of the power of the multitude, its role in the 
composition of the commonwealth, and the vexed issue of the unity of the multitude.
mutual constitutive relevance of all entities. It gives rise to a dynamic 
“politics of relation,” which has seen various elaborations in the more 
recent history of political thought (cf., e.g., Balibar, 1997; Butler, 2009; 
Sharp, 2005, 2011).
(2) The second idea results from the combination of this relational ontology 
with Spinoza’s denial of any transcendent source of legitimation. Within 
the immanence of the one substance or nature, there is no other source of 
right than the relationally constituted potentia of each finitely existing thing: 
“the right of each thing extends so far as its determined power extends” 
(Spinoza, 1670/2007, p. 195).2 Combined with Spinoza’s understanding of 
power as the essential capacity of each entity – which is identical to a thing’s 
dynamic essence – this postulate implies that no individual can ever com-
pletely cede all of their power to a political body, on pain of self- 
annihilation. This makes for a natural limit to the power of a 
commonwealth, as those governed will continue to possess power of their 
own and thus remain capable of resistance, and even, under certain con-
ditions, have the capacity to topple their rulers so as to regain control of 
their political constituency. In particular, no commonwealth or monarch 
can ever possess more power than the combined power of all individuals 
governed – the power of the “multitude” (potentia multitudinis).3
(3) As the aggregate of all individual potentias, the multitude is the founding 
source and enabling ground of political power and legitimacy. The point of 
this concept is that it does not unify its constitutive elements (human indi-
viduals as carriers of potentia) into a single substantive body (such as “a 
people” or “das Volk”), but that it is a non- homogenizing aggregate of 
individual forces, a multiplicity of distinct yet dynamically – that is: affec-
tively – interrelated actors that, under certain conditions, acquire the capa-
city to act in concert (cf. Saar, 2013, pp. 350–368). The multitude is the 
principal subject of politics in Spinoza’s account, a dynamic accretion of 
agentive potentials capable of both founding and dismantling a polity. 
Understandably, this notion of a multitude as the radically egalitarian, albeit 
highly unruly and unpredictable founding instance of political constituen-
cies, has for a long time fired up the imagination of proponents of radical 
democracy – including the early Marx and those inspired by him (e.g., 
Hardt & Negri, 2004; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Virno, 2004). The politi-
cally ambivalent character of the multitude has likewise been stressed, not 
least by Spinoza (1677/1985) himself: “The mob is terrifying, if unafraid” 
(Ethics, IV P54S). The multitude is that which carries the original potential 
for democracy – democracy’s vital substance – but may also be destructive 
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of democracy, as masses are prone to delusions and destructive impulses, 
and may be seduced by manipulative leaders into hatred and violence 
(cf. Saar, 2013, pp. 395f.). This ambivalence is closely tied to the affective 
character of the multitude and accordingly should never be lost sight of in 
considerations of political affect (cf. Kwek, 2015).
(4) The forth notable idea presents the ultimate “point” of politics for 
Spinoza: “the true purpose of the state is in fact freedom” (Spinoza, 
1670/2007, p. 252). Among much else, this emphatic orientation towards 
freedom ties Spinoza’s political thought back to his understanding of 
affect, in particular, his distinction between passive affects – the classical 
“passions,” which for Spinoza often constitute instances of bondage as 
opposed to expressions of freedom – and active affects, which amount to 
the realization of an individual’s or a collective’s capacity to act out of 
rational insight: “Like the Stoics, Spinoza sees the free and virtuous life as 
a transition from passivity to activity – in his terms, from ‘bondage’ of 
passion to the free activity of reason” (Gatens & Lloyd, 1999, p. 48).
Accordingly, the decisive criteria for assessing the viability and legitimacy of a 
polity is whether it enables its constituents to realize and live their potentials 
– whether it provides conditions conducive to the enjoyment of active affects 
and thus enables action in line with rational self- understanding (cf. Gatens & 
Lloyd, 1999, pp. 117–120). At the collective level, the key measure for a 
polity is accordingly the “free multitude” (multitudo libera) – a collective that 
is constrained in its actions only by those laws that are compatible with the 
essential characteristics of its constituent members (cf. Saar, 2013, 
pp. 361–368), and that is on the whole “guided more by hope than by fear.”
 Spinoza’s understanding of freedom is complex and runs counter to the 
main currents of modern thought, especially as freedom is, to him, not a 
matter of the will, but a matter of knowledge and understanding: insight into 
necessity (cf. Gatens & Lloyd, 1999, pp. 41–57). Crucially, one must not mis-
construe this orientation toward freedom in an individualistic manner, for 
instance, as an expression of the liberalist conception of individual thriving. 
This would violate the basic tenet of the relational constitution and thus the 
foundational interdependence – “transindividuality” – of all finite realities 
(Balibar, 1997). Spinozan freedom is a social affair, inextricable from col-
lective self- realization and “acting in concert,” as especially feminist interpret-
ers of his writings have convincingly argued (Armstrong, 2009; Sharp, 2011). 
Again, affect is key here: The identity of an individual is the product of a 
history of constitutive relations of affecting and being affected, and thus inex-
tricable from formative connections and affective alliances in an enabling 
milieu. Freedom, then, informed by adequate insight into these formative 
affective connections, comes with an expanded sphere of selfhood. Its actuali-
zation consists in joint action based on these insights – joyful active affects 
enacted collectively. As Aurelia Armstrong (2009) puts it, freedom or 
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autonomy for Spinoza is “a social process, that is, an effort to build and main-
tain mutual, reciprocal relationships with others that support and foster this 
striving for all concerned” (p. 61).
 These four points inform a nuanced understanding of emphatically polit-
ical affect. When things go well, political affects are active affects of alle-
giance: joyful collective engagements grounded in rational insight into the 
determining factors of individual and collective existence – freedom realized. 
It is not too far fetched to see a connection between Spinoza’s views and 
Arendt’s programmatic claim that the “raison d’etre of politics is freedom” 
(Arendt, 1961, p. 146). However, things rarely go well, particularly for “finite 
modes” such as human beings, as Spinoza would be the first to remind us 
(cf. Kwek, 2015). In such a context, “political affect” designates affective 
reactions to prevailing conditions of unfreedom, to bondage, oppression, and 
tyranny. One might presume that these affects would be found in the vicinity 
of resistance, expressions of a longing for freedom, cracks in the fabric of 
dominance, or energies that fuel fights for liberation. Here, notable affiliations 
lie less with Arendt and other centrist political thinkers but rather with the 
likes of Frantz Fanon, Assata Shakur, Audre Lorde, and others engaged in an 
uncompromising struggle against oppression.
Affects in politics: affective governance – affective 
resistance
As we have seen, Spinoza suggests that even if political action is ultimately 
aimed at and might even depend on some kind of freedom, it can rarely, if at 
all, be realized. Investigating this dilemma of freedom in unfreedom is a major 
task of politics. It is one of Foucault’s (1982) central theoretical insights that 
political subjects are always- already governed, and resistance and governance 
are inextricably linked. Thus, an orientation toward freedom is inextricably 
linked to dialectical relations of power. In Foucault’s (esp. 1984) work, the 
cultivation of affect plays a major role in governance and resistance. With his 
convincing co- reading of the two authors, Rainer Mühlhoff (2018) has 
shown how the production and governing of subjectivity as described by 
Foucault are largely compatible with a Spinozan notion of affect.
 The creation of political subjects, be they individual or collective, is not 
conceivable without processes of affective attachment, whether to a system of 
governance, a political cause, a group, or to individual peers or comrades 
(→ attachment). To maintain organizational political arrangements, affective 
dynamics are crucial, both to mobilize members and to enforce compliance 
with rules. At base, such processes are comparable when it comes to the state 
itself governing its citizens or to a group of dissidents resisting the state. The 
wielding of power, either in order to govern or to resist, is fundamentally an 
affective process. Insofar as politics is about the creation, maintenance and use 
of power, political actors understand the relevance of the creation of relatively 
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4 Bargetz and Sauer (2015) argue that this has led to a trend of overestimating the positive 
effects of affect while downplaying its negative outcomes. On this matter, we basically agree 
with them and would also stress the political ambivalence of affect.
stable affective dynamics to further political projects, both as a target for 
destabilization when it comes to their political opponents, as well as a goal to 
achieve for themselves.
 It is therefore not surprising that much work on affective dynamics and the 
political has dealt with the production of emotion and sentiment (→ emotion, 
emotion concept; → sentiment). Emotions such as love for god or country, hatred 
for the enemy in war or class struggle, anxiety of foreigners or social disen-
franchisement, enthusiasm for economic advancement or legal equality are 
powerful and culturally scripted devices for “doing politics.” Beyond the 
evocation, production, and maintenance of political emotions (cf. Nussbaum, 
2013), politics also aim at creating sentiments – relatively stable regimes of 
meaning embedded into affective and emotional dynamics. Being for or 
against something, assessing an action as right or wrong, finding an outcome 
just or unjust – these are all processes that play out in the context of the cre-
ation, mobilization, and transformation of sentiments. Seemingly different, 
even contradictory notions such as racism, social equality, gender stereotypes, 
class struggle, warmongering, peacemaking, law and order, liberal values, or 
conservatism come to the fore not as abstract rational concepts, but as senti-
ments. Being able to skillfully navigate, govern, or transform sentiments is 
accordingly a powerful political capacity.
 In the study of affect and the political, authors have tended – sometimes 
based on a Massumian notion of an all- too strict differentiation between affect 
and emotion (cf. Massumi, 1995) – to emphasize the role of affect in pro-
cesses of resistance and transformation, while taking emotion and sentiment 
to be prevalent in processes of governing and stabilization.4 We are wary of 
such distinctions and make a plea for systematically investigating the role of 
affect, emotion, and sentiment in all kinds of political processes, including 
governance and resistance, stabilization and destabilization, revolution and 
reaction. Kyla Schuller (2018) has given an impressive account of 19th-cen-
tury biopolitics and the decisive – and highly problematic – role of feeling 
and sentiment as means of governance, bringing forth the notion of “senti-
mental biopower.” She uses this concept to highlight the extent to which 
affectivity was – and still is – a discursive device for establishing and cement-
ing hierarchies of race and gender. With regard to affective resistance, on the 
other hand, Hardt and Negri (2004) see affective dynamics as the birthplace 
of a new form of political subject, the global multitude, which can be the 
agent of fundamental and radical change against the capitalist world economy. 
Based on a similar notion, Mouffe (2000) highlights the role of the mobiliza-
tion of passions for bringing the political, in the form of agonistic struggle, to 
the fore and forming the basis for leftist resistance against neoliberal policies.
Political affect  347
 One field of inquiry in which the role of affect, emotion and sentiment 
has been especially highlighted is the workings of colonial governance. In 
such works, many refer to Fanon (1952/2008) as a scholar of colonial affec-
tivity (e.g., Ahmed, 2007). Fanon shows how racist colonial governance is 
affectively inscribed into the self of the colonized (→ affects of racialization). At 
the same time, he indicates that anti- colonial resistance must also aim at the 
modulation of feeling and sentiment to free the governed from colonial 
power. Ann Stoler’s work (e.g., 2007), largely based on Foucault and on fem-
inist readings of his texts, has skillfully demonstrated how colonial governance 
aimed at the cultivation of specific sentiments and the crafting of emotional 
dispositions. In her work on Dutch colonial policies of education and chil-
drearing in the Dutch Indies (today’s Indonesia) in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries, Stoler (2002) carves out a practice of governance she calls “senti-
mental education” (pp. 112–139). From the thorough investigation of 
colonial records, Stoler (2002) maps out “the moral landscape of a racializing 
and reformist colonial regime for whom child rearing and affective attach-
ments were defining features and affairs of state” and describes what was at 
issue, namely the “learning of place and race” (p. 112). It was by learning 
certain sentiments and sensibilities that young citizens in the colonies were 
granted the right to be treated as European; a right that was denied to others. 
Stoler shows how the concern with nurturing specific affects and sentiments 
was not limited to the colonial peripheries, but also began to dominate the 
European motherland. Her work demonstrates that the colonial state’s con-
cerns for feelings of belonging and affective attachments were not metaphors 
for something else, but key conduits of power themselves. As such, the har-
nessing of sentiment and the making of communities of sentiment was a 
crucial site of political contest. Stoler (2009, pp. 73–102) also describes a 
protest from 1848 in Batavia, the Javanese capital of the Dutch East Indies, 
which was likewise directed at educational policy – namely the rule that only 
those youths schooled in the Netherlands would be eligible for the colony’s 
most coveted civil service posts. This education in the “motherland” should 
culturally cultivate bureaucratic selves governed by “self- denial, diligence, 
temperance and self- control” (Stoler, 2009, p. 65). The protesters were con-
testing the strain this policy laid on their affective attachments to their sons, 
when they had to ship them off to The Hague for years. For the governing 
colonialists such “parental sentiments and the sorrow of a father’s heart now 
looked more like ‘political’ issues and concerns of state” (Stoler, 2009, p. 83).
 Along similar lines of thinking, a number of entries in this volume have 
highlighted the role of feeling, affect, emotion, and sentiment for political 
processes of governance and resistance. One crucial technique of governance 
is immersive power, a term which describes the multifarious techniques of 
immersing people in affective arrangements to form them as subjects and 
selves, harness their energies and potentials for the purposes of a larger appar-
atus such as a party, a movement, or a company, and to evoke thoroughgoing 
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compliance (→ immersion, immersive power). One form of affective governance 
is the production of a racialized regime of othering and inequality, described 
by the concept of racialized affect (→ affects of racialization). In line with the 
idea of affective subjectivation is the claim that affect plays a key role in the 
formation of collective subjects and communities (→ affective communities). 
The citizenry is a specific community of political subjects brought about by 
the state whose inner workings can be fruitfully investigated through the lens 
of affect; citizenship is far from a formal, criteria- based mode of allegiance but 
a thoroughly affective affair (→ affective citizenship). Practices of resistance, 
such as dissident practices of image- making and image- distribution in political 
protests are likewise rendered meaningful by way of affective dynamics 
(→ affective witnessing). Political protest can open up affective possibilities and 
create potentialities to imagine and even produce new political futures 
(→ Midān moments).
Outlook
We have proposed using “political affect” as an analytic notion that helps to 
render visible the multifaceted involvement of affect in efforts of governance 
and in the manifold reactions and resistances these efforts encounter. Culti-
vating affect is a force to create new potentialities and possibilities, but the 
crafting of specific affective dynamics is also a successful technique of govern-
ance and creating compliance. Investigating affect in the myriad of practices 
that unfold in this constant dynamic of governing and resisting significantly 
broadens investigations of politics beyond reductionist characterizations, such 
as those that see politics as a game of negotiating purportedly rational political 
interests, with the occasional application of physical violence. Political affect 
is an analytical perspective that lets us look more closely into the fine- grained 
intricacies of political interaction that all too often shift out of focus: the 
intimate, the everyday, that which is only possible, yet not realized, and how 
these are entangled with the public, the extraordinary, and the real. Political 
affect asks most broadly and curiously “what matters?” (Lutz, 2017) – and 
does not know the answer in advance.
 Besides this practical and analytical orientation toward concrete politics, 
we have taken the political thought of Spinoza as an exemplary articulation of 
a deeper theoretical involvement of affect with “the political.” While thor-
oughly realistic and empirically oriented, Spinoza’s reflections on the dynamic 
constitution of political bodies do more than analyze the affective workings 
of extant political formations. Over and above such forays into the Realpolitik 
of his day, Spinoza inspires foundational reflections on the philosophical con-
nection between affect and the political as such. In particular, his thoughts on 
the ultimate “point” of politics, namely, a social form of freedom as joyously 
enacted collective action, suggests an elaboration of the concept of the polit-
ical as deeply involving affect. Spinoza – at least on the feminist reading of his 
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works we espouse – outlines an orientation toward a radically democratic 
polity in which individuals realize their potential through the forming of 
affective alliances, thereby creating a collective life grounded in understanding 
and solidarity. While this is an exemplary vision of the political that not 
everyone will share, it orients us toward inquiring into the upshot or the 
“point” of the political as such. Other answers are conceivable here. Some, 
for instance, will reckon with a much more antagonistic political landscape, 
where the road to human freedom leads through a thoroughly contested ter-
ritory and via the conflicting orientations and demands of multiple groups 
and collectives – a Schmittian vision of politics as struggle, in which the para-
mount political affects would have to be sought in the vicinity of conflict, 
war, or general antagonism (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). Again, others will take 
a stance against such an ultimately “bellicose” orientation and instead posit 
the necessity of tying a notion of the political to an ethical perspective, which 
likewise invites articulation in affective terms. Authors drawing on the work 
of Levinas and Derrida have associated the political with an “infinite” ethical 
demand issued by the Other. Butler (2004) and Critchley (2008), for 
example, straightforwardly tie such a line of thought to considerations of con-
stitutive affective relations to alterity. On these grounds, Critchley (2008) 
explicitly invokes an “ethical politics” (p. 205) – a notion that is near incon-
ceivable to proponents of an antagonistic understanding of the political.
 The more general message we take from these conflicting accounts is that 
“political affect” in all these proposals works as a philosophical notion that 
inspires assessments and problematizations of the political as such. Understood 
in this way, the concept of political affect does not invoke a definitive articu-
lation of the meaning of politics, but rather works as a means for reflection on 
the nature of the political (Reflexionsbegriff ). It points in a certain direction – 
for instance, to collectivity, antagonism, justice, or freedom – but without 
delineating a direct path to a single, unambiguous answer. This entails an ori-
entation within a given political situation that transcends the merely factual 
and moves toward a sense of possibility. The political is the sphere where 
human individuals and collectives determine – either jointly or adversely – 
what their finite earthly existence will ultimately look like: the how of their 
living together and relating to one another. A truly political affect in this 
sense will be one that begins from an awareness (or mere hunch) that, within 
human affairs, change is possible at any time.
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